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Abstract 
Within the organisation of all societies, there are basic contradictions which histori- 
cally have given rise to certain undesirable structural features. These same contradictions 
also lie at the root of alienated, ideological forms of consciousness which act as a barrier 
to the solution of these problems. In chapter one, I will deal with each of these issues in 
turn, thus introducing Marx's problematic, i. e. the so-called "riddle of history". 
Chapters two and three contain a discussion of Marx's methodology, which was 
intended to avoid the pitfalls of ideological forms of consciousness and provide a theoret- 
ical framework for coming to terms with the problem. Chapter three in particular pro- 
vides a syntax and a logical explanation for the terms and forms of argument employed in 
the rest of the thesis. 
Marx believes that historical development itself determines the possibility of solv- 
ing the problems referred to. Chapters four and five, therefore, are an analysis of the 
processes which govern the development of social structures, i. e. so-called "Historical 
Materialism". Chapter six is an investigation of the relationship between historical 
change and forms of consciousness. 
This sets the stage for an analysis in chapter seven of the nature of capitalism itself 
and how it gives rise in the consciousness of the working class to a solution, in principle, 
to the problems identified in chapter one. Finally, chapter eight reviews the factors within 
the development of capitalism which might make possible the transition to socialism and 
the implementation of the solution in practice. 
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Preface 
I began writing this thesis in the mid-eighties when politically there was a swing to 
the right. I felt that the problem for socialists was not so much that there were no convinc- 
ing arguments against the new right, their ideas harked back to the nineteenth century and 
the counter-arguments were well rehearsed, but that the left was unable to put forward a 
convincing alternative. What defence there was, was moralistic in character. There was a 
need, therefore, to demonstrate the rational as well as the moral basis of socialist ideas. 
This thesis is intended to be a contribution to that enterprise. 
Other than in Capital, Marx's work exists in the form of notebooks, polemics, pam- 
phlets, historical studies and letters. Only in Capital is there a systematic attempt to 
expand upon a particular dimension of his thought. His epistemology and his theory of 
history, therefore, have to be gleaned from the totality of his work. 
In this thesis I have attempted to answer the question of what socialism means to 
Marx as an answer to a set of problems which arise in the context of his analysis of 
human, historical development, i. e. socialism as the solution to the "riddle of history". 
Thus, I have attempted a rational reconstruction of the viewpoint which I feel con- 
sistently underlies the whole body of his work. This has led me to expand, in places, on 
his analysis in a manner in line with the principles and perspectives which he adopts. 
Irrespective of whether the main proposition of the thesis has been established there 
are a number of technical problems which I have attempted to solve. Hopefully, these 
contributions stand on their own. 
The piece of work which follows was, as previously stated, conceived as an inter- 
vention in the cultural changes, particularly at the level of ideology, going on in the 
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1980s. It was not, therefore, intended primarily as a response to other interpretations of 
Marx's work. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this preface I shall briefly situate my own 
approach in relation to some of the most influential writers on Marxism, and indicate how 
it differs from theirs. 
As an attempt at a rational defence of the Marxist perspective which attempts to 
show its coherence and explanatory power, the thesis is perhaps similar in intention to G. 
A. Cohen's Marx's Theory of History -A defence' The differences between his book and 
my thesis are, however, that he takes a narrower set of propositions to defend, namely, 
those concerned with the base/superstructure model and his method is explicitly that of 
analytic philosophy whereas mine is not. In contrast to Cohen, I don't believe that the 
complex causal explanations which Marx employs are treated adequately by the analytic 
approach. 
1. The analytic approach 
Analytic philosophy requires that concepts should be unambiguously defined and 
should be used consistently. One can immediately see the kind of problems which a work 
like Marx's, which draws upon dialectics, will generate when given this treatment. 2 
Bertell Oilman gives examples of this in his book Alienation. 3 What is one to make, for 
instance, of the assertion that "labour" is "variable capital" and that "capital" is "materi- 
alised labour"? - seemingly an identification of concepts defined in opposition to one 
another. 
Marx's usage is clearly context dependent. Labour is variable capital from the point 
of view of the capitalist who regards it as a cost of production and hence part of the 
I G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: a defence, Clarendon Press, Oxford University 
Press 1978. 
2 For a more extensive critique of Cohen from this perspective see Sean Sayers, "Marxism and 
the Dialectical Method: a critique of G. A. Cohen", Radical Philosophy No. 36,1984. 
3 B. Oilman, Alienation: Marx's conception of man in capitalist society, Cambridge University 
Press, 1971. 
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necessary outlay from which he extracts a surplus, i. e. "capital". From the point of view 
of ownership, however, labour is employed by capital and hence is distinct from it. 
Again, from the point of view of its substance, this capital is only past, accumulated 
labour. Marx's dialectical epistemology would suggest that this context-dependency of 
individual statements is unavoidable. His total account, however, is that of a many-sided 
structure in line with his method. I have given an explanation of the logic of this approach 
in chapter three. 
Context-dependency, however, leads to the violation of the condition of consistent 
usage as well as that of unambiguous definition. Lack of subtlety in handling such state- 
ments can lead to theoretical mistakes, e. g. the attempt to eliminate supposed logical con- 
tradictions in order to render the theory coherent. 
Oilman also suggests that Marx uses his terms with a core meaning and an extended 
meaning. A concept which specifically excludes a certain term from its core meaning by 
being defined in opposition to it, nevertheless, may include that same term within its 
extended meaning. For example, whatever affects politics may be regarded as political. 
This may include economic factors although the political and the economic are differenti- 
ated in terms of their core meanings from each other. In this usage, terms which are 
defined as opposites can include each other in their extensions. This also violates the con- 
dition of unambiguous definition. 
Cohen seeks to avoid most of these pitfalls, he is happy with reciprocal causality 
between base and superstructure. 4 and can handle after a fashion, the simultaneous predi- 
cation of social and physical factors. However, when trying to specify what factors are to 
be included in the base as forces of production, he includes ideas. 5 Now it is true that 
Marx speaks of "mental forces of production"6 but again the context is all important. 
4 c. f. Karl Marx's Theory of History, op. cit. pp 138,145,169. 
5 Karl Marx's Theory of History, op. cit. pp 45-47. 
6 K. Marx, Grundrisse (1857-8), Hannondsworth, 1973 p. 502. 
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Ideas are not by themselves forces of production. Only when put into practice, i. e. materi- 
alised in the collective activity of people, do they become forces of production. To exist, a 
force must be capable of acting. 
All forces of production consist of the intelligent arrangement of matter whether 
they are devices, arrangements of natural forces or the arrangement of human activity in a 
specific fashion. What makes the analytic philosopher miss this point is that the notion of 
a "materialised idea" violates the condition of unambiguous definition. He realises that 
ideas are important factors in material progress so feels they have to be included in the 
base. 
The danger of this, of course, is that firstly, it seems to conflict with the account of 
practical-critical activity. There, ideas appear secondary in so far as they are determined 
by the conditions of material existence both in terms of their content and also in their sta- 
tus as acceptable. If ideas are forces of production, however, it seems that they have the 
primacy accorded to the base. Secondly, any mechanically causal version of the 
base/superstructure model would give support to the "ideas as the motor of history" view- 
point if ideas are included in the base. This would conflict with Marx's view that there is 
no independent history of ideas which determines real history. This is an important point 
of departure for Marx's theory of history. 
Although I believe that the analytic approach is inadequate for the reasons stated, 
my own attempt to clarify the logic involved in dialectical arguments may nevertheless be 
in the spirit of this approach in that it aims at conceptual clarity. 
2. Lukäcs 
My work coincides with the Lukäcsian approach in a number of places. Lukäcs 
regards theory as important because he believes that for a revolution to be successful it 
must be a "conscious" revolution. He believes this to be a necessity because otherwise 
other interpretations of experience might "grip the masses"7 and divert action into 
7 Georg Lukäcs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone, London: Merlin 
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unprofitable activities. His emphasis, therefore, is on showing the practical consequences 
of holding a correct theory. In my thesis, I have emphasised the same point in relation to 
overcoming ideological and alienated views of society which paralyse effective action. 
Indeed, I have introduced chapters two and three, on materialism and dialectics respec- 
tively, using precisely this justification. 
I would also add to the above consideration the point that since the aim of a socialist 
revolution is to develop the capacity to channel beneficially previously misunderstood 
social forces, it must of necessity be a self-comprehending, conscious movement. Other- 
wise, it is likely to slip back into the same kinds of practices as its predecessors. Theory 
thus helps one to understand and clarify the objectives of a socialist revolution. This latter 
is the principal aim of my thesis. 
Correct theory, for Lukäcs, involves the dialectical method. His principal concern is 
that theory should avoid partial, one-sided viewpoints which involve categories regarded 
as applicable for all time. Such viewpoints are characteristic of "reified" class perspec- 
tives which are products of the historical process but are in fact limited and relative to that 
process although they are treated as if they have universal validity. 
To this end, he emphasises dialectical relations, as indeed I do consistently through- 
out the thesis. In particular, however, he stresses the dialectical relation between subject 
and object. This is because from History and Class Consciousness onwards, it plays a 
crucial epistemological role in his theory. 
Lukäcs understands knowledge as a product, the result of an active engagement with 
the world on the part of the subject. He asserts this in opposition to a more traditional 
view which regards knowledge as the result of contemplation of the object. This latter 
view contrasts the subject's impressions with the real object. He believes that this 
inevitably produces the problem that since all the subject has access to is his or her own 
Press, 1971 p. 2. 
V 
impressions, the true nature of the object is rendered unknowable. His own view avoids 
this consequence because in production, i. e. via labour, the subject objectifies him/herself 
and the object is subjectified. Thus the subject knows the nature of the object because it is 
his/her own creation. 
This raises the obvious question of whether this is not idealism. The argument that 
the subject creates a world of material objects historically is not an idealist argument but 
neither is it universally true, since some of the objects of experience are not the result of 
labour. On the other hand, the argument that the subject actively creates knowledge of the 
world of objects may be true but it appears to be idealist. In this respect, the account 
given above8 doesn't take us much further than the problems besetting the traditional 
approach. 
I have addressed the problem of how Marx can retain the notion of the subject- 
relativity of knowledge and yet not produce an idealist (and/or relativist) theory of knowl- 
edge in chapter two of my thesis. I have taken the position that objective knowledge9 
describes the power of an object to affect particular subjects in particular ways. Although 
what is predicated of the object is subject-relative, the power which the predicate 
describes is a real property of the object. The descriptions by different subjects who stand 
in different relationships to the object can be synthesised into a wider theory which can 
account for subject position. '0 This is an application of the dialectical perspective. 
If a materialist account of the subject-relativity of knowledge can be given along the 
lines of the above, then the first argument about the historical production of the objects of 
8 This is Parkinson's understanding of Lukäcs' position, cf. G. H. R. Parkinson, Georg Lukkcs, 
London and Boston, Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1977 p. 44. 
9 Two senses of objectivity are used here. In the first usage, one-sided views are regarded as 
merely subjective, while the complete multi-faceted account is objective by contrast. This is 
Hegel's usage. In the second usage, the independent reality of the object is asserted over and 
against mind. Materialists need to hold both. To merely hold the first but not the second leads to 
an idealist position. 
10 Even at an elementary level of knowledge this kind of synthesis occurs. A table top which is 
described as square can be experienced as a trapezium or a diamond shape from different points of 
observation. 
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the world is not required. 
With respect to relativism, clearly different subjects will adopt different conceptual 
frameworks through which they can identify the features of the world, within the range of 
their experience, which are of relevance in terms of their needs and interests. ' l These par- 
tial perspectives, however, can be synthesised in a wider theory which accounts for their 
one-sidedness in terms of subject position. 
Although this can be done, since theories result from an active engagement with the 
world, Lukäcs has to explain why it will be done, in particular why the working class 
should do it. He also needs to explain why a proletarian perspective is not one-sided if it 
is driven by their particular needs and limited by their experience of the world. In History 
and Class Consciousness he says the following: 
"Only when a historical situation has arisen in which a class must understand 
society if it is to assert itself; only when the fact that a class understands itself 
means that it understands society as a whole ... will the unity of theory and 
practice, the precondition of the revolutionary function of theory, become pos- 
sible. 
Such a situation has in fact arisen with the entry of the working class into 
history. "12 
In chapter six of my thesis I examine the conditions which make this the case. I try 
firstly, to show why any class whose mode of existence depends upon exploitation of 
another class will not be able to form an accurate theory of the basis of power in the soci- 
ety. I then show why these problems do not affect the proletariat and why this class must 
attempt to understand accurately both itself and the source of its subordination. I then 
show how historical circumstances make this possible. I discuss the factors which are 
II This is the notion of an active engagement with the world as productive of knowledge. 
12 History and Class Consciousness, op. cit. pp 2-3. 
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most likely to promote a veridical understanding of the society and how these are more 
prominent in capitalism than any previous system. Finally, I show how, because capital- 
ism presents itself as the rule of property in general and as the depersonalised rule of a 
system of transmutable property, the problem of subordination poses itself to the prole- 
tariat in a fundamental way, a problem it cannot ignore. 
In chapter seven, I chart the principal forms of consciousness of the capitalist era 
and show how they are part of a single problematic. I then show how and why working 
class consciousness prefigures a solution to the "riddle of history". 
This approach is essentially Lukäcsian but some of the detailed work is different 
though complementary. 13 This brings me to the issue of the use of concepts by Lukäcs 
and myself which Althusser criticises as being part of a "humanist" problematic, i. e. 
where my work stands in relation to Marxist humanism. 
3. Althusser 
The thesis touches on the concerns of Louis Althusser in certain areas, namely, the 
nature of ideology and its relationship to science, the question of humanism in Marx's 
work and the model of historical change employed by both. 
The very first statement of the thesis, the quote from the Economic and Philosophi- 
cal Manuscripts, poses a problem in terms of Althusser's viewpoint because he considers 
them the work of the "young Marx" which address a different "problematic" to the later 
works. Only the later works are regarded as "scientific" by Althusser. Also, my subse- 
quent elaboration of the opening statement's content in terms of the later works, in partic- 
ular, The German Ideology which is a "work of the break" seems to compound the prob- 
lem by bridging the problematics. 
13 My treatment of the epistemology is more precisely related to classical problems and I hope 
has contributed to the clarification of issues which are still contested, thus forming the basis of a 
sounder defence of Marx's position. 
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My justification for doing this, however, stems from a view expressed by Marx him- 
self: he says, 
"It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism 
and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be antinomies. The resolution 
of theoretical contradictions is possible only through the practical energy of 
man. This resolution is ... a real task of life, a task which philosophy was 
unable to accomplish because it saw there a purely theoretical problem. "14 
If the "riddle of history" is posed in terms of mutually exclusive abstract oppositions, that 
is because the kind of social object the oppositions are abstracted from always contains 
them as irreconcilable antitheses. In a different kind of social object, e. g. the society sug- 
gested by communism, the concepts may express complementary aspects of a single 
practice or thing. 
To grasp the nature of the problem and its solution, therefore, both the problem and 
the solution need to be considered in relation to their social context, i. e. the problem 
should be posed in terms of the transformation of the social structure. This is the kind of 
analysis associated with Marx's later works and also reflects my own procedure. 
Althusser does not disagree with this approach, he says: 
Note that my purpose is not to dispute the reality that the concept of " socialist 
humanism" is supposed to designate but to define the theoretical value of the 
concept. "15 
By this he means that statements such as the antitheses cited indicate a real problem but 
they are not scientific, rather they are ideological in form. If this is his objection to 
Marx's early works, then it is obvious that a different problematic is not the same thing as 
a different problem. What is at issue is the form in which the problem is posed and 
14 K. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Progress Publishers, Moscow 
1977 pp 103,104. 
15 L. Althusser, For Marx, Verso, 1979 p. 223. 
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answered and the political consequences that follow from this. 
What Althusser is worried about can be seen from the following passage: 
"There can be no doubt that communists are correct in opposing the economic, 
social, political and cultural reality of socialism to the "inhumanity" of Imperi- 
alism in general; ... But 
it might be equally dangerous to use an ideological 
concept like humanism, with neither discrimination nor reserve, ... when 
it is 
inevitably charged with associations from the ideological unconsciousness and 
only too easily blends into themes of petit-bourgeois inspiration. "16 
In other words, it is the substitution of a pre-scientific framework of analysis for Marx's 
scientific analysis which poses the threat, not the clarification of ideological statements in 
terms of a scientific analysis. 
When Althusser says that humanism is "ideological" it is important to see what he 
means by this claim in order to assess his criticism of the use of ideological explanations. 
Of ideology in relation to science, he says: 
When I say that the concept of humanism is an ideological concept, I mean that 
while it really does designate a set of existing relations, unlike a scientific con- 
cept, it does not provide us with a means of knowing them. In a particular (ide- 
ological) mode, it designates some existents, but it does not give us their 
essences. " I7 
and also, 
"We can say that ideology, as a system of representations, is distinguished from 
science in that in it, the practico-social function is more important than the the- 
oretical function. "18 
16 For Marx, op. cit. p. 239. 
17 Ibid. p. 223. 
18 Ibid. p. 231. 
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The picture of ideology thus given is of a set of imperatives (moral or political etc. ) 
based upon an ontology or picture of reality which is inadequate to explain their founda- 
tion. For example, "the rights of man", "human freedom", "the dignity of the individual" 
are ethical ideals which are conceptualised in terms of the abstraction "man", not in terms 
of the conditions of actual people located in historically evolving societies. To address the 
basis of ethics in practice, i. e. scientifically, a new set of categories are required (social 
class, mode of production etc. ). 
This description of ideology differs from the one I attributed to Marx in the thesis. 
The latter is derived from Hegel's concept of one-sidedness. Ideology is "partial" in two 
senses. It is a partial perspective in contrast to a complex multi-faceted whole, and it is 
partial in that its one-sidedness serves the interest of a particular group. 
Althusser's stress on the pragmatic factor of ideology to the neglect of its logical 
structure leads, I believe, to the rehabilitation of ideology in his work and licences posi- 
tions I would disagree with. He says, for instance, 
"it is clear that ideology (as a system of mass representations) is indispensable 
in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and equipped to respond to 
the demands of their conditions of existence. "19 
and 
"I am not going to steer clear of the crucial question: historical materialism 
cannot conceive that even a communist society could ever do without ideology, 
be it ethics or world outlook. "20 
He substantiates this latter point by reference to the fact that the base-superstructure 
model which is supposed to have general applicability, has ideology as a superstructural 
element. Marx used the term in different senses, however, and the forms of consciousness 
19 Ibid. p. 235. 
20 Ibid. p. 232. 
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of communist society may not have been intended to be regarded as ideological in a pejo- 
rative sense. 
Where does Aithusser's view leave the consciousness of the working class? It would 
seem led by ideology constructed by an intellectual elite who alone have access to the sci- 
entific outlook. This view legitimates a practice which runs the risk of demagogy. In my 
opinion, the best defence against demagogy is that the working class should have an 
objective view of their circumstances and the possibilities for the realisation of their own 
goals, i. e. a "scientific" view of their situation. This would prevent them from being 
duped into a new form of subordination. I believe that the confidence that the working 
class, through debate and rational appraisal of their circumstances, could develop such a 
consciousness was the view held by Marx and Engels. 
To return to the question of humanism, I have used the concept of "alienation" 
which Althusser associates with a humanist problematic, in a fairly central way in my 
thesis. He criticises the "young Lukäcs" for using it in the following terms: 
"... I am not using "class humanism" in the sense adopted in Marx's early 
works, where the proletariat in its "alienation" represents the human essence 
itself whose "realisation" is to be assured by the revolution; this "religious" 
concept of the proletariat (the "universal class", since it is the "loss of man" in 
"revolt against its own loss") was re-adopted by the young Lukäcs in his 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. 21 
Whatever the validity of this criticism, in Althusser's own viewpoint, the meaning of a 
concept can only be understood in terms of its place within a problematic. It is not neces- 
sarily the case, therefore, that because I use the term "alienation", I am committed to the 
problematic which he indicates. I use the term to designate the phenomenon whereby, in 
modes of production based upon antagonistic social relations, institutionalised practices 
21 Ibid. pp 221,222 fn. Given Lukäcs's emphasis on relating consciousness position within a historically changing social structure, this criticism of his views as ideological may not be valid. 
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become a constraint upon every individual and seemingly become an alien power subject 
to their own laws. A corollary of this is indeed a loss of power by the individual in pro- 
portion to the power gained by the system. A prime example of this phenomenon are so- 
called "market forces". 
Alienation, in the above, is contextualised within the framework of the concepts of 
"antagonistic social relations", "mode of production" etc. These are "scientific" concepts 
according to Althusser. The phenomenon described has no other name but "alienation" 
within the literature and has not been replaced by another, scientific concept. There is no 
reason, therefore, not to use it. 22 
The central point, however, is the question of whether to write from the point of 
view of humanity is always ideological. Whilst it is true that men make history collec- 
tively, and also their behaviour is socially conditioned, hence in a sense, as Althusser 
says, society is the subject in Marx's work, at the highest levels of generality, it would 
seem that the use of concepts such as "human need" or "need satisfying activity" is 
unavoidable. 
The issue turns upon what kind of thing the generalities signify. If they imply the 
similarity of experience for all individuals to the exclusion of the diversity and develop- 
mental character of human life, then they are abstract universals and ideological. 23 In 
Hegelian terms, a concept which does not recognise its own internal complexity is an 
abstract universal. It is this latter charge which humanism stands accused of in 
Althusser's work. But if on the other hand, they designate a complex historically evolving 
process, then they are concrete universals and are not ideological if they represent some- 
thing real. 
22 It is certainly central to Engels' understanding of the task of theory, namely to grasp scientif- 
ically the nature of social relations in order that they cease to be an alien power, just as nature 
ceased to be an alien power after the advent of the natural sciences. 
23 If they indicate a set of behaviour patterns current at a certain time and social location but 
falsely generalised to all time and all locations, they are ideological in the sense of being one- 
sided, as well as implying the fixed character of human nature per se. 
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"Human needs", for instance, are understood by Marx as a diverse set of require- 
ments which develop historically within the context of an evolving social system. They 
also differ between persons and between social groups. Communism is a form of social 
arrangement whereby need-satisfying activity and personal self-development can be pur- 
sued by all members of the society within the limits of its material resources with the sup- 
port of the community as a whole, rather than by some members benefiting at the expense 
of the rest. 
In so far as communism has transcended one-sided interests it functions for the ben- 
efit of "humanity". The latter, however, is understood as a concrete universal. This 
"humanism" serves the complexity of human need and is made possible by certain spe- 
cific social arrangements. Without some concept of this generality it is difficult to com- 
prehend the purpose which communism/humanism serves. 
Also, without a general concept of "human" need-satisfying activity, the animus 
which produces the transition between modes of production can only be accounted for in 
terms of an "alien" process, a mechanical transition between social arrangements rather 
than one driven by human requirements. It appears that these high level general concepts 
both cannot be dispensed with and are not necessarily ideological. 24 
The question of transitions brings us to Althusser's theory of history. Althusser uses 
concepts taken from Freud to develop Marx's theory of historical change: "condensation", 
"displacement" and "overdetermination". "Condensation" means, for Althusser, the way 
that different social antagonisms coalesce in a revolutionary situation into a conflict along 
a single dimension. 25 Displacement means the circumstance where the focus of social 
discontent can be transferred onto a different object than the one which engendered it. 26 
24 In Althusser's defence, I believe that the prejudice in bourgeois circles against his work in 
the last decade or so indicates the importance of his general approach in the present era. I believe 
that there has been a regression to pre-Marxist pre-scientific concepts in social theory and in gen- 
eral political consciousness. 
25 E. g. how workers and peasants, with different forms of oppression fought together against 
the Tsar and again against the "White Army". 
26 e. g. when internal unrest is displaced onto an external enemy in a war. 
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His complementary concepts "overdetermination" and "structure in dominance" are 
used to account for political questions which arise from the uneven development of the 
productive forces. Mao, in his paper "On Contradiction", 27 identifies many distinct levels 
of social antagonism (contradictions) and asks the question as to which is the dominant 
one around which the others coalesce. Similarly, he asks which of the levels of activity: 
economic, political, ideological, taken from the base-superstructure model should be 
principally engaged in at a particular time, i. e. which one is dominant. 
From these examples it becomes obvious that Althusser is not addressing the same 
questions as Marx. He is using these concepts to address tactical issues which arose in the 
context of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. The concept of "structure in dominance" 
is intended to supply the answers to these questions. At this point, however, it overlaps 
with the base-superstructure model employed by Marx and appears as a re-interpretation 
of it. 
Engels explains the relations between base and superstructure by saying that the 
superstructure "reacts back" on the base but the base determines the superstructure "in the 
last instance". 28 Althusser interprets this to mean that superstructural elements are not 
epiphenomena, they produce effects in their own right but the action of each of the levels 
is modified by its dependence on the other levels. In Althusser's terms, each level is 
"overdetermined" in its action by the rest of the structure. This is also what he means by 
"structure in dominance". 29 The economic sphere, however, has primacy in the sense that 
it determines which is the dominant level of contradiction at any time. 
For instance, Althusser says, in a revolution, the political sphere is dominant. This is 
determined by the crisis in the economy which makes the future of the society rest upon 
27 Mao, Tse-Tung, Selected Works, International Publishers, New York 1954, Vol. 11(1937-38) 
pp 13-52. 
28 F. Engels, "Letter to J. Bloch", 21 Sept 1890, in A Handbook of Socialist Thought, ed. Irving 
Howe, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London 1972 p. 153. 
29 "Structure in dominance" is also intended to imply that because of uneven development, one 
contradiction will always dominate the structure as a whole. 
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the outcome of the political struggle. Thus, when Engels refers to mutual causal relations 
between base and superstructure but "determination in the last instance" by the base, 
Althusser suggests that he was referring to the way the sphere of the economic continu- 
ously determines the relations of dominance between the levels, not some point in time 
when the economy determines the future of the society alone. This is what he means by 
the statement "the lonely hour of the last instance never comes. "30 
What this ignores, however, is the fact that what Marx was trying to stress by using 
the base-superstructure model is the "correspondence" between base and superstructure 
and that when this correspondence is broken by different rates of development, it is the 
superstructure which is forced to adjust. Thus, in a sense there is a time when the eco- 
nomic sphere asserts its dominance, i. e. in the period of adjustment. Nevertheless, the 
argument that the superstructure is semi-autonomous and exercises real causal relations 
over the base, i. e. that the base is always modified in its action by the superstructure is not 
disputed. I have given my own account of this semi-autonomy in chapter five. 
Determination in the last instance, however, I have explained in terms of the fact that 
the base is the "raison d'etre" of the superstructure and hence, when the base changes its 
form, then much of the legitimation for the superstructural elements is lost. Whatever 
"self-perpetuating" factors have been built up by these spheres will then prove inadequate 
to prevent the imperatives of change from overcoming them. This explanation is in line 
with Marx's original use of the theory. 
It is not simply the case, therefore, that the primacy of the base consists in its power 
to select which of the levels of struggle dominate at any particular time, or which antago- 
nisms will prove the galvanising factor in a revolution, or even which country will prove 
the "weakest link" in Lenin's terms. Whilst it may do all these things and Althusser's the- 
ory may extend the explanatory power of the base-superstructure model, the "primacy of 
30 c. f. For Marx, op. cit. p. 113. 
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the base" originally explained which key elements produce the transformation of one 
social structure into another. Althusser appears to neglect this central point. 
4. Summary 
To summarise, my work would suggest that it is necessary to retain the notions of 
human need and its satisfaction to make sense of the Marxian enterprise. However, as 
Althusser says, to do justice to Marx this should be explained in terms of a theory of his- 
tory in order to put it on a scientific footing. I disagree with Althusser, however, in his 
treatment of ideology and hence also, of the science/ideology distinction. 
My understanding of Marx stresses the Hegelian inheritance and many of the posi- 
tions I take are similar to Lukäcs. In many ways my work is a contribution to the 
Lukäcsian enterprise but my account of the epistemology is, I believe, more adequate and 
less prone to idealist interpretation. 
Finally, the stress on dialectics makes my work incompatible with the analytic 
approach as exemplified by G. A. Cohen but I have approached the topic with the same 




The Riddle of History 
"Communism is the riddle of history solved and knows itself to be this solu- 
tion. " - [Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844] 
1 
In this thesis I will attempt to outline what I believe to be the perspective which 
prompted Marx to write the sentence above. It will involve the analysis of Marx's 
dialectical-materialist conceptual framework and the reasons why Marx adopts this per- 
spective. I will show how this provides the tool for the analysis of historical development 
and hence conditions his theory of history. Then I will go on to show the way in which 
the theory of history informs his analysis of the capitalist economy and the transition to 
socialism, and hence why, Marx believes, there is the possibility of a solution to the so 
called "riddle of history". 
The first step in this exposition however, involves trying to grasp what Marx might 
mean by "the riddle of history" which requires a solution. The sentence which is quoted 
in the opening paragraph is the summary and conclusion of a set of statements which pre- 
cede it and which outline the problems2 that communism is alleged to solve. They state :- 
"This communism, as fully developed naturalism equals humanism, and as 
fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of 
the conflict between man and nature and between man and man - the true reso- 
lution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and 
self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and 
1 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Progress publishers, Moscow 1977 pg 97. From 
henceforth referred to as "E. P. M. ". 
2 Problems in the sense of being the source of human suffering; of being problematic to the 
realisation of human goals. The "riddle of history" is the question of how to overcome them. 
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the species. "3 
Stated in this way, these oppositions, however, are a-historical abstractions. To under- 
stand what a resolution of them might mean in social and historical terms we need to 
examine how Marx conceptualises their embodiment within historically developing 
societies and social structures. The material I have used to illustrate this perspective is 
mostly drawn from The German Ideology. 
One of the problems which will be described in the course of this exposition is the 
emergence of "ideological" forms of consciousness which obstruct the attempts of human 
beings to form a correct understanding of their situation and hence their capacity to alter 
it for the better. Marx's own method is an attempt to correct this problem and so the 
exposition provides both an explanation and a justification for his adoption of this 
method. 
However, since the method is used to develop the theory of ideology and the theory 
of ideology is used to at least partially justify the method, then there is a problem of cir- 
cularity in the account. This problem will be dealt with in chapter 2. In the meantime, 
since a circle must broken into at some point, I will start where Marx himself starts, with 
the exposition of the theory rather than its justification. 
1. The fundamental problem of society 
Marx sees "man" as a natural being with appetites and needs for objects existing 
outside of himself. 4 He satisfies those needs however, within a social group i. e. via col- 
lective activity. In the simplest form of society, social cooperation coincided with indivi- 
dual self-interest. Social man cooperated with others to fulfill his individual needs. Self- 
interest, however, is a potentially divisive motivation and is capable of destroying 
3 op. cit. E. P. M. pg 97 
4 cf. CH3 sections 3.2 - 3.3.1 
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cooperation. The need to cooperate and individual need, therefore, are aspects of human 
motivation that have the potential to come into conflict with each other. In the simplest 
societies, i. e. ones with little or no specialisation of economic functions, (division of 
labour), no particular sectional interest is powerful enough to impose its will upon the 
whole group. This is because the nature of this mode of production gives rise to more or 
less equal power within the social structure. The only social differences which occur here 
are at the individual level and any individual no matter how gifted or powerful will 
always be weaker when outnumbered by the rest of the group. 5 This is the stage of 
development of the mode of production which Marx refers to as primitive communism. 
The main institutional characteristics of society as we know them emerge with the 
extension of the division of labour beyond the family. This, according to Marx, gives rise 
to the social phenomena of private property, class rule, artificial scarcity, the state, and 
alienated consciousness. Each emerges as a result of the conflict between sectional com- 
petition and co-operation under conditions of an advanced division of labour. 
In various places in The German Ideology Marx writes about the division of labour 
as if it automatically implies conflict of interest between the different functional groups. 
On page 43, Marx says, 
"The division of labour inside a nation, leads to the separation of industrial and 
commercial from agricultural labour, and hence to the separation of town from 
country and to the conflict of their interests. "6 
Again, when discussing why ideology comes into contradiction with the forces and rela- 
tions of production, Marx says, 
5 Indeed it is a feature of hunter-gatherer societies today that equality is enforced and anyone 
who possesses anything special will be obliged to share it with the group. It is considered normally 
reprehensible in these societies not to do so and such behaviour would invite reprisal cf. Politics 
and History in Band Societies, Leacock and Lee, Cambridge University Press 1982, pp 7,8. 
6 The German Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1970 pg 52. 
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".... because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the very fact that 
intellectual and material activity, enjoyment and labour, production and con- 
sumption - devolve upon different individuals, and that the only possibility of 
their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the divi- 
sion of labour. " 7 
The social mechanism which causes separation to produce conflict requires a more 
detailed explanation. The theoretical premiss on which Marx proceeds I believe to be as 
follows :- Productive relations are necessarily co-operative in character. This implies that 
each co-operating partner will be dependent upon others. Division of labour separates the 
activities of people such that functional groups stand in this relation of dependence to 
each other. Where each functional group pursues its own collective self-interest, each 
group will try to extract the maximum in terms of resources and effort from the group or 
groups upon which it depends in order to enhance its own way of life. Thus each group 
will attempt to subordinate the others and organise the society in a manner favourable to 
its own aspirations. 
Whereas in primitive communism an individual pursuing self-interest to the detri- 
ment of others in the group would be outnumbered, here, the power relation is not so 
unequal. Where a section of society stands opposed to other sections, the odds against it 
are thus reduced and if its role in the society is perceived as the most crucial to the 
community's well-being, may well be able to impose exploitative relations upon the rest 
of society. 
It is the pursuit of self-interest within co-operative relations which produces condi- 
tions where functional separation implies conflict of interests. The concept of 
7 Ibid. pg 52 
Ideology, in so far as it represents some aspect of society as the independent cause of social 
behaviour, will be at odds with any forces and relations of production other than those which it is 
in fact inseparably related to and therefore at odds with social change. 
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exploitation comprises these two aspects, the interdependence of co-operative relations 
(which gives point to one party subordinating another) and the pursuit of self-interest 
(which leads one party to suppress the interests of another). In Marx's subsequent dis- 
cussion of the consequences of division of labour, we see that this situation is the origin 
of the formation of and conflict between classes, the privatisation of property, the emer- 
gence of the state and of alienated consciousness i. e. the major features of all societies 
hitherto excepting primitive communism. These features embody the contradictions 
referred to in the quotation, the difficulty of overcoming which is referred to as the "rid- 
dle of history". 
1.1. Social classes 
Although functional groups act collectively and therefore individual members 
depend upon each other, selfishness within the group only promotes mutual suspicion and 
hence intra-group discipline (each demands that the other "pulls his weight"). Between 
groups however a struggle ensues until a group or groups, aided by their position in the 
division of labour, become dominant i. e. become a ruling class. Marx describes the pro- 
cess of class formation thus, (with respect to the bourgeoisie) 
"The extension of trade, the establishment of communications, led the separate 
towns to get to know other towns, which asserted the same interest in the 
struggle with the same antagonist. Out of the many corporations of burghers 
there arose only gradually the burgher class. "8 
and also 
"The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a 
common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with 
each other as competitors. On the other hand, the class in its turn achieves an 
8 op. cit. The German Ideology pg 82. 
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independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their 
conditions of existence predestined, and have their position in life and their 
personal development assigned to them by their class, become subsumed under 
it. ... We have already 
indicated several times how this subsuming of individu- 
als under a class brings with it their subjection to all kinds of ideas etc. " 9 
Thus class formation is predicated upon conflict of interest between different functional 
groups within the division of labour. Conflict of interest as we have seen is the result of 
the mutual pursuit of self-interest within the division of labour. 
Control of the means of production is clearly a crucial factor in maintaining class 
domination. It confers power to extract a surplus product which can then be used to con- 
trol and direct labour. This brings us to the issue of private property. 
1.2. Private property 
Privatisation of property is the struggle to retain control of resources and thus 
(de)prive others of their use. This situation occurs as a result of the pursuit of self-interest 
within the division of labour. Marx says 
"With the division of labour, in which all these contradictions are implicit, and 
which in turn is based on the natural division of labour within the family and 
the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another, is 
given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, 
both quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property: 
the first form of which lies in the family, where wife and children are slaves of 
the husband. " 10 
9 Idem. 
10 Ibid. pg 52. 
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we see that for Marx labour power is the basic resource and hence the struggle for control 
of labour power is the essence of the privatisation of property. He goes on to say of pro- 
perty 
".... even at this early stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern 
economists who call it the power of disposing of the labour power of others. "11 
Control of physical objects is for Marx merely control of labour power in the past tense. 
For him, competition for hegemony over labour power lies at the heart of any system 
based upon the private ownership of property. 12 
1.3. The state 
The social relations in the type of society described are simultaneously relations of 
conflict and co-operation (because of exploitation). These aspects are opposed in inten- 
tion. Hence, there is a danger that the conflict will destroy the co-operation leaving either 
a "Hobbesian" war of all against all or complete atomisation. Either way the implication 
is social breakdown. In order to maintain the co-operation the the more extreme actions 
arising from the conflict of interest have to be suppressed. This gives rise to the institu- 
tions of the state. The state represents itself as the executor of the "general interest" and 
the communal life of the society appears to be acted out at this level. 13 In fact if there is 
genuine communal consensus there would be no need for a separate institution to enforce 
this interest against the intentions of individual members of the society. 
The state, however, isn't simply a neutral institution which ensures a necessary 
minimum of co-operation within a conflict riven society. The state must be organised and 
maintained and in a class divided society and only a ruling class has both the power and 
interest in organising such an institution. 
II Ibid. pp 52,53. 
12 Since property has to be produced and reproduced. 
13 op. cit. The German Ideology pg 53 last paragraph. 
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The ruling class wishes to preserve a division of labour from which it benefits to a 
greater extent than others, hence the state at any particular time operates to ensure a 
minimum of co-operation within the existing division of labour. This latter clause 
expresses the particular interest of the ruling class. All struggles between classes there- 
fore are accompanied by struggles to determine the form or even the existence of the 
state because of its role in protecting the existing division of labour. Marx says 
"It follows from this that all struggles within the state, the struggle between 
democracy, aristocracy, the struggle for the franchise etc., etc., are merely the 
illusory forms in which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out 
among one another. .-" 
14 
The state does, as an institution, reflect a genuine interest in preserving co-operation 
for economic purposes common to the members of a society. But because of the "con- 
tradiction" between the need to co-operate and the conflicts of interest within the society, 
the state, the agency which promotes this interest is set up in opposition to the free action 
of the members of society as if it were another individual with another particular 
interest. 15 Thus society appears to be something other than its members - an alien being 
which constrains individual liberty. This is an example of the more general phenomenon 
inherent in the situation under discussion, namely alienation. 
1.4. Alienation 
Thus we see that the conflict between the individual and society also has its roots in 
the situation of the pursuit of self-interest within co-operation. The reification of the col- 
lective activity of the members of a society into an alien, super-social and repressive 
14 Ibid. pg 53. 
Marx uses the word illusory in the same sense in which he refers to ideas as imaginary premisses 
i. e. they are expressions of something other than themselves and not, as they appear to be, the 
thing itself. 
15 Ibid. pg 53 last paragraph. 
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force is a pervasive phenomenon in societies founded upon antagonistic social relations. 
The logic of such a situation is as follows: - If each individual makes demands upon 
the other members of society then paradoxically each individual will experience the rest 
of society making demands upon him. The result of this is that he will feel that his 
behaviour is the product of external coercion, the very opposite of his intention to assert 
his own interests at the expense of the rest. 
For instance, because each individual demands from others as much work as possi- 
ble for minimum returns, each individual also feels forced to labour, is forced to labour, 
and is in constant danger of not being able to survive. This state of affairs in capitalist 
society is reified as the "laws of the market". In so far as it is not thought to be the result 
of any individual human will, it is identified with a super-human will, the action of com- 
modities as they exchange in the market according to their own immutable laws. The 
imperatives of the economic system appear to control peoples lives. Marx says, 
"The social power, i. e. the multiplied productive force, which arises through 
the co-operation of individuals appears to these individuals, since the co- 
operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, 16 not as their own 
united power, but as an alien force existing outside of them the origin and goal 
of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the con- 
trary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the 
will and action of man nay even being the prime governor of these. " 17 
Later he says, 
"Or how does it happen that trade, which is after all nothing more than the 
exchange of products of various individuals and countries, rules the world 
16 The distinction between volition and nature is that between free will and determinism. In the 
context of division of labour which is a human activity, nature refers to determination by actions 
not consciously directed to the end achieved. 
17 op. cit. The German Ideology pg 54. 
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through supply and demand -a relation which as an English economist says, 
hovers over the whole earth like the fate of the ancients, and with an invisible 
hand allots fortune and misfortune to men, sets up empires and overthrows 
empires, causes nations to rise and disappear....,, 18 
Similarly, the hostility which the individual expresses and exercises towards those 
who endanger the relations which serve his interests, helps to create a collective hostility 
towards each individual should he endanger the existing social relations, the institutional 
expression of which is the state. 
Again, the states of affairs which each individual wishes to see manifested or prohi- 
bited take collective expression as a set of societal norms or ethics binding upon every- 
one and seemingly originating from no-one in particular, simply a large alien "ought". 
All these situations exhibit the same pattern and arise from the same cause, the pursuit of 
egoism or self-interest within the relations of interdependence which constitute division 
of labour. Each class also contains alienated relations between the individual and the 
group. 
Competition within the working class expresses itself as "the work ethic", in the 
capitalist class as "market forces" and between the classes as "the trade cycle". 
1.5. Scarcity 
Finally, There is the question of scarcity. Harvey defines economics as follows 
"Scarcity forces us to economise. We weigh up the various alternatives and 
select that particular assortment of goods which yields the highest return from 
our limited resources ..... Economics is the study of how men allocate their lim- 
ited resources to provide for their wants. " 19 
18 Idem. 
19 Modern Economics, J. Harvey, Macmillan 1969 pg 24. 
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The problem of scarcity which forces this situation upon us he describes as follows: - 
"This then is the economic problem - unlimited wants, very limited means. " 20 
What this viewpoint conceals is that there is more than one type of scarcity involved in 
the discussion. Harvey, in the examples which he gives, suggests that people do not have 
enough money to buy everything they desire, this is a conflation of two issues, whether 
the range of human needs can be satisfied and whether society could provide enough of 
each particular good it produces to satisfy desire for that good. Money is a means of 
rationing consumption and no rationing is required for goods produced in abundance. 
Marx might well have agreed that human desires run ahead of the means required 
for their satisfaction in the short term. This after all is what gives human society its 
dynamic character. He could well have conceded that there may be a greater number of 
desires than can be satisfied at any one time by the whole society. None of this however 
addresses the problem of the scarcity of particular goods which are available in the 
society already. Why for instance are food and shelter scarce in large areas of the world 
including so called first world countries? Scarcity of particular goods is not an inevitable 
human problem as Harvey seems to imply. The Sumerian civilisation of 6000 b. c. pro- 
duced food surpluses and traded them to command the labour of wood and stone cutters 
of other areas to provide the raw materials for their temples. Yet in the societies with the 
greatest capacity to produce that the world has seen, people go short of these things. 
Scarcity of this kind is the result of unequal distribution of the power to consume and to 
determine what is produced, which in turn is the result of egoism within the division of 
labour. 
What is more, scarcity isn't only the result of the attempt to control the production 
of goods for one's own benefit in co-operative enterprises, it is also the principle means 
of exercising that control. Anyone who can supply a commodity which is scarce can 
20 Ibid. pg 2 1. 
12 
command the labour of others and hence social power. If scarcity were to disappear, class 
rule would be thereby undermined. Scarcity is, therefore, socially necessary to the 
maintenance of class divided societies. 
This situation is rationalised in our own society in the idea that people need to be 
forced to work by scarcity. Instead of regarding work as a means of overcoming scarcity, 
scarcity is seen as a means of producing work as if work had no rational justification of 
its own, thus obscuring scarcity's role in class domination. 
Scarcity is both a product of conflictual/co-operative societies and also serves to 
produce them. In principle there is no reason why all goods actually produced should not 
be produced in quantities in excess of need. 
Scarcity, Alienation, the repressive state and class antagonisms are all limitations 
imposed upon the possibilities of human self-fulfillment by humanity's own institutional- 
ised practices (which is a general definition of the "riddle of history"). We can now turn 
to the question of the role of consciousness in bringing about a solution to these prob- 
lems, and hence to the significance of the materialist method. 
2. The nature of consciousness 
In the section of the book where Marx analyses the material basis of human his- 
tory'21 he points out that first and foremost in order to survive human beings must pro- 
cure their means of existence, i. e. they must enter into a relationship with nature. 
Secondly, since they do this collectively, they must enter into co-operative relations with 
each other. Thirdly, the satisfaction of needs by the social group leads to the emergence 
of new needs, thus making this situation dynamic in character, and fourthly, to perpetuate 
this social arrangement, a new generation of people must be produced, nurtured and 
presumably socialised. These then are the basic material prerequisites of the history of 
21 op. cit. The German Ideology pg 48. 
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human society as we understand it. He then turns to the issue of consciousness and thus 
to the relationship of ideas to material circumstances. 
Immediately he begins to talk about language. 
"Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that 
exists also for other men, and for that reason also for me personally as well;,, 22 
(echoes of Wittgenstein's private language argument, but also Marx's views on 
objectification). He goes on, 
"Language like consciousness only arises from the need, the necessity of inter- 
course with other men. ', 23 
The conclusion however is 
"Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and 
remains so as long as men exist at all. "24 
This seems to me to be quite a cogent argument. If for instance I feel love towards some- 
one, I would simply experience it, but if I desired to tell her that I love her, I would have 
to render my emotion in conceptual form. Consciousness in conceptual form does seem 
closely related to language and therefore social in character. 
It follows that if the purpose of consciousness is to make communication possible 
and hence to mediate the relations between people in their social life, and since their 
social lives contain the co-operative relations formed to facilitate their relationship to 
nature, then it helps to mediate the relationship to nature as well. The contents of cons- 
ciousness therefore are representations of events in both these realms first and foremost. 
This is what allowed Marx to say in another section, 




"The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. "25 
2.1. Ideology 
He then goes on to give an account of ideology of which the various types of ideal- 
ism are examples. He roots ideology in division of labour. 
"Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division 
of material and mental labour appears. (The first form of ideologists, priests, is 
concurrent. ) From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself 
that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really 
represents something without representing something real; from now on cons- 
ciousness is in a position to emancipate itself and the world and to proceed to 
the formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy, ethics etc. " 26 
What intellectual production as a specialisation makes possible is that not only the intel- 
lectual products, but also the raw materials of production are ideas. It is easy then for 
such a producer to conceive of the process as moving solely within the realm of ideas. It 
appears to him that ideas evolve from other ideas due either to an immanent logic, each 
system solving the theoretical problems engendered by the previous system, or via the 
intervention of the intellectual, i. e. via "mental" labour. Nowhere, however, is it dis- 
cerned that the material circumstances of life play a part in this process. 
Furthermore, since ideas play a causal role in human activity, it becomes possible to 
view this "autonomous realm" as the driving force of history and social change. This 
viewpoint, however, stresses only one aspect of the part which production of ideas plays 
25 Ibid. pg 47 
26 Ibid. pg 51 
15 
in practical-critical activity. The actual causal connections are more complex and include 
how ideas are conditioned by historical processes. The idealist perspective cited above, 
therefore, is partial and "one-sided". 
Also, since concepts are the medium via which people represent to each other facts 
about the material world, it becomes possible to represent the products of this thought 
process as the world itself A medium acts as a transmitter of the effect of something 
other than itself, it acts as its representative, when this is forgotten the medium can 
assume the causal power of that which it only represents, as in the "motor of history" 
case, or it may appear that objects only exist in the form of their representation, as in the 
"world as Idea" case. 
Ideology and idealism are synonymous for Marx. Not only is idealism a form of 
ideology (because it is "one-sided"), all ideological, one-sided views are regarded as 
idealism, as we shall see in the section entitled "Materialism as Idealism". 
Whilst these perspectives are given substance by selective and one-sided viewpoints 
which the idealist/ideologist can credibly maintain from his specialised position in the 
division of labour, this is not to suggest that his reason for adopting them is mere short- 
sightedness. 
Ideology is a one-sided, partial account of things, usually stressing certain causal 
relations whilst ignoring others. "Partiality" like the concept "bias", which literally means 
one-sided, has both a logical and a socially pejorative sense. These meanings are dis- 
tinguished only by the implication that "interest" might or might not be served by the 
selectivity of viewpoint. The combination of "class interest" and one-sidedness produces 
ideology in the pejorative sense. 
The notion of an autonomous sphere of action which determines all other social 
phenomena confers on this sphere "God-like" powers. It is an uncaused cause, a "first 
mover". The parallel with religious thought is not mere coincidence as we shall see later. 
The conceptual error contained in ideological production of this kind is primarily of 
16 
inverting expressive and causal relations between the ideal product and the material 
world. Thus Marx can say 
"If in all ideology men and their productions appear upside-down as in a cam- 
era obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life pro- 
cess as the inversion of the object on the retina does from their physical life 
process.,, 27 
The social position of the ideologist intellectual, however, does not totally account 
for how ideology is produced and propagated. Theorists receive their concepts second- 
hand from practitioners of one kind or another. When they attempt to work out where the 
ideas came from and what their role in society is, they produce ideology - ethics, political 
theory, theology and philosophy etc. However, the misinterpretation is not always 
entirely due to the perspective of the theorist. The concepts which form the raw material 
of their subject may already be ideological in character. 
Political economy for instance takes as its concepts the concepts used by capitalists 
who see everything in terms of money values. This perspective also owes its origin to the 
nature of the capitalists' role in the social system. The money aspect of objects is the 
significant aspect in terms of what they do. Although it is the political economist who 
suggests that this realm behaves in a law-like manner and determines human action, it is 
to be noted that the capitalist already perceives the market in this fashion when he has to 
take account of market prices. This perspective is not the result of the capitalist's theoret- 
ical role in society but of an alienated view of economic activity deriving directly from 
practice. 
Again, ethical concepts such as "good" and "right" are not invented by ethical theor- 
ists but form part of our everyday discourse. Whether they originated with the priests 
Marx referred to is a debatable issue, they can equally be thought to express an alienated 
27 Ibid. pg 47 
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view of what the consensus of opinion is on what is desirable. There is clearly a relation- 
ship between alienated consciousness and ideological production which needs to be 
explained. 
The alienated perception of human activity is one which regards the products of 
such activity as independent, alien powers which determine human behaviour. This is of 
course exactly the same view which the ideologist described above propagates. The 
mechanism which convinces the practical man of this view however is different from that 
which convinces the theorist. The two perspectives, however, complement one another 
such that the alienated view of social action is reinforced and reified by ideology. Again 
an alienated view may be the original source of the intellectual ideologist's concepts. 
This relationship between ideology, alienation and how alienated perception affects the 
possibility of coming to terms with and solving the fundamental problems mentioned ear- 
lier, is the key to understanding the the practical significance of Marx's materialist 
method. I will take up this point again in the section headed "The religious conscious- 
ness". 
2.1.1. The political dimension of ideological production 
The description of the production of ideological theories so far suggests that they 
are either result of mistaken perceptions due to the theorist's position in the division of 
labour or to the apparent autonomy of alienated social processes. This however is not the 
whole story. Ideologies, if accepted as valid theory, have consequences for political 
action. 
If, for instance, one accepts the consciousness of statesmen who may believe that 
the decisions made by them and the relations forged with other statesmen determine his- 
tory (the so called great man theory of history), 28 then one's political behaviour will 
28 Actions of statesmen are material, nevertheless Marx would have regarded a theory ascribing 
one-sided" causal determinacy to them as idealism as we shall see in the next section. 
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consist in trying to influence the thoughts of such figures (lobbying, petitions and the 
like) in order to bring about social change. If, on the other hand, they are seen only as the 
spokesmen of social groups whose material interests they express and from whose sup- 
port they draw their power, then one has to organise to alter the balance of power in 
society to bring about social change. Thus where causality in the social system is thought 
to be located is crucial for political action. 
Equally, the view that ideas control social action leads to educational programmes 
rather than action to alter the material conditions which produce and support those ideas. 
Ontological idealism, (Berkeley, Hegel et al. ), is not exempt here. If one believes that the 
objective sensuous world is an illusion, then political action to alter it commits the mis- 
take of taking the illusion seriously. 
One suspects that Berkeley, for instance, would have advocated prayer to God in 
whose mind the world exists as a mechanism for bringing about social change. Hegel was 
content that the individual as a thinking subject should mentally experience individual 
freedom through identification with the monarch rather than freedom of action at the 
material level. Even the young Hegelians did not see the problems of society as practical 
problems but as theoretical ones, a problem of inconsistent principles. Ontological ideal- 
ism is responsible for all of this. 
Now ruling classes, although they don't like being verbally attacked or having their 
representatives harangued by pressure groups, much prefer this kind of opposition to pol- 
itical organisations aimed at directly removing the source of their power and influence 
(e. g. redistribution of property, by force if necessary, or a new division of labour). They, 
therefore, tend to look favourably upon those who suggest that this type of activity is the 
way to make society a better place. The production and dissemination of ideology is, 
therefore, carried out not only by those who hold genuinely mistaken viewpoints but by 
people ranging from active ideologues who produce such views for their political effects, 
through those predisposed to believe in ideologies since their conclusions are less 
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alarming than alternative views (but who believe that their attitude is objective), to those 
who in all sincerity are unable to see things from any other viewpoint due perhaps to their 
position in society and lack of insight. There is, therefore, always a built-in bias in the 
establishment of any class-divided society towards the production and dissemination of 
ideologies. In essence because of the differential benefit which ruling classes gain from 
the existing social arrangements they have no interest in the main in solving the problems 
mentioned above. Indeed the promotion of ideology is aimed at diverting action into 
unfruitful channels. 
Thus Marx opposes idealism on political as well as methodological grounds but 
what is at stake here can only be seen when we consider what Marx envisages as the 
solution to the central problem outlined earlier. 
2.1.2. The creative power of labour 
The crucial concept for understanding human activity for Marx is labour. In the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 he says 
"The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phanomenologie and of its final out- 
come, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is 
thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives 
objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this 
alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective 
man - true because real man - as the outcome of mans own labour. " 29 
Labour changes man's material environment and in doing so permits a different lifestyle. 
The act of labour itself, the manner of producing, constitutes a change of life activity and 
correspondingly also generates new needs. All these things alter and add to what man is. 
By labour he thus creates himself. In Marx's terms he objectifies himself, becomes actual 
29 op. cit. E. P. M. pg 140. 
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or real, by affecting other things. Hence he depends upon nature to be what he is and 
upon natures reciprocal effect upon him to be conscious of what he is. 
This is an open ended process. All processes involve negation; the future negates 
the present, the present negates the past. A conscious process involves negation of the 
present in thought, criticism, as well as in practice, labour. Labour is practical-critical 
activity. 
Hegel objected to a deterministic materialism which suggested that the objects of 
nature had their own laws to which man was subject, nature as an alien, powerful being. 
He believed that the mind posited nature but then came to regard it as having a life of its 
own. This he regarded as a mistake. When the thinking subject becomes aware that 
nature reflects his own mental activity then he becomes conscious of what he truly is. 
Marx regards this positing activity as physical labour'30 and believed that Hegel had 
correctly objected to the view that man is impotent in the face of his own creations. The 
loss of control of man's own products however has a social cause and its solution 
involves both critical reassessment and material alteration in practice. Consciousness 
plays a key role here, it is due to man's ability to criticise that he can assess and alter his 
situation for the better. If man can understand nature then he can change it, and thereby 
change himself. 
2.1.3. The religious consciousness 
Society is a human product which daily is reproduced anew by human social 
activity. If it has undesirable features they can be altered by practical-critical activity. If 
however it is represented in consciousness as an autonomous realm which controls 
human action then it appears as though its "behaviour" must merely be accepted since no 
action can change it. This latter view is an "alienated" viewpoint and ideology reinforces 
30 op. cit. E. P. M. p 140. 
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this view. In Anti- Mhring Engels says, 
"The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces of nature - blindly 
violently and destructively, so long as we fail to understand them and take 
them into account. But once we have recognised them and understood their 
action, their trend and their effects, it depends solely on ourselves to increas- 
ingly subject them to our will and to attain our ends through them. " 31 
In describing man's emerging consciousness of nature Marx says, 
"At the same time it (consciousness) is consciousness of nature, which first 
appears to men as a completely alien, all powerful and unassailable force, with 
which mens relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like 
beasts; it is thus a purely animal consciousness of nature (natural religion) just 
because nature is hardly modified historically.,, 32 
i. e. it has not been subjected to labour, to practical-critical activity. We know however, 
that as soon as men began to recognise the patterns of causality in nature they were able 
to subject it to their will. It then no longer appeared to be the domain of an alien all- 
powerful will itself. 33 
In our theories which pertain to social life however, as we have seen alien powers 
still apparently rule. For instance Marx describes political economy as the "theology of 
the god capital" and its representation of the exchange of goods in the market (as the phy- 
sical representatives of money values) as fetishism. 34 
31 Anti-D4hring, F. Engels, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1976 pg 361 
32 op. cit. The German Ideology, pg 51 
33 It is true that Marx criticises 18th century empirical science on the grounds that it produces a 
collection of dead facts", (Ibid. pg 48) His criticism is that these facts are taken as givens and not 
understood in relation to a particular subject in time and space and also not understood as part of 
the process of nature itself. In this sense they remain "alien" and "out there" both to the subject and 
to nature. 
34 Capital Vol. I, Ch. 1, section 4, K. Marx, Penguin 1976, pp 163,164. 
22 
Thus we see the historical significance of idealisms and all ideology since they reify 
an illusory view of the world and thus presents an obstacle to our ability to come to terms 
with our social problems and solve them. This is done (a) by locating all causality in a 
particular part of the social system, ignoring the way in which it is derivative or depen- 
dent upon the other parts, (b) making this particular realm impervious to human interven- 
tion or even (c) representing the derivative part as the whole. Hegelian idealism does all 
three of these things. 
In The Ger? nan Ideology, Marx sets out to show the manner in which ideas are pro- 
duced; the fact that they can represent an alienated conception of society or be superficial 
due to the theorists position in the division of labour or be wilful distortions for political 
purposes. All of which shows that they cannot be uncritically accepted as the premisses 
for a theory of society. He says, 
II 
... we do not set out 
from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as 
narrated thought of, imagined, conceived in order to arrive at men in the flesh. 
We set out from real active men and on the basis of their real life process we 
demonstrate the development of ideological reflexes and echoes of this pro- 
cess.,, 35 
Direct observation by the theorist and an adequate materialist methodology do not suffer 
from these problems. The manner in which all ideas are produced including Marx's own 
must, therefore, be explained not taken for granted. Thus, he rules out both idealism as 
ideology and ideas as premisses. We can now also see the historical significance not only 
of Marx's materialist method but also of his whole work in providing the necessary criti- 
cal consciousness to allow practical action to follow, as he says in the I lth thesis on 
Feuerbach, "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to 
change it". 36 
35 Ibid. pg 47 
36 Selected Works (in one volume), K. Marx and F. Engels, Lawrence and Wishart 1968 pg 30. 
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2.2. Ideology and science 
Marx believes that his method of approach in coming to terms with social 
phenomena is "scientific", in contrast to ideologies which promote a religious and placa- 
tory attitude to such phenomena. Their method is conservative whilst his is radical. 
But this espousal of science is open to at least two objections. First is it not the case 
that science in our society serves to strengthen the ruling class rather than undermine it? 
Indeed it might be argued that "science" is one aspect of the ideology of the bourgeoisie. 
Secondly, increase in scientific control over nature has not led to its emancipation rather 
to its enslavement and exploitation. Is it not more likely that a scientific grasp of social 
forces will increase social control and lead to less freedom not more? 
An answer to these questions will anticipate later discussions, but briefly, in answer 
to the first objection, all social products increase the power of the ruling class when the 
mode of production is prospering. Science in the realm of the productive forces increases 
the surplus product which the ruling class appropriates thus increasing its own power 
relative to the subject class. In so far as it increases prosperity in general it helps to stabil- 
ise society and its success is seen as the success and fitness to rule of the class which pro- 
motes it. In the realm of social control it provides sophisticated means of coercion as well 
as methods of behaviour analysis which enhance the ability to manipulate others. As 
ideology, as stated before, it provides the rationale for trusting the ruling class to rule, 
those who employ scientific methods know best. 
However, when, as Marx suggests happens in all class divided societies, the rela- 
tions of production cease to favour the development of the forces of production, then the 
situation changes. Anything which promotes the forces of production tends to undermine 
class rule and social control. It tends to promote another class. Social analysis tends to 
point to the problematic nature of the mode of production itself and the need to alter the 
relations of production which favour the ruling class. Even advances in methods of coer- 
cion and military tactics have proved, at best, forces used by both sides, at worst (from 
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the point of view of a ruling class) to favour the revolutionaries. Science has the inherent 
quality that it shows how the limitations to human life can be overcome. It therefore 
serves whoever is engaged in promoting such activity. When a ruling class can no longer 
afford to play this role, it no longer furthers their cause. 
In answer to the second issue, socialism is intended to transform social relations, 
indeed, according to the Economic and Philosophical manuscripts of 1844, the relations 
between man and the whole of nature. 37 At present, due to the egoistic form of co- 
operative relations, society is based upon exploitation of nature, others, and even one's 
own nature. In changing this antagonistic form of social existence, socialism makes use 
of science in a different manner. 
To anticipate, Kant says that men should not be treated as merely means to 
another's ends, 38 i. e. exploited, but should be treated as ends in their own right i. e. their 
own ends or right to satisfy their needs should be respected. For Kant, this can be no 
more than a pious hope opposed to the reality of human egoism. The dialectical solution 
to this opposition however, would be to create a society where to treat others as ends in 
themselves would be a means to one's own ends. Where each individual benefits from the 
enhancement of other people's development instead of, as in competitive societies, 
suffers from it. 39 The paradoxical situation of alienation gives an incentive to create such 
a society where men are not enslaved by their own powers and the demands each makes 
upon others. 
In the discussion so far I have referred to the "one-sidedness" of ideologies as the 
decisive logical feature which characterises them rather than the reduction of reality to 
"ideas". A clearer view of what is meant by this is required here before we discuss the 
37 c. f C141 introduction. 
38 The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in Kant's Critique of Practical 
Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 6th. edition, Longmans, Green and Co. 1909, section 63, 
pg 52. -reprinted 1963. 
39 See chapter seven 2.3.1. 
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role which dialectics play in Marx's materialism. 
2.3. Materialism as "idealism" 
In the previous section of the thesis I referred to the fact that theories which reduce 
a whole to one of its aspects and/or treat an aspect as if it is independent of the whole 
and/or treat the whole as if it is causally determined by an aspect to the exclusion of 
reciprocal relations, is ideological irrespective of whether that aspect is the realm of 
ideas. The point is that we are dealing with a partial explanation, something which can 
only exist as an abstraction, an idea. Hegel refers to such explanations as one-sided, i. e. a 
description from a particular perspective which nevertheless claims to be a self-sufficient 
characterisation of the object. 40 
Despite its use of the philosophical category of matter, Marx refers to 18th century 
materialism both as ideology and indeed idealism in this sense. In the Economic and Phi- 
losophical Manuscripts of 1844, referring to the materialist science of his day he says, 
"In consequence, natural science will lose its abstractly material - or rather its 
,, 41 idealistic tendency, and will become the basis for human science, ... 
Thus he clearly regards contemporary materialism as "idealism" in the sense indicated. 
The way Marx distinguishes his own views from the 18th century materialists is impor- 
tant both from the point of view of understanding what he means by materialism and in 
terms of the consequences for his understanding of human history and human potential- 
ity. However, I will defer the discussion of one-sided materialism until the discussion of 
idealist positions in chapter two. Other examples of one-sided materialist theories which 
have already been cited however, are theories which treat economic arrangements as true 
for all time and their laws therefore absolutely unchangeable, and the "great man" theory 
40 Hegel makes this the basis of his subjective/objective distinction. See CH. U. 
41 op. cit. E. P. M. pg 105. 
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of history. 
Marx regards philosophical idealism as a reification of alienated perspectives in the 
realm of philosophy i. e. the rationalisation of a fundamentally religious viewpoint. 42 The 
philosophical grounds which justify this perspective originate principally in two prob- 
lems, the so-called "epistemological gap" between the subject and object and the problem 
of the ontological status of universals. 
The former problem is a consequence of the fact that philosophy is a purely intellec- 
tual pursuit. When the thinking subject examines the criteria for the validity of his own 
thoughts there is always a problem of how one bridges the gap between the mind and the 
world (the correspondence theory of truth). This follows from the fact that since the 
object of the "mental" labourer is thought, the world itself tends to appear as a world of 
thoughts to him. 
The second issue, the problem of universals, has long been linked with issues to do 
with God and therefore to the issue of alienation. It is in part the attempt to solve this 
problem which leads to the perspective of dialectics. Hegel's solution is regarded by 
Marx as still one-sided and he considers his own dialectical materialism as providing the 
more correct conceptual basis for the scientific investigation of social phenomena. It is to 
the origins of this perspective that I shall now turn. 





In the previous chapter, I suggested that Marx identifies "idealism" and "ideology" 
to the extent that he regards certain one-sided forms of materialism as idealism. Clearly 
Marx's own materialism must avoid these problems if it is to be the basis of a non- 
ideological viewpoint. The following chapter is intended to demonstrate and justify 
Marx's approach to this topic. 
Marx's materialism is based upon his rejection of idealism and his own understand- 
ing of the epistemological problem. The account given below is an attempt at a rational 
reconstruction of this position based upon his comments in his notebooks and elsewhere. 
Marx is a materialist in the minimal sense that he believes that all things, including 
human beings and their mental processes, are part of the physical world. ' He is not com- 
mitted to any particular notion of "the material" or "matter". 2 At most he is committed to 
a view which would regard the world as "real,, 3 in the sense of being independent of the 
mental activity of the subject and, in principle, capable of being known via the senses. 
Whether Marx's views are consistent with realism will be examined in section 2.1.2. 
The justification of Marx's materialist perspective, however, requires him to be able 
to refute idealism on the ground on which its proponents attempt to establish it, namely, 
I Mental experience is merely the way that the human organism is aware of changes in its own 
physical state and the beyond it, the causes of these changes. 
2 Thus "light", which is not matter, but is still part of the physical world and any other physical 
entities by which the world can be described, pose no problems for materialism in this sense. 
3 Materialism is of necessity "realist" because it is committed to the reality of the material 
world, i. e. its independence from mind. 
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philosophy. To do this he needs to show both how and why idealist views arise and why 
they are misconceived. This is what I shall attempt to do below. 
2. Mental labour and the epistemological gap 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that there are essentially two philosophical 
issues that lead to idealist theories, the epistemological gap between subject and object 
and the status of universals. The idealist solution to the first of these is, I believe, condi- 
tioned in the way that Marx suggests, by the philosopher's position in the division of 
4 labour as a purely "mental" labourer. 
The epistemological question is: "What constitutes knowledge? " This is usually 
understood in the sense of "How can I know if my ideas are validly held? " The latter for- 
mulation accepts that knowledge has the form of ideas. The question of validity is usually 
understood in terms of the relation between ideas and reality. 
Whether one's ideas represent anything real however, is not simply a philosopher's 
question. An engineer might ask himself whether the bridge which should stand up in 
theory will actually stand up when built - whether the ideal bridge can correctly represent 
a real bridge. But there is a difference between this question and the one which the philo- 
sopher asks, a difference which illuminates what the philosopher is doing. 
The engineer tests his ideas against sense-experience. If he and others experience 
the bridge collapse, then he believes his ideas were wrong. The philosopher on the other 
hand questions the nature of experience itself, it might be an illusion or a dream. The 
difference is not simply that the engineer uncritically accepts the evidence of the senses. 
He is well aware that there are occasions when he may make wrong judgements based on 
sense experience. The crucial difference is that he and the philosopher are trying to solve 
different (though related) problems hence they are engaged in different different types of 
4 op. cit. The German Ideology pg 5 1. Cf. also, Chapter 1,2.1. 
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practices 
The philosopher is searching for a criterion of certainty internal to the world of 
ideas, which are the raw material of his speculative task. He is aware of the fact that 
experience is thought-mediated and therefore as problematic as thought itself 
The engineer in contrast does not care if experience is classified as an illusion. His 
problem is to avoid the unpleasant experience of a bridge which falls down. Sense- 
certainty is necessarily involved in validating the engineer's ideas by virtue of his pro- 
ject, his type of practice. 
The philosopher is searching for intellectual certainty which renders him satisfied 
with the plausibility of his thought-world. On the other hand, the world of the senses is 
the real world to the engineer, in the sense of being the world to which his actions are 
held to account. Its objects are real, sensuous and therefore material. 
The philosopher's final court of appeal, on the other hand, is the intellect, reality is 
therefore mediated by the subject's mind and this realm appears more secure than the 
objects it postulates, hence the epistemological gap. 
The paradigm case of this is Descartes. Descartes is searching for propositions 
which are certain on which to base his sYstem of knowledge. He sets up a thought experi- 
ment to discover them. Since the basis of a thought experiment is thought itself, this 
basic presupposition of the method seems the most certain piece of knowledge, "I cannot 
doubt that I am thinking because to doubt is to think". 6 One might imagine an engineer 
-5 1 will argue below that an understanding of the relationship between material practice and in- 
tellectual practice provides the solution to the intellectual problems which appear to licence ideal- 
ism. 
6 Discourse 4, Discourse on Method and the Meditations, translated by F. E. Sutcliffe, Penguin 
Classics, Penguin 1968, pg 54. 
If a doubt was not regarded as a "thought object" but perhaps merely as a "phenomenon" or a cer- 
tain kind of event, then it would not necessarily follow that "to doubt is to think", From this exam- 
ple it can be seen how the ontological assumptions about the method condition the conclusions 
drawn. 
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coming up with the proposition I build therefore material things are". Certainty resides 
in the presuppositions about the method. 
Philosophers deal with ideas and search for intellectual criteria internal to ideas 
(consistency, intuitive clarity etc. ) to demonstrate their validity, but the world on which 
they operate appears, by virtue of their method, as ideas first and foremost and reality 
only derivatively. 
Scepticism periodically collapses philosophical systems back to the world of the 
thinking subject and to that alone. Even the 18th century empiricists who suggest that the 
mind is a blank slate until experience writes upon it, discovered via Berkeley that the 
only evidence of which we can be sure is the slate itself and the writing upon it. Marx, 
however, is also a philosopher so the question arises as to whether his philosophy escapes 
the charmed circle of the mind and its contents. 7 
A correct understanding of the origin of these idealist positions I will later argue 
requires a critique of the epistemological enterprise itself. I intend to show that the ques- 
tion of certainty, indeed the very concept of knowledge stems from the problems encoun- 
tered in material practice and not from speculative activity considered in isolation. 
The functional separation of the realm of intellectual practice from the realm of sen- 
suous practice, 8 however, results in the situation where practical issues become tran- 
sposed, referring exclusively to problems within the realm of ideas rather than to those of 
sensuous reality. The question of certainty then applies in respect to a self-subsistent 
world of ideas and in this context, can only be answered in a fashion which is purely arbi- 
trary. This is the source of "the dilemma of epistemology" which I will discuss later. 
71 am not suggesting that philosophy has no practical use. The intellect is always involved in 
informing our actions. To critically assess the means by which we represent reality to ourselves 
therefore has a crucial effect upon our orientation to action. Philosophy comes to the fore in 
periods when our conceptual or theoretical frameworks cease to function adequately and a new in- 
tellectual approach is required. 
8 see CHI section 2.1 
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The arbitrary nature of what one calls certain opens up the content of our ideas to 
sceptical doubt, militating against a realist viewpoint. It correspondingly licences not 
only relativism but also idealist viewpoints since the relationship of ideas to the thinking 
subject seems more secure than the relationship of ideas to any object they purport to 
represent. 
2.1. The epistemological gap 
The epistemological gap is a problem which occurs in the context of a realist 
epistemology. Sceptical arguments about realism provide the point of departure for all 
the major idealist theories and this problem affords idealists such an opportunity. 
These skeptical arguments take two principal forms. Firstly, skepticism about a 
world beyond our ideas which is based upon observations about human fallibility, which, 
given that philosophy's point of departure is the thinking subject, leads to idealism. 
Secondly, skepticism about a world beyond our ideas deriving from the assumption that, 
since experience is the experience of a thinking subject, its objects are necessarily 
thoughts and nothing else. 
The epistemological gap results from the assumption that experience cannot be 
taken at face value, it may be subject to error and illusion or in some other way prob- 
lematic. The rationalists were always suspicious of the evidence of the senses9 and even 
the empiricist tradition, in so far as it sees a problem in "the veil of perception", impli- 
citly acknowledges that experience need not convey the nature of reality unadulterated. 10 
The problem for a realist is how he can know that his ideas correspond to reality if the 
world can only be apprehended via problematic experience. 
9 E. g. Descartes says that the sun appears to be small but reason tells us that it is large. Cf. op. 
cit. Discourse on Method 4, pg 59 and pg 118. 
10 Cf. Locke, Berkely, Hume: central themes, Jonathan Bennett, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
University Press 1971, pp 68-70. 
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The realist model of the relation between subject and object and their co-products 
knowledge and experience is as follows: - humanity and the non-human world have an 
existence which does not directly depend upon the cognitive relation between them but 
knowledge and experience are the product of their interaction. 
In the positivist version, correct theories or knowledge have the same form as the 
object itself, but in the Kantian version, they cannot be known to have the same form 
since the form of thing-in-itself (reality), cannot be conceptualised. The existence of the 
thing-in-itself, however, is asserted. 
The problem is this: knowledge and experience depend in part on the conceptual 
apparatus of the knowing subject whereas the character of the thing-in-itself does not. We 
cannot compare subject-related experience with reality unless we can experience reality 
"independently of experience". We cannot step outside of human experience to see what 
things are "in themselves". This holds good for the question of whether the thing-in-itself 
exists. 
It follows that objective knowledge cannot consist in a correspondence between 
reality and experience or reality and theory since no comparison can be made. How then, 
can we be sure that the objects which our concepts describe exist independently of the 
knower? The idealist answer to this question is that we cannot; I will discuss the prob- 
lems associated with this position later. On the other hand, Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx 
all present solutions to this problem based upon the notion of "objectification" which 
attempt to bridge this gap. 
2.1.1. Objectification 
Hegel's solution to the gap between subject and object is to regard the world as 
"Reason". In The Philosophy of History, he says: - 
"... Reason ....... is Substance, as well as Infinite Power; its own Infinite 
Material underlying all the natural and spiritual life which it originates, as also 
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the Infinite Form - that which sets this material in motion. " II 
Reason as the source of reality is subject creating the world, as the world itself it is 
object. Subject and object are thus identified. The rational individual can understand the 
world because the world is itself reason. The individual subject shares the faculty of rea- 
son with the "cosmic subject", God who created it. Treating the world as "reason external 
to the subject" leads to the notion of "objectification", i. e. reason becoming something 
real and independent of its creative source. 
Feuerbach as a materialist treats the creative source as man and stresses the sensu- 
ous nature of objectification both in thought and action. Man objectifies his needs and 
powers through labour when he creates useful objects and equally objectifies his needs 
and powers in thought when he creates thought objects. A concept such as "food" for 
instance relates to the need and power to eat, and God, for Feuerbach, is a thought object 
created by man as an imaginary satisfaction to what are ultimately sensuous needs. 
However, the whole notion of our view of the world as objectification seems prob- 
lematic for a materialist. A realist/materialist cannot say that a thing has a certain form 
because we think that it does. This is Idealism. This view suggests that if we were not 
human-beings with human needs, we would presumably describe the world differently. 
This appears to make our concepts subject-relative in a way that seems incompatible with 
the notion of something which is true independently of a subject's impressions. Nor can a 
materialist say, as Kant does, that the human input to experience creates a phenomenal 
world of experience different from the "world-in-itself'. The realist element in Marx's 
position dictates that thought should be able to arrive at a correct representation of the 
thing-in-itself and that the object so described is not merely mental or a projection of the 
subject's sensuous need. 
II The Philosophy of History -introduction, G. W. F. Hegel, Dover Publications 1956, pg 9. 
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The problem of knowledge thus posed for materialism is that if the subject is 
regarded as the co-producer of knowledge, then it seems that we cannot prove that the 
product corresponds to a reality independent of the producer, unless we regard "reality" 
as something produced by the subject's mind, i. e. some kind of idealism. The problem in 
particular for Marx is how one retains the notion of objectification and yet avoids ending 
up in an idealist position. 
His solution I believe is as follows: in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
of 1844, Marx says, 
"The sun is the object of the plant - an indispensable object to it, confirming its 
life - just as the plant is an object of the sun, of the sun's ob ective essential j 
power. " 
and 
"A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being" 
and 
"A non-objective being is a non-being". 12 
What Marx appears to be saying is that what a thing is depends upon its relation to other 
things, i. e. how it manifests itself. The extreme corollary of this seems to be that that 
which is not manifest is not! 
An object's properties clearly do relate to how it interacts with other things. It fol- 
lows from this that what a thing is is what it is for some other thing, i. e. the cause of cer- 
tain effects. Part of what an object is, therefore, is what it is for a human being, the effect 
which it has. Consciousness of these effects, the attempt to describe them in language, 
does not, for Marx, therefore, render the object mental or merely a subjective impression, 
since the nature of its being is partially disclosed via this relation; the relation to a 
12 Op. cit., E. P. M. p145. 
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conscious subject will reveal rather than conceal what it iS. 13 The contrast with Kant 
perhaps shows this most clearly. For Kant the relation to the subject obscures what the 
object is, For Marx it reveals it. 
What has been shown so far is how, by adopting the ontological position that the 
being of an object consists in it being the locus of a set of powers, 14 Marx avoids the 
epistemological problem that what a thing appears to be to a particular subject might be 
different from what it is "in itself'. In Marx's view what a thing is for another thing and 
what it is in itself are necessarily related. 15 Hence there is no "gap". The epistemologi- 
cal justification for adopting this ontological position is not complete however, if it is 
simply pointed out that this position avoids both the problems of "correspondence theory 
of truth" and the "subjectivising" of the object. The idealist move is still possible, so a 
complete justification requires a refutation of Idealism. Furthermore to show that Marx's 
viewpoint is a realist one requires that other points relating to a realist ontology be met. I 
will attempt to deal with the latter issue first. 
2.1.2. Realist Claims 
If we are going to judge whether Marx's views are consistent with realism, it will be 
necessary to examine in more detail the sorts of claim involved in a realist position. The 
first and minimal claim of realism is that there is some independent and conditioning fac- 
tor in our experience which we cannot wish away. Nearly everybody is a realist in this 
13 This, of course, leaves the problem of how one accounts for errors, illusions, etc. This will be 
dealt with in section 2.1.2.1. 
14 i. e. it acts as cause. It is worth noting that the fact that Marx defines identities in terms of 
how things act is the characteristic which leads G. A. Cohen to ascribe a functionalist method to 
Marx in Karl Marx's Theory of History: a defence, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press 
1978. "Capital", for instance is anything which is used to increase its own value in the ]about pro- 
cess, in Cohen's terms anything which "functions" as capital. Marx's view of course does not car- 
ry the implication that something only takes on value or indeed can be completely understood in 
terms of the role which it plays in some particular system. 
15 As potential to actual. 
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sense. This is the quality of "out-thereness" or intransigence of the world. Another way of 
formulating it is to say that there is some check upon our creativity, the world cannot be 
created by us "willy-nilly". 
Popper claims to be a realist in this sense because the world acts as a negative check 
on theories in his system. 16 Kant's "thing-in-itself' is also real in this sense, in so far as 
interaction with it provides the raw material of experience, which reason organises into 
the phenomenal world. However, this claim does not go far enough to satisfy a fully- 
fledged realism as Collier's attack on Kolokowski's position shows. 17 Kolokowski 
pointed out that "the qualities of the world do not arise out of nothing. " They are created, 
in Kolokowski's work, out of a "pre-existing chaos" which human beings encounter and 
make sense of in a manner which is useful in relation to their needs. Collier counters that 
"Precisely to serve our needs, cognition must obtain a certain independence of them". 18 
Just because Kolokowski's world is not created in total freedom, does not allow him to 
characterise it as "real" in Collier's sense. Collier wants to know how reality can be 
separated from illusion and error which are also part of that which is "created (by the sub- 
ject) from a pre-existing chaos". 
Thus the second claim made by realists is that the form which reality actually has, 
exists independently of the form which anyone might think that it has. In this contrast, 
according to Collier, consists the possibility of science and the quest for for objective 
knowledge. Illusions and errors are just as intransigent as reality to the person who does 
not know that they are illusions and errors. 
Thirdly, the criterion that the world should offer opposition to the creative activity 
of some subject does not go far enough to establish the independence of the world for 
16 Conjectures and Refutations, by K. R. Popper, 4th edition, Routledge, Keegan and Paul 1972. 
pp 116,117. 
17 Andrew Collier, "Truth and Practise" - Radical Philosophy No 5, summer 1973 cf. Leszek 
Kolokowski, "Karl Marx and the classical definition of truth" - Marxism and Beyond 1969 18 Idem. 
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realism proper. The world must be asserted to exist whether any subject does encounter 
it, has encountered it, or ever will encounter it. Its reality cannot depend upon its contact 
with a human subject. 
These then are the three principle claims: - 
(1) The question of the limit to creativity. 
(2) The question of truth and error. 
(3) The question of the independent existence of the world. 
From the point of view of our three realist criteria, it is the issue of the independent 
existence of things which causes epistemological problems for Kant. If the thing-in-itself 
is not subject-mediated (by definition), how can it be "deduced" or "intuited" (depending 
on which interpretation of Kant you accept)? Doesn't this activity make it "thing-for-a 
human subject" i. e. make it a phenomenon? Hegel correctly pointed out that if nothing 
can be known about it then we cannot talk about it at all. 
it is the objectivity of knowledge which is problematic in Popper. Popper admits 
that scientific theories are "Doxa"19 i. e. opinion. He must therefore, if he is going to 
defend science against non-science, have some method of differentiating good opinions 
from bad ones, to prevent the rejoinder that one opinion is as good as another. His cri- 
terion of falsification however, only indicates an inconsistency between ideas held, it 
doesn't show which is correct or even more correct, since his criterion could be used in 
such a manner as to select less true theories, it being always possible that the major flaws 
in a theory have yet to be discovered. The fact is that on this view we cannot know. 20 
The first criterion of realism, the limit to creativity, suggests that the objective world 
constrains the forms in which it can be apprehended. This can be shown to be a debatable 
issue also since Idealists are able to argue that the constraint on the form in which the 
19 Op. cit. Conjectures and Refutations, pp 25,26. 
20 1 am endebted to Greg Hunt for this argument, presented in his lectures at the University of 
Warwick in the late seventies. 
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world appears is due to the structure of the mind. But this issue perhaps gives us some 
purchase on the problem, namely in what respect experience itself contains obdurate or 
intransigent features, that is to say, in what respect it can be thought to have an objective 
structure (in the sense of not being moulded by the subject's will). 
2.1.2.1. The objective structure of experience 
Firstly, the "restraint to creativity" criterion. Marx's retention of the notion of 
objectification from the Hegelian/Feuerbachian philosophy, as has been shown, does not 
lead to the misrepresentation of the real features of the object, (e. g. the concept "food" 
not only expresses the significance of the object in terms of the needs of a human subject 
but also the real power of the object to satisfy that need). 
Nevertheless, how the subject apprehends the object is not solely determined by 
nature of the object itself, there is an element of subjective choice involved. This obtains 
in two areas, namely, what type of activity the subject wishes to engage in (and hence 
what the theory is intended to explain) and how the subject identifies the key features of 
his experience (i. e. how the world is to be analysed when that activity provides an experi- 
ence). This latter practice is theoretical activity. 
But given that these choices have been made, once we have decided for instance 
what type of action it is necessary to perform to validate a statement such as "the cat is 
over there" (looking), and we have decided what kind of mental identification procedure 
would constitute "seeing a cat", then either we can or cannot perform these actions suc- 
cessfully and thereby have the expected experience. Whether the expected experience 
occurs or not is beyond our control, it is a constraining feature of the world. 
The meaning of an assertion about the world carries the implication of what subjec- 
tive choices have been made i. e. what actions are intended to be performed in order to 
validate it. To claim to understand an assertion you must know how to apply it in a 
judgement. From that point on however, experience either conforms or it does not to your 
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expectations. 
This has a bearing upon the question of what constitutes an error. The previous dis- 
cussion suggested that if the proposed act of identification cannot be performed then the 
judgement is in error. This is correct but it is not the whole story as the problems engen- 
dered by a statement such as "the golden mountain does not exist" shows. 
The problem is how the statement can refer to something which the import of the 
sentence suggests cannot be referred to. The answer is of course that the golden mountain 
may exist as an object of thought but not as a physical reality. All assertions about 
existence must be qualified by the intended context of verification if they are to be unam- 
biguous. The error here, therefore, might be considered to be a misunderstanding over the 
intended context of verification (thought-object or sense-object). 21 
The meaning of an assertion however, cannot necessarily be unambiguously read off 
from a statement, the meaning of a statement will alter if the context of its application 
alters, e. g. in our example "over there" could apply to any direction and even "cat" can 
have more than one meaning. The criticism must be answered, therefore, that by altering 
the context any statement whatsoever could be shown to be valid, hence the world does 
not constrain our theories. In effect we are saying that from some viewpoint any theory is 
valid. 
For Marx, who is a dialectician, however, this is not a problem. Emphasis on any 
one viewpoint is for him one-sided and incorrect, what the object is can only be described 
fully in terms of the complete set of its manifestations or effects including effects on 
human subjects. An object described this way transcends the subjective choice of per- 
spectives. it is what the object is for a human experiencer from all possible experiential 
21 This reflects Hegel's approach to ascertaining the trUth of statements. It is not so much 
whether something exists but what kind of existence it has. It is a question of seeing things in con- 
text. This is characteristic of the rationalist approach to truth and error as against he empiricist ap- 
proach. 
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contexts i. e. its complete human significance. 
In practice of course, the synthesis is never complete one can always say more about 
any object. As knowledge grows however, the world view moves closer to objectivity 
since one-sidedness is being eliminated. Thus it is possible to say that the form which 
experience takes is not freely created but constrained both in the sense that there is a 
necessary connection between certain actions and the occurrence of certain experiences, 
and that increasing knowledge of the world tends towards a transcendence of subjective 
choice, at least in principle. 
This brings us to the second criterion namely, the ability to distinguish truth from 
error and illusion from reality. Something has already been said about how this can be 
done. Identifying error however, goes beyond finding the appropriate context for single 
statements and empirically testing them. 
A crucial source of error for Hegel and Marx is mistaking one-sided viewpoints for 
universally valid viewpoints. This also, of course, is a question of understanding the con- 
text in which the statement is correct, but it also shows how more complex theories 
replace simpler ones by including them as partial perspectives. Furthermore, it allows us 
to explain how opposed statements can be accommodated within a more complex theory. 
Now there is some evidence that the way in which Marx distinguishes less errone- 
ous from more erroneous theories is related to the way Hegel makes this same distinc- 
tion, namely, in terms of the relation between essence and appearance. Marx's view of 
the relation between his work in Capital and the work of bourgeois political economists 
for instance is that they simply formulate the regularities found in appearances whilst he 
conceptualises the appearances as an expression of their essential causes. 22 He shows the 
22 Cf. op. cit. E. P. M., pg 66. Rg, the "Labour theory of value" involves the reconceptualisation 
of money relations as "value" relations (Marx's use of the term). Money is shown to be the 
representative of value and the laws governing its movement depend upon the movement of value. 
To treat the realm of monetary transactions as a self-subsisting realm is one-sided and ideological. 
The more "essential" theory shows how value must "appear" in money form. Cf. Capital: a Cri- 
tique of Political Economy, Karl Marx, translated by Ben Fowkes, foreword by Ernest Mandel, 
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whole process, they only comprehend part and hence are limited in their perspective and 
arrive in places at contradictory conclusions. 
But what is this relation between essence and appearance? Hegel believes that more 
essential theories "absorb and supercede" more superficial ones. For instance the view of 
the world which postulated two stars, the morning star and the evening star, is super- 
ceded by the view that they are both the same object, the planet Venus. For Hegel, the 
morning star and the evening star turn out to be "moments" or aspects of the planet 
Venus, not self-subsisting entities. In this way, the better theories are considered to 
comprise and include the less adequate ones. The criterion which is being used to make 
this distinction, it seems, is growth in content and/or more adequate systernatisation of 
evidence. Yet there are features of the less complete theories which are being rejected. 
The view that there are two stars is clearly at odds with the view that there is only 
one planet, so how can one say that one theory contains the other within it rather than that 
it simply replaces it? Note that if one theory does simply replace the other we will once 
more require a criterion for deciding which is the better of the two. This is the same issue 
as that discussed by Paul Feyerabend about whether Newton's theory is "contained" 
within Einstein's theory as a subordinate case. 23 
Feyerabend points out that the concepts in each theory are mutually exclusive in 
meaning i. e. incommensurable, as indeed with our present example, therefore one cannot 
describe the other. There is nevertheless a systematic link between them, namely, that in 
each instance where the respective theories are applied, Einstein takes into account fac- 
tors which Newton does not (relative frames of reference). Newton conceptualised the 
world in a manner such that these factors did not exist for his theory. His view was, we 
now believe, erroneous. We therefore know which factors to ignore or consider when we 
Penguin 1976, Vol. 1, pp 127,128 and introduction pg 20. 
23 * "How to be a good Empiricist" - Paul Feyerabend in PhilOsoPhY of Science: The Delaware 
Seminar, ed. B. Baumrin, Vol. 2 1962-3, pp 13-16. 
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wish to move from one theory to the other. 
The main difference is that Newton's view is now thought to be valid in a particular 
context rather than in all contexts i. e. his absolutism is refuted but not his localised 
results and this leaves room for other viewpoints which are now no longer excluded by 
the law of non-contradiction. Newton's theory becomes an explanation of a particular 
appearance i. e. how reality manifests itself in a restricted context. Such appearances are 
not illusions unless they are treated as self-subsisting things. 
The sense in which one is a subordinate case of the other is this. There are a set of 
tests, a set of actions and experiences which verify both theories. The fact that one says 
that what is being identified in each theory which is being tested is a different entity, 
doesn't mean that the identification procedure isn't the same. 24 The difference between 
them lies in the implications of the respective concepts which lie beyond the test pro- 
cedure. The notions of one star and two stars respectively, carry different implications for 
actions and the connected experiences. They diverge over such issues as whether both 
stars could be seen at the same time from some point in space and a whole series of other 
assumptions which differ between the experience of one object and the experience of 
two. In practice however, the only tests which could be performed until recently were 
those that verified both. 
One might be tempted to say in the light of this that the problem with erroneous 
theories is that they go beyond the evidence, that they carry excess meaning. But separat- 
ing the excess meaning from the content to be verified can only be done in retrospect. All 
our experiences are theory-mediated hence they contain assumptions which are liable to 
be discredited at some future date. We discover which assumptions are untenable, only in 
the process of attempting to render our theories consistent with new pieces of knowledge. 
24 The procedure I am describing here 
is similar to C. S. Pierce's "definition in use". Cf. C. S, 
Peirce, Collected Papers, Harvard University Press 1931-1935, Vol. 11, section 330 (the definition 
of Lithium). 
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For instance, the orbiting planet theory might be disproved were it discovered that a 
distortion in the medium across which it is observed is responsible for the apparent 
movement. If we refused to commit ourselves in advance to a viewpoint because other 
possible interpretations exist we would not be able to say anything. Our theories then 
might be considered as useful fictions, in so far as they carry excess content and thus 
since our experience is theory mediated this would render it illusory. 
Nevertheless, we also know in retrospect that not all the implications of the theory 
are rendered false and an accretion of dependable connections between action and experi- 
ence occurs as our theories succeed each other. It is in this sense that one theory absorbs 
another and it is in this sense that these false theories are becoming more and more objec- 
tive. 
Finally, the criterion of the existence, independently of experience of entities 
encountered. In Marx's philosophy, the existence of an object and its nature is equated 
with its power to affect other things, it is the locus of powers. Now "powers" are poten- 
tialities and can be understood in terms of hypothetical relations to other objects e. g. if a 
human subject came into contact with "A", "B" would be the result. This statement 
makes no assertion about whether a human subject actually fulfills this condition and is 
therefore quite consistent with criterion (3). We only know what an object is (its poten- 
tiality), however, after it has manifested or realised its powers in the world. 
2.1.3. What is wrong with idealist arguments 
Having shown that Marx's viewpoint is consistent with the realist criteria, in order 
to complete the justification of his materialism it is necessary to show that idealist alter- 
natives based upon a sceptical argument about the relation between subject and object are 
misconceived. I will attempt to show that firstly, idealist arguments built from empirical 
evidence are fallacious and secondly, that there is good reason to accept a realist view of 
the world which is more securely grounded in the empirical evidence and which the 
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idealist is obliged to reject. What is at issue here can perhaps be condensed into the alter- 
natives of whether the mind is in the world or the world is in the mind. 
2.1.3.1. The structure of idealist arguments 
The idealist argument typically proceeds as follows: - The realist view of the world 
holds that there are perceiving subjects, perceptions and non-mental objects which are 
perceived. For the idealist, the link between the perceiver and his perceptions is 
epistemologically sound. The link between the perceptions and the objects of perception 
however cannot be established with certainty. Hence the view that there are objects 
which perceptions represent is not a matter of knowledge. Therefore we are only entitled 
to assert the existence, in the world which we experience, of ideas. 25 This view is further 
supported by the normally accepted applicability of the concepts of error, dreams and 
illusion. all of which imply that perceptions need not correspond to their objects, if 
indeed there is an object. Might not the world be a dream or an illusion or always the pro- 
duct of an erring mind? 
In order to establish his case the idealist must demonstrate a relation between sub- 
ject and perceptions such that the dependence of perceptions upon the subject prejudices 
their objectivity, i. e. their relation to an object. 26 
In the light of this it worth examining the precise nature of the relationship between 
the subject and perceptions which the idealist is attempting to establish. In order to do 
this we need to look at the idealist concept of the subject. 
Commonsense would locate the subject in the world with external relations to other 
things. The idealist subject however, is identified with the world, since the world is 
25 Kant falls into this category despite the thing-in-itself. since it is the fact that he sees the link 
between the object, the thing-in-itself. and perceptions as problematic which leads him to regard 
the world of experience as mental. 
26 This is not presupposed in the meaning of a perception since it remains to be established 
what sort of thing perception is. 
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composed of ideas and ideas are located in the mind of the subject. Mind, world and sub- 
ject are the same. 27 1 intend to argue that it is impossible for the idealist to support this 
view since firstly, most of the evidence of our experience tends to contradict it and 
secondly, the evidence which he selects does not support his claim. 
2.1.3.2. Some evidence against 
The first piece of evidence which seems to contradict the idealist viewpoint is the 
fact that the point of perception of the subject appears to be located in space among its 
objects. Clearly this view of the subject is no use to the idealist since spatial relations are 
external and locate the world outside of the subject. The idealist subject cannot be located 
in space no matter what appearances might suggest. 
However, a subject which is capable of motion in space offers the possibility of 
establishing the dependence of perception upon the subject, since movement affects the 
possibilities of perception in the tactile as well as the visual fields. Motion on its own 
however, is insufficient to establish this point as Copernicus showed when he pointed out 
that the empirical evidence is consistent with the motion of either the subject or the 
object (earth or stars). To establish the mere subjectivity of perception, the subject must 
be shown to be the cause of the perceptual change, his movement must be the indepen- 
dent variable. This is possible only if we assume a willing subject whose decisions act as 
first cause. 
This viewpoint however, is the basis of the realist distinction between perceptions 
and their objects. The object is distinguished from the experience of it by the fact that the 
object is said to exist when the subject is not in a position to perceive it (when he changes 
position). This distinction however, is simply between something whose existence 
27 For non-solipsist idealists there may of course be more than one self-contained mental world, 
perhaps carbon copies of each other, perhaps not. 
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depends only upon itself (the object) and something whose existence depends upon 
interaction (the experience). 
The idealist cannot use it, since the interaction referred to is interaction in space i. e. 
external relations between subject and real object. If motion in space is the foundation of 
the distinction between perceptions and objects of perception then it contradicts rather 
than supports the idealist argument. 28 
2.1.3.3. The empirical starting point of idealist arguments 
Although the idealist must show that the perceptions depend upon the subject he 
cannot do so in a manner which involves references to the body or locates the perceiver 
in space. What he requires is empirical evidence that perception does not in fact have this 
character. 
Now there are certain empirical phenomena which do not appear either to be con- 
nected to the body or to be located in space. These phenomena are classed as "mental" 
and they include thinking (a kind of dialogue with ourselves which we nevertheless don't 
hear in the normal way), imagining (similarly a kind of "seeing" which is not really see- 
ing), emotions, decision making, etc. These phenomena appear to take place against the 
background of sense-perception such that we can experience them simultaneously with 
our everyday sensuous activity. They are not associated with any particular parts of the 
body as would be a pain for instance. Hence we cannot locate them directly in space. 
The idealist requires that all perceptions, including "sense" perceptions, should be 
related to the subject in a similar way. Sense perceptions, as we have seen, do not appear 
to have this character. However, the idealist can find some purchase for his argument due 
to the fact that certain types of apparent sense-experience is categorised in the realist 
28 A further corollary is that since motion of the point of perception in space is effected via the 
ability to control the body, the subject tends to be associated with the body, because it is this 
which moves in space. 
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perspective as mental along with the phenomena mentioned above. These are dreams, 
illusions and errors. The idealist will typically therefore attempt to show that all sense- 
perception either falls into these categories or analogous philosophical ones and hence all 
perceptions are mental. Berkeley for instance thought the mind has "ideas" for which 
there is no corresponding material object. This is similar to what we mean by dreaming 
or hallucinating. Kant believed that the mind intervenes in the the perceptual process 
such that the object perceived is different in character to the object in the world. This is 
similar to what we mean by an illusion or a perceptual error. The distinctive feature of 
idealist theories therefore, is that all sense-experience is assimilated to these categories. 
2.1.3.4. A note on evidence 
Before continuing to show how the idealist develops his argument it is perhaps 
worth noting that should the idealist manage to establish this view, then he is in a posi- 
tion. to dismiss the commonsense empirical evidence to the contrary simply as misleading 
ideas. Clearly there are epistemological dangers in doing this as we shall see below. 
2.1.3.5. The development of the argument and the role of reason 
The next step is to investigate how it is possible for the idealist to categorise experi- 
ence in this way. In the case of dreams, the realist view regards them as mental because 
the "sense" evidence of our dream is hard to reconcile with the rest of our sense experi- 
ence plus the fact that it is likely to be at odds with the reports of others in our vicinity at 
the time and place at which the dream took place. It is due to the inconsistency of the evi- 
dence that we banish dreams to the realm of the merely mental and likewise with illu- 
sions. But this shows that what is regarded as objective has something to do with the 
thought process. Correction of errors discloses the role of reason. Similarly, it is the 
inconsistency of the 18th century scientist's description of the perceived world with the 
way we describe our experience of it (pulses of air as against sound etc. ) which led Locke 
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to relegate the latter to the merely mental. This provided Berkeley with his point of 
departure from which to prove that all perception was of secondary qualities (merely 
mental). 
Again, the inconsistency between a description of the world purely in terms of sense 
data and our customary descriptions of it, led Hume to relegate the non-sense-data con- 
cepts to the merely mental in keeping with his empiricist method. This provided Kant 
with his point of departure from which to prove that since these categories are isolatable 
only by intellectual analysis but not in experience, all experience is a partial product of 
the mind. 
In general, it is because we reason about the world that some sensuous phenomena 
(including illusions, dreams, etc. ) are thought to be merely mental. It should be noticed 
at this point however, that the action of reason is discriminatory in these cases, it makes 
its distinction within the world which is experienced as sensuous. This becomes prob- 
lematic for the type of argument which the idealist wishes to construct upon this analysis 
of experience. 29 
The idealist argument now typically proceeds as follows: - If we can be mistaken 
about one experience i. e. it is merely mental, dream, idea, etc., then by recursion we 
could be mistaken about every experience of the same type. Even stronger is the sugges- 
tion that if perceptions are of the same type then they are thereby proved to have the 
same status i. e. mere ideas. 
This is the form of the argument which Berkeley uses against Locke showing that if 
primary and secondary qualities are of the same type, then what is true of secondary qual- 
ities is also true of primary qualities and hence all qualities. Kant's argument is slightly 
different, he attempts to show that all experience requires the mental categories hence it 
29 1 have not mentioned Hegel here but Hegel in this context is a completion of Kant. He ef- 
fects a transformation similar to the Locke-Berkeley move to remove the thing-in-itself, leaving all 
form supplied by the mind. His attitude to contrary empirical evidence is similar to Berkeley also. 
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is all mind-dependent. These recursive arguments are logically correct for any perception 
hence the plausibility of the idealist case. 
However, there is a problem which the idealist does not acknowledge but which 
invalidates his conclusion. Since the class of "sense-perception" which comes to be 
regarded as mental is established by the discriminatory action of reason, then by recur- 
sion there is always some sense-perception which is by contrast not regarded as merely 
mental. The conclusion that all sense-perception is mental therefore is invalid. The possi- 
bility that we might be deceived by the content of some of our experiences is admitted by 
the realist viewpoint but the possibility that we might be deceived by all of it is not. 
It should be noted here that Kant attempts to maintain the contrast between ideas 
which form the content of our experience and an unknowable real world which is dis- 
tinguished from it. Experience is ideal precisely because it is different from the thing-in- 
itself. But since the thing-in-itself cannot be part of the known world on pain of introduc- 
ing a non-idea into experience, it is difficult to see how the contrast, which is intended to 
be a piece of knowledge can be made. 
If we cannot know the thing-in-itself we cannot know that the experienced world is 
ideal. If we can know the thing-in-itself then Some of our experience is not merely ideal. 
This inconsistency shows that Kant cannot remain an idealist and also retain the contrast 
which justifies this position. The conclusion remains that the idealist argument is non- 
sequitur. 
2.1.3.6. Idealism and the problem of evidence 
The failure of the sceptical argument to establish its conclusion leads to further 
problems for the idealist. The ordinary usage of terms such as idea, mind, subject, is in 
terms of oppositions ideal/real, mind/matter, subject/object. This accords with the dis- 
tinctions which reason makes within experience. The idealist wishes however, to use the 
term on one-side of each opposition universally. This produces an inconsistent use of 
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terms between the oppositional and universal usage. 
The idealist view of reality seems to contain ideas which are ideas in distinction to 
real things to which they correspond, but also ideas which are the real things. (thus some 
ideas are also not ideas, a contradiction). It will contain a subject in distinction from its 
objects, and objects which are also part of the subject. Finally, it will contain mind which 
is indeed mind but also matter which is mind. It thus degenerates into contradictions as 
the universal usage comes into conflict with the oppositional one (e. g mind which is 
matter is mind which is not mind). 
This does not create an insuperable obstacle for the idealist however, he simply 
relegates the oppositional usage to a distinction between mere appearances. Thus there 
are ideas which appear to be ideas and ideas which appear not to be ideas etc. - no con- 
tradiction. However, in denying validity to the distinctions made by the realist view of 
experience, by calling them mere appearance, the idealist invalidates the foundation of 
his own argument in experience. 
This has the consequence of rendering the idealist argument impervious to empirical 
evidence since such evidence is drawn from the world of mere appearance. Thus Samuel 
Johnson's demonstration of the solidity of a stone is regarded by idealists as no refutation 
since solidity is yet another idea, Johnson was misled by mere appearances. Similarly, 
Kant would not have accepted the "Johnson-like" claim that because I experience objects 
as extended in space, this constitutes evidence that this is how they are "in-themselves". 
if the idealist is consistent then empirical evidence can count neither in support of his 
position nor against it since it is all compromised. This, as stated before, contradicts the 
foundation of the position in the facts of experience, now regarded as inadmissible. 
Idealism thus ends up as dogma. This is ironic since it is ostensibly founded upon a 
sceptical epistemological attack upon the relationship between perceptions and their 
objects. 
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2.1.4. Hegelian idealism 
Hegel's idealism, in contrast to the idealists referred to above, does not rest upon the 
sceptical argument about the relation between subject and object. If Marx's critique in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 184430 is correct however, it nevertheless 
stems from the identification of the subject with the thinking subject, i. e. the philosophi- 
cal consciousness. As we have seen it is the philosopher's method, the search for criteria 
of certainty which are internal to the world of thought, which leads to the view that the 
world is "ideal". 
Hegel conceives the epistemological problem from a rationalist perspective very 
like that of Descartes. Reason is to be used to determine what is true, i. e. our thoughts are 
to be rendered internally consistent. As stated before, to a rationalist everything which 
can be thought has existence, the problem is posed as to what kind of existing thing it is. 
The subject of such a procedure however, is a reasoning subject and only as such does it 
experience the objects of the world. Since the raw material of reason is ideas, the world 
only exists in this form for such a subject. 
That this is the case can be seen in the Phenomenology where Hegel attempts to 
prove his method correct by comparing the objects which a subject experiences with the 
subjective action thought appropriate to give adequate knowledge of the objects. 31 The 
fact that these actions are regarded only as activities of the mind is shown by the name 
which Hegel gives the process "The Phenomenology of Mind". The subject is merely a 
thinking or reasoning subject. Sense-experience is comprehended only as the image 
immediately given to the thinking subject i. e. to the philosophical consciousness. This is 
why some empiricist philosophers, although they stress sense-experience, nevertheless 
30 Op. cit. E. P. M. pg 152 and pp 154,155. 
31 He discovers, like Hume, that sensuous experience cannot be fully explained in terms of the 
action of the senses, it involves perception. Similarly, Perceptions involve understanding and 
understanding reason. Only the action of reason is consistent with its intended object. Cf. Richard 
Norman's Hegel's Phenomenology, op. cit. 
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end up as idealists; they regard sensation not in terms of the implications it carries for a 
real world but simply in terms of its "being" as the raw material of their own speculations 
and as such a form of idea. 
In contrast to the philosopher's practice, which involves intellectual labour upon 
mental objects, sensuous practice involves intellectual and physical activity upon real, 
material objects. The theoretical problem facing the engineer in the example given ear- 
lier, is to bring his ideas into congruence with the real possibilities in the world. The 
notion of an independently existing sensible world is assumed within his method, it is 
internal to the way the problem is set up. 32 If there was no gap between the ideal and the 
real in this sense there would be no practical problem. This does not exclude the possi- 
bility that due to philosophical deliberation, he might regard his enterprise as operating 
within a world of mere appearances i. e. he might be a philosophical idealist, but what 
might be called his "operational ontology" is necessarily realist and materialist because it 
is implicit in his practice at the most basic level (i. e. it is an "essential" part of it). 
Marx's critique of Hegel therefore revolves around the issue of the abstract or one- 
sided understanding of human activity. The idealist error stems from the fact that the phi- 
losopher generalises his own practice to human practice as such. Marx's claim is that 
intellectual products are produced first and foremost in the context of sensuous practice 
and it is only with the division of mental from manual labour that the intellectual element 
appears to operate independently. 
Also, the intellectual level remains parasitic upon sensuous practice for its raw 
materials and its products can only be understood, therefore, in relation to this practice. 
In The German Ideology, 33 Marx gives a brief analysis of the production of ideas, 
correct and ideological, from this perspective. 34 Because of this false generalisation. of 
32 This does not subjectivise this view since the world confirms the assumption as we have seen 
above. 
33 Op. cit. The German Ideology, pg 47. 
34 Op. cit. The German Ideology, Pg 47. The possibility of the Production of one-sided, ideo- 
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his own practice, the philosopher is necessarily unaware of the relation of intellectual 
labour to other kinds of practical activity within the social division of labour and thus 
gives a misleading account of the relationship of ideas to the human life-process. Marx's 
characterisation of the subject as involved in sensuous practice is intended to rectify this 
error and is the basis of his materialism. The world reveals itself to the person involved in 
sensuous practice as something real and material to which he has to come to terms. 
2.1.4.1. Feuerbach's critique 
The Hegelian "error" was criticised in purely philosophical terms by Feuerbach, a 
critique which Marx accepts. His objections are epistemological and ontological, the 
former leading to the latter. The epistemological critique centres upon the criterion of 
certainty. Feuerbach stresses sense-certainty, he says, 
"The true and the divine is only that which needs no proof, that is certain 
directly in itself ..... But only the sensuous is clear as daylight; all doubt and 
dispute cease only where sensation begins. The secret of immediate knowledge 
is sensation.,, 35 
Commenting on the Cartesian criterion of certainty (clear and distinct ideas), he says, 
"The existence of God is doubtful, and so generally that which I think; but that 
I exist, that it is I who think and doubt, is certain. But the self-consciousness of 
modem philosophy is itself only a being ideated and mediated through abstrac- 
tion and thus a doubtful being. "36 
Thus he rules out the Cartesian criterion as mediated and ideal. He appears to identify 
ideation and mediation here. This is because the certainty of the cogito depends upon a 
logical viewpoints means of course that idea systems cannot be uncritically accepted as premisses 
for theory. 
35 Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, Ludwig Feuerbach, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis 
1966 pg 55 (S38). Henceforth referred to as "PT. F. ". 
36 Ibid. S37. 
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rational demonstration and a process of abstraction and hence is only indirectly perceived 
37 by the mind. 
Feuerbach is not espousing the empiricist doctrine of the tabula rasa however, as 
can be seen by the following, 
"All is mediated says the Hegelian philosophy, but something is true however 
when it is no longer mediated., '38 
Truth is not considered by Feuerbach to be transparent to the mind via the senses. He is 
referring here to confirmation by sense-experience. He goes on, 
"Historical epochs arise therefore, only where that which before was ideated 
and mediated becomes an object of immediate and sensuous certainty, namely 
that which before was only an idea becomes truth. ', 39 
That is to say, when the idea is put into practice and validated by sense-experience. On 
mediation he says, 
"Who can elevate mediation to a necessity and a law of truth? only he ..... who 
still struggles and quarrels with himself, who has not completely made up his 
mind; in short he in whom truth is only a talent, a matter of special, even out- 
standing ability but not genius and a matter of the whole man. 40 Genius is 
immediate sensuous knowledge., '41 
The talented man entertains doubt and has to prove his case, but to the genius sense- 
experience filtered through his superior understanding continually confirms the identity 
between his thoughts and reality. Thus Feuerbach is stressing confirmation not the tabula 
rasa doctrine. 
37 Husserl, who took this criterion to mean a direct mental "seeing", would have disagreed. 
38 op. cit. p. p. F. S38, (my italics). 
39 Ibid. S38, pp 55,56. 
40 A reference to the one-sidedness of the merely thinking subject. 
41 Ibid. S38, pg 56. 
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However, Hegel's epistemological criterion of "self-mediation" which he criticises 
is a device for overcoming a problem which Richard Norman refers to as "The dilemma 
of epistemology,, 42 and which will be encountered below in relation to Marx's work. 
Hegel's own viewpoint on mediacy and immediacy is superficially not unlike 
Feuerbach's because he believes that the unity of opposites which mediate each other 
form a new concept which is grasped immediately. Hence truth is characterised by 
immediacy for Hegel also. The distinction between this and Feuerbach's view, however, 
can be seen by considering Feuerbach's ontological criticisms of Hegel. In section 28 of 
the principles of the Philosophy of the Future he says, 
"That being with which the Phenomenology starts stands in the most direct 
contradiction to real being no less than the being with which the Logic 
starts,, 43 
The being with which the Phenomenology starts is immediate sense-experience 
represented by the concept "this" which denotes its particularity. Feuerbach continues, 
"What an immense difference there is between the "this " as an object of 
abstract thought and the "this" as an object of reality! "44 
He goes on to point out that since every object can be referred to correctly as "this" 
object, if the meaning were strictly adhered to, the statement "this house is mine" would 
suggest that every house which can be referred to as "this house" is mine and he makes a 
similar point with respect to wives. Since the statement is true for everyone who can lay 
claim to a house or wife he suggests that the result would be communal ownership of 
property and women. The "this" of sense-experience is a unique object, the "this" of 
language and thought is a universal. He concludes, 
42 Hegel's Phenomenology, Richard Norman, Sussex University Press 1976 pg 12. 
43 Op. Cit. p. p. F. S28, pp 42,43. 
44 Ibid. S28, pg 43. 
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"Just as the word is not the object so the being that is spoken or ideated is not 
the real being.,, 45 
The immediacy of Hegel, therefore, can at best be the immediacy of the idea which he 
himself refers to as "intuition". 46 Even this however, is subject to Feuerbach's critique 
since even mental experience must be particular and different from the universal itself. 
Hegel may however mean to use the term "(im)mediate"to denote logical simplicity, 
although it clearly cannot mean axiomatic. Feuerbach still has to explain why a criterion 
should not be one which is internal to the thought process i. e. why such a criterion would 
not give us knowledge of the real world. He fends off a supposed criticism of his onto- 
logical attack on Hegel as follows, 
"Were one to reply that Hegel deals with being, not from the practical 
viewpoint, as here, but from the theoretical viewpoint, I would be obliged to 
reciprocate by saying that the practical viewpoint is here completely justified. 
The question of being is indeed a practical question in which our being partici- 
pates; it is a question of life and death. "47 
This is a telling point as we shall see below. Feuerbach's ontology is materialist since 
what is known is ultimately sensuous and real (being the contingent particular which is 
independent of the thought process). Hegel's view is therefore a misrepresentation. 
Abstractions are now taken to be part of the material world. With respect to art (which is 
always abstract to some degree), he says, 
"Art "depicts the truth in sensation"; this means when rightly comprehended 
and expressed, that art depicts the truth of sensation.,, 48 
45 Ibid. S28, pg 43. 
46 This is also Husserl's "seeing". Hegel regards it as the lowest level of knowledge, reflecting 
first impressions and popular prejudice. This is because the true meaning of a concept is only un- 
derstood when it is grasped in relation to the universe of thought to which it is necessarily related. 
Our concepts must be critically assessed in this light according to him. 
47 op. cit., P. P. F. S28 
48 Ibid. S39, pg 57. 
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and of religion, 
"Where God appears in the fire and is worshiped, there in truth, the fire is 
worshiped as God. God in the fire is nothing other than the essence of fire 
which, because of its effects and attributes astounds men; 49 God in man is 
nothing other than the essence of man.,, 50 
This is the Feuerbachian inversion of Hegel. However, explaining how essences, which 
are universal, exist in the world of sensuous particulars is more difficult. Language con- 
sists of universals, sensuous particulars are not part of language, they are, according to 
Feuerbach, "unutterable". He says, 
"But here also I owe my existence never to the linguistic or logical bread - 
bread in itself - but always only to "this" bread, to the "unutterable". Being 
that is founded on many such unutterable things is therefore itself something 
unutterable. "51 
and, 
If therefore, being unutterable is being irrational, then the whole of existence is 
irrational because it is always and forever only this existence.,, 52 
This assumes that reason is possible only in terms of relations between universal con- 
cepts. He goes on, 
"But it is not irrational. Existence has meaning and rationality for itself, also 
without being utterable. "53 
49 This is not the case unless all the attributes of God are manifested in the fire. Even then the 
logic is not strictly correct. Iron was once regarded as a holy metal. An iron sword might be treated 
with reverence but so might an iron bucket. The particular object is not what is being revered. 
Feuerbach may be correct in saying that the essence of fire is the predicate of a material object, but 
as a universal it could be predicated of many different objects. This is precisely how the trinity is 
described in the Greek texts although the evidence for the existence of the things to which divinity 
is ascribed is scanty. 
50 Op. cit. p. P. F. S40, pp 57,58. 
51 Ibid. S28, pp 43,44. 
52 Ibid. S28, p44- 
53 Ibid. S28, pg 44. 
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He seems to be saying that nature has a "logic-like" structure, perhaps a kind of natural 
necessity. What he is denying is the identity of this with its mental representation. 
Despite saying that nature is "unutterable" and "particular" he clearly thinks that it is 
describable in terms of universal concepts since he himself continually attempts to 
describe particular features of it. I would suggest that the view that he is expressing is 
that language "maps on" to nature without being identical with it and that nature itself has 
a "language-like" structure. This is presumably what licences the use in Marx and Engels 
of phrases like the "logic" of history or the "contradictions" of capitalism. An explanation 
of how this mapping is possible and how universality is revealed via particular experi- 
ences would of course involve a development of Marx's position on the relationship 
between subject and object. 
The Feuerbachian inversion does not however, fully explain Marx's relationship to 
Hegel. Marx's view is not simply Hegel's view of History interpreted as a material pro- 
cess. Feuerbach is simply the point of departure. Hegel for instance uses empirical 
material to demonstrate the existence of "Logic" in nature and society, whereas Marx 
uses the "Logic" as a means of analysing and expressing practically significant empirical 
material. Furthermore, Marx does not find it necessary to endorse Hegel's long deduction 
of the categories but uses Hegel's results piecemeal. Not only have these differences of 
approach and their consequences to be explained but crucially, how it is possible that a 
system of concepts, which can be applied to the world a priori and which is connected by 
logical necessity, can be interpreted as part of an a posteriori, contingent reality. 
Feuerbach is accusing Hegel of misrepresenting the nature of experience and thus 
giving a false account. But a critique of this kind still only addresses the question of the 
nature of the phenomenal world, is it not simply in this sense, a phenomenology? 
Although we have seen that when considering the evidence of experience, a self- 
consistent idealist theory cannot be constructed from it, whereas materialism can solve its 
own conceptual problems, yet there is a lingering sceptical doubt about the nature of 
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experience. 
Appeals to consistency and the evidence of the senses do not completely dispel this 
doubt because they appear to be criteria which function only to show the form which the 
the phenomenal world must necessarily take but which lack the power to ascribe a status 
to it as a whole. We are still playing the philosopher's game of looking for criteria which 
are internal to thought but which leave the nagging doubt that when all is said and done 
we are still dealing with a world of ideas. 
To put the discussion into perspective we must look at nature of epistemology itself 
and its relation to practice. But first a related problem will be examined, namely, on what 
basis can acceptance of the epistemological criteria themselves be justified? This is the 
problem previously referred to as "the dilemma of epistemology". 
2.1.5. The dilemma of epistemology 
Richard Norman summarises the problem as follows: - 
Any principle which specifies some criterion of what can and cannot count as 
authentic knowledge must itself appeal either to that criterion (circularity) or to 
some other criterion (regress); and this is so because, as Hegel says, any such 
principle is itself a claim to knowledge. "54 
He gives as an illustration of this point not only Hegel's analysis of the problem but also 
the way that it applies to Descartes and to empiricist philosophers. For Descartes, he 
quotes a passage from the "Meditations" where he tries to justify the criterion of clear 
and distinct ideas, in order to show that it is circular. But Descartes provides an excellent 
example of the problem in the longer and more celebrated "circle" within his thought. 
54 Op. cit. Hegel's Phenomenology, Richard Norman, pg 12. 
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He imagines an evil demon which puts ideas into his mind and asks himself the 
question as to whether there is anything which he thinks of about which he might not be 
deceived? He arrives at "the cogito" which he finds impossible to doubt. Then he asks 
himself why the cogito is convincing, formulating the criterion of clear and distinct ideas. 
But then he asks why it might not be that the whole mental process was the result of the 
demon's activities? The answer is that God created this process and would not allow us 
to be permanently deceived (to be a deceived being). This of course rests upon assump- 
tions about the existence and nature of God, propositions which elsewhere he tries to 
prove from the criterion of clear and distinct ideas. Thus he completes the circle. 
It is to his credit that he saw that no matter how plausible or inevitable the criterion 
might seem, one can continue to ask whether or not the plausibility itself might not be an 
error? 55 He chose circularity rather than the regress, hoping perhaps, that piety might do 
what logic could not. 
Modem empiricists also seem to be engaged in a justification for their methods 56 
which seems suspiciously circular. A good criterion it seems is one which rules out 
Astrology but admits physics. 57 When asked why Physics is epistemologically accept- 
able the answer seems to be because the criterion justifies it58 which is of course a circu- 
lar argument. 
55 Descartes is of course asking the question in terms of thought and what it represents not the 
somewhat sterile Husserlian question of whether I can know my own thought content? 
56 If I appear to be using the terms "method" and "criterion" interchangeably, this is because 
although one suggests a simple test and the other a complex of procedures, both function to rule on 
the admissibility or otherwise of theories. 
57 In Conjectures and Refutations Popper says, 
"My criticism of the verifyability criterion has always been this: against the intention of its de- 
fenders, it did not exclude the most obvious metaphysical statements; but it did exclude the 
most important and interesting of all scientific statements . ....... 
Op. cit. Conjectures and Refutations, K. R. Popper, pg 281. see also pg 40 and pp 255,256. 
58 Ibid. pp 57,56. In this section he also attempts to show that logic grounds the criterion thus 
begging the question of what grounds logic? 
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Even if the criterion is applied to things other than the physical sciences, it does no 
more than show that the method of these other practices is consistent with the physical 
sciences, which themselves remain unproved. The criterion can neither be established in 
terms of its own plausibility nor in terms of a well reputed body of theory. Perhaps this 
accounts for what some have perceived to be an ambiguity in Popper's work, namely 
whether he is saying what scientists do or what they ought to do. This may be vacillation 
between grounding his method in science or its own plausibility. 
popperians might object that Popper does not ground his method in anything in the 
sense of making it rest logically on other premisses, it is a hypothesis which is held open 
to refutation. But how is the method to be refuted? If it is tested directly to see if it gives 
satisfactory results, then the criterion by which we judge whether the results are satisfac- 
tory or not is either the criteria of the method itself, which involves us in circularity, or 
some other criterion in which case we are involved in a regress. The problem of what 
determines the admissibility of the evidence by which the method is tested is a variant of 
the problem which Paul Feyerabend pointed out, namely that there can be no neutral test 
between paradigmS59 (particularly epistemological paradigms). Testing the method 
against experience is an attempt to show its plausibility directly (what scientists should 
do). 
If, on the other hand, we take we take the option that this is what scientists actually 
do then we run into problems here also. This is because the method is validated not 
against experience but against an as yet unjustified methodology. Suppose the paradigm 
of science was Astrology. Popperians would hardly consider the question "does it accord 
with scientific method? " a reliable test under these circumstances. The only way to 
ensure that the test is reliable is to have a body of knowledge which is tested in the 
manner prescribed by the method itself. But now once again the result of the test of 
59 Op. cit. "How to be a Good Empiricist", Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar, pp 
7,8. 
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method is a foregone conclusion. If on the other hand science is justified in some other 
way, e. g. by its "success" (however this might be evaluated), then the position is not cir- 
cular but it has the problem of a regress. But if the method cannot be tested in these ways 
how can it be tested? 
The problem appears in Marx's work in The Gennan Ideology where he adopts the 
materialist perspective derived from his emphasis on sensuous practice. On the basis of 
this, he then proceeds to mount a critique of idealism, which forms the basis of the 
justification of his method. The method initially adopted assumes results based upon 
60 itself, the procedure is clearly circular. 
Hegel's attempted solution to this problem rests upon the view that all plausible cri- 
teria are partially valid methods of arriving at knowledge. Since they are partial, in his 
terms , one-sided", he can generate, via the usual logical procedure, a whole and complete 
method from them. This escapes the "dilemma" for two reasons. Firstly it is a negative 
process, each partial criterion is shown to be invalid since it isn't adequate to give the 
kind of knowledge which its "notion" suggests. This is what Richard Norman refers to as 
an "internal" test. 
61 It escapes the dilemma because criteria are not "founded" on each 
other in the usual way, i. e. the validity of one criterion depending upon the validity of 
another. Rather the validity of one criterion depends upon the correction of the invalidity 
of another. This avoids the foundationalist regress since one is not required in turn to 
validate the criterion which acts as the invalid point of departure. This might be referred 
to as a "critical" method since it proceeds by self-correction. Secondly its claim to vali- 
dity rests upon the totality of the result. The method is a kind of completeness proof; it 
generates all the partially valid criteria and shows their relationship to each other. It fol- 
lows that there can be no criterion giving another kind of knowledge which lies outside 
of the method. Hence there can be no sense in which the method can be shown 
60 Op. Cit. The German Ideology pp 47,48. 
61 Op. cit. Hegel's Phenomenology, pg 20. 
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inadequate to provide knowledge of any kind. 
One might doubt, however, that all plausible criteria are in fact linked conceptually 
in this way. Why should they be? Or secondly, even if there is such a structure of related 
criteria, Hegel may not have given a correct account of it. This last point is illustrated by 
Feuerbach's criticisms that Hegel misrepresents the role of sense-experience in the 
acquisition of knowledge. 62 
However, in suggesting that all criteria that appear superficially acceptable are con- 
tiected in some way, Hegel is making an important point, because criteria are either plau- 
sible or implausible for some definite reason. If the reasons which make criteria plausible 
could be uncovered then an important insight would have been gained into the nature of 
the epistemological enterprise. Hegel's own account of this connection however, is less 
than satisfactory. 
Criteria are related by virtue of being "moments" in the activity of reason. Reason is 
the appropriate way of gaining knowledge because reality is rational. Reality is rational 
because God is rational and reality is the embodiment of God's thought. This is both a 
Inystified account of why the criteria must be connected and also one which does not 
advance the understanding much further. Reason has a structure which is itself not amen- 
able to further explanation it just "is". In fact reason is the only real, objective and 
independent being for Hegel, freely conditioning everything else, whilst itself remaining 
unconditioned (or self-conditioned). It is Hegel's cosmological and theological 
equivalent to the Kantian structure of the mind. 
62 See above, P. P. F., secdon 28. 
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2.2. Epistemology and practice 
The explanation for all these problems I believe is as follows: - epistemology is the 
investigation into what constitutes knowledge. This is not a purely definitional problem. 
One might, for instance, say that if we take knowledge to be intellectual (knowing "that" 
rather than knowing "how"), then the criterion of self-consistency must apply since other- 
wise the candidate for knowledge would be unintelligible and therefore could not be 
intellectual knowledge by definition. But all definitional issues are, in the last instance, 
underdetermined by another question, namely, what criteria will give reliable information 
about the world? This question is a practical one, it refers to reliability in practice. Self- 
consistent theories may well be rejected if they give the wrong results and inconsistent 
ones may be retained. 63 Feuerbach put his finger on the key issue when he said with 
respect to ontology, 
"The question of being is indeed a practical question ..... it is a question of life 
and death. " 64 
What is true of ontology (what kind of world we face in our lives), is also true of 
epistemology (how we can come to know and hence deal with it). If the epistemological 
question is a practical one, that narrows down the sort of thing which can count as an 
answer. In general, the answer to "what criterion will give information which is reliable 
in practice? " is "one which can be shown to give reliable results in practice". This is a 
tautology but it serves a useful function because it rules out criteria that bear no relation 
to practice e. g. "inner certainty" as inappropriate answers and it demands that other cri- 
teria e. g. "internal consistency", be justified in terms of their practical value if they are to 
count as an answer. The "dilemma" as it applies to Popper for instance can be prevented 
by stopping the regress as follows. 
63 Witness quantum theory. 
64 Op. cit. PY. F., S28, pg 43. (My italics). 
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Science is a collection of theories and methods which have proved reliable in prac- 
tice. This provides a foundation against which we can test epistemological principles. 
"Reliability in practice" as a criterion of acceptability doesn't require further justification 
because it is directly related to the question asked, namely, "what methods provide infor- 
mation which is reliable in practice?,, 65 1 am not simply defining the epistemological 
enquiry in these terms, the practical question has always underlain epistemological con- 
cems no matter how the problem has been posed by different writers. 
Epistemological criteria in fact take their plausibility from the role they play in 
practice. Internal consistency for instance is a "good" criterion because understanding is 
involved in human beings coping with the world. Since inconsistency thwarts the under- 
standing so consistency becomes valued as a pre-requisite of knowledge. Similarly, since 
human beings are attempting to predict sense-experience so in the last analysis these 
predictions can only be tested against sense-experience. Thus sense-experience becomes 
valued as a criterion of knowledge. The fact that we might misinterpret the evidence of 
the senses only poses a sub-problem for empiricism, not a refutation. We must both test 
our views this way and eliminate false interpretations. Sceptical arguments cannot be car- 
ried to the limit against the evidence of the senses as we have seen. Once again this stops 
the regress. if criteria are justified in terms of the role they play in practice then the 
appeal to practice needs no further justification. To ask the question whether our views, 
though they work in practice, might not be useful fictions; would beg the question as to 
what we might mean by "fiction" in this context. 
In general, however, the problems of the pervasiveness of scepticism about any 
form of realism (might it not just be an idea? ) and the dilemma of epistemology, are due 
to treating the epistemological enquiry as if it were a question of discovering that which 
65 The criterion is somewhat vague; no doubt the Zande believe that their witch-oracle is reli- 
able in practice. I would argue however, that a reduction in unexplained fires would be better af- 
fected by fire precautions than by hunting for witches and that this can be shown unequivocally. 
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is convincing to the intellect. The status of the intellectually plausible can never be more 
than that of a belief or hypothesis and hence uncertain and vulnerable to skeptical argu- 
ment. If one's belief is wrong then it is nothing more than an idea, a subjective impres- 
sion. It is this view which undermines all certainty about the ontological status of the 
"real" world. 
Similarly, all criteria of certainty are vulnerable to scepticism for the same reason 
hence the dilemma of the "regress" or "circularity". However, once the epistemological 
question is posed not in terms of plausibility but in terms of reliability for sensuous prac- 
tice, the ground of the debate is shifted from questions of belief to questions of evidence. 
The realist, materialist ontology is "built in" to the way this question is asked. One may 
question the actual relationship between our ideas and sense-experience but not the 
attempt to produce a congruence between them. 
Marx, s materialism therefore is justified in the last analysis not simply by the fact 
that it is conceptually coherent (his solution to the subject-object relation), nor that ideal- 
ist alternatives are conceptually incoherent. These are necessary but not sufficient condi- 
tions of a correct epistemology. The final justification comes from the manner in which 
these criteria are themselves related to the fundamental question of epistemological 
inquiry, i. e. their relation to sensuous practice. 
3. Universals in a Materialist perspective 
Now we can turn to the second conceptual source of idealist theories, namely the 
status of universals. Universals are collective entities. The question of the relationship 
between a collective entity and the sectional and individual parts that comprise it directly 
addresses the issue raised in chapter one concerning the source of undesirable features of 
all societies other than primitive or developed communism. 
It addresses the question of how to correctly understand the relationship between 
collective or societal interests and individual interests, collective values and individual 
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values, institutionalised action and individual or sectional action. It is the coincidence of 
social co-operation and individual and sectional conflict which is the source of the prob- 
lems referred to above and the solution to them presupposes an adequate analysis of these 
relationships. 
To represent the collective as something which has or ought to have causal primacy 
, over the individuals which comprise it is to represent it as an alien force which controls 
people, a god. It is characteristic of a religious, non-scientific mode of thought. Such 
, views in part derive their plausibility from the conceptual errors in the treatment of the 
problem of universals. 66 Marx tends to refer to any theory which treats the collective in 
this way as "idealism" since it involves treating an abstraction as an all powerful and 
complete entity. Such an entity for him is a projection of the mind, an imaginary or 
illusory being. 
The connection with idealism in the narrower sense, however, comes through the 
identification of the universal with unavoidable or morally obligatory conceptualisations 
of the world. Sensuous particulars by contrast are identified with the irrational, pliant, 
material substrate of the world. Such views act as justifications of a moral order. 
Marx's philosophy of science is, among other things, an attempt to "de-mystify" this 
interpretation by exposing it as fallacious. Correct articulation of the relationship 
between universal and particular and the corresponding status of the former is especially 
urgent for Marx since he is committed to re-interpreting the Hegelian "Logic", a system 
, of universals, as something which refers to material reality. 
66 Marx stresses the reciprocal argument as even more fundamental. The representation of 
universals as something other than and opposed to their parts is made plausible by the existence of 
collective entities such as the state and the market which appear to correspond to this relationship. 
It is Marx's contention that only by changing the social circumstances which give rise to these 
spurious collective entities, (spurious in the sense of not totally expressing the collective will and 
itherefore not being the proper universal corresponding to their supposed particulars), that the intel- 
lectual arguments will be settled. Historical circumstances will provide counter-examples to the 
speculative logic and undermine its plausibility. Cf. op-cit. Economic and Philosophical 
Afanuscripts, pg 103, last paragraph. 
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What then is the origin of universality and necessity? I think that whilst one may 
accept Hume's point that they are not sensuous particulars, one need not conclude that 
their origin is unconnected with the world of sense-experience. Truth is a description of 
reality, and how the world is to be described for Marx and Engels is in terms of its 
predisposition to manifest itself in certain ways. 
What an object actually does, how it interacts with other things including the sub- 
ject, is recorded in experience. What it is however, is something which can be relied on 
to act in certain ways, that which "always" acts in certain ways, that which "necessarily" 
acts in certain ways. Universality and necessity are implied in the move from descrip- 
tions of experience to descriptions of essence. 
There are good practical reasons however, why we should describe the world in 
terms of essences. Hume showed that the alternative is conceptual atomisation of the 
world in time and space. These essences however are material essences, material things 
with dispositional properties, but it is their dispositional character which involves univer- 
sality and necessity. 
One cannot of course know with absolute certainty on the basis of the evidence of 
experience that some relation holds universally and necessarily. There are however, prac- 
tical advantages in looking for and acting as if relationships have this character. 
if, for instance, a series of separate events are linked in a necessary sequence, then 
when part of the sequence is experienced, I can anticipate the rest. Thus, I regard the 
presence of each event as an experience of the process in which it is embodied, (a single 
thing which is experienced as a sequence of different things). The process is the univer- 
sal single cause of the appearances. When each event is present the process is present. 
Similarly, when I experience a useful object, say a carrier bag, from different visual 
perspectives, I assume that other experiences can be had in relation to this object if the 
appropriate actions are performed, visual experiences as well as the experience of carry- 
ing things in it. The assumption that this is necessarily the case allows me to make 
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inferences about the potential of the object which go beyond factors which are immedi- 
ately present to experience. That these properties are permanent features of the object is 
an assumption which allows me to regard each different experience as an experience of a 
single universally present object. 67 
The fact that these are only assumptions however, does not licence the conclusion 
that in describing the dispositional properties of an object I am characterising it as an 
idea. Also, in so far as experience does not falsify them, the assumptions are justifyable 
from the point of view of sensuous practice. 
Not all universals however, seem to represent a single entity which is predisposed to 
act in certain ways. A word such as leaf represents many objects which are not simply 
manifestations of the same thing. 
68 It does however represent the propensity of each of 
these objects to stand in the same relation in some respect to a subject or to other objects. 
Thus it relates to a common mode of action and interaction which is assumed to be a 
universal property of the class. The universal "leaf', of course doesn't name the common 
property but whatever has the property. 
There is a link between the unification of many events into the behaviour of a single 
entity and the unification of many entities into a single class. If some dispositional pro- 
perty exists there is a suggestion that it will manifest itself on more than one occasion or 
67 This position is derived from Hegel's approach to the question of the nature of universality 
and necessity. Hegel criticises the Kantian solution to the problem bequeathed by Hume that the 
necessary connections between sensuous particulars which would establish their unity are not 
themselves given in experience. Kant suggests that unifying categories are supplied by the mind 
but Hegel tries to show the intrinsic, logical relation between the universal and particular. 
In contrast to the Socratic position which identifies the universal with the common feature 
within each particular, Hegel's view regards the universal as the whole interconnected structure of 
particulars which is expressed through each individual. There need not be a common feature. This 
clearly is an attempt to solve the modern, Humean problem of universals not the mediaeval one 
(despite the Platonic connection evidenced by the similarity of the solution to the discourse in the 
second part of Plato's Parmenides). 
68 Marx ridicules Hegel for confusing these different uses of universals in The Holy Family 
where he points out that there isn't an entity called "the fruit" which manifests itself now as an ap- 
ple, now as a pear. 
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in more than one set of circumstances. The situations in which it does manifest itself are 
thereby linked as a class. Some operation which can be performed with respect to each 
member of the class defines it, i. e. each member responds to some particular way which a 
subject is disposed to act, (the class of objects I define as food is composed of all the 
things I am disposed to eat). 
A universal used to denote a class names anything possessing a particular value for 
action. Referring to things by class names simplifies our relations to the world, emphasis- 
ing only those features which are of Particular significance in terms of our general orien- 
tation and de-emphasising the features which are not significant for action. Referring to 
things uniquely would put impossible barriers in the way of lastingly useful, transmissi- 
ble, knowledge. 
At no time in this description have I suggested that what the universal names is an 
idea. Both the common feature and the thing which possesses it can be part of the 
material world. Thus Marx and Engels can intelligibly regard universals as material. 
Hegelian universals are linked by logical necessity however, so if Marx accepts 
these logical relations his position requires an explanation of how such relations can 
describe the apparently contingent world of sense-experience. Formal truths such as logi- 
cal and mathematical truths are true by virtue of the rules of how to correctly manipulate 
the concepts, Le. correctness is checked a posteriori against the rules rather than against 
the world. But where the concepts can represent relations in the world, they represent 
abstract formal properties of invariant material relations. If the material relations were 
not invariant then the mathematics or logic could not represent them. 69 
68 There is a problem of the intelligibility of the notion of a common property which appears in 
Plato's Parmenides which I will not discuss here. 
69 This is why Euclidean geometry which is essentially a system of logic can be used to solve 
architectural problems for example. 
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Thus Hegel's logic is not just a conceptual game with arbitrary rules but a game 
whose rules have a physical analogue. Marx and Engels regard the Logic as an abstrac- 
tion from the physical world of its most general features and the necessity it expresses 
represents the necessary relations within the material world. 70 But if Marx accepts the 
logical relations the question arises as to whether the whole encyclopedia applies in every 
case since it is connected by a long chain of deductive links. It raises the question of the 
position taken by Marx and Hegel to the long deduction. 
3.1. The Locke-Leibniz debate 
In response to the question of Marx's attitude to the long deduction of Hegel, it will 
be useful to recall the background to the Hegelian enterprise. Some light may be shed on 
this by considering the debate between Locke and Leibniz on the contents of the mind. 
Locke held that the mind is a blank slate (tabula rasa ) until experience writes upon 
it. The only functions other than recording experience allotted to the mind was the capa- 
city to dissociate and associate ideas, such that for instance the idea of a centaur can be 
formed from the ideas of part of a horse and part of a man. 
Leibniz wrote to Locke pointing out that mathematical truths cannot be accounted 
for in this way. The truth that two and two make four cannot be derived from experience 
since no matter how many times this is observed to be true of objects in the world, the 
necessity of the result, which is what vouches for its universal validity, cannot be demon- 
strated. Leibniz went on to suggest that the mind was less like a blank slate than a piece 
of veined marble. 
71 If a sculptor attempts to carve veined marble, unless the chisel is held 
at or close to a right angle to the veins, the stone will fissure along the line of the vein. 
70 Why these features are seemingly ubiquitous is discussed in the next chapter. 
71 New Essays on Human Understanding, G. W. Leibniz, translated and edited by Peter Rem- 
nant and Jonathon Bennett, Cambridge University Press 198 1, Bk. 1, Ch. 1, Preface and section 23 
(86). 
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The stone tends to assume certain shapes which are natural to it since these are already 
part of the way that it is constituted. 
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Similarly, Leibniz suggested, The mind also has an inbuilt structure which 
predisposes it towards recognition of certain formal relations in the world, indeed since it 
cannot do otherwise in virtue of its nature, these relations appear to be necessary rela- 
tions, their denial a denial of thought itself. 
Kant was a dogmatic Leibnizian73 until he realised that Hume's discovery that 
universality and necessity are not sense objects accorded with Leibniz' account. He then 
realised that it was possible to give a single account in line with both traditions. Kant's 
categories and Hegel's Logic are both attempts to trace the veins in the marble but since 
Hegel believes that the world is mind for him this is an attempt to trace the ultimate 
structure of reality. 74 Logical necessity for him as for Leibniz is the defining characteris- 
tic of this structure. To show that something is logically necessary then, is to demonstrate 
that it is part of the framework of reality. 
He also accepts the view of Plato that truth is that which doesn't change. 75 The state 
for instance can be a monarchy, an oligarchy, a democracy etc. To discover what the true 
or essential nature of the state is, Socrates searches for characteristics which remain 
unchanged in the differing forms. Characteristics which are always present are neces- 
sarily present. Hence the search for truth is the search for universal and necessary 
72 This is a somewhat Kantian interpretation. In the section quoted Leibniz does no more than 
suggest that the mind needs to be "polished up" (by mathematics) to see the veins (structure). 
73 Re. , dogmatic slumber", Prolegomena to any Future metaphysics that will be able to 
Represent Itself as a Science, Introduction and notes by Peter G. Lucas, Manchester University 
Press 1971, pg 9. For Kant's relation to Leibniz see Kant, R. Scruton, Oxford University Press 
1982, pp 13-17. 
74 Hegel is taking a position opposite to Leibniz and Kant in so far as this structure is not re- 
garded as a structure of the subject's mind but of objective reason-in-the-world, e. g. "What is real 
is rational and what is rational is real". 
75 The argument is something like as follows: - Truth is an assertion about reality which is nev- 
er false, which evidence cannot refute. Since the assertion always applies, what it is an assertion 
about can never change, otherwise the real world would no longer correspond to the assertion. 
Hence the search for truth is a search for descriptions of the unchanging features of the real world. 
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characteristics. 76 One must add to this that the object of inquiry in Hegel is the world in 
its most general features not any particular quality of it. So his truth is not any particular 
truth but an all-embracing structure of truth. 
Thus we are back to Leibniz's veined marble, a universal and necessary structure 
which because it is universal and necessary is an ideal not a sensuous object. It's status as 
truth depends upon these features and the deduction establishes the status. 
3.2. Marx and Engels on Truth 
All conceptual frameworks for Marx and Engels are human products and as such are 
related to sensuous practice. Given the relationship which Marx postulates between conS- 
ciousness and language, one would assume that the "Logic" is regarded as a linguistic 
form. 
Since language is a historical human product not a framework of eternal truth, the 
validity of the application of both language and logic, one would presume, is to be found 
by assessing their role in representing and communicating those features of the world 
which have practical significance to a human subject. Hence, Marx and Engels must 
reject the veined marble account. 
if universality and necessity are due to the structure of the mind, the structure of 
reason (or language as they would regard it) or even due to the structure of the brain (if 
this is taken as the ultimate level of explanation) then we have "realityll, as it is experi- 
enced, determined in these most basic features by subjective factors alone and untouched 
by human interaction with the external world. This is an non-dialectical explanation. The 
form of Marx and Engels' explanations of the features of the world is invariably evolu- 
tion via interaction. There are no uncaused causes. 
76 Though as stated previously, for Hegel it is not some part of each individual which remains 
the same but the connection of each individual to the whole. The connection to the whole is an im- 
portant element in the identity of each part. 
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The role of the deduction as something which establishes truth, therefore, must be 
77 rejected by Marx and Engels along with the metaphysics in which it is embedded. 
3.3. Marx's selective use of Hegel's analysis 
The insight into the logical relations between some of the concepts, however, is 
accepted. Marx does not accept all the deductions of the Encyclopedia, in particular he 
criticises the connections which Hegel tries to establish between the major divisions of 
the Encyclopedia. These transitions are clearly different in kind from the relations within 
these divisions. Also, he only accepts sections from the "Nature" and the "Mind". The 
explanation for these usages is given below. How and when concepts are to be applied to 
reality, is determined by empirical circumstances. Marx's use of dialectics therefore is 
part of the methodology of an empirical science. I will discuss this in more detail in 
chapter three. 
The basis of the argument which justifies the transition from the "Logic" to the 
"Nature" in the Encyclopedia is that nature is the realm of the particular, and the univer- 
sals of the Logic presuppose particular instantiations. This view draws upon the Humean 
dichotomy which sees particulars as part of the external world of experience but univer- 
sals as supplied by the mind. He also says that nature is not merely external to the mind 
but is itself the realm of external relations, one supposes because particulars are external 
to each other. 
In fact the particulars in the "Nature" are just the universals of the Logic with the 
qualification that they are to be regarded as external to the mind. These universals there- 
fore inhabit the Humean realm of sensuous experience, they are universals in the world. 
"Being" becomes "Space" and "Becoming" becomes "Time". "Space" and "Time" are 
regarded as particular instances of "Being" and "Becoming". 
77 The so-called "logic" of historical processes is a different concept, see below. 
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Their deduction however, relies upon identifying "particularity" with "externality to 
the mind" since it is this latter quality which is the specific difference which has been 
added rather than particularity as such. This represents a provisional acceptance of the 
Humean view of particulars but also a negation of this view in favour of the "naive real- 
ist" position with respect to universals. 
Since the universals are related logically to each other, so the concepts of the 
"Nature" lose their externality to each other in the course of the dialectical reasoning pro- 
cess. What is achieved, however, is on one hand the reproduction of the Logic with the 
qualification that it has external existence; on the other, and perhaps more enlightening, 
an exposition of the logical relations between the concepts commonly used to describe 
natural phenomena. This is a useful practical result. 
With respect to the former point, Marx says that the transition to Nature is made 
because thought is dissatisfied with its own sterility and wants to deduce something real. 
But the deduction of nature can never be anything more than the deduction of the thought 
of nature. 78 
Hegel cannot deduce the empirical detail of the natural world only explain the rela- 
tions between the concepts we use to describe it. He has unified the universal and particu- 
lar which are divided in Hume in an attempt to show that the universals are as objective 
as the particulars. This is intended to overcome the devaluation of the universal to the 
status of the merely subjective in contrast to the sensuous particulars, a view subscribed 
to, each in their different ways, by both Hume and Kant. 
He criticises Kant on this account for being too empiricist but this proximate result 
is even more empiricist since the subject now supplies no content to reality. The second 
major transition from "Nature" to "Mind", however, is intended to rectify this situation 
by unifying subject and object in a manner which gives primacy to subjectivity. 
78 op. cit. E. p. M. pg. 152-155 
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When Hegel's analysis of nature has reached the categories of organic life he 
attempts to take the next step to deduce consciousness. Consciousness is represented as 
holistic awareness, i. e. the organism aware of the whole of its own functioning. This is 
part of the way the whole controls the behaviour of the parts implied by the analysis of 
"organic causality" Oust as reciprocally the parts determine the behaviour of the whole). 
Conscious life however, is subjective so the object is now simultaneously subject as well. 
From this point on he analyses human conscious activity which he sees as deter- 
mined by mind. He draws the conclusion therefore, that individual and social life in so 
far as it is determined by reason will once again reflect the categories of the Logic though 
this time via the mediation of consciousness. The conscious mind discovers the logical 
sequence of the categories in history. 
This gives the dialectic a temporal dimension whereas in the "Logic" it only has a 
logical dimension and in the "Nature" a structural dimension. In the "Mind" therefore 
subject dominates object and determines its form. Because Hegel could analyse nature in 
terms of the structure of the Logic he somewhat unwarrantedly drew the the conclusion 
that Reason, i. e. the Logic, was the "substance" of nature. After the transition to Mind he 
also draws the conclusion that it is "subject" also. The Logic works itself out through 
conscious action in the world. 
Marx agrees with Hegel's insight that in human activity, both individual and social, 
man is both subject and object. He makes himself and the world on which he depends the 
object of his own actions. He disagrees however, with the view that the sequence of the 
flegelian universals determine his actions in changing himself as an object. 
In the "Mind", in one sense, what we have again is the sterile replication of the 
Logic in yet another dimension of existence, the purpose of which is merely to justify 
flegel's metaphysical claims. But again crucially, we also have an analysis of actual 
social relations which shows the correct structural forTn which they take due to his use of 
the appropriate logic in his analysis of them. It is this substantive element in Hegel's 
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work, rather than the more grandiose claims, which Marx praises as going beyond any 
other theorist up to his own time. 
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, he says, 
"The human character of nature and of nature created by history - man's pro- 
ducts - appears in the form that they are products of abstract mind as such, 
therefore, phases of mind - thought entities. " 
and 
....... even though man appears only as mind, there lie concealed in it [the 
Phenomenology] all the elements of criticism, already prepared and ela- 
borated in a manner often rising above the Hegelian standpoint. The "unhappy 
consciousness", the "honest consciousness", the struggle of "noble and base 
consciousness", etc., etc. -these separate sections contain, but still in an 
estranged form, the critical elements of whole spheres such as religion, the 
state, civil life etc. " 79 
The Logic as the determining force in history however is the central point with which he 
disagrees. Hegel refers to "the cunning of Reason" that it makes use of the passions in 
order that ideas may be brought into effect. Ideas for Hegel arouse passions, men are pas- 
sionate about ideas and struggle over them. Sensuous existence therefore serves reason. 
For Marx, however, the relation is reversed, reason is in the service of sensuous 
existence. Material conditions determine the problematic of sensuous existence and 
rational thought is always, no matter how obliquely, a response to that problematic. It is 
the material process, not the dialectic of ideas therefore, which is the crucial determining 
factor. 
79 Ibid. pg 139-140 
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In the Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy of 1859, 
he contrasts the Hegelian notion of the order of discovery of concepts running from sim- 
ple to complex with actual examples. In these examples he shows instances which coin- 
cide with Hegel's view and ones which show the opposite. He demonstrates in this text 
the complexity of the methodological problem to which Hegel's simple reproduction of 
the Logic in the realm of history is not adequate. 
Marx himself analyses history as a predictable process, however, but the material 
process which he analyses draws upon the Logic as the correct form in which the empiri- 
cal material is interconnected. The content of history is not supplied by the Logic as it is 
in Hegel, it is discovered. 
Hegel's Nature is not in fact a single structure. The earlier categories "sun" and 
"moon" are not intended to be regarded as part of say "the terrestrial organism,, which 
comes later. The principles which the sun and moon embody may be involved in the later 
structure but the substantive examples are separate. This is also true of the Mind 
In the same way the substantive issues which Marx addresses must be analysed on 
their merits, organic systems require organic logic etc. In the widest framework of 
analysis we are dealing with totalities so that in this sense the organic logic always 
required for an exhaustive explanation but for localised problems it is not always 
required. One might, on this basis, want to argue that "choice of context" determines 
which level of analysis will be used, but inclusion of a wider context re-defines the object 
of study, i. e. it gives us a new object. 
To understand what Marx specifically derives from Hegel's work we must look at 




1. Hegel's problematic and the Logic 
Hegel's dialectical approach to philosophy may be understood both as a response to 
the political and social environment in which he wrote and to the problems of the intel- 
lectual traditions which he inherited. Hegel wrote at a time when Europe was attempting 
to come to terms with one of its most significant events - the French Revolution. It 
offered the spectacle of a society attempting to reconstruct itself on the basis of a new 
philosophy. The challenge to the old ways of thought was fundamental. Truth was to be 
decided not by reference to an authoritative source (tradition, Aristotle, the Bible) but by 
reference to reason and the evidence of the senses. This method tended to produce a 
naturalist ontology with no place for spiritual entities such as angels or God, and none 
therefore, for the church. Its ethics were egalitarian since all men, as a natural species, 
had the same capacities for enjoyment and suffering and its democratic politics flowed 
from this since it followed that inherited power and status appears arbitrary and 
unjustified from this standpoint. The challenge was thus epistemological, ontological, 
ethical and political. It was a phenomenon of the utmost importance for the future of 
European society and exercised the minds of all its hereditary rulers who had much to 
lose. 
For philosophy, however, it raised questions which had not been addressed by the 
enlightenment up to this point, questions concerning the dynamics of change. The battle 
between the idea systems appeared on the surface to be the cause of the historical change. 
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It raised the question for rationalists of whether one can decide on rational grounds that 
one system is better than another. All systems previously had assumed their own founda- 
tions intuitively to be correct or by virtue of rhetorical arguments which were not recog- 
nised as such. Hegel saw that their was a problem with foundations (the dilemma of 
epistemology). 1 Although he doesn't set out explicitly to give an answer to the political 
problem of legitimacy as the point of departure of his work, nevertheless, it addresses it 
at this crucial time, a point not lost on his successors, "The Young Hegelians", of whom 
Marx was one. 
The Hegelian "solution" involved the development of a dialectical logic in which 
ideas and systems based upon them are seen to be related in terms of oppositions and 
reconciliations in syntheses which encompass the opposites. Politically, this allows com- 
parison and evaluation of the idea systems on whiclý social programmes are based 
because a synthesis is superior to each of the opposites (since they are partial or one- 
sided by comparison). History is seen as the progressive movement of reason in time 
expressed through human action. Later developments are justified at the expense of ear- 
lier since they preserve what was of value in previous systems whilst superceding them. 
This view is a form of rationalism which attempts to avoid the charge of simply being a 
subversive antithesis to tradition as was levelled at the French Enlightenment. It could be 
seen, therefore, as a defence of rationalism against both reaction and relativism. 
Hegel's response to the philosophical thought of his time, the Enlightenment and 
German Idealism, can also be seen as the source of his dialectical logic. He accepted the 
essentially Leibnizian move of Kant in response to the crisis of Hume's empiricism. The 
mind or reason has a structure outside of which we cannot think intelligibly. According 
to Kant, this structure is composed of fundamental concepts which must be applied to the 
world in order that it may be understood. Hegel, however, claims to be more thoroughly 
I Op. cit., Hegel's Phenomenology, Richard Norman, CHI pp 9-12. 
This dilemma is at the root of much of the anti-foundationalist philosophy of the present time. 
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rationalist than Kant. 2 For him, the way we reason the world to be is the way that it is. 
The concepts are also "in the world" as its fundamental structure and not merely products 
of the human mind. Since, however, he also accepts the view that the concepts are 
universals and that universality is a characteristic of reason, he is led to regard everything 
as "Mind" in a sense similar to the "Nous" of Anaxagoras or to the viewpoint of Spinoza. 
Hegel's grounding, however, was in ancient Greek philosophy and he analysed the 
Humean problem in terms of the relationship of the universal to the particular, i. e. he 
understood it as a rediscovery of the problem of universals. 3 The defect in Hume's 
empiricism for him, therefore, was its one-sided emphasis on the particular events of 
sense experience to the exclusion of the systematic interrelationships in terms of which 
each event alone becomes intelligible. For Hegel, the characterisation of the particular 
depends upon its relationship to other particulars and therefore, to the universa14 and 
(vice versa). The Phenomenology of Mind, beginning as it does with sense-certainty, is 
intended to address the Humean problematic from this viewpoint. He regards Kant's 
5 
solution as being in error, therefore, in regarding the universals of the mind and the par- 
ticulars of sense as separate orders of things such that the imposition of the categories 
distorts reality and masks the nature of the "thing-in-itself' from the subject. For Hegel, 
in contrast, "the rational" is "the real" and sense-experience, in so far as it is intelligible, 
logically presupposes the universal structure in which it is embedded. 6 
2 He regards Kant's "thing-in -itself, as an empiricist Prejudice that there is something "out 
there" which causes experience and which is not a product of mind. 
3 If experience takes the form of individual events, the question arises as to the origin of the 
universal concepts in terms of which we describe it. 
The answers to this question are usually classified under the headings realist, conceptualist 
or nominalist. Kant is clearly a conceptualist, Hegel is a cOnceptualist-realist, since he thinks 
everything is "Mind", and Marx is a nominalist-realist, since he regards consciousness as identical 
to language but also as representing something real. 
4 For Hegel, the interrelated system of particulars is what the universal names. 
5 Hegel's other main criticism of Kant, of course, is that he did not grasp that Mind evolves his- 
torically and hence did not appreciate the role of reason in this Process (or indeed as the process). 
Hegel regarded Kant's epistemology as retarded at the level of the understanding. 
6 The Feuerbachian/Marxian critique of which is to accept the logical point but to object that it 
also re-absorbs the objectivitY of sense-experience into the realm of Mind. Cf. op. cit., E. P. M. pg 
141. 
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In the character of this solution, based upon the interrelation between the universal 
and the particular, we see one of the reasons for Hegel's reversion to and re-interpretation 
of the dialectics of ancient Greek philosophy which will be explained in greater detail 
below. In the Kantian problem of "the antinomies of reason" we see another. Kant found 
that when applying "the categories" to infinite objects: the world, God, the mind etc., one 
can construct equally good arguments supporting opposed propositions with respect to 
the predicate in question, e. g. "the world is limited (in time and space)"; "the world is 
unlimited (in time and space)". Kant reasoned, however, that since the purpose of the 
categories is to make sense of experience and "the infinite" cannot be experienced, then 
the categories cannot properly be applied to it. 
7 
Hegel thought this solution to be based upon a misconception of the problem. 
Firstly, he demonstrated that Kant's antinon-fies are actually contradictions, (e. g. from the 
assumption that the world is limited it can be deduced that it is unlimited and vice 
versa). 8 Secondly, the reason for the contradiction lies not in the nature of the object to 
which they are applied but in the nature of the categories themselves. The Kantian 
categories are what Plato referred to as "categorials" - concepts which can be predicated 
of everything. Everything has unity, i. e. is one thing; everything has a cause etc. 
Hegel accepts the proposition that "to determine is to negate", i. e. to specify some- 
thing involves differentiating it from what it is not. Specification, therefore, produces 
pairs of concepts, e. g. red and non-red. If the concepts are not categorials, then of the 
objects of which they can logically be predicated (in the case above colours), one side of 
the opposition will refer to some of the objects and the other side will refer to the rest. If 
on the other hand the concepts are categorials, then both of the opposed concepts can 
always be correctly predicated of everything, that is to say they will of necessity refer to 
7 Cf. The Critique of Pure Reason, I. Kant, introduction, Norman Kemp Smith, "Antinomies of 
Pure Reason" section 9, Macmillan 1929 pp 454,455. Reprinted 1978. 
8 Cf. The Science of Logic, G. W. F. Hegel, trans. A. V. Miller, Allen and Unwin 1969 pp 236, 
237. 
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the same things at the same time. This is the source of the antinomies. The application of 
the categories to totalities such as the world draws attention to the problem but is not its 
cause. 9 Furthermore it affects every object not just the so-called infinite ones. 
1.1. The classical sources of Hegel's dialectics 
In the zusatz to SS81 of the Lesser logic, the section which describes dialectic, 
Hegel gives as examples, Kant's antinomies of reason and Plato's Parinenides. 10 
In the third part of the Pannenides the question is posed, "Can the one be many? " ("One" 
and "many" are, of course, categorials). The answer given is "no". The argument contin- 
ues: If the one cannot be many then it cannot have parts (since that would make it many). 
If it doesn't have parts then it cannot be a whole because a whole is composed of parts. 
Then later: It cannot be round because to be round is to have all points on its circumfer- 
ence equal distance from the centre, but to speak of points, circumference and centre is to 
divide it into parts. Similarly, it cannot be straight, at rest, moving, etc. This is a sample 
of the argument. " 
What appears to follow from it is first, the concepts of one and many, although 
exclusive of each other in meaning, must apply to the same things on pain of setting up a 
destructive pattern of reasoning which denies truth to every proposition including both 
predicates of exhaustive oppositions. This situation would reduce all statements to unin- 
telligibility. This is the opposite view to the one which informs the law of non- 
contradiction. There, the predication of mutually exclusive concepts to the same thing 
9 If a concept is applied to a totality - an infinite object - there is nothing for its opposite con- 
cept to apply to except the same totality (otherwise it would have no referent). 
10 He also discusses the relationship of dialectics to Sophistry and Humean skepticism. C. f. 
Hegel's Logic - being part one of the encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences., trans. W. Wal- 
lace, Oxford University Press 1975, section 81, pp 116-119. 
11 Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntingdon Cairns, Princeton 
University Press 1961, Parmenides, section 137 c, d, e, pp 91,92. 
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results in unintelligibility, here, it results from not permitting it. Secondly, concepts such 
as "straight" or "round" which are not categorials are affected also because they can be 
regarded as "species" of the categorials, e. g. a line defined as a series of points is a 
specific form of "plurality". As such it becomes entangled in the problem of the relation 
of plurality to unity. This latter point gives an insight into how Hegel's logic might be 
related to arguments concerning more concrete issues than just the relationships between 
the categorials themselves-12 
In The Sophist, Plato responds to his own problem (of "necessary" contradictions) 
through the character of an Eleatic philosopher. In the course of attempting to define a 
Sophist as someone who propagates illusions, he confronts the problem of what an illu- 
sion (which is unreal) might "be". Parmenides had said, 
"Never shall this be enforced, 
that things that are not are; " 13 
He therefore begins to investigate the use of the term "being". "Being" is the most funda- 
mental of the categorials since everything else presupposes it. 14 Since categorials 
describe everything, it follows that being can be predicated of things to which its oppo- 
site, non-being, is predicated, e. g. illusions. He looks at the descriptions of being, in par- 
ticular the quantification of it (unity, plurality, etc. ) in the work of famous philosophers 
in order to ascertain its nature and why it appears to admit of contradictory descriptions, 
e. g. "one" and "many". In the course of this argument he recapitulates some of the prob- 
lems of the Pannenides as well as dealing with "being and becoming", "mind and 
matter" and "rest and motion". Returning to the main problem, he concludes that certain 
12 A Heraclitan example might be "Father and son are one", cf. Heraclitus: The Cosmic Frag- 
ments, ed. G. S. Kirk, Cambridge University Press 1962. Fr. 50, pg 65., or more correctly, "Parent 
and child are one". This, in the most obvious sense, is a qualified form of the dialectical relation 
between cause and effect. 
13 Plato: The Sophist and the Statesman, trans. A. E. Taylor, ed. Raymond Klibanski and Elisa- 
beth Anscombe, Thomas Nelson and sons 196 1., The Sophist, section 25 8D, p 167. 
14 including its nearest "relatives" non-being and coming-to-be (becoming). 
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terms cannot be predicated of each other (or by implication both of the same thing) e. g. 
motion is at rest, but some can, e. g. "one" is also "many,,. Put another way, sometimes 
different names name different things but other times the same thing. He defines the pur- 
pose of the process of dialectics as follows: 
"To divide things by their kinds, not to take one and the same form for dif- 
ferent, nor different forms for the same, that, shall we not say, is the business 
of the science of dialectic? "15 
With respect to "being", his solution is to suggest that to say an object is not some partic- 
ular thing, e. g. "non-red", is merely to say that it is other than that thing, not that it has no 
being. Thus an illusion is "other" than it appears but nevertheless "is". This seems to 
dismiss the problem of the contradiction as a mistaken use of words. A deeper reading, 
however, shows this not to be the case. The concept of "other" suggests two things, that 
with respect to a particular predicate the "other" is not what it designates but also that it 
is something else. Plato is indicating, therefore, that the concept "non-being" is an 
abstraction from the more complex concept "other" (it refers to its negative aspect). An 
illusion is regarded as a non-being only in so far as what it purports to be has no being. 
There is a logical relation between being and non-being in the concept "other" - together 
they comprise its definition. 
opposed categorials in general necessarily apply to the same things but are rela- 
tional in character, differing by virtue of the aspect of the object which is focused upon, 
e. g. "the other" is the non - being (of that which it is other than) but it "is" (in relation to 
itself). One cannot predicate one categorial without implicitly assuming the predication 
of its opposite. Hence, one normally predicates unity of something which is assumed to 
be a plurality and plurality of objects considered together as a unity. 16 The relation 
between them may be named (or implied) by a third categorial, e. g. "quantity", which 
15 The Sophist 253 D. 
16 In the language of Heraclitus, "They arise together". 
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explicitly refers to a differentiated unity. The categorials presuppose each other and form 
a logical framework which applies as a whole. This it would appear is how Hegel read 
Plato and why he approves of his approach. The concepts in The Sophist, are the ones 
which form the beginning of Hegel's Logic: "being", "nothing", "becoming", "other", 
"same" and (by implication) "different". 
1.2. Deduction and movement 
Hegel deduces the relations between the categorials in a systematic fashion. Begin- 
ning with one side of an opposition, he looks at all the objects of which it can be 
correctly predicated, looking for that which is common to all of them and disregarding 
those features which are characterisations of the opposite concept. The first concept he 
considers is "being" so he disregards all aspects which give rise to the predication of 
non-being, i. e. he disregards specific differences between beings - the respects by virtue 
of which they are not each other. 17 Being appears indeterminate by this method since it 
ignores all specific differences. Similarly, "nothing" is also indeterminate when con- 
sidered in abstraction, since it is also "no thing" - the absence of specific determination. 
The opposites thus appear identical. It is the relation between the concepts which defines 
each and the attempt to comprehend them intelligibly outside of this relation fails. This 
amounts to a transcendental deduction of the concept which embodies the opposition 
between them-18 Naming this concept is referred to by Hegel as the speculative stage of 
the Logic, since it involves finding a term not previously given. In the case of "being" 
and "nothing" the concept is "becoming". 19 
17 Op. cit. Hegel's Logic, section 87 (zusatz), pg 128. 
18 Op. cit. Hegel's Logic, section 82, (gamma) pg 119. 
19 In "becoming" nothing is transformed into being (what is not comes to be) and/or being 
passes into nothing (what is ceases to be). What "becoming" describes is a point of transition, a 
boundary. Things are determined by virtue of boundaries, hence, "being and "nothing" can only 
describe something determinate if they are predicated together in this relation, not in isolation - in 
abstraction. 
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The identity of the opposed concepts appears at first simply to be an error induced 
by treating them as if they could be predicated in isolation from each other (they both 
appear indeterminate). The contradiction of the unity of opposites, therefore, appears to 
have only negative significance. Hegel points out, however, that in so far as it negates the 
view that they are conceptually isolable, it also indicates a genuine unity between them. 
They are identical in the sense that they logically presuppose one another and hence, can 
exist only as elements of this logical relation. Thus, each is to be understood as a descrip- 
tion of this relation differing only in respect of which pole is explicit and which is impli- 
cit, i. e. their content is the same. 
20 The new concept which describes this relation (the 
synthesis), however, is also a categorial and so the deduction can begin again with 
respect to its opposite concept. In this way Hegel attempts to generate the complete set of 
categorials and to demonstrate their relationship to each other. 
The set of categorials revealed in this way could be regarded as the structure of 
mind in the Kantian sense, i. e. as a framework of concepts which must be applied at all 
times on pain of unintelligibility. Hegel, however, regarded them not as a structure but as 
a process - the process of reason. This has important implications for his philosophy. It 
gives it its historical dimension. 
21 Hence, he says, 
"The reason why dialectic first seizes upon motion as its object lies in the fact 
that dialectic is itself this motion; or put another way motion is the dialectic of 
all that is.,, 22 
20 As in the case of "one" and "many", they are descriptions of the same thing. Each, while 
emphasising one aspect, implies the other as part of the thing described. 
21 Hegel's work marks an important point of departure in modern philosophy. The philoso- 
phers of the enlightenment had sought to establish a new foundation for knowledge based upon the 
methods of natural science after revealed truth had ceased to be able to fulfill this role. Paradoxi- 
cally, this attempt to replace one epistemology with another calls into question the ultimate status 
of all epistemologies (the dilemma epistemology) and gives rise to questions concerning the pro- 
cess by which they change, a situation dramatically emphasised by the conflict of these ideas 
which appeared as the bone of contention of the French Revolution. Hegel was the first modern 
philosopher to address this important issue for a rapidly changing world. 
22 Quoted by Gadamer in Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University Press 1976 pg 13. from Werke 
edited by Freunde des Verewigten, Dunker, Berlin 1832- A modem source in english is Lectures 
on the History of PhilosophY, translated by E. S. Haldane, Vol. 1, p 266. Routledge, Keegan and 
88 
There are two propositions here, first that the conceptual dialectic is a process (motion) 
and secondly, that all motion is dialectical in form. This explains why the Logic has a 
dialectical form. The statement that "motion is the dialectic of all that is", however, goes 
further in its implications. It can be rephrased as "all dialectics, (the dialectic of all that 
is) describe, or indeed are equivalent to, motion". Not only has motion a dialectical struc- 
ture but all things with a dialectical structure are motion. Hegel appears to be attempting 
to establish the origin of dialectics in the nature of motion. 
There is a similar view expressed by Heraclitus that all movement is the result of 
the ebb and flow of opposed forces, "War is king and father of all, ' . 
23 This view remains 
merely a metaphysical principle of change, however, unless justified epistemologically. It 
is not sufficient to regard dialectics simply as a description of this internal structure of 
motion. To Hegel, for whom the rational is real, the description would have to be demon- 
strated to be a consequence of reason. He would have to show that motion can only be 
rationalised or conceptualised in this way. He offers the following explanation in The 
Philosophy of Nature, 
"We are accustomed to viewing it (motion) as a predicate, as a condition, 
[because our comprehending thereby predicates and fixes], but it is in fact self, 
subject as subject, the remaining of disappearance. "24 
He appears to be saying that the attempt to use concepts to describe motion involves us in 
imputing duration to that which by definition does not endure. 25 This entangles us in con- 
Paul 1955,1963. 
23 The implication of this for systems or "totalities" is that their evolution is to be explained in 
terms of an internal struggle between their constituent parts, a form of explanation employed by 
Marx. See chapter 4, sections 1.2 and 2. 
24 Quoted in Hegel's Dialectic, H. G. Gadamer, op. cit. p 13. A modern source in english is The 
Philosophy of Nature, translated by A. V. Miller, Clarendon Press 1970. - zusatz to paragraph 261 
p 43. My emphasis and words in () brackets mine. 
25 it may be objected that there can be a "momentary" condition. Even so, There is a sense in 
which the moment may be thought to endure - for a moment. But not only May it endure. If it is 
not to be regarded as static, it must also have "transition" within it. This involves duality and 
hence, even the "moment" can only be described in terms of the dialectic of change. 
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tradictions. 
It is clear that the attempt to describe "change" in general involves us in a contradic- 
tion because it implies that "something" has changed. The something is on one hand 
assumed to be the same thing but on the other different since it has changed. We identify 
the object before and after the change despite its characteristics not being the same in 
every respect. The subject-predicate form of synthetic statements shows that our thought 
processes exhibit the same characteristic. We assume a certain subject and then add to 
our conception of it in the predicate. The subject is thus characterised in different ways 
before and after the predication. 
This general schema may be also applied to the Logic since it represents the 
description of the same thing (Being) by a succession of different concepts. Hegel dif- 
ferentiates reason from understanding in precisely this fashion, i. e. that whereas under- 
standing implies subsuming reality under a static non-contradictory conception of things, 
reason is a process of discovery which, starting from what is understood, develops it in 
new directions. 26 In doing so it alters the conception of its object from that which was its 
point of departure and thus involves the contradiction inherent in change. 
1.3. Three sources of contradiction 
It appears now, however, that I have given two if not three different explanations of 
the origin of contradiction in Hegel's work: universality, (the fact that the concepts of the 
Logic apply to everything), motion, and also context (because of his concept of one- 
sidedness). These different explanations, however, are linked in his work. The contradic- 
tions engendered by universality occur because if a concept applies to everything then it 
can only be defined by distinction from another concept which also applies to everything 
but which differs from it by virtue of a different emphasis or context of interest. Univer- 
sality as cause is thus reduced to context as cause. The contradictions which are the 
26 Op. cit., Hegel's Logic, sections 79-82, pp 113-12 1. 
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result of predication of concepts in different contexts, however, can also be reduced, as 
we have seen Hegel does, to the movement of reason as it examines and discovers the 
Ilature of its object first from one point of view then from its opposite. Movement thus 
appears to be the primary source of contradiction in Hegel. This is not surprising given 
bis phenomenological approach. The problem presents itself in the form of the question 
, of where the unity originates which links together the Humean stream of perception. The 
movement of the mind is his starting point. The spinning out of the universal structure of 
inind, however, is a specific problem inherited from Kant and related to Hegel's concern 
about the characterisation of totalities and infinite objects. He applies the more general 
-perspective of dialectics to this problem to produce The Encyclopedia, which resembles 
the Cartesian project of unifying knowledge but which is grounded in a way which 
avoids the problems of a self-evident foundation. 
1.4. The law of non-contradiction 
By suggesting that motion, context and universality necessarily involve contradic- 
tions in their descriptions I am implying that there can be such a thing as an intelligible 
contradiction. For most theorists this is an irrationalist position. For them contradiction 
implies unintelligibility. If something is a contradiction then it cannot be understood, if it 
can be understood then it is not a contradiction. This view is often asserted somewhat 
dogmatically. Light may be shed on the issue, however, if we ask what makes a contrad- 
iction unintelligible? 
In symbolic logic a contradiction is the conjunction of A and not-A. This 
corresponds to the claim that a thing cannot both be and not be something. This formula- 
tion involving being does not specify the full range of contradictory statements however. 
The concept of a round square is said to be contradictory and similarly, a colour cannot 
be both red and green. To reduce these contradictory predications to formal contradic- 
tions, bridging statements of the form "what is green is non-red" would have to be sup- 
plied so that the being and non-being of a single predicate (red) can be inferred. Such 
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additional statements would, however, have to distinguish between incompatible predi- 
cates such as "red" and "green" and compatible ones such as "red" and "square" which 
can be predicated of the same thing without contradiction. From these considerations a 
more general account of contradiction may perhaps be formulated. 
Clearly, the difference between the relationship of "red" and "green" and that of 
"red" and "square" would seem to be that the former are species of the genus "colour" 
whereas the latter do not share the same genus. The rule would appear to be that one can- 
not predicate more than one species term of its own genus without contradiction, e. g. a 
colour cannot be both green and red nor a shape both round and square. To do so would 
be to invoke the specific difference between the terms only implicitly to then deny the 
difference by identifying them. A rule of communication is thus invoked by the form of 
the statement only to be violated by the content. The result is miscommunication and 
hence unintelligibility. Being and non-being might be treated as examples of the same 
phenomenon. The distinction between them is annulled by their predication of the same 
object. 27 
it might be argued, however, that the argument for a general explanation based upon 
the genus-species form is circular since it makes use of the intuitive unintelligibility of 
the conjunction of being and non-being. One might argue that to assert a specific differ- 
ence and then to deny it is both to assert and deny its being and, therefore, to make use of 
the conjunction to be explained. The language used in the explanation above, however, 
refers to action - the pragmatics of communication. Although any attempt to logically 
reduce a contradiction to another statement is liable to produce another contradiction 
because one cannot find a logical antecedent to a primitive rule, the point being made 
here is that the unacceptability derives not from another rule governing unintelligibility, 
27 What the genus term is here, however, is difficult to say; these terms are intimately tied up 
with specification and concept formation itself and hence have a kind of primacy. Hegel demon- 
strates this by showing their relationship to determination (determinate being). Nevertheless, the 
cause of miscommunication appears to be of the same kind. 
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but from the imperatives of communication, i. e. observance or breach of a rule governing 
speech. If this account is acceptable we may now be in a position to see why Hegel's 
contradictions do not fit this scheme and are in fact intelligible. 
1.4.1. Categorials 
With respect to the categorials, it is obvious that the opposed concepts are abstrac- 
tions. The rule suggested before, that not more than one species term may predicated of 
its own genus, needs to be further qualified. The genus concept, e. g. "colour" may be 
described by more than one predicate but where it is used to indicate that some 
specification of it is to follow, e. g. "this colour is ....... then only one such specification is 
allowed. In the case of the categorials, a concept such as "quantity" may be described as 
"one" and "many" in so far as it is understood to represent a differentiated unity. One 
may not say "this quantity is both one and many", however, if what is meant is that the 
number of quanta are both one and many, i. e. if some specification of "this quantity" is to 
follow. Abstraction is the predication of a partial description, it is not the further 
specification of a genus term and therefore does not fall within the rule. 
1.4.2. Context 
The categorials are distinguished from each other by the point of focus of our 
interest. We abstract certain features of an object according to our interest in them 
thereby producing a dichotomy between the features relating to our interest and those 
which do not. The object is thus described in different ways in relation to, or in the con- 
text of, our focus of interest. For example, a "whole" is the unity of its parts - here we 
stress unity, diversity being implicit; "the parts" comprise the differentiated structure of 
the whole - here we stress plurality, the unity being implicit. This is not the only example 
of context-related predication, however. 
The Heraclitan aphorism "To the fish the sea is pure but to the man it is polluted"28 
28 Op. cit. Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, Fr. 61, pg 74. 
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shows that a differing relationship between subject and object can lead to contradictory 
judgements about the properties of an object. This issue was almost theorised by Locke 
when he defined secondary qualities, not as Berkeley attributes to him - as ideas in 
minds, but as the power of an object to affect a subject in a certain manner. 29 The 
subject-relative nature of secondary qualities should have led him to realise that there 
could be contradictory attributes to an object depending upon the context of interaction 
with the subject. Berkeley was right, however, in pointing out that all qualities are secon- 
dary and this would have implied that all qualities have this potential for involvement in 
contradiction. Locke encountered this problem in the relationship between the descrip- 
tions of sensory phenomena in terms of the ontology of sensation and the ontology of 
material properties. Sound for instance, is described by physics as a pulse of air, a physi- 
cal object accessible to touch rather than an auditory phenomenon accessible to hearing. 
This is similar to the Heraclitan aphorism described above but because physics explains 
the former in terms of the latter, Locke gave primacy to the physicists' ontology. 30 
One might argue that what I have just shown is that these context-relative state- 
ments; do not contradict each other. This would only be the case, however, if one restricts 
the meaning of contradiction to the genus-species relation as suggested above. Formally 
these statements appear to be contradictions - mutually exclusive concepts predicated of 
the same thing. 
Marx uses both of the above perspectives in his criticism of political economy. He 
characterises it as bourgeois and one-sided because firstly, its questions and answers are 
restricted to those which concern the capitalists and the significance of everything is seen 
in relation to these concerns. 
31 Secondly, because the approach to the topic begins with 
29 C. f. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke, ed. and introduction Peter H. 
Nidditch, Oxford University Press 1975, Chapter VIII, section 10. p 135. 
30 The physicists view may give more control over nature and fit into a general framework 
which relates it to other materialist theories but this doesn't give its concepts the kind of ontologi- 
cal primacy which Locke describes. 
31 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in op. cit. Selected Works, pg 120. 
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competition and exchange in the market which reflects the way the capitalists experience 
the economy. Money values and competition appear to explain everything. Questions 
such as the source of value and the nature of profit are poorly analysed or ignored. 
Marx distinguishes the classical bourgeois economists from the later "vulgar" 
economists on the grounds that the former were led from exchange relations to produc- 
tion and exploitation by their inquiries although their analyses were imperfect, whereas 
the latter, seeing where the arguments led, avoided the questions for ideological reasons. 
The former views are limited because they do not totally transcend the experience of the 
bourgeoisie, the latter because they do not transcend their interests. Marx and Engels also 
try to show that arguments that appear to be inevitably in conflict are often, in fact, only 
partial perspectives on the same problem and can be reconciled when seen in context. 32 
In this way they try to show the superiority of their own analysis. 
1.4.3. motion 
Clearly the characterisation of some identical object as changing and consequently 
manifesting mutually exclusive characteristics sequentially does not fall within the rule 
governing the unintelligibility of contradiction as I have described it. If as a counter- 
example to the claim that a colour can not be both red and green I was to cite the colour 
of a traffic light, I would risk not being taken seriously. Yet to add the qualification "at 
the same time" is an important restriction to the application of the law of non- 
contradiction. Change involves identifying things which are dissimilar -a formal con- 
tradiction - and most things have duration in time and are processes. The problems raised 
by this issue are not trivial. They include the issue of how one can show the continuity 
between idea systems and the question of the progress and growth of knowledge. In the 
philosophy of science there is the view that all new theories should "save the 
phenomena" of the theories that they replace, i. e. the should account for the same evi- 
32 E. g. the discussion on Say and Ricardo in op-cit. E. P. M. pp 169,170 
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dence. When the terms of the description are totally different, however, it is problematic 
how one can show that it is the same phenomenon that is being described. The incom- 
mensurability of theories makes comparisons between them problematic and tends to 
relativise them all. 
Hegel encounters this problem in the political context of the French revolution. The 
ideas of the enlightenment challenged the traditional viewpoints at the level of epistemol- 
ogy, ontology, ethics and politics. Furthermore, the new viewpoints were used as the 
basis for the reconstruction of society. The relativising of ideas poses a problem of legi- 
timacy in this situation. Hegel was concerned to show how ideas, and hence history, 
evolved as a single rational process, solving the problem of legitimacy and providing the 
basis for a critique of new ideas. Hegel sees himself in the tradition of Plato and Socrates 
arguing for realism against compelling arguments for relativism. 33 The same problem 
was encountered in the philosophy of science a century later when the theory of relativity 
replaced the Newtonian system. Because the ontology of the former was different from 
the latter, doubt was cast on the status of theoretical terms and certainty was restricted to 
what could be known immediately in doctrines such as phenomenalism and operational- 
ism. 34 This transformation, however, is a good example of the way knowledge grows by 
the inclusion and reconciliation of opposed descriptions in a wider context. The results of 
measurement in a situation where the measurer and the measured (subject and object) do 
riot move rapidly with respect to each other was held by Newton to be true in all situa- 
tions. Einstein showed that depending upon the relative velocity between subject and 
object judgements of measurement would differ with respect to time and space. A set of 
context-relative judgements are thus obtained for any particular situation. Newton's view 
33 As Plato does in the Theatatus and later in the Sophist where he approves of the Eleatic pro- 
ject of finding "the truth" but disapproves of Heraclitan/Protagorean relativism. Hegel takes up the 
same position relative to "Parmenides" and the question of "truth" in general. 
34 See Conjectures and Refutations; Chapter 3- Karl Popper. Popper attributes the change to 
quantum theory but most of the debate about the status of theoretical terms appears to have been 
generated by the demise of the Newtonian system. 
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thus appears in Hegelian terms to be "one-sided" since it only takes into account a single 
context which it erroneously generalises. Einstein's view supercedes Newton's by virtue 
of being a more comprehensive account. In this way, later theories are compared with 
earlier ones and knowledge is shown to progress by absorbtion and supercession. As 
stated before, this is the way, via the theory of ideology, Marx deals with opponent's 
views. It also means, however, that he tends to take the work of others as his point of 
departure and his work is continuous with theirs. 
Marx not only uses Hegel's logic as a means of criticising the theories of others, he 
assumes it in the elaboration of his own views. This is why his use of language some- 
times reveals contradictions. 35 In particular his analysis of social systems and of the 
movement of history draws upon the treatment of organic relations and of evolutionary 
processes in the work of Hegel. 
1.5. Marx's use of Hegel's logic 
As the discussion above shows, Marx uses Hegel's logical analysis in a number of 
different ways. In his own theory it is Presupposed as a kind of logical syntax the viola- 
tion of which leads to theoretical mistakes and fallacies. He puts it to critical use when he 
uses it to expose the errors in the work of his opponents. He accepts Hegel's analysis of 
the logical relations between the categorials, applying this kind of analysis, for instance, 
to political economy in the Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. 36 He also adopts the more general perspectives which underpin it, i. e. the more 
general understanding of "one-sidedness". This latter concept allows Marx to incorporate 
the Heraclitan issues of the context relativity of predication both in terms of focus of 
interest, as Hegel does, and also of the experiential context in which the judgement is 
35 cf. Alienation by Bertell Ollman, Cambridge University Press, 2nd. edition 1976 CHI 
-"With words that appear like 
bats". 
36 Where production and consumption, for instance, are treated accOrding to the dialectic of 
"Being and Nothing". C. f. Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy, K. Marx, Introduction, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1976, pp 17-18. 
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made since for him, ideas are not simply the product of reason but of social practice. In 
addition, it also allows him to incorporate the Protagorean position, that "man is the 
measure,, 37 which is usually thought to imply relativism, via the concept of "interest" in 
so far as interest leads to one-sided interpretations. His own position is, like that of 
Hegel, that of dialectical realism where a many-sided solution is deemed superior to a 
one-sided one. 
When a dialectical account is used descriptively, the debate is about the nature of 
the world, whereas when it is put to critical use the debate occurs at the level of theory 
(although possibly conditioned via interest by mundane factors). The critical use includes 
Marx's methodological deliberations. A further use is epistemological. 38 In this case the 
relationship between the theorist and the object of the theory is treated dialectically. A 
fourth use is speculative, namely the attempt to envisage a set of circumstances in which 
oppositions coexist without limiting each other, i. e. without being in conflict. It is this 
latter use which gives Marx's work its optimistic, revolutionary character since it raises 
the possibility of solutions to problems which are ruled out by the limited oppositions of 
"either/or" in which bourgeois political theory is cast. 
2. The Dialectics of Nature 
The explanation of Hegel's Logic so far has mainly been based upon the "Doctrine 
of Being", the first part of the Logic. The method of the Logic is to uncover the relations 
by which a concept is defined. These relations are made increasingly explicit in succes- 
sive concepts, e. g. the relation to "non-being" is more explicit in the concept "Deter- 
minate Being,, 39 than in the concept "Being". Thus by the second section of the Logic, 
the "Doctrine of Essence", the concepts form pairs, e. g. positive and negative, which 
explicitly refer to each other -although only in a negative way, i. e. they are defined by the 
37 Cf, Plato: Theatatus, trans. Robin H. Waterfield, Penguin 1987. Theatatus 167d, pg 58. 
38 See section 5, "The Subject/Object Dialectic". 
39 By virtue of the assumption that to determine is to negate. 
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opposition between them. This section is mainly about essence and appearance although 
it contains a general definition of causality40 where the cause, as essence, is deemed the 
source of its effects, the appearances in which it manifests itself. 
Many of the concepts, such as causality, in this section and the next (the "Doctrine 
of the Notion") are part of the ontology of the natural sciences and, in so far as society is 
viewed "objectively", also of the social and historical sciences. The third section, the 
"Doctrine of the Notion", follows from the development of the concept of Necessity; 41 
perhaps most intelligible as "natural necessity". From "Necessity", Hegel derives the 
notion of Freedom-42 He says that in so far as something acts according to its own inter- 
nal necessity, i. e. its nature, it acts freely. Thus he identifies freedom and necessity. He 
can only do this, however, in so far as all causes are internal causes and necessity is inter- 
nal necessity, that is to say in so far as the object under consideration is regarded as a 
self-determining system. 
This brings us to the "Notion". In the Notion the unity and not just the diversity 
between the related elements is explicitly recognised. Each set of concepts in the "Doc- 
trine of the Notion" forms a mutually referring triad consisting of a pair of opposites and 
that which names the unity in which they coexist as aspects. Each element explicitly 
makes reference to the other two. 
43 
40 1 intend to emphasise in heavy type key concepts in this section. 
41 Hegel regards all causation ultimately as reciprocal causation because it requires a contribu- 
tion from both active and passive elements and because both the cause and the effect can be re- 
garded as either the active or passive factor from different standpoints. He identifies this as the 
structure of Necessity. 
42 The treatment of this particular opposition, freedom and necessity, is especially important to 
his whole philosophy because the struggle for freedom is the source of human action in Hegel's 
work. 
43 1 use the term "explicit" here in the sense in which I used -implicit " when describing the 
poles of the relation of one and many. In that case the element named e. g. "one- was differentiated 
from that which was only implied, e. g. "many". However, that which is implied is more explicit 
than that to which no reference is made at all and that is the contrast I am making here. 
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2.1. The Doctrine of the Notion 
The Doctrine of the Notion investigates the logic of relations conceptualised as a 
system. It is sub-divided into subjective, objective and "the idea" which is conceptualised 
as both subject and object. Hegel's distinction between subjective and objective rests pri- 
marily on the concept of one-sidedness. Each of the elements of the Notion, when con- 
sidered separately, is something abstract and therefore, its separateness is the result of an 
act of consciousness; it is subjective. Conversely, when the meaning of each is fully 
developed it is seen that they only exist by virtue of each other, together they form an 
object which, because of the way their meanings are mutually dependent, each one is. 
Objectivity, for Hegel therefore, is synonymous with completeness or absence of one- 
sidedness. This is important for a number of reasons one of which is that "Nature", or the 
external world, for Hegel, is the objective aspect of the idea. 
In the section on the objective notion he deals with three forms of causality basic to 
natural and social phenomena - mechanical, chemical and teleological. This analysis 
allows us to understand Marx's use of these same concepts. When dealing with Teleol- 
ogy he introduces the concept of subjectivity again. This time the contrast is between the 
"End" understood as something merely postulated by a subject, and therefore subjective 
because non-existent, and the objective state which the End represents. His resolution of 
this contradiction is the immanent end which is a design working itself out in the 
development of the activity of the subject. This for Hegel is the Idea. The Idea is a self- 
realising subject/object. Nature is regarded by Hegel as the objective aspect of the 
thought process (phenomenon) viewed by the subject as something external. In this way, 
it is objective in the sense that it embodies the categories of the Logic in a fashion which 
is not one-sided but is non-objective in the sense that it doesn't acknowledge the role of 
subjectivity in the constitution of the object of consciousness in the first place. It is in the 
latter sense, therefore, that Hegel regards Nature as one-sided. Of the transition from 
Logic to Nature he says: 
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The Idea which is independent or for itself, when viewed on the point of this 
unity with itself, is Perception or Intuition, and the percipient Idea is Nature. 
But as intuition the Idea is, through an external "reflection", invested with the 
one-sided characteristic of immediacy, or negation . .... in its own absolute truth 
it [the Idea] resolves to let the "moment" of its particularity . ..... the immediate 
idea, as its reflected image, go freely forth as Nature. 44 
2.2. Nature 
in The Nature, Hegel regards nature as embodying particular instances of the 
universal categories of the Logic. Since universals are thought to be mental and the par- 
ticular is regarded at this stage one-sidedly as something merely opposed to the universal, 
nature as the realm of the particular is regarded as something merely external to mind. 
However, nature is not only external to mind, external relations exist between the entities 
in nature themselves (as between parts of a whole). 
Also, whereas in the Logic, the existence of each category depended upon its rela- 
tions to other categories, in nature there is also an external relation to mind which estab- 
lishes the existence of an entity independently of its relation to other entities in nature. It 
follows therefore that only the part of the object's identity which depends upon the rela- 
tion is destroyed when the relation itself is destroyed. 
Molecules for instance are composed of atoms. If a molecule is dissociated into 
atoms the molecule disappears but the objects which composed it have not disappeared 
they have simply lost their character as parts of a whole or collectively as the molecule 
itself. The part/whole relation has been destroyed but the molecule is only destroyed "as 
such" i. e. as a whole composed of parts not as something existing in relation to the sub- 
ject since the atoms remain. In general it is always the case with natural objects that it is 
44 N. B. This interpretation of the transition from Logic to Nature would justify Marx's view 
that Nature is portrayed merely as an object of consciousness without real objectivity and indepen- 
dence. C. f. op. cit., E. P. M., P9 155. 
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only the constitution of their identity which depends upon the dialectical relations in 
which they participate. This coincides with Marx's views since he regards the interaction 
of objects with other things (including a subject) as the source of their "being" 
45 For a 
known object, the direct or indirect relation to the subject always remains. 
2.2.1. Causality 
The major divisions of the"Nature" are "Mechanics", "Physics" and "Organics". 
These divisions correspond to the three types of causality in the section of the Logic 
called "The objective notion". The correspondence is not quite exact since "Chemism" 
corresponds to only one section of the "Physics". It is obvious from this treatment how- 
ever, that Hegel sees his enterprise as tracing the development of different methods of 
analysis rather than different subject matters. Organics for instance includes "The terres- 
trial organism" even though such things as rocks or the earth itself would normally be 
classed as inorganic. 
46 What defines something as organic is the nature of the causal rela- 
tions between its parts. The logic leads us inwards towards greater understanding not 
onwards towards different entities. 
47 For Hegel nature as a whole is organic. Mechanical 
or chemical relations exist only between entities abstracted or considered in isolation 
from the whole. Particles and Chemicals exist of course as independent entities apart 
from any organic relations in which they may or may not participate but "organicity" is 
implicit in what we take them to be. 
2.2.2. The Hierarchy of the Sciences 
If this treatment is given to the hierarchy of sciences and their ontologies, then the 
45 op. cit. E. p. M. pg 144. 
46 That teleology applies to the non-biological nature therefore involves the claim that non- 
biological nature forms a self-contained system with constraining conditions which regulate its 
growth. I think that Hegel would claim that 
in the last analysis any totality must have this form. 
Clearly there cannot be an external cause for a self-sufficient whole by definition. 
47 Where specific natural objects are named they exemplify a logical category embodied in na- 
ture. 





more "micro" the entity the more abstract one must regard it. Abstract here cannot mean 
existing only as an aspect of a more concrete entity. As stated previously entities in 
nature only take on character from the dialectical relations not existence itself. Atoms can 
exist independently from molecules but their character as identical units which can be 
arranged in different ways to produce different substances depends upon their role within 
molecules. In this sense they are abstract. 
Relations at the more abstract levels provide an explanation for relations at the more 
concrete levels but as one might expect such explanations are also deficient in some 
respects. The laws governing sub-aton-iic particles for instance explain what chemical 
combinations are possible, but they don't explain what chemicals actually exist and what 
reactions actually take place nor why this is so. The range of possible interactions given 
at this level is wider than those actually taking place and more information is needed to 
narrow these possibilities down and provide a totally deterministic explanation of the 
world. 48 Explanation in terms of different types of causality is required at the different 
levels precisely because higher levels of determinacy are required for more concrete enti- 
ties. Chemical explanations in terms of affinities or predispositions (e. g. notions of aci- 
dity and basicity - defined in terms of their reactions with each other - or electrochemical 
replacement) define the entities in question in terms of the the reactions they typically do 
participate in. Chemical explanations of this kind do not explain why precisely these 
chemical groups exist nor whether any of the reactions they describe will take place at 
any particular time, but that they do take place is implicit in the way that the subject 
matter is defined. An organic explanation on the other hand will show how as a conse- 
quence of the operation of the whole system certain chemicals are brought into contact 
with other chemicals at a certain time enabling them to react and produce some new 
chemical. This holistic determination completes an explanation that would otherwise 
48 Hegel regards contingency as the sign of immature science and the greater the degree of con- 
tingency in the explanation the less scientific it is. It is in this sense that mechanically causal ex- 
planations are partial and for him abstract. 
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remain at the level of mere possibilities. It is in this sense that the more micro levels are 
abstract, since they can only provide a partial account as elements of a more comprehen- 
sive explanation. Mechanical and chemical causality needs to be supplemented with 
teleological causality, i. e. the form of causality appropriate to self-governing systems, in 
which they find their proper place. 
2.2.3. Causality within systems 
organic explanations, therefore, are for Hegel the most adequate form of explana- 
tion because there are no contingent causes. All causality is internal and mutually refer- 
ring. Furthermore, not only do the parts of an organism cause the whole to be what it is, 
but the whole functioning organism is required for the maintenance of the parts. There is 
a relation of mutual causality, therefore, between the parts and the whole. The organism 
may simply maintain itself in a steady-state or it may evolve. All living things have a life 
cycle, that is they evolve. The process of growth is controlled by the organism itself 
through self-regulation. A steady-state will also typically involve self-regulation through 
homeostatic mechanisms. The concept of teleology, therefore, finds its application here. 
Where there are no contingent causes the end to which an organism progresses is totally 
determined. It is quite in order to regard its parts as functioning to bring the end about - 
especially when one considers that the parts are themselves produced and maintained by 
the whole organism. A self-regulating, evolving organism is the physical counterpart of 
"The Idea". in which the end progressively realises itself via an immanent teleology. 
Expressed another way, an adequate explanation of functioning totalities or systems 
requires the acknowledgement of these kinds of causal relationship. 
2.2.3.1. Systemic and external causes 
physical organisms, however, do not correspond exactly to the logic of "Organic" 
causality which Hegel describes. An organism will require sustenance from outside of 
itself, i. e. things which it does not itself produce. It will be subject, therefore, to external 
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causality. Nevertheless, it will have an internal dynamic which will determine its growth 
- "ceteris paribus" i. e. if nothing interferes, 
for example, with its food supply. This can be 
studied in abstraction. Human beings who produce their own food bring this external 
causal factor within a wider system of an economy over which they can exercise control. 
This can once again be studied as an organic entity. 
In general, social arrangements which are based upon self-reproducing institutions 
are best analysed in this way. They fulfill all the criteria for a system of mutually refer- 
ring causes with self-governing mechanisms. It is part Marx's method to analyse them in 
this way. Social arrangements can also be interrupted by external causes of course, 
natural distasters may fall into this category. Nevertheless their evolutionary tendencies 
can also be studied "ceteris paribus" as before. 
Since society is composed of human organisms which depend upon external factors 
to sustain them, so there is a potential for conflict between them over the procurement of 
these factors depending upon the social arrangements through which they interact. Each 
human organism will have its own internal dynamic of development which will typically 
make demands on its external environment, Le needs. Part of that external environment 
will include its relations with other human beings on which it depends. This raises the 
possibility that each, by pursuing its own development, will make mutually incompatible 
demands upon the others, i. e. there will be a conflict of interests. 
If one also takes into account that human needs are Partially conditioned by social 
environment, then to this extent, the conflict may be understood as a product of the social 
system itself. Conflicts produced in this way are what Marx refers to as "material con- 
tradictions". In Chapter 1, one can see that this perspective forms the framework in which 
he analyses the emergence of private property, artificial scarcity, class, class struggle, the 
state etc. Initially conflict may be merely a product of individual egoism but as soon as 
this is institutionalised as exploitation, it becomes principally a product of the system 
which maintains and reproduces it in its social relations. 
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3. The Philosophy of Mind 
The previous section explained why the forms of causality appropriate to organisms 
are also appropriate in the explanation of social systems. However, this procedure 
neglects the role of consciousness in determining human behaviour. 
Hegel sees consciousness (or "mind" since at its most basic levels Hegel doesn't 
regard it as conscious) as a faculty of organic life at a certain level of complexity. More 
specifically, it is the faculty which monitors and regulates the organism's performance, 
i. e. which makes it sentient and responsive to its environment. The dialectical relation 
between part and whole in an organism permits us to understand mind in terms of these 
holistic functions. There is, therefore, no sharp break between nature and mind for Hegel. 
3.1. Self-consciousness 
Consciousness involves awareness of the phenomena of experience. It becomes 
self-consciousness according to Hegel with reflective thought where the object is experi- 
enced as a thought object. At this point the mind is aware of its contents as part of itself. 
Within Marx's perspective, where such developments tend to be explained as 
responses to the practical need to cope with the environment, reflection could be seen as 
part of the process of anticipation of events, a useful capacity for any organism in a 
changing environment. 
This creates two senses of the self - as knowing subject and as a thought object. The 
contradiction between these incompatible accounts of mind is the source, according to 
Hegel of desire. 
3.2. Desire 
Desire is the need of an organism for something Outside of itself. There are two 
forms of desire that Hegel draws attention to: the desire for knowledge and the desire for 
"self-realisation". The desire for knowledge is the need to subsume experience under 
forms of thought, i. e to subjectivise it and thus to make it familiar and manageable for the 
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subject. 49 The desire for self-realisation derives from the fact that the subject as agent or 
cause can only know itself by its effects. It must, therefore, create effects in the world in 
order to become an object for itself Thus desire, for Hegel, is the need both to subjec- 
tivise the object and to objectivise the subject, i. e. to mentally achieve some kind of unity 
between these aspects of the self 
This explanation moves totally within the sphere of the mind. However, physical 
needs can be treated in a similar fashion. Physical needs, such as the need for food, can 
be seen as the need of an organic system to incorporate elements of the external world 
within its own sphere of activity, Le. in a sense within itself, in order to function properly 
and cope with the world around. The need for knowledge is part of this process. 50 Simi- 
larly, action in the world is necessary for self-realisation not only in order to experience 
oneself as a thinking subject, but also as a subject capable of having an effect upon the 
natural world. 
The utility of the latter is obvious, since it is an advantage to be able to estimate 
one's own capacities when one needs to take action and also, the more capacities one has 
the greater freedom and control one will feel. This is perhaps part of the explanation of 
the satisfaction felt at the discovery and exercise of ability. Nietzsche refers to the desire 
to manifest ones capacities as "the will to power" and regards it as the fundamental 
human need. Marx includes the failure of objectifying activity to provide self-realisation 
under the rubric of alienation and treats it as one of the problems of "the riddle of his- 
tory,,. 51 
49 His explanation of the euphoria engendered by the renaissance amplifies this point. He ex- 
plains this as the realisation that the world is governed by reason and hence for the first time man 
felt at home in it. C. f. The Philosophy of History, G. W. F. Hegel, trans. J. Sibree, intro. C. j. 
Friedrich, Dover 1956, p440. 
50 This is what Hegel in The Philosophy of Right refers to as "appropriation" and is the source 
of "Property". Marx often follows this usage. - cf. The Philosophy of Right, G. W. F. Hegel, trans. 
and notes T. M. Knox, Oxford University Press 1952, sections 44,45, pp 41,42., 
51 op. cit. E. P. M. pg 97 see CHI introduction - The powerlessness implied here is not merely 
psychological, however, the worker's efforts in extreme circumstances do not permit him/her to 
sustain his/herself physically either. 
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3.3. Freedom 
Desire manifests itself in a multiplicity of urges or impulses, some of them mutually 
exclusive. Which are to be acted upon is a matter of choice and this is a decision of the 
will. In order to ensure maximum satisfaction, the will must be free to make the optimum 
choices. In this way the freedom of the will itself becomes a desirable objective. When 
this objective is pursued consciously, we have, according to Hegel, the primary driving 
force of social organisation and social change. 
3.3.1. The Social Dimension 
The need of human beings for others is explained by Hegel in his discussion of 
self-consciousness. Whilst labour can produce objects which conform to human designs, 
hence objectifying both the idea and the power to produce in conformity with it, human 
qualities such as "goodness", "taste" etc. can only be confirmed by the assent of other 
people. These others, moreover, must be free to withhold their approval. In the relation- 
ship between master and slave for instance, the slave says what the master tells him to. 
His behaviour, therefore, is merely an extension of the master's will and hence cannot 
confirm the master's humanity independently. 
This need for others is not only psychological, the division of labour enhances the 
possibilities of human activity and human life. Almost all the things we enjoy make use 
of the creations of others both past and present. In these relations of material interdepen- 
dence, therefore, there also exists the possibility of the master-slave relation. This latter 
can only be transcended in circumstances where people develop the need for each other 
as both allies and companions - hence as free individuals. For Hegel and for Marx, there- 
fore, both self-realisation and freedom depend upon society. 
The form of organisation of society, according to Hegel, always embodies the claim 
by some or all of its members for freedom, in the sense defined above. Political disputes 
about the organisation of society are, accordingly, disputes about the potential for free- 
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, gjom that different systems will confer. 
Z3.3.2. Historical change 
Historical change for Hegel, therefore, always takes the form of collisions between 
%Jifferent ideas about the principles on which the organisation of society should be based. 
-The relationship between these ideas has the same kind of structure as that between all 
ideas (indeed, for Hegel, of all reality) namely, the dialectical structure of "reason". Thus, 
Vegel sees the unfolding of reason at work in history. 
In The Philosophy of History, he says that eastern despotisms are based upon the 
]principle that one is free, Athenian democracy was based upon the principle that some 
ýthe citizens) are free but only Christendom recognised that all are free by virtue of the 
rature of man. 52 
The progressive realisation of such principles in the consciousness of human sub- 
jects is the motor of history. As soon as men understand that it is their nature to be free, 
then they can no longer tolerate institutions which support their captivity. Then begins a 
struggle to bring about a new social order. Human interests and passions are involved in 
this struggle but Hegel sees reason as the latent guiding force as human beings progress 
towards the establishment of institutions which permit the realisation of their true nature 
as free, rational beings. 53 
Views about freedom are at first one-sided and engender the contradictory view as 
equally valid. Oppositions of this kind, embodying the authentic claims of different 
groups will lead to conflict. This can, however, be overcome when the genuine human 
aspiration expressed in each claim is accommodated in a synthesis in which they can be 
52 Op. cit., The Philosophy of History, pg 18. 
53 Freedom, however, according to Hegel is only possible within a structure of law because 
although the law restricts individual freedom, it does so to prevent individuals restricting each 
other's freedom. The point of the law (at least good laws which embody "right") is to maximise 
freedom. Freedom is only possible, therefore, within a state which enacts rational laws. 
it follows, however, that battles over what behaviour is appropriate to man as a free indivi- 
dual will become battles over the form of the constitution of the state. 
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shown no longer to be opposed and hence neither a denial of nor limit upon each other. 
An institutional form has then to be found which allows the behaviour thus legitimated to 
be manifested without conflict. In this way, according to Hegel, reason in the world 
develops through conflict and conflict resolution. 
4. Differences between Hegel and Marx 
This account of the role of consciousness in history is a point of departure for 
Marx's own work but differs from it in crucial ways. First and most important is the fact 
that Hegel views history as determined by the development of "the idea" in the minds of 
men. This is essentially a logical process although passions and action are required to 
realise the idea in history. 
Marx, on the other hand, does not agree that history is determined by a teleological 
process in the minds of men which is aimed at the realisation of the absolute idea. In the 
German Ideology he says: 
"Morality, Religion, Metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their correspond- 
ing forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of indepen- 
dence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their 
material production and material intercourse, alter, along with this their real 
existence, their thinking and the products of thinking. Life is not determined 
by consciousness but consciousness by life. " 
Hegel justifies his view of the world by logic because for him "the rational is the real" but 
Marx sees reason in the service of a practice oriented towards the solution of the prob- 
lems of embodied subjects in the natural world. 54 Ideas, for Marx, are a product of 
practical-critical activity (or critical-practical activity in the correct temporal order). 
According to Marx, human beings assess the nature of their environment critically, Le 
54 This is why in the previous sections I provided an explanation both in terms of the logical 
development of Hegel's concepts and also of the practical reasons for the development of the men- 
tal processes thus described. 
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with a view to changing it in accordance with their needs. Their ideas reflect these con- 
cems. Firstly, ideas begin as responses to the problems of sensuous existence and thus, 
their content is conditioned by changes in the material environment as they affect human 
needs. Secondly, the acceptance of ideas is determined in the final instance by whether 
they provide solutions to these problems. 
Marx's objection to Hegel is that his view of the causality involved here is one- 
sided and therefore ideological, since although he recognises that ideas condition actions 
and hence the world, he ignores the reciprocal relationship, the way that the world condi- 
tions ideas. Furthermore, because of the way the acceptance of ideas is conditioned by 
material concerns, it is this relationship which is decisive for the sequence of the dom- 
inant ideas in history. 
This, however, raises a problem with respect to Marx's acceptance of Hegel's 
Logic. The relationship between the categories in the Encyclopedia is one long unbroken 
deduction. If Marx accepts the Logic then presumably he has to accept the validity of this 
deduction. There are, however, problems with Hegel's deduction in the Encyclopedia. 
4.1. Contingency in Nature and Mind 
As stated in the previous chapter, the terms Hegel uses in the The Nature and also 
the The Mind are exemplars of the categories Of the Logic with the qualification of being 
regarded as either external to the subject or explicitly mental respectively. 55 As exam- 
ples, however, they are not unique, they merely represent a class of entities which all 
embody a certain relation. The specific form of each, therefore, is something which has to 
be discovered a posteriori, i. e. empirically. This allows Marx to stress the role of experi- 
ence in supplying the content of history. 
Moreover, for Marx, the logical process is not the historical process. The concepts 
55 This is illustrated by the example in the Nature of the "sun" and "moon", which are clearly 
not aspects of "the terrestrial organism" although they precede it in the deduction. 
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of the logic, therefore, can be used in their interconnections at each point in the historical 
account as appropriate. 
It might be argued that this procedure is Kantian, in that empirical material which 
has not been deduced is organised within a logical framework which has been imposed 
upon it apparently without regard to content. This, however, would not be strictly correct 
because firstly, the concepts of the Logic are not regarded by Marx as a priori valid since 
they are part of language and have been created as instruments of communication in 
response to the world. They are, therefore, equally as subject to empirical validation as is 
the content itself -a point elaborated below. Secondly, their application is constrained by 
the nature of the objects to which they are applied. For instance, Organic relations only 
apply to organic wholes. 
56 There is a connection between form and content, therefore, 
which is absent in Kant. These points provide Marx with some defence against the accu- 
sation that the Logic is a metaphysical framework. 
4.2. Contingency in the Logic 
Even the deductions of the Logic itself, however, pose a problem. Hegel refers to 
the terms in the logic as abstractions but if the categories arise by the process of abstrac- 
tion and the dialectic only synthesises the abstractions back into the concrete entity from 
which they originated, what is the point of re-tracing the process in the opposite direc- 
tion? One presumably already knows its outcome, i. e. the point of departure from which 
the abstractions were made in the first place? 
On the other hand, Hegel clearly regards the movement of the dialectic from simple 
abstractions to more complex concrete categories as a process of discovery. His treatment 
of History as a process governed by the evolution of "the Idea" demonstrates this point. 57 
56 Although a complete explanation of any phenomenon will in the widest context arrive at an 
explanation in terms of the organic whole of which it is part, not everything itself is to be regarded 
as an organic whole. 
57 Op. cit., The Philosophy of History, pg 53. 
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This is in contradiction to the first point. How can consciousness discover the abstrac- 
tions before the synthesis when they need to be derived by a thought process from it? It 
seems that one would initially need to have knowledge of the Absolute and derive all the 
categories of the dialectic from it by abstraction in order to arrive at the point of origin of 
the dialectical process. It seems difficult to reconcile these competing claims about the 
origin of the categories. 
An explanation might be as follows: consciousness first encounters a field of aware- 
ness within which it then discovers distinctions. This clearly is the logical order of 
discovery. The understanding then derives separate concepts from this differentiated 
unity by a process of abstraction. Now it is possible to perform a task, even an intellec- 
tual task, without being conscious of precisely how the task is performed. The intercon- 
nection between the abstracted concepts and the synthesis in which they originated, 
therefore, may remain unexplained and thus remains a possible source of confusion until 
the philosopher comes along and explains it via the dialectic. 
Marx says that the philosopher comes along "post festurn", that is, he/she merely 
synthesises into a rational theory viewpoints already developed through practice. In the 
case above, the concepts of the Logic arise from the activity of making distinctions in the 
world, an activity which is conditioned both by the interests of the subject and the nature 
of the world itself (in so far as language is able to represent the possibilities of experi- 
ence). There is thus an element of contingency in the process of concept formation. The 
logical necessity of the dialectic results from the fact this process is one of making dis- 
tinctions which produce pairs of opposites related by meaning which together comprise 
the whole. Retracing the related meanings shows the logical connections but the original 
distinctions are formed by a contingent process. Whereas Hegel's theory of history sim- 
ply recapitulates the Logic in the realm of social relations, Marx uses it selectively 
according to empirical context. 
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4.3. The World as Mind? 
Hegel's transition from Nature to Mind is the basis of his view that everything is 
Mind. The "Mind", however, is mostly about the human mind and it is not obvious in 
what sense Hegel regards the rest of nature as mind, therefore. A clue may be given, 
however, by what he says in the introduction to The Philosophy of History: 
"The destiny of the Spiritual World and - Since this is the substantial world 
while the physical remains subordinate to it... - the final cause of the world at 
large, we allege to be the consciousness of its freedom on the part of the spirit, 
1158 
The view that the form which the natural world will ultimately take will be one imposed 
by mind implies that in the end it is human designs which shape the destiny of nature. 
There would seem to be some truth in this view when one considers how humans have 
continually extended their domain of control over the rest of the natural world. 
One implication of this for the hierarchy of the sciences would be that the social sci- 
ences are the least abstract and the most complete. Even evolutionary theory, for 
instance, which explains the development of species, cannot ignore human activities' 
Some species have been destroyed, others have adapted to conditions of increasing indus- 
trialisation and lately men have been able to create new species by genetic engineering. 
perhaps man will destroy the planet by war or pollution. For all these reasons one cannot 
predict the course of evolution without taking into account the activities of man. 59 Marx 
accepts this view in his statements about a single science. 60 His criticism of Hegel's 
58 Op. cit., The Philosophy of History, pg 19. 
59 Even the human physical constitution is not a natural "given". Men have the potential to 
modify their own biology . "Human Nature" is not, therefore, fixed in any respect, it is an ongoing 
process - one reason why only a dialectical approach will suffice in the study of what .. man" is. 
60 
"History is a real fact of natural history .... Natural science will one day incorporate the science 
of man just as the science of man will incorporate natural science; there will be one science" 
- op. cit. E. P. M. pg 105. 
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idealism relate to the representation of Nature as the phenomenal content of mind. 
5. The Subject/Object dialectic 
The transition from Logic to Nature portrayed nature as the phenomenal content of 
mind. When this phenomenal content becomes dominated by mental activity, according 
to Hegel, the mind recognises itself in the phenomenal object, thus coming to self- 
knowledge. The distinction between subject and object produced by the first transition, 
therefore, is reunited as a differentiated unity by the second. The unity of subject and 
object is realised in the "subject-object" which is the topic of "The Mind". In this section, 
Hegel sees human activity as a process of coming to self-knowledge and as a process of 
self-changing. 
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Marx agrees that both theorising and acting in the social realm involves this peculiar 
relation where the actors are both subject and object at the same time and this creates an 
important set of logical problems in his work. These include problems concerning two 
other oppositions which are related to the subject/object opposition. These are the free 
will/determinism opposition and the fact/value opposition. 
With respect to the free will/determinism opposition, subjective awareness suggests 
to the actor that he/she is making choices in the world and hence that the will is free to 
choose whatever it wishes. On the other hand, however, it is always possible to predict 
human behaviour to some extent and such behaviour, when studied as an object of 
knowledge, exhibits law-like regularities. Subjective awareness, therefore, suggests that 
the will is free, objective awareness that it is determined. 
With respect to the fact/value opposition, human beings evaluate things in the world 
according to subjective preferences, placing things in rank order. On the other hand, these 
preferences can be studied objectively as a species of fact and explained as predictable 
61 Marx agrees except that where Hegel sees the latter as a means to the former, Marx sees the 
former as a means to the latter. 
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responses to the environment. 
62 Because these other oppositions involve the 
subjective/objective opposition the problems which affect it affect them also. 
5.1. Free will/determinism 
Hegel deals with the relation of freedom and necessity, as stated above, by regard- 
ing human behaviour as law-like on the one hand, yet on the other, to act in accordance 
with the law of one's own nature is also to be free. The opposites thus coincide. The main 
problem arises, however, when the relation is formulated in terms of the interaction 
between subject and object. Engels says: 
"The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces of nature - 
blindly, violently and destructively, so long as we fail to understand them and 
take them into account. But once we have recognised them and understood 
their action, their trend and their effects, it depends solely on ourselves to 
increasingly subject them to our will and to attain our ends through them. ', 63 
But if our actions are determined, how do we have the freedom to change them? 
The problem is most acute in psychotherapy where self-understanding is directly the 
means to changing oneself. Would not such a change refute the original account? On the 
other hand if the account is correct how can any change be made? 
The same problem occurs with social action; if the description of the way society is 
constituted is correct how can it be changed? If it can be changed does that not prove the 
original account wrong? 
64 
62 Value systems which claim to be objective (in the sense of not being based merely on sub- 
jective preference) are treated in Marx's work as alienated social Products (see Chapter 1). 
Preference appears to be independent of the individual subject because either it results from 
the views of the majority of society (as in Durkheim's -, conscience collective") or of the majority 
of some powerful and influential subgroup (as 
in the "dominant ideology" thesis). In addition to 
this, if a dominant ideology, such a system must needs be represented as universal truth rather than 
sectional interest for political reasons, a point expanded upon in Chapter six. 
63 op. cit. Anti-Nhring pg 36 1. 
64 The problem occurs even with respect to natural science once practice is emphasised. Bacon 
says: 
"In order to command nature we must first obey it". 
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These arguments occurred at the turn of the century in the exchanges between Lenin 
and Kautsky over the question of the inevitability of a revolution or the need for political 
activity 
More recently, Karl Popper in The Poveny of Historicism says: 
"The social scientist may be striving to find truth; but, at the same time, he 
must always be exerting a definite influence upon society. The very fact that 
his pronouncements do exert an influence destroys their objectivity.,, 65 
Popper believes that the theorist should always be an outside observer to the object of 
study. 
Critical Theorists, on the other hand, believe exactly the opposite. Theorising, for 
them, is a hermeneutic process aimed at assessing the world from the point of view of the 
desire to change it (their point of departure being Marx's concept of practical-critical 
activity). They criticise "positivism" and in particular "Positivistic" accounts of Marx 
which result in dogmatic, scientistic theories which allow neither for subject error nor 
subjective intervention. 
Engels is often regarded as the source of these views. They hold that while he 
understood dialectical relations within changing, Organic social structures, he neglected 
the dialectical relation between the theorist and the object of study, placing the former 
outside of the latter. 
That the relation of free will to determinism is still not understood in Marxist circles 
is evidenced by argument between critical theorists who stress subjective intervention 
and structuralists who stress the evolution of structures of social relations according to 
- Francis Bacon, The New 
Organon, ed. F. H. Anderson, Bobbs-Merrill 1960, pg.., Book One, 
Aphorism 111. 
This is a contradictory formulation. If we are obeying the laws of nature, how can we intervene to 
command it? 
65 The Poverty of Historicism, K. R. Popper, R. K. P. 1957 pg 16. 
He doesn't believe this to be true of hypothetical statements since their truth is contingent upon the 
fulfillment of the initial conditions which may exclude the influence of the theory. 
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their laws of transformation and composition. 
5.1.1. Means v ends as a solution 
The problem is less formidable, however, if the question is divided into that of the 
relationship between knowledge and action concerning means and between knowledge 
and action concerning ends. With respect to ends: knowledge of our desires or goals 
which motivate us will not lead us to change those desires. By definition we will have no 
incentive (desire) to do so. 66 Knowledge of the appropriateness of the means used to 
achieve those ends, on the other hand, will affect our behaviour, it will make us more 
efficient at getting the things we want. A critical assessment of our conditions of 
existence, therefore, would consist of appraising the means in the light of our knowledge 
of the ends. 
When we describe goals or tendencies, therefore, we are describing something that 
endures, that will not change as a result of our theories. When we describe the means, on 
the other hand, these are historically specific - the description is true for the time they are 
in use, Le up to the point when we know better and change them. They can be changed 
without altering our view of the ultimate direction taken by our activities. 
Popper is simply wrong, therefore, with respect to both ends and means, when he 
assumes that because theories influence action they undermine the objectivity of their 
own account. 
Engels' statement is intelligible in the light of the above. Our social practices are 
means to the achievement of certain ends and can be critically assessed in relation to 
those ends provided that we can understand fully their consequences. Otherwise, our 
activities may have undesirable consequences at the collective level, whatever the inten- 
tions at the individual level. 
66 Where there is a conflict of ends we may repress one in favOur of another. Although this 
complicates the picture, the general principle holds. 
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Similarly, with psychotherapy, it is our behavioural strategies for dealing with the 
world which we seek to change in the light of knowledge of our desires. Freudian 
methods, for instance, advocate sublimation rather than repression of desire, existential 
therapy seeks to extend the choice of behavioural strategies and behaviourism attempts to 
coerce the patient into different behavioural patterns. In each case the focus of action is 
on behaviour as a means to an end. 
Ends, of course may also be means to more remote ends. For instance, if I rob a 
bank, the end is to obtain money but obtaining money is itself perhaps the means to help 
me retire in luxury in South America. Nevertheless, the fact that the end may be regarded 
as a means in another theoretical context, does not undermine the points made above. In 
any given theoretical framework, ends will be treated descriptively rather critically, i. e. 
will not be assessed in relation to some further goal beyond the issue considered. There 
is, therefore, nothing logically problematic about this procedure. 
This does raise the question, however, of whether there is some ultimate set of 
human needs or goals to ground the regress of ends and means. In The German Ideology, 
Marx says: 
I# 
... we must 
begin by stating the first premise of human existence and, there- 
fore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live 
in order to "make history". But life involves before everything else eating and 
drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things.,, 67 
This has been taken as the basis of a theory of a hierarchy of needs. A dialectical treat- 
ment of human development, however, would suggest that since human development is 
an open ended process, no needs are immutable. Furthermore, needs will differ within 
any society between both social groups and individuals. Nevertheless, it would be true to 
say that basic needs based in human biology have existed since the beginning of history 
67 op. cit. The German Ideology, pg 48 
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and are likely to remain over a very long period. These needs are also generalisable to all 
members of the species. This view, however, is complemented in Marx's work by his 
emphasis on the fact that it is the increasing complexity and diversity of need which 
characterises human life. Universalism, for him, does not stem from a levelling down to 
some minimal set of common characteristics, but from precisely the opposite, namely, 
interchangeability of social roles and hence of experience within a modem, complex, 
pluralistic society as we shall see in Chapter Seven. 
5.1.1.1. Critical Theory and Structuralism 
Structuralist Marxism takes as its point of departure the view that, in Marx's words: 
Feuerbach resolves religious essence into the human essence. But the human 
essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality it is the 
ensemble of the social relations. 68 
It claims that the epistemic subject of Marx's later works was not "man" in the abstract 
but the structure of social relations and the rules governing the transformation of one 
kind of society into another. 
"Man", however, was not the subject of Marx's earlier Works either. The quote 
above is part of a polemic in his early work directed against both the "Young Hegelians" 
and Feuerbach for doing just that. Marx's humanism concerns the possibility of making a 
society in which each individual is free to develop his or her potential to the full. These 
are concrete individuals, located in different places in a social structure, having different 
needs and capacities. 
To suggest that Marx's later work does not contain this emancipatory element I 
think would be false and for structuralism to take this Position would be to portray 
Marx's theory merely as a description of the laws governing social change rather than 
also as a means to bring it about. 
68 Theses on Feuerbach, K. Marx, thesis VI. 
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The structuralist method applied to a mode of production allows one to generate the 
: set of logical possibilities for the forms that the mode might take given the institutional 
parameters that define it, e. g. commodity production, wage labour, etc. In principle it 
allows one to determine what, for instance, capitalism can and cannot be; can and cannot 
do. 
Applied to history as a whole, however, the problem is different because the struc- 
tural parameters which govern the transformation of modes of production cannot be any 
particular set of institutionalised practices. In Marx's work the constraining parameter of 
social change, such that it is, is the tendency to adopt practices that satisfy human need 
and realise human aspirations to the greatest extent. This alone governs the transition 
between modes of production. This, of course, whilst being an assertion of fact in the 
theory, is also a supposedly a "humanist" concern which brings us to the relationship 
between fact and value in Marx's work. 
5.2. Fact/value 
The /Fact value distinction is usually expressed in the form of the argument that no 
description of what is the case can deterniine whether a person approves or disapproves 
of the situation. Fact and value are separate orders of judgement such that one neither 
determines nor logically implies the other. This is the position as stated by David Hume. 
Hegel, on the other hand, points out that when one positively evaluates something 
by saying that it "ought" to be so, the standpoint only makes sense if it also could be so 
as a matter of fact. It then follows that the only judgements of what ought to be the case 
that make sense are are those that approve of what will in fact be the case at some future 
time. To will the future is the "true" ought for Hegel. A description of what ought to be is 
a description of what will be at some future date. Thus fact and value are not distinct. 
Nevertheless, the subject in the world does not know for certain what the world will 
be like in the future and furthermore, his or her actions will help to shape that future. The 
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subjective view of value is that it is a matter of free choice or preference although equally 
we could treat choices or preferences people actually make objectively as matters of fact. 
But if values can be treated factually, what is taken to be fact is not entirely 
independent of evaluation either. As my treatment of the dilernma of epistemology sug- 
gested what is accepted as the criterion of truth itself rests upon pragmatic choice, i. e. its 
relationship to human projects. However, projects express values or desirable ends hence 
this underdetermines our judgement of what is a fact. 
Nietzsche, for instance, treats all theoretical systems as symptoms of a particular 
orientation to life, not as potential "truths". If one so desired one could always look at 
things differently. This viewpoint expresses the Protagorean doctrine "man is the meas- 
69 ure". 
The relationship between fact and value is thus dialectical. The question which we 
need to answer is how Marx's work is located within this dialectical relation? Marx's 
theories are couched in factual language and are mostly intended to be factual accounts. 
At the same time they are critiques of the existing system of social relations with a view 
to facilitate changing it. 
The point of view from which Marx's critique is set up, however, is not arbitrary. 
Marx accepts the projects which men have taken upon themselves and which are 
expressed in their theoretical systems. His critique consists in showing how their prac- 
tices undermine and fall short of these implied goals. Thus he suggests that though capi- 
talism claims to make the society richer, it simultaneously impoverishes most of its 
citizens. The goal of improved welfare is not a value of Marx's invention but one which 
historically has always been able to achieve popular support. It is one current in the 
society in which he and indeed we live. 
69 Scepticism about "Truth" and indubitable foundations for knowledge is the basis of Post- 
inodernist critiques (of which Post-structuralism is a species in so far as Structuralism is also re- 
garded as "modernist"). 
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Marx's view is similar to Hegel in this respect, he does not judge society from an 
absolute standpoint outside of it but treats values factually as immanent tendencies within 
it. Values are created by men in history and no other source of value is possible. Having 
said that, however, it is possible to judge men's practices in the light of these ends. The 
process is similar to the means-end distinction employed to elucidate the free will/ deter- 
minism dichotomy. 
Although one might object that there are many and conflicting goals and values 
within society, Marx's dialectical view would suggest that a system which could permit 
the satisfaction of these ends simultaneously and without conflict would have priority as 
a goal. Only the "one-sidedness" of values brings approbrium from Marx's view, i. e. spe- 
cial pleading, selfishness and exclusivity. It is in the context of these dialectical perspec- 




The Theory of History (1) 
I. History as the evolution of systems 
The analysis of human society is, at the abstract level, an analysis of systematic 
ýarrangements or totalities. Institutionalised behaviour patterns are the forms taken by 
social cooperation and it is the dynamics of their operation which governs social develop- 
Inent. it is from this point of view that Marx elaborates his theory of history. The types of 
3relationship, which are characteristic of totalities are those of mutual causality i. e. dialec- 
-lical relations. The dynamics of history are therefore analysed by Marx in these terms. 
Although the elements of a system are interdependent the nature of the interaction 
between them can vary. Each element may act from an internal dynamic which is syn- 
chronised in some way to the imperatives of the system as a whole. 
1 Under these cir- 
c, umstances there can be no conflict between the parts or disharmony within the system. 
On the other hand, the dynamics of each element of the system may simply respond 
to external constraint and hence the dynamic of the system as a whole would then appear 
to be the accidental result of the external relations between the interdependent parts. 
The history of all societies prior to communism presents us with development along 
the lines of the latter model. What follows therefore is a more detailed elaboration of this 
process. 
I Durkheim's "conscience collective", for instance, is intended to play this role of synchronis- 
ing social activity in his social theory. 
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Positivism and history 
It may appear from the preceding paragraph, that I am representing Marx's theory of 
history as a theory about social relations understood as an independent, self-evolving 
alien structure which determines individual action. As such, it would be at odds with the 
discussion in the earlier chapters of alienated consciousness and of the religious as 
against the scientific approach to social phenomena. 
There appears in fact to be a paradox in Marx's own work here, since on one hand 
he wishes to say that to represent social relations, which are social products, as an exter- 
nal force compelling men to act, is to represent them as God-like and as such is an illu- 
sion. On the other hand, he is also committed to saying that this is precisely the situation 
prior to communism and therefore to describe it as such is correct. Men under these cir- 
cumstances are in fact slaves of their social products. 
The difference between Marx's views and a positivist history, however, is that the 
latter raises to a metaphysical absolute what the former regards as a historical cir- 
cumstance. For the positivist, alienation defines social relations per se. It becomes the 
paradigm of social existence. Marx's view, by contrast, includes the analysis of how 
men, as conscious subjects, come to understand and take control of their own society. 
it is true that the emergence of an adequate social consciousness is itself analysed as 
a predictable and law-like process, (within limits), and so the whole process appears 
deterministic, but the willed activity of the subject, even if it is law-like cannot be said to 
be an alien constraint. 
2 To act in accordance with one's will is to be free. In the last 
analysis therefore, it is this willed activity which has causal primacy in the theory and not 
the social product, i. e. social relations, as such. 
The scenario is roughly as follows: in order to shape "alien" nature to human needs, 
men engage in production. Production implies the application of humanly developed 
2 Logic (part one of the encyclopedia), G. W. F. Hegel, section 158. 
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means; implements, skills, knowledge, forms Of social cooperation etc., to the task. Apart 
from their limited utility in overcoming nature, these products are objects of nature in 
their own right and have their own characteristic patterns of "behaviour". 
Human beings are, therefore, confronted with a second world of alien beings in their 
own products. In order not to be subjected to these as they were to nature, they have to 
attempt to understand and control this realm also. 3 Since, however, this is the realm of 
their own life-activitY, this is self-understanding and self-control. 
Any theory which attempts to comprehend this realm, must necessarily be able to 
explain its own existence since it is also a part of the life-activity of the society and a 
means of overcoming alienation. This then raises the seeming paradoxes concerned with 
loself-creation" and the subject-object dialectic discussed in the previous chapter. In par- 
ticular it raises the "Baconian paradox" of how if the world is law-governed it is possible 
to change it. 4 
1.1. Mutual causality in a dynamic context 
We see in debates about whether mental events are the cause of material events or 
vice-versa, the problems which arise when it is assumed that only linear causation is pos- 
sible and that there must be some "first cause" which determines everything else. Mutual 
determination thwarts the question which desires to know which is prior, seeming to 
answer, paradoxically, both and neither. Mutual causality is perfectly possible, however, 
in at least two respects. 
First, when interacting elements of a system simultaneously condition each other's 
behaviour; for instance, in the case of capitalists and wage labourers (the characteristic 
3 c. f. Anfi-Dýhring, F. Engels, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1976, pg 361 - cited in CHI 
section 2.1.3 
4 Bacon says that "In order to command nature we must first obey it-, - op. cit. The New Or- 
ganot4 Book One, Aphorism 1U. The discussion of how one can create anything new whilst still 
obeying natural laws is discussed in the previous chapter. 
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behaviour of each is related to the behaviour of the other). Secondly, and for our purposes 
crucially, when the causation from A to B follows the causation from B to A in time, i. e. 
when we are dealing with a continuous process. 
In this latter situation, if the action of each simply maintains the other in its existing 
form, or has no effect upon the form of the reciprocal action of the other, then we have a 
purely cyclical process which preserves the status quo, e. g. in the way an organism repro- 
duces its own organs and the organs sustain the organism, (not taking into account 
growth). 
If, on the other hand, the action of A on B changes the nature of the reciprocal 
action of B on A from what it was previously and similarly, for the action of B on A, then 
what we have is a system that evolves Such a self-enclosed system of causes has both 
cyclical and linear properties. It can perhaps best be likened to a spiral. This dual charac- 
ter is summed up in the Heraclitan aphorism, 
"The movement of the screw is straight and the movement of the screw is 
round. "5 
This kind of developmental dynamic is part of the structure of the fundamental processes 
of historical change. 
6 Substantive examples of the key processes will be given in the fol- 
lowing sections. 
1.1.1. Production and the division of labour 
One such spiral is the relationship between volume of production and division of 
labour. For instance, in order for someone to specialise in a particular task, it is necessary 
that its performance should require something close to the average amount of social 
5 op. cit. Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, ed. G. S. Kirk 1962. 
6 whilst Marx characterises these relations in terms of mutual determination, in some cases he 
also stresses "determination in the last instance" by one of the poles of the relation. I will discuss 
the logic of this below. 
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labour expected of the individual by other members of the group. 
A Farrier in a community with only one horse would be regarded as not pulling his 
weight. As output grows, however, the volume of work at each particular task grows. 
Specialisation in small tasks then becomes feasible. 
Increased production therefore permits increased division of labour without loss of 
man-hours to the community. Increased production is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of the division of labour. Since, as stated earlier, we cannot rely upon syn- 
chronised action7 as the means by which this development tends to occur historically, an 
individualistic explanation is required to fill the gap. 
For the individual, specialisation in a particular skilled task might bring with it a 
number of advantages. Firstly, the contribution of that particular activity to the group 
might be that of a key element in the economy. Thus someone who is skilled at it might 
gain social leverage by making him/herself indispensable. Secondly, it isn't easy to quan- 
fify the contribution of someone whose activity is different from everyone else. It is 
therefore possible for that person to argue the case that less effort at this task makes the 
same contribution to the community as more effort at other tasks. In primitive societies 
(in terms of the development of productive forces), key skills such as "rainmaker" take 
on a mystique which gives their practitioners a relative advantage in the social division of 
labour. 
Increased output, given these incentives, therefore, will give rise to an increase in 
the division of labour. Increase in the division of labour, however, gives rise to an 
increase in output since it makes production more efficient. 8 Thus we have a dynamic of 
7 such as might be brought about by a common understanding of the benefits of division of la- 
bour and consequent collective action. 
8 Efficiency may increase because it is easier to become skilled at a smaller task hence the 
goods produced by the specialist will be more effective for the purpose for which they are used. It 
may also be the case, however, that a specialist has more time to study the Productive process in 
which he is engaged and therefore more likely to invent new techniques. 
The fact that other variables intervene in the spiral process doesn't render false the conclu- 
sion that this is a self-enclosed in the sense of a self-referring dynamic. Also, all the other vari- 
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expanding output and increasing division of labour as each responds to the other. 9 
In the history of mankind after the ice age, of course, we are discussing what was 
initially a slow and fragmented process but its effects can nevertheless be discerned. As 
early as 8,000 BC, 2,000 years before the river valley civilisation of Sumer, the city of 
Catal Hayuk in Anatolia specialised in the production of craft objects, - axes, mirrors, 
other edged tools, etc., made of Obsidian. This testifies to the degree of expansion and 
intercourse between the small agricultural settlements in Anatolia to make this possible. 
A noticeable feature of history with respect to these movements is how in the course 
of time the the whole process speeds up. One of the reasons for this is possibly the way 
that consciousness intervenes in the process. Once the effect of certain kinds of practice 
are known, then if they give desirable results they will be consciously and actively pur- 
sued. 
Knowledge increases the efficiency of action and thus speeds up the process of 
growth. Thus in the capitalist system, entrepreneurs actively search for a "gap in the 
market" i. e. a form of production in which to specialise, and the theorists of capitalism 
consciously advocate the increase in the division of labour, by the community, as a 
means of increasing output. ' 
0 
By this stage the whole process has become conscious and institutionalised. This 
illustrates how consciousness can intervene in a historical process without altering its 
overall direction, since the goal of the process is the satisfaction of sensuous need, and 
what is affected here is only the means of achieving that goal. 
ables are themselves involved in mutually enhancing spirals so that together they form a self- 
enhancing system. 
9 See fig. 1 
10 Cf "Taylorism", from Scientific Management: comprising shop management, the principles 
of scientific management and testimony before the special house committee, F. W. Taylor, Harper 
and Bros. 1911. 
129 
Another contributory factor to the speeding up of change, is that since in a system, 
changes in one particular area affect a wider set of circumstances than the thing that has 
been changed, new opportunities for development are opened up in other parts of the sys- 
tem affected by these output-enhancing changes. 
This in turn produces an escalating chain reaction as each of these changes affects 
an even wider range of activities. The whole environment therefore becomes progres- 
sively more volatile until the dynamic just described ends up permeating every part of the 
system. 
Clearly, the more changes taking place at any given time the faster the process of 
change in the system as a whole since the changes feed o, ff each other. This process is 
enhanced considerably by the fact that as output and division of labour increases, the sys- 
tem becomes larger and more complex. 
The effect of change, therefore, has consequences which increase in both number 
and diversity in the larger and more interconnected system. The rapidity of change in the 
C, apitalist system is connected to the size and complexity of this type of production. The 
rate of change in the system as a whole, therefore, speeds up until as Marx says: - 
All that is solid melts into air etc. II 
1.1.2. Population 
In The German Ideology, Marx says that production begins with an increase in 
population. 12 Presumably this necessitates the conscious attempt to control the environ- 
ment in order to provide for the requirements of extra people from limited resources. 
Humans thus begin to actively produce their own means of subsistence. 
II The Communist Manifesto, K. Marx and F Engels, Penguin Books 1967 pg 83. 
12 op. cit. The German Ideology pg. 42 
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He goes on to assert that this attempt to organise production entails definite forms of 
social organisation, i. e. relations of production, corresponding to the productive forces 
available. He continues: 
"How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most mani- 
festly by the degree to which the division of labour has been carried. Each new 
productive force insofar as it is not merely a quantitative extension of produc- 
tive forces already known ..... causes a further development of the division of 
labour. " 
Population pressure produces the need to develop new productive forces and this in turn 
increases the division of labour. 
One cannot guarantee that this kind of division of labour increases the efficiency of 
production. It doesn't involve the breaking down of tasks into smaller specialisations, it 
merely produces diversity of production method. 
Diversity of production, on the other hand, may make an economy more stable, 
more flexible in its response to the needs of the population and less vulnerable to changes 
in the environment in which the production is carried out, all of which will tend to pro- 
mote further population growth. 13 
This dynamic assumes a limited supply of the existing means of production in the 
face of expanding population, necessitating the discovery of new means. These new 
means are new technology in the broadest sense. I will deal with the dynamics involving 
technology in the next section. 14 
There is however, another spiral which operates when population expansion occurs 
under conditions where the means of production exist in abundance relative to the 
13 See fig. 2(b) 
14 The division of labour involved here is extemal to the existing forms of production in the 
sense that a new form of production is added to them. 
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producers, i. e. for practical purposes they may be regarded as unlimited. 
These conditions obtain when a new technology has been discovered but is as yet 
under-exploited. Under these circumstances, increased Population leads to expansion of 
production, (since it increases the number of Producers), and thus to an increase in out- 
put. 
This, as we have seen, leads to an increase in the division of labour. Increased divi- 
sion of labour, (i. e. specialisation), produces greater efficiency and increases output per 
head. Increased output per head produces the material conditions which, unless totally 
offset by the maldistribution of wealth, lead to a further increase in population. 15 
Thus division of labour and population cause each other to increase via the media- 
tion of output. 16 This situation seems to have occurred on the Iranian Plateau some time 
before 9,000 b. c. amongst the first known agricultural communities. Settlements 
increased both in size and number and since there was a relative abundance of agricul- 
tural land spread out across the Iranian Plateau. This gave rise to the possibility of whole 
settlements specialising in craft manufactures such as occurred with the town of Catal 
Hayuk. 17 Added to this, under conditions where large families are an insurance against 
not having enough labour to exploit the available resources there are positive incentives 
to population growth. 
It can be seen from this discussion that the two spiral movements described occur in 
historical succession as a new method of production is Progressively exploited and even- 
tually becomes limited relative to the expanding population. This puts into perspective 
the viewpoint of Malthus, that population increase engenders a cyclical movement 
whereby wars and famine reduce the number of people until the process of expansion 
15 See fig. 2(a) 
16 The division of labour here is internal to the existing means of production in the sense that 
no new form of production is involved only the subdivision of tasks within the existing forms. 
17 We see a similar cellular division with respect to pastoral communities in the biblical story 
of Lot. 
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1-Degins again. 18 Malthus's problems occur only at the end of a period of development 
t)ased on certain methods of production and as the first discussion indicated, even then 
x--an be overcome by technological innovation. 19 
It is interesting at this point to contrast Malthus's theory with the analysis put for- 
Xward by Lenin in Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin suggested that the 
Uorld after the turn of the century had been totally divided up into "economic spheres of 
influence" by the advanced capitalist nations and that the expansionary dynamic of each 
w. --apitalist nation could only continue at the expense of each others economic interests. /** 
-Yhe difference between this theory and Malthus's, however is that the barrier to produc- 
tion in this situation is not scarcity of the means of production but the internal barrier of 
A: be lack of purchasing power by the majority of the consumers. 20 What is required to sus- 
V-ain the capitalist system, therefore, is new consumers who are not wage labourers for 
lkzapitalism itself. 
Since the world is divided up, there are no external consumers. As a consequence, 
itzapitalist nations attempt to "dump" their surplus goods on each other's markets. As for 
Ithe question of resources, since competitiveness is affected by the cheapness of raw 
: rnaterials, and raw materials which are owned are cheaper than those acquired on the 
, open market, there is a struggle to control those areas where these resources are to be 
bad. The limit in this situation is lack of consumers relative to supply, not the other way 
t7ound. Increased productivity tends to worsen the situation rather than solve the problem 
unlike in the "Malthusian problem". Technology is not the answer in this case, rather, 
-ýjome of the means of production have to be destroyed. 
18 An Essay in the Principle of Population, Thomas Malthus, printed for J. Johnson, 1906. 
19 See fig. 3 
19 V. 1. Lenin, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 
1975, pp 89-103. 




New Technology, in so far as it increases productivity per head, releases surplus 
labour and makes possible the satisfaction of new needs. This leads, other factors permit- 
ting, to new forms of production and productive activity. In turn this engenders both a 
reorganisation of production as a whole, since it alters the demands upon labour, raw 
materials and capital, and also poses problems for the organisation of the new activity 
itself. These new production problems then engender further technological developments 
to provide solutions. 
There are two types of spiral involved in this situation, a shorter one involving the 
reorganisation of existing kinds2l of production and new technology which engender 
each other, and a larger one between new kinds of production and new technology (medi- 
ated by the need for reorganisation as well as the release of surplus labour). 
An example of the shorter process can be seen in the cotton industry in the late 18th 
and the 19th century. Kay's "Fly Shuttle" speeded up the weaving process which pro- 
duced a bottleneck since the spinning industry could not produce enough yam to keep 
pace. The problem was solved via the invention of a series of spinning machines, the 
Jenny, the Water Frame and the Mule. This reversed the problem. Now the weaving 
industry could not use the excess yarn. 22 In turn the invention of the Power Loom 
reversed the situation again. At each stage there was massive unemployment due to the 
introduction of the machines but some of this at least was in the long term diverted into 
other kinds of production. 
An example of the longer process can be seen in the situation after machinery was 
introduced into agriculture. The displacement of labour into new kinds of production is 
illustrated by the fact that workers were forcibly shipped from agricultural parishes to the 
21 Kinds of product rather than methods of production. 
22 Cf. "Early Factory Development in the West Riding of Yorkshire 1770-1800", in Textile 
History and Economic History, Manchester University Press 1973, pg 249. 
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expanding towns where labour was in relative short supply. This in turn made possible 
the expansion of new industries and the development of new technologies. 23 
1.2. Conflict, crisis and new technology 
New technology can create crises by causing dislocations in the productive process 
as we have seen, and also, in capitalism for other reasons e. g. the tendency to depress the 
rate of profit. In a competitive society, it can also be the source of conflict as a result of 
the crises engendered. Examples of this are numerous. "The swing riots of the late 18th 
century would be a domestic example. 
Internationally, wars provoked by trading advantages or general recessions are often 
the result of prior technological changes. The industrial revolution, for instance, led to 
the conquest, often by force, of lucrative trade outlets. The technological growth of the 
German economy is said by some to have caused the attempt to wrest colonial markets 
from the other imperialist powers in the First World War, /** and the Second World War 
followed on the heels of a major recession. Technological change can disturb the balance 
of power as well as disrupt the coordination of the division of labour. 
But if technological change can create crises and conflicts (in the context of anta- 
gonistic economic relations), it also results from them. In the conflict with the working 
classes, workers occupying key positions in the economic process can be outmanoeuvred 
by a reorganisation of that process. This particularly applies to skilled workers whose 
jobs can be de-skilled by the evolution of new techniques. 
Warfare is generally acknowledged as a stimulus to technology, and technological 
development is particularly rapid in periods of war. Finally crises as we have seen also 
act as a stimulus to the invention of new technologies to afford an escape from them. In 
23 See fig. 4 
23 cf Henry Noel Brailsford, War of Steel and Gold, London, G. Bell, 1914. 
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capitalism this takes the form of the individualistic motive to cheapen costs, although 
such things as alternative energy sources etc. might be pioneered by government in a 
situation of extreme shortage. There is, therefore, a spiral relationship not only between 
, reorganisation and 
diversification and new technology, but also between conflict and 
crisis and new technology. 24 
These latter considerations are part of a more general issue. They pose the problem 
& the relationship of antagonistic social relations to the development of the productive 
: forces. So far we have been discussing these relations from their productive aspect, their 
-tendency to promote growth, albeit sometimes through the mediation of destructive 
episodes. But this view of the spiral movement is too simple, for a fuller picture we need 
to examine the destructive aspect of the movement. 
Division, conflict and uneven development 
In the section on dialectical oppositions in the discussion of the logic of dialectics, 
the example used is that of the parent-child relation. 25 In that instance we were discuss- 
ing the relation between the concepts which represent the being or identity of the real 
object. The discussion of dialectical relations within an evolving system presents us with 
the same type of situation in a dynamic context. 
What a thing is is to be understood, according to Marx, in terms of the characteristic 
way in which it manifests itself, i. e. the way in which it interacts with other things. 26 
This gives us a method of transition from identity or "essence" to "action" and the 
analysis of processes. 
In the parent-child example the concept of "parent" implies the relation to the child 
and therefore has the whole relation as its content. Similarly with the concept "child". In 
24 See fig. 5(a), fig. 5(b) and fig. 5(c). 
25 CH3 footnote 12. 
26 cf CH2 2.1.1 
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the context of "action", the parent can only act as "parent" with the compliance of the 
child. If the child should run away, for instance, then the parent would not be able to 
carry out his or her parental duties. Similarly for the child. If the parent-child relation is 
regarded as a simple social system, then the whole system is involved in the action of 
each of its elements, just as before the whole relation was involved in the identity of each 
of its elements. The action of each, therefore, is the combined action of the whole. 
Each element, however, has its own dynamic. Each element may be regarded as a 
sub-system, the causes governing its development may simply apply to each other, thus 
forming a totality in themselves. 
We have seen in the section on "Organic Causality" how even when such a system 
exists, and this system accounts for the direction of the organism's development, still 
there may be other, enabling inputs from outside of the system as well. Organisms 
require raw material, food etc., to transform into their own living material. Whether the 
environment is conducive or not, therefore, affects their growth. 
In a similar way, the self-enclosed dynamic of each pole of the relationship we are 
considering requires the compliance of the opposite pole, even though the dynamic of the 
pole itself as a spiraling system of mutual cause and effect is not determined in its direc- 
tion by the opposite pole. Its relation to the other pole is as to an external constraint on its 
progress. Focusing upon the poles, therefore, one can discern the principle or law which 
governs the action of each of them by considering its internal dynamic in isolation 
(ceteris paribus). However, things are not necessarily equal. Indeed, in certain kinds of 
system it is necessarily the case that the behaviour of each of the elements will not be 
supportive to the dynamic of the other elements. Since each relates to the others as to an 
external constraint, this implies a conflict within the system. 
In any organic system, the parts and their modes of action are both created and sus- 
tained by the system as a whole. If the system manifests itself in conflicting processes 
this shows its identity to be self-divided, the unity Of an action and its negation, a so- 
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27 
called "material contradiction". 
The situation just described is one of ongoing conflict. However, the contradiction is 
posed at its sharpest form under conditions where neither of the conflicting elements can 
accommodate the other to any degree at all, a situation where, for instance, each in order 
to survive must immediately realise its ends. Since these ends are mutually exclusive of 
one another, only one can succeed. For the system as a whole this produces a destructive 
dilemma. Two processes each of which play an essential role in the system cannot sur- 
vive except on the condition that the other is destroyed. Whichever process is preserved 
the result is the same, destruction of the system as a whole. 
One might, for instance, envisage a situation in the capitalist system where the rate 
of profit is almost too low to act as an incentive to production. Two conflicting impera- 
tives operate within the capitalism to preserve the profit making process without which 
the system would cease to function. First, unless the system continually expands, profit 
for the system as a whole cannot be taken. 28 Secondly, If the system continually expands 
and profit accumulates as capital, then the rate of profit, (which is the actual incentive for 
production), will be depressed. 
29 In the situation described above, stagnation of the sys- 
tem would destroy profit by virtue of the first mechanism, expansion of the system would 
destroy it by virtue of the second. Contradictions, therefore, may act as a stimulus to 
development as in the spirals described earlier, but they can also, under certain cir- 
cumstances, be the source of its destruction. 
27 It is worth pointing out at this point that the empiricist model of a causal law would not per- 
mit us to draw the above conclusions i. e. that the action of the system as a whole can be described 
by conflicting laws. If a law is to be understood as being verified, or not falsified, when specified 
set of antecedent conditions are observed and a predicted set of consequences are observed to fol- 
low, then two laws or principles which state the same set of antecedent conditions but different, 
mutually exclusive consequences, cannot both be verified. Hence they cannot both describe the ac- 
tion of the object. The "ceteris paribus" condition may allow us to escape from falsification. How- 
ever, as I have argued earlier in Chapter 3, causal laws cannot be specified in this way and cir- 
cumstances which are specified by neither can be taken as a verification of both. 
28 c. f. op. cit. Communist Manifesto, pg. 83. 
29 c. f. CH8 section 1.1.1.2 
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The crises which figure in the theory of history are mainly situations arising from 
uncoordinated development of the elements of a system. In some cases this is a result of 
the quasi-separate existence of the individual processes that comprise the system, in other 
cases it is the direct result of a tendency towards polarisation. 30 
In both cases what occurs is that the relations of interdependency are strained by the 
lack of synchrony between the poles. This causes a crisis and either a rapid and more or 
less violent re-adjustment of the system or its total failure. We have already seen this pro- 
cess occur in the example of developments between the spinning and weaving industries. 
Hegel's concept of quantitative change leading to sudden qualitative change is 
relevant here because changes in the operating environment of some element of a system 
will only become critical beyond a certain point when the affected part will be forced to 
respond. A period of sudden change will then follow. 
It is because of the uneven development and the external relations between the parts 
of social systems that developments in history and particularly in the capitalist period 
have had a spasmodic character. Antagonistic modes of production engender crises 
because they lead to polarisation. Uncoordinated division of labour leads to crises 
because it would be highly fortuitous and unlikely that any synchrony would occur 
except through the agency of crisis. 
We see in Marx's analysis how dislocations occur between the economic base and 
the political superstructure and between forces and relations of production leading to a 
rapid adjustment of the latter in so-called "revolutionary" periods. Changes in the for- 
tunes of groups in the division of labour undermine the political and legal relations 
30 The distinction between these causes is by no means trivial. In the case of Marxist analyses 
of the capitalist economy, it is the point at issue between "neo-harrnonists" who believe that capi- 
talism could be stabilised if the proportions of goods exchanged could be synchronised properly 
and "overproductionists" who believe that polarisation is a necessary feature of the system. For a 
fuller discussion, see The Making of Marx's CaPital, Roman Rosdolski, Pluto Press, London 1977, 
Ch. 7 pp. 406-504. 
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between them, leading to a reorganisation of the "peck order" usually by means of 
conflict. 
Marx's analysis of the capitalist economy also makes use of this model. As soon as 
use-value and exchange-value, which are aspects of the commodity, become physically 
separated in the money system, then the possibility, or rather the probability, exists that 
the imperatives corresponding to each will come into conflict. Similarly with the two 
aspects of exchange, purchase and sale, which become separated by the money transac- 
tion. 
The seeming contradiction in Marx's account of base-superstructure relations 
between suggesting on one hand, that there is a necessary correspondence between them, 
and on the other, that the base develops faster than the superstructure, provoking crisis, is 
thus explained by this model also. In the first case he is describing the relations of inter- 
dependence, in the second, the process by which they develop out of synchrony with each 
other leading to re-adjustment. 
This illustrates the Marxian version of the Hegel-type analysis. One-sided conceptu- 
alisation becomes physical separation and conflict between the opposed dynamics. Syn- 
thesis is a form of coordination which can preserve the humanly valuable elements in the 
action of the opposed functions. Now we can return to the more substantive topics we 
were discussing earlier. 
2.1. Relative limits 
In the section on population, a cycle or spiral of development was described 
whereby a new method of production permits economic expansion under conditions of 
relative abundance of the means of production upon which the method is based. Expan- 
sion continues until these resources become scarce relative to demand. A period of 
increasing conflict will then follow as competing groups struggle for control of the lim- 
ited resources in order to continue to expand, often expropriating them from each other. 31 
31 In a society based upon exploitative social relations, there will be principally three interrelat- 
ed spheres of conflict: between the exploiter and the exploited for the division of the social pro- 
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-The problem of scarcity can be solved by new production techniques which require dif- 
: ferent means of production thus beginning a new cycle of expansion based upon a new 
%jivision of labour. 
If the new method of production is of such a fundamentally different kind that it 
wecessitates changes in the principal relations of production, i. e. the form of domination 
cxercised by a ruling class, the method of appropriating the surplus and consequently the 
torm of distribution, then the life cycle of this new technique corresponds to the life cycle 
4of what Marx refers to as a "mode of production". 
We see from a study of the development of manufacturing that the existence of a 
: fundamentally new method of production will pre-date the period of its initial rapid 
cxpansion. Manufacturing develops within the context of the feudal system prior to its 
iexpansion in the sixteenth century. In a similar way, agrarian experiments amongst 
]hunter-gatherers must have pre-dated the expansion of small agricultural communities. 
'The period of relatively unlimited expansion therefore initiates a new historical epoch but 
is not co-terminus with the development of the new technique on which it is based. 32 
The question of what it is that "limits" the expansion of the economy based on a 
vew technique is an important one because everywhere such a limit is encountered the 
: society will begin to exhibit the features characteristic of the later stage of the cycle 
rather than those of the former. The limits encountered by an expanding system are not 
usually absolute limits. They can be relative in at least three different ways. Firstly, they 
4duct, between exploiters for the right to exploit and between the exploited for the right to be ex- 
ploited and hence to survive. All these dimensions of conflict intensify when resources become 
scarce. 
31 New technologies within a mode of production will, however, also produce "mini-cycles" of 
the same kind for those who attempt to exploit them. 
32 It should be further noted that the point in time at which the relations of production are 
transformed oes not necessarily occur either when the new technique is implemented or when it 
begins to become dominant. It depends upon which feature in the new method is responsible for 
the change and at what point this feature begins to assert itself. Some of the crucial features of cap- 
italism for instance are conditioned by the scale and rapidity of change of this method of produc- 
tion. These changes only take effect at a relatively mature stage of the emergence of this system. 
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izan be relative to a particular method of production as we have seen. Here new tech- 
iniques overcome the problem. Secondly, they can be relative to the rate of expansion of 
Oe economy, and thirdly relative to the ease of obtaining means of production by other 
xnethods such as theft or warfare. All these situations cause resources to be regarded as if 
they are finite for all practical purposes. 
We see present day examples of limits to the expansion of the economy in three 
-irnpending crises, namely, the shortage of raw materials, in particular energy reserves, the 
ithreat of pollution, and the threat of nuclear war. 33 The first is a good example of a limit 
)r, elative to the rate of expansion of the economy and the latter two, though a result merely 
, itDf the scale of production are worth discussing because they approximate to the destruc- 
V-ive dilemma situation described above. 
The shortage of raw materials, it should be noted, is not the result of the resources 
]having been gradually used up over the years. Rather it is the case that production has 
Cocreased exponentially over the latter part of the century such that the demand for raw 
t-vaterial is increasing faster than the ability to find and develop new resources. Resources 
'-tjre scarce relative to the rate of increase in demand. 
In absolute terms, there are ample resources. Two thirds of the world is under water 
, Zod the resources of the sea bed have been exploited hardly at all. These latter resources, 
Anowever, are more difficult to extract which raises the possibility of regarding the limit as 
;a relative one in the third sense as well as the second. 
As the century progresses, one would expect sharpening tensions over possession of 
k-esources (although the recession has slowed this process down). The third sense in 
Vhich resources are regarded as finite involves a weighing of cost against benefit between 
the alternatives of developing a resource oneself and trying to take it from someone else. 
IResources can be regarded as limited in this sense at any point in the life cycle of their 
'I- 
33 For an extended discussion of these contradictions c. f. CH8 section 1.2.3 
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use and the same consequences follow from such a situation as if the limit was absolute. 
Limitation relative to the rate of increase in demand is an example of a situation where 
one pole of a relation, i. e. demand, expands faster than the other pole, i. e. supply, thus 
straining to crisis point the relation of interdependence between them and threatening the 
whole system. 
In the case of pollution and nuclear war the situation is not simply one in which the 
poles of a relation develop in a non-synchronised way relative to each other, but where 
these related processes are actually in conflict with each other. Again it is the rapidity in 
the growth of industrial production which has increased both the power to pollute and to 
destroy. The ecological system supports the productive activities of men. These activities 
in turn make possible pollution and destruction on a scale which will destroy the ecology 
of the planet. Indeed the dynamics of capitalism engender these destructive tendencies. 
War has always destroyed some of the productive forces but now, through the destruction 
of the ecological system, it can destroy them all. 
This is a dynamic of self-destruction. The case is similar with pollution if it contin- 
ues. This situation has similar formal properties to the destructive dilemma outlined ear- 
lier. If the destructive tendencies continue then essential elements of the system will be 
destroyed. The question is whether wars and pollution are themselves also essential ele- 
ments in the development of the capitalist system, because if they are and they cannot be 
removed without destroying the system then the dilemma is complete. 
It may seem that in the period of expansion of an economic system when the means 
of production exist in relative abundance no limits will be encountered and thus there 
will be no conflict. This is sometimes but not necessarily the case. 
A concrete example might be the dispersion of settlers into the western part of the 
U. S. A. (Indians notwithstanding). There does not seem to have been any conflict between 
the settlers. The nearest example of conflict is the range wars between farmers and ranch- 
ers. This probably occurred when the available land had been already mostly converted to 
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range, since it is unlikely that settlers would deliberately fence off ranges if there were 
alternative sites. 
On the other hand, the limitation to the available land could have been relative in 
the sense that alternative land was not as good or difficult to farm for other reasons. The 
ranchers for their part may have refused to move for the reason that in a competitive 
society it is necessary to prevent others from taking what you have. 
One imagines that the dispersion of the early agricultural communities across the 
Iranian plateau was probably relatively conflict free in the same way, although Engels in 
"The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State", suggests that as soon as 
labourers can produce more than mere subsistence, then raids between communities, the 
taking of slaves and the gradual emergence of a class of warriors that regard labour as the 
activity of a lower class may begin to emerge. 
Another scenario is possible however. If a new method of production emerges from 
a system in which power and wealth has become centralised in the hands of rival factions 
and conflicts have sharpened in the latter phase of the previous cycle, then the antagon- 
isms engendered are not necessarily dispelled by the relatively easier economic climate 
which follows. The reasons for this are twofold. First, new means of production, although 
not scarce, enhance the power of erstwhile rivals and, should a new limit be reached on 
the basis of the new technology, that power would become a threat. 
Secondly, the wealth accumulated in the previous era might prove a more tempting 
prize than any new resource that could be developed, therefore no state can let its rivals 
become too powerful. Conflict is therefore likely to arise over the potential productivity 
of a resource rather than its actual productivity. 
This phenomenon can be seen at times of imperialist expansion when land is seized 
and defended irrespective its actual yield of wealth. 34 At the same time, whilst this 
34 c. f. Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, Martin Loney, Penguin 1975, pp 29-36. 
144 
expansion is taking place actual productive resources are treated as limited. They are con- 
tested over on the basis of the principle that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush". 
What has already been developed is of proved value and is of significance in terms of the 
rivalry. What has not yet been developed is for the future and is not as significant. Euro- 
pean powers were prepared to trade whole continents in the new world for small Euro- 
pean possessions at the beginning of their expansion into this area. The system is always 
therefore relatively closed in this sense. 
Relative closure creates three principal tendencies: the intensification of social anta- 
gonisms, the discovery of new techniques and the tendency towards the centralisation of 
wealth and power. The extent of the pressure towards the realisation of these societal 
results depends upon the extent to which the closure of the system cannot be circum- 
vented. 
2.2. Centralisation and Decentralisation 
Marx states in many places that the tendency of capital is towards concentration and 
centralisation in a few hands. In Capital volume 1 he gives the reason as follows: 
"This expropriation [of capitalists by other capitalists] is accomplished by the 
action of the immanent laws of capitalist production itself, by centralisation of 
capital. One capitalist always kills many, '35 (my parentheses) 
This explanation holds good, however, not just for capitalism but for any mode of pro- 
duction which involves competition for the possession of private property. The wealthy 
always have advantages over the less wealthy. 
Feudalism, for instance, began with small kings and ended up with the whole terri- 
tory of Europe owned by just a few families. The Greek city states began as independent 
entities but ended up as part of the Spartan or Delian leagues, dominated economically 
35 op. cit. Capital, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, pg 927. 
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and politically by Sparta and Athens respectively. Economic and political centralisation 
seems to take place in all competitive modes of production. 
It also appears from this, however, that it is equally the case that decentralisation of 
wealth and power must take place between modes of production since each starts out 
with small scale private property. Engels, in "Outlines of a critique of political econ- 
omy,,, 36 talks about the restoration of monopoly by capitalism. This is because small 
scale capitalist private property took the place of Feudal monopolies only to re-establish 
monopoly again through its own dynamic. There seems to be a cyclical pattern, therefore, 
between the centralising and decentralising tendencies for each economic epoch. 
2.3. Centralisation 
I will deal more specifically with the mechanisms of centralisation under three head- 
ings: "competitive centralisation", "administrative centralisation" (i. e. to meet the needs 
of administration) and centralisation as a response to external threat. 
2.3.1. Competitive centralisation 
As soon as economic systems are efficient enough to produce a surplus product over 
and above the minimum subsistence for the workers, there is an incentive for the exten- 
sion of hegemony by any ruling class over the largest possible amount of the means of 
production in order to appropriate the largest possible surplus. However, the extent to 
which this accumulation, should it occur, also represents a centralisation of wealth and 
consequently of power in the hands of fewer and fewer people, depends upon whether or 
not the means of production are in relative abundance or shortage relative to potential 
producers. 
36 "Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy" in op. cit. E. P. M. Appendix, pg 165. 
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In a closed system (in the sense of limited resources) the stronger parties will incor- 
porate the resources of the weak until only a few, sometimes only two, economic and 
political entities remain. In an open system, however, producers will constantly escape 
from the dominance of would be rulers and set up in economic and political opposition 
since the resources from which to do this exist in relative abundance. 
ThisIs where the concept of a relative limit comes into play. The degree of centrali- 
sation and the intensity of the centralising process depend upon whether the potential for 
expansion encounters a limit. If the limit is only a question of the ease of appropriating 
resources and subordinating other producers as against developing new resources oneself, 
then beyond a certain point of centralisation with its attendant subordination and exploi- 
tation, producers will begin to "bleed" from the system. The external difficulties associ- 
ated with the underdeveloped resources will be preferable to living in an exploitative sys- 
tem. 
Russia and Poland experienced this problem in the 16th and 17th centuries when 
large numbers of workers escaped serfdom to live with the Cossacks in the south. The 
diaspora westwards in the U. S. A. was fueled by similar motives as was the immigration 
to America itself. 
Where small producers go the large producers follow, however. in America for 
instance the large corporations followed the pioneers and subordinated them once more 
(except for those that had grown rich rapidly enough to be large capitalists themselves). 
The incorporation of smaller producers by the larger ones takes place most rapidly how- 
ever, when new resources are exhausted, (in America when the frontier reached the 
Pacific Ocean). 
Capitalism progresses in exactly the same fashion in the cycles of boom and slump, 
although the limit to the development of new resources is here provided by the market. In 
the expansionary phase of the cycle, small capitalist enterprises spring up attempting to 
cater for new needs in an expanding economy, these , pioneers" or at least the ones that 
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. are successful, are then taken over 
by large corporations. 
The real process of centralisation begins, however, when the rate of profit starts to 
, decline and there are insufficient markets to retain profitability. The small firms then go 
4out of business and the large firms merge or take one another over. Since these large 
lirms can survive the crisis, the "frontier" of small capitalists becomes a less significant 
: factor in the economy relative to the larger and fewer corporations cycle by cycle. 
]Economic power in the system thus becomes increasingly centralised. 
A historical example of competitive centralisation under conditions of finite 
iresources is that of the Greek city states of the classical period. The Hellenic peninsula 
]has a "backbone" of mountains into which are cut small fertile plains. Each of these 
]plains originally supported a number of independent city states. As they prospered and 
]population grew, so they were brought into conflict with each other over the possession 
of agricultural land. Eventually one city came to dominate each plain, which meant in 
4effect that although the plain did not produce any more food, now, only the ruling class 
cf one city was appropriating the surplus. The dominant city needless to say grew in 
-wealth and power. 
Then the same situation arose between plains until the lesser ones were joined on 
tinfavourable economic terms to the stronger. Eventually there were just two "super- 
]powers" Athens at the head of the Delian league and Sparta at the head of the Spartan 
league. Athens by this time, however, had advanced technologically and was producing 
craft products which it traded for food with Egypt. This did not reduce the need to dom- 
inate other states, however, because this arrangement made it dependent on its trading 
partners and so spread the sphere in which it needed to exercise control overseas as well. 
The result of the rivalry between the leagues as we know was the Peloponesian war 
which ruined them both. 
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2.3.2. Administrative centralisation 
Having said that property based on a new form of production begins as small private 
property and gradually centralises, it is necessary to qualify this by looking at several 
notable exceptions and to elucidate a second factor governing the centralisation process 
which has consequences for the extent to which it can progress. 
Early in the feudal period, "Charlemagne", established an empire across Western 
Europe. That empire, however, subsequently disintegrated into smaller states after his 
death. Alfred the Great, on the other hand, a king obviously styling himself on Charles a 
century later, managed to unite the kingdoms of England and this economic and political 
unit survived him. Similarly, in the classical period, Alexander the Great established an 
empire which included an area around the Mediterranean sea and a substantial part of the 
Near East stretching as far as Northern India. This empire also broke into smaller king- 
doms after his death whereas the equally extensive Roman empire, reaching its full extent 
four hundred years later, remained viable for almost half a millennium after that. 
The empires of Charlemagne and Alexander represent early political centralisation 
by conquest based on a certain mode of production and I would argue were inherently 
unstable political entities compared with the later cases of England and the Roman 
empire based on the same mode of production respectively. 
A number of factors affect the stability of a centralised system. First there is the 
question of how efficient the mechanism is for making the surplus product available to 
the central authority. The central authority must create for itself forces strong enough to 
subdue any power base existing within its realm which might rebel or secede. For this it 
requires taxation. 
It is a chicken and egg situation. Taxes buy soldiers and bureaucrats, soldiers and 
bureaucrats make it possible to collect taxes. Mutual causality however, is a characteris- 
tic of evolutionary processes and each of these things enhance the development of the 
other. Under these circumstances one would expect centralisation to occur gradually, 
149 
although exceptional historical circumstances may allow more rapid development. 
Once such a self-funding centralised system has been established, however, it it 
exhibits stabilising characteristics. Principally it seems to be the case that any ambitious 
person who is strong enough to resist the central authority will also be strong enough to 
try take control of it. Provincial power bases therefore, will tend to be used by ambitious 
men as springboards to take control of the whole system rather than to hive off part of it 
as a smaller independent system. The whole system is the richer prize. It follows that 
centralisation must take place over a period of time by small increases so that conquests 
can be consolidated. Only then do the larger properties become viable economic and pol- 
itical units. Alexander's and Charlemagne's empires were too large and were conquered 
too rapidly to be consolidated. Only the personal qualities and reputations of these men 
could hold them together. 
Secondly, there is the degree to which the economy of the area to be consolidated is 
integrated or composed of self-sufficient units. If the economy forms an integrated unity, 
then secession of part of it means a loss for everyone, if not it can easily be dissociated. 
Whether the seceding part loses or gains of course depends on how ruthlessly it is being 
plundered in favour of the central authority. An integrated economy however, can pro- 
vide a strong incentive to maintain it as a single unit. 
Cromwell's economic unification of the Scottish and English economies had created 
sufficient prosperity to prevent the lowland Scots from "rocking the boat" by supporting 
the Stuart claims to the throne in 1745. Integration of the economy in turn will require 
coordinating functions to be performed centrally and therefore necessitate centralisation. 
This consideration comes into play when unification comes about by alliance or merger 
rather than by conquest. Alexander's empire on the other hand was easily dissociated into 
its component parts. 
Thirdly, external threat will necessitate the centralising of resources on a sufficient 
scale to meet the threat. This may force petty rulers to submit to a central authority to 
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ensure their mutual survival. All these factors work together. 
Alfred's kingdom was smaller than Charlemagne's. The merchant classes supported 
him because unifying the country promoted trade between different areas. A healthy 
economy for the merchants in turn meant a full exchequer, a prerequisite for centralising 
power. The external threat from the Danes lasted for the next two hundred years, necessi- 
tating a strong Saxon army. This also relied on the exchequer in the last analysis and the 
establishment of a single dynastic rule prevented internal squabbles weakening the Saxon 
cause against the common threat. This situation was consolidated by the time the 
Norman's centralised the system even further. 
Charlemagne's empire by contrast was too large to build an efficient tax gathering 
system in his lifetime. Although the court moved from place to place and he had inspec- 
tors to check on his dukes, no successor without the benefit of his military abilities and 
reputation could have held on to so vast an area with this arrangement. 
Alexander's conquests took place in such a short space of time that the administra- 
tion of these countries was virtually the same by the time of his death. The Roman 
empire on the other hand grew over two hundred years in which the provinces were sys- 
tematically plundered to enrich Rome. Although the wealth itself created problems the 
aspiration of ambitious provincial governors was always to become Emperor in Rome not 
to secede (at least not until the empire's collapse). 
This brings us to the question of the second factor governing the process of centrali- 
sation mentioned at the start of this section. As an economic system which is based upon 
competition expands to take in extra units of production, it will also require extra admin- 
istrative apparatus to oversee their operation, but not in the same proportion. 
If, for instance, a state consisting of productive forces of a certain size were to add 
to itself a province of approximately the same productive capacity, it would have dupli- 
cated its productive forces. It would not, however, simply be required to duplicate its 
administration. if it simply duplicated the administration in the new province, there 
151 
would in effect be two administrations with the possibility of conflict between them and 
the danger of secession. There would also be no coordination or integration of their 
economies. As the number of productive units increase, one cannot simply add an admin- 
istrative structure of the same kind as all the other units, the hierarchy must also get 
"taller". In a competitive system there is always the question of "who guards the guards". 
Both with respect to coordination and central control, therefore, a higher, more central- 
ised level of bureaucracy must be added. In general, the broader the productive "base" of 
a system, the taller the administrative hierarchy needed to maintain centralised control of 
it. The alternative is at best a loose federated structure, at worst the disintegration of the 
system. 
Expansion of a system based on competitive relations, therefore, involves a dynamic 
whereby the central administration must expand faster than the productive base, because 
it not only keeps pace "laterally" but also gets "taller". Beyond a certain size, therefore, 
administrative costs will outstrip the surplus product available to pay for them. This is 
another example of a situation in which one pole of a relation develops faster than the 
other endangering the relation of dependence between them. There is, therefore, for any 
technological level and given rate of surplus production, a limit to how far a system can 
expand and maintain central control. 
If the dynamic which causes the system to expand is not coordinated with needs of 
administration, it will push the system beyond this point into crisis. This was probably 
the main factor at work in the eventual collapse of the Roman Empire. 37 
37 Other factors include the fact that Western Europe had a sparse Population distributed in a 
large area, which produced long borders to defend with only a small amount of agricultural pro- 
duction within them to defray the costs. 
Also, the Germanic tribes along that border increased in size and number over time increas- 
ing military costs even further. Increased production within those boundaries, however, may have 
worsened the situation since central administration would have to cope with controlling the power 
of governors who would become richer thereby. 
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attempts at centralisation of power by the king in England under successive "Angevin" 
monarchs (who held more land in France than the French king) resulted in political 
upheavals. The most notable of these was king John's encounter with the barons at Run- 
nymede where the principle bone of contention was the king's unlimited right to extract 
taxes for the exchequer. Richard I had had problems in raising money from time to time 
and Henry 11 problems in regularising the administration of the law. 
In a period of economic prosperity, however, the increased surplus will permit a 
greater degree of centralised power providing the ruler can take possession of the surplus. 
At such times, on the other hand, the rulers peers also become stronger and will attempt 
to increase their own wealth and power. Such periods in a competitive system are there- 
fore predisposed towards power struggles. 
Periods of economic crisis provoke conflict because there is less property to share 
amongst the class of proprietors. This tends to produce fewer owners with the winners 
taking over the property of the losers. Prosperity on the other hand can produce the same 
effect although this time property will polarise within the existing class. 
If the surplus is large enough and polarisation is taken beyond a certain point, it will 
be possible for the winner of the competitive struggle to build a bureaucracy and estab- 
lish himself as an absolute ruler. A good example of this in the late middle ages is the 
rise of absolutism in England. The hierarchy thus becomes "taller" and the class subdi- 
vides. 
The first "Wars of the Roses" began at a time of economic crisis and tension. The 
"Black Death" killed a third of the working population which led to less income for the 
nobility and revolts by the hard pressed peasants who were expected to make up the 
deficit. Although plunder from the hundred years war offset the losses to some extent and 
focused attention abroad still the times remained unstable until the end of the 14th cen- 
tury. 
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The second "Wars of the Roses", however, took place a century later at a time of 
unprecedented prosperity. The increase in production in the 15th century laid the basis 
for the expansion of trade in the 16th century. In these wars, ambitious barons fought to 
control and later to become monarch because the king was at first a minor then later an 
unpopular monarch with disputed title to the throne. 
The wars, however, weakened the barons sufficiently for the victorious Henry VII to 
subordinate them completely and establish himself as absolute monarch at the head of a 
bureaucratic machine. Increased prosperity not only permits the centralising of power, 
therefore, it necessitates it through competition. 
2.3.3. Centralisation as a response to external threat 
We saw earlier how the existence of an external threat assists the process of concen- 
trating wealth and power in the hands of a central authority. As soon as one state has 
achieved this centralisation, however, it becomes a threat to all the rest of its competitors 
due to the resources which it has at its disposal. They are forced therefore either to 
attempt to centralise power themselves or to succumb to external domination. In this way 
the world tends to follow the leader and the economic and political entities in the world 
are bound to become larger and fewer. 
A contemporary example of this can be seen in the logic advanced by pro - E. E. C. 
politicians that only an economic and political unit of this size will have the resources to 
compete both economically and politically with the super-powers. The E. E. C. 's central 
budget permits ventures such as the European space programme and it has become neces- 
sary for European countries to cooperate on arms production and civil aviation etc. 
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2.3.3.1. Unity and Kingship 
Group decisions within centralised organisations imply some element of bureau- 
cratic control and the bureaucratic principle requires a single authority to have ultimate 
power over executive decisions. A "monarch", therefore, is the logical head of a bureau- 
cratic system. Where centralisation occurs via alliance due to external threat, (threat from 
a subject class is an external threat to a ruling class), then the relation between the allies 
and the executive power is important. 
Alliances, particularly for the purpose of warfare, are stronger if there is a single, 
acknowledged leader. This is because troops who owe allegiance to different leaders 
within an alliance will behave as rivalS38 and differences between the leaders can cause 
conflict between the troops. A single executive power provides a mechanism for settling 
divisive disputes within the ruling group. The greater the external threat, the more 
dangerous is internal division. Agreement to obey a single authority entails members of 
the ruling group relinquishing some of their personal power to the central authority but 
this is the price which is paid for ensuring internal cohesion and discipline. (This power 
may not always be relinquished voluntarily in the first instance). 
There is a tendency, therefore, for ruling classes, both because of the threat from 
other ruling classes and the threat from their own subject classes, to foster a cult of 
leadership. "The leader" produces unity and is treated as if he/she embodies the ideals of 
the organisation or movement. 
Identification with a cause can also act as a unifying force but where potential anta- 
gonism between the allied forces is great, a strong executive is required, essentially to 
protect them from themselves. The extent to which obedience to leaders is thought 
important reflects the extent to which the rule of a class depends upon the existence of a 
38 An example of this was the allied annies in the Second World War whose troops had to be 
kept apart to prevent conflicts breaking out between them. 
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bureaucratic machine rather than the natural abilities of its members. Subservience is 
thus treated as the greatest "good". 39 
2.4. Decentralisation 
We have so far been discussing development within a mode of production rather 
than the transition from one to another. Although Marx and Engels' analysis indicates 
decentralisation occurring on the basis of a new mode of production, there are also decen- 
tralising tendencies within the period of development of an "old" mode of production. 
Periods of relative prosperity, (as well as periods of crisis), as we have seen lead to 
competitive centralisation within the ruling class and sometimes administrative centrali- 
sation also. Not only the ruling class will necessarily share in the prosperity, however. 
Groups of "nouveau riches" will appear. The number of groups capable of exerting politi- 
cal pressure, therefore, will increase. 
Whether these groups can consolidate their position will depend upon whether their 
prosperity is based on linear or merely cyclical factors in the development of the econ- 
omy. Nevertheless they will press for economic and political privileges reflecting their 
new position which are denied to them under the existing power structure. This kind of 
challenge from below will usually meet with opposition from those with a vested interest 
in maintaining the structure as it is. This is to be expected in a competitive system where 
each is jealous of his position. In so far as the newly gained economic base confers lever- 
age, however, the demands will have to be accommodated and eventually they will be 
incorporated into the existing structure. 
By accommodating input to government from a larger set of interest groups the base 
of the governmental system is thereby widened. This may take place on the basis of new 
legal rights or in terms of direct representation depending upon the strength of the 
39 cl CH7 section 2.2.3 
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challenge. The system remains centralised in the sense that no independent power base 
remains outside of it but the incorporation of pressure groups leads to increased democra- 
tisation of the state machine itself 
Centralising tendencies both within the economy and the state, however, tend to 
focus the real power at the centre of the bureaucracy, undermining the input from the 
periphery. In the modern era in Britain, as national capital has become centralised in 
large corporations, so the interests of the local capital of particular areas has become less 
important for the economy and correspondingly the influence of backbenchers in parlia- 
ment has lessened. Government has become increasingly centralised even within the 
cabinet. The ruling interests are those of "the city" and the multinational corporations. 
An example of the incorporation process just described is given by the way the de 
Montfort rebellion in the middle ages led to the establishment of the house of commons. 
The thirteenth century was a period of prosperity when trade in particular flourished. The 
king, Henry III, was absent on crusades for long periods of time and the country was run 
by his son-in-law Simon de Montfort. Henry had angered a number of groups of people 
for various reasons but the problems came to a head when he angered the Pope by not 
paying a sum of money which he had agreed to pay but which he didn't have. The view 
of the dissatisfied groups within the country was that he was endangering their prosperity 
and that the country's wealth was not simply his personal property to dispose of as he 
wished. They coined the concept of "the Commonwealth" and demanded accountability 
in its disposal. 
The rebellion was crushed, but Edward 1, Henry's son and general, recognised that 
many of the people who had opposed his father were a new political force with no legally 
acknowledged voice in government, so when he became king he gave them a second 
chamber, the House of Commons, thus incorporating the dissent. He may have seen them 
as potential allies against the barons but the principle remains the same. 
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The gradual extension of the franchise towards universal suffrage in the 19th cen- 
tury provides more examples. The extension in 1832 comes two years into the boom 
period beginning in 1830 and gave the vote to the newly prosperous middle classes. The 
extension of 1867 is one year later than the commercial crisis which began in 1866 and 
extended the vote by 88%. The extension of 1884 comes one year into the crisis begin- 
ning in 1883 and confers universal male suffrage. The latter two occasions extended the 
vote to the working classes, at first with property qualifications based on house owner- 
ship. They each come at the end of a boom period and at the onset of crisis. 
The explanation for this is possibly that the worsening conditions act as a trigger for 
agitation after a period when the strength of the groups later enfranchised had been con- 
solidated within the economy. The years from 1850 to 1875 were referred to as "The gol- 
den years" and British capital in those years dominated the world. The basis for this 
supremacy however, was the productivity of the working class whose demands for recog- 
nition eventually could not be ignored. Recognition may, however, fall short of having 
ones own representatives within the political system. 
In the 1960's boom, subordinated groups such as youth, women, ethnic minorities 
etc. and oppressed groups such as homosexuals, demanded equal rights and consideration 
of their specific demands as interest groups. This was a period of full employment when 
the market for their labour gave them financial independence and freed them from 
economic control. The principles which they asserted were partially conceded either in 
the form of legislation or their accepted treatment within the culture. 
The gains made by these groups continued even with the onset of crisis in the 
1970's but the 1980's has seen increased pressure to re-subordinate them with youth 
being the most vulnerable group, bearing the brunt both of unemployment and discrimi- 
natory legislation. Whether this subordination can be achieved to the extent of pre-war 
situation will depend upon how far the boom period has altered the material basis of the 
whole culture and correspondingly their position within it. The growth in consciousness 
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in those years is an equally important factor in the realisation of their potential as a politi- 
, cal force 
The discussion so far has been concerned within the period of the "normal" develop- 
inent of a mode of production. In the next chapter the discussion will turn to the "revolu- 
tionary", transitional periods between modes of production. 
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Chapter Five 
The Theory of History (2) 
1. Periods of transition between modes of production ("revolutionary" periods) 
The period of transition between modes of production presents us with a different 
situation to the one described so far. In the processes analysed above, the rich get richer 
and the poor get poorer, relatively speaking. But in a period of transition, an underclass 
emerges to displace the ruling class and property and power become decentralised rather 
than centralised. The reasons for this are described below. 
1. The failure of incorporation 
in the previous section we saw how groups whose social position improves as a 
result of general prosperity will demand some kind of recognition of their interests. If 
their demands are supported by a real change in the power differentials in society, then 
eventually their demands will be recognised and the group will be incorporated within 
the central power structure. In an earlier section we also saw how small property owners 
"pioneer" a new means of production only to be incorporated economically within larger 
concentrations of property at a later date. I 
In these situations centralised power and wealth always has the advantage but in a 
transitional period this is not the case. If a form of property and method of production 
contains within itself the potential to become the principal wealth creating activity of the 
whole society, then the activities of those directly involved in this practice can never 
c. f. CH4 section 2.3.1 
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ultimately be incorporated either economically or politically. The rise of such people to 
become the dominant social group does not depend upon their ownership of their own 
means of production, the importance of what they do to the economy will give sufficient 
social leverage to deliver control of the process into their own hands. 
Any attempt to incorporate them politically by giving them a voice in central 
government will merely present them with a public platform from which to advance even 
greater demands corresponding to their growing power and significance within the econ- 
omy. They can be incorporated only temporarily whilst the potential of the productive 
process in which they are engaged is as yet underdeveloped. An example of how the 
potential of a productive process can overcome legal and political restraints is seen in the 
way the bourgeoisie emerged as an independent class from feudal society. 
Originally, the bourgeoisie were peasants who had been granted "burgages" by a 
feudal lord. Instead of performing agricultural labour to produce surplus for the lord, they 
engaged in craft production on a similar basis, with the lord having some entitlement to 
the surplus. Burgages were popular with the feudal aristocracy because of the economic 
advantages they bestowed. First they involved very little land, the principal form of 
wealth in feudal society, yet yielded goods of equivalent value to a peasants acreage and 
secondly, they provided "luxury" products. The lord could thus have his land and craft 
production too (or money equivalents). 
As a consequence of this the number of burgages grew, increasing the collective 
strength of the burghers. Small towns with markets appeared and commerce grew 
between them. The wealth of the towns allowed the burghers to apply for Royal Charters. 
Instead of being subject to the rule of the local feudal lord, the charter conferred self- 
government. 
This effectively meant taking absolute control over their own property, it meant 
ownership of the town with the right of administration in the way a feudal lord would 
administer his land and govern the activities of those within his domain. The price of this 
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was taxation paid by the town to the monarch. The monarch himself now saw the towns 
as a source of revenue and was prepared to trade this for political privilege. 
As the wealth of the towns increased, even this claim on its property was either cir- 
cumvented or repudiated. The bourgeoisie had become strong enough to assert complete 
independence and defend it with armed force if necessary. 2 At each stage it was the 
wealth-creating potential of this particular mode of production which proved the decisive 
lever. 
Economic incorporation of such enterprises will also fail with a powerful method of 
production. New economic ventures set up outside the main structure of the productive 
process cannot be run on the same basis as the main productive process since they consti- 
tute a new form of property and a new method of production. Control of the practice 
must be left in the hands of those who already manage it. They cannot, therefore, be 
integrated into the existing economic structure. 
They cannot be dominated either, because the wealth which they produce and the 
consequent increase in the size and scope of their activity will eventually provide a power 
base from which those engaged in such activity will be able to break free of such domina- 
tion. An example of this process can be seen as early in the development of capitalism as 
1776, when the American colonies were able to successfully break free of their colonial 
masters. Had the schism not occurred then it must have occurred later as the full potential 
of the American continent began to be realised. 
Independence rather than a bid to take control of the central authority was bound to 
be the political objective once the centre could no longer control the periphery. It was 
clearly part of the consciousness of the rebels anyway that the future lay with the society 
that they were building, to play power games in Europe was no longer worth the effort. 
op. cit. Communist Manifesto, pg 81. 
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In a period when a new means of production is in relatively abundant supply outside 
of the existing system and incorporation of the new activity is proving problematic for 
the ruling class, small scale private property can not only maintain its independence but 
increasingly assert its collective power. 
The large concentrations of property based on the old methods of production pos- 
sess no advantage when moving into the new areas of activity. Correct methods have to 
be discovered and the old ruling class are not the people best equipped to discover them. 
Large scale organisation based on the new means of production is at this stage premature 
and the structures for managing it do not exist. This situation is well illustrated by the 
way the monarchy attempted to incorporate merchant capital at the beginning of the 16th 
century. 
Trading monopolies were granted to favoured courtiers in much the same way as a 
member of the service nobility might have been given a piece of land. The courtiers 
managed them as they would a piece of land, as absentee landlords, having little grasp of 
the new situation. The capital that thrived, therefore, was in the hands of practical mer- 
chants who understood the cut and thrust of trade and not the capital of these courtiers. 
The monarch could confer a trading monopoly but not prosperity. This power was 
now out of his hands, he had to ally himself and the interests of his country increasingly 
to those of the merchant capitalists. Hence under these circumstances the old monopolies 
break up and independent small scale private property becomes the central feature of the 
economy. 
Since the people who control the new property form an alliance of more or less 
numerous people of roughly equal power, their political ideas are egalitarian and their 
typical form of organisation is democratic, reflecting the real power situation. 
They also tend to be critical of despotism in the form in which it appears in the late 
stages of the old mode of production. Other transitional periods such as the break up of 
the monopolies of the "gens" in Attica in favour of private property, slave production and 
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trade exhibit the same features. 3 
1.2. Division of labour and class control 
The progress of a future ruling class begins as we have seen when a group of people 
within the economy are directly involved in a form of production which is destined to 
become the main source of wealth for the whole community. It is due to the leverage 
which this confer that they come to dominate the society economically and politically. 
Their position thus depends initially on their role within the division of tabour. 
However, since a society based on private property is by its nature exploitative, 4 
this class will develop from the position of performing the most useful function in the 
economy to performing no function at all. They will eventually become "Rois faindants" 
substituting the labour of others for their own wherever possible. The ability to do this of 
course depends on the size of the output which determines the divisibility of labour, and 
the size of the surplus, which determines the degree to which a ruling class can exist as 
tion-producers without harming the productive process itself. 
An industrialist in the 19th century for instance would initially be his own accoun- 
tant, lawyer and factory manager. As his prosperity increased he would divide these func- 
tions and employ others to perform them. We see the same phenomenon in antiquity. The 
slave-based society of the Greek city states supported a class of "citizens" who regarded 
labour as the behaviour of a slave and hence beneath them. In Greece and in Rome this 
made the economic system particularly inflexible when Crisis overtook it. 5 This process 
3 op. cit. Origin of the Family Private Property and the State, pp 528-535. 
4 Those who "possess" means of production which are more productive than their fellows have 
an incentive to privatise it. The division thus Created between rich and poor however engenders 
avarice, emnity and a competitive dynamic. This ultimately leads to the centralisation of the means 
of production as we have seen. Centralisation of property fully developed leaves a mass of proper- 
tyless people who would otherwise starve if not used on an exploitative basis by those who pos- 
sess the property. The motive to enrich oneself at the expense of others is present, however, in the 
first act of privatisation which excludes others from the use of the productive forces. 
5 op. cit. Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, pg 560. 
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always takes place however as a mode of production matures and centralises. 
The basis of class control rests on three factors. Firstly, as already stated, it rests on 
the role of the ruling class within the economy, which confers the initial social leverage. 
Secondly, it rests upon a repressive apparatus which can be set up to control dissent once 
social leverage has been established, and finally, it rests on the complete monopoly of the 
means of production which serves the dual purpose of maximising the wealth of the rul- 
ing class and depriving would be rebels of an independent economic base from which to 
sustain their rebellion. 
A ruling class, however, will as stated, eventually dispense with the first of these 
and depend on the other two. This renders their position potentially more fragile than it 
would otherwise have been. Although the performance of the economic function associ- 
ated with the ruling class is eventually abandoned by them, the forms of authority which 
they exercise is still notionally legitimised by it. These forms are also specifically related 
to the principal role of the ruling class in the mode of production since they were esta- 
blished during that class's rise to power. 
If then a new type of production emerges which entails a division of labour in which 
their traditional role plays no part, then, first, the forms of authority which they tradition- 
ally exercise will not be able to control it, and second, the right to exercise authority in 
the new areas will not be perceived as legitimate. Class rule thereby becomes under- 
mined. 
Traditional land taxes could not, for instance easily be used to appropriate surplus 
realised in the form of mercantile or manufacturing profit. Taxes on the towns were even- 
tually circumvented by manufacture outside of the towns. 
The old feudal bargain whereby the lord was entitled to the surplus in return for mil- 
itary protection was not regarded as a reasonable legitimation for feudal taxes by classes 
who were forced to defend themselves, which they did quite capably, principally against 
the predations of these same feudal lords. The feudal lords performed no service for these 
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classes and no obligation was acknowledged. 
If the proletariat were to begin to organise their own production and distribution a 
similar situation would obtain. Neither the government nor the capitalists could use their 
traditional methods of appropriating the surplus, nor could they justify the attempt to do 
so, (the capitalists could not claim remuneration as the "organisers" of production). The 
shift in the division of labour gives the ruling class problems with respect to both legi- 
timacy and power. 
1.3. The definition of "Class" 
Transitional periods occur when a ruling class is displaced by an emerging class, but 
what defines a class? So far we have only referred to the association with a method of 
production and/or a new type of product. This is a somewhat vague definition. An emerg- 
ing class will occupy a specific position within the division of labour. The butcher, baker 
and the candlestick maker occupy different positions within the division of labour but are 
they members of the same class? and if so, is it the artisan class, the bourgeoisie, or are 
they each classes by themselves? Division of labour alone is clearly not a sufficient cri- 
terion to identify a class. 
Perhaps classes are defined in terms of the type of exploitative relationship in which 
they are involved? e. g. serfage, slavery, wage labour etc. This cannot be a satisfactory 
definition either because in ancient and feudal societies Marx suggests that there were 
many classeS6 whereas definition by these criteria produces only pairs of classes. Even if 
we regard the relations within the feudal aristocracy for instance as exploitative, the 
lord/vassal relationship obtains throughout the hierarchy and is incapable of dividing 
great barons from barons and barons from knights by virtue of the type of relationship. 
Exploitative relations in general are much too widely diffused to be the basis of class 
6 op. cit. Communist Manifesto, pp 79-80. 
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definition if we disregard the question of type. 
A further problem is raised if we consider the fact that Marx specifically says that 
the relations within the guilds have the same form as feudal relationS7 op. cit. The Ger- 
man Ideology, pg 74. 
on the land yet he does not regard the guild master as a member of the aristocracy. What 
divides the guild master from the aristocrat is the type of product the property of each 
produces and its role in the economy. This brings us back to the division of labour. 
1.3.1. Production processes and class rule 
To understand the role of division of labour in the determination of class we need to 
re-emphasise a distinction made in the early section on population. Division of labour 
can occur in two ways, by the sub-division of tasks within a productive process and by 
the discovery of new productive processes. It is the latter not the former situation which 
produces new classes as can be seen from any of Marx and Engels' discussions on 
changes in the social structure. 
The discovery of agriculture and animal breeding leads first to a shift in the balance 
of power between male and female in the pre-class, gentile social system. 8 Then later, 
since raiding parties increase because of the greater surplus, it leads to warrior cultures 
and the taking of slaves. New methods of acquiring wealth, e. g. agriculture based on 
slavery, form the basis of new classes-9 This form of production co-exists, for a time with 
the gens organisation until the latter is unable to cope with the new social practices. 
In the same way manufacturing arose and co-existed with the agrarian production of 
the feudal system although destined to displace it as the principal form of productive 
8 The origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, op. cit. pp 485487. 
9 In this case the first classes to emerge historically. 
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activity. At this early stage the form of exploitation within the system of craft production 
did not distinguish it from the forms of exploitation in feudal society in general. The 
labourers, - journeymen, apprentices etc., would live in the house of the master craftsman 
and he would feed them as a feudal lord would feed his household. The surplus was at the 
disposal of the master. Wage labour does not appear as the basis for manufactures until 
the 18th century. What distinguishes the two classes of exploiter, therefore, is the form of 
property. 
One is destined to grow relative to the other because of the natural dynamic of the 
economy. This must eventually upset the political and economic balance of society and 
bring them into conflict with each other. The process which produces this effect is the 
basic principle that as productivity increases demand diversifies, as stated in the sections 
on division of labour. Proportionately, therefore, agricultural production must become 
less important and with it the classes based on this kind of production. Thus there are 
two intersecting criteria which define class, division of labour and exploitation. Each of 
these criteria, however, must be explained in greater detail. 
On the question of division of labour, for instance, as stated previously, the butcher, 
baker and candlestick maker are members of the same class though they produce dif- 
ferent artifacts. None of these trades could form the basis of a dominant class with a 
separate class interest because demand for these artifacts will never dominate the produc- 
tive process of the community. Which divisions of labour are the operative ones in the 
formation of classes as interest groups, therefore, is determined by the changes in the pro- 
cess of social production itself and the position occupied by those groups within it. It 
cannot be ascertained by merely looking at the characteristics of each group in abstrac- 
tion from that process. 
Artisans are natural allies since their conditions in the developing economic system 
tend to prosper or fail from the same major changes but none of them is strong enough to 
assert its interests alone. These objective conditions determine their unity as part of a 
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class 
On the other hand, merchants, manufacturers and professional people are considered 
to be part of the bourgeoisie. Merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were 
likely to be as rich as landowners. The explanation that they could not form an effective 
separate interest group does not necessarily hold for them. 
The division of labour between the groups cited above, however, is due to the sub- 
division of a single process rather than the discovery of a new productive process. It is 
the first type of the division of labour mentioned earlier, not the second. Originally all 
these functions were performed by the same person, the mediaeval burgher. He marketed 
his own goods, kept his own accounts and fought his own legal battles. 
Later, for reasons already given, different people found it advantageous to specialise 
in these functions. Nevertheless, as elements, or moments, in the same process, the for- 
tunes of each are tied to those of the others. Trade cannot increase unless the manufacture 
of the products traded increases. Manufacture can not increase unless trade outlets 
increase. Professional services depend upon the forms of intercourse that require them. 
These activities are organically linked and it is for this reason that they form a single 
interest group. 
Specific issues may divide them, but ultimately their interests coincide. In the 
modern era, finance capitalists, for instance, benefit when manufacturing is in crisis 
because there is an excess of liquid capital looking for profitable investment. The money 
handled is of larger amounts and the profits correspondingly greater. But these cir- 
cumstances indicate a sick economy and typically precede financial collapse as debtors 
default. 10 The long term interest of finance capital therefore must lie in supporting a 
healthy manufacturing base upon which it ultimately depends. Temporary, tactical 
interest is outweighed by long-term strategic interest and disputes are never allowed to 
10 c. f CH8 section 1.1 AA 
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endanger class unity on the more fundamental issues such as the future of the existing 
division of labour itself. These issues are the crucial test because they affect the power 
relations in society as we have seen. 
It should be noted that major producing industries need not be functionally indepen- 
dent of one another in order to form the basis of different classes. Agriculture supplies 
the raw material for many manufactures and also food for its labourers. Nevertheless the 
market which this provides is not sufficient to prevent the wealth accruing to each from 
diverging. The latter will come to subordinate the former. Agriculture is not organically 
linked to manufacture, it also provides products for other groups of consumers. Manufac- 
ture provides tools for agriculture but again this does not exhaust its speciality. Their 
development can proceed semi-independently therefore as the pattern of demand 
changes. This is not true of the functionally related groups of the bourgeoisie discussed 
previously. 
It is possible, however, for a specific functional element in a process to become 
more complex, absorb more labour, add more value and consequently generate more 
wealth than other functions. The question therefore is whether this would provide the 
basis of a sub-division of the class? In theory this ought to be possible, since the descrip- 
tion of exploitation given earlier involves manipulation of the relations of dependence 
within the division of labour. In practice, however, when a class sub-divides, what seems 
to happen is that members of the class who perform the same function become polarised, 
usually through competition, into rich and poor. 11 The rich then attempt to force the 
poorer members of their own class into increased dependence upon them and an exploita- 
tive relationship is set up which allows the rich to appropriate the surplus product of the 
poorer members. Once such a relationship exists the class has become sub-divided into 
exploiter and exploited. 
II Polarisation occurs when the surplus increases. 
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An example of this is how early Greek society was polarised. into larger and smaller 
landowners and a relationship of usury set up between them. The poorer class was a tran- 
sitory phenomenon, however, because its members were eventually reduced to the class 
of slaves. After this of course finance and land were united once again in the hands of the 
same class. 12 
1.3.2. Exploitation and class membership 
With respect to the criterion of exploitation, there are again complexities. Exploita- 
tion is a property relation since it involves expropriation of a product surplus to the sub- 
sistence requirements of the direct producer. A distinction between goods and services is 
not relevant to this concept. A person who spends more time performing a service in 
return for subsistence, a slave for instance, than he/she would require to produce that sub- 
sistence his/herself is being exploited. One can see in this example why Marx interprets 
appropriation and property in terms of labour expended rather than any particular kind of 
product of labour, e. g. in "the labour theory of value". 
A distinction does need to be made, however, between direct producers and other 
forms of labour. Direct producers are those people whose activities satisfy "natural" as 
against "social" needs. Labour of supervision, for instance, since it has as its object the 
social relationships which allow production to be carried out, is not direct production. 
Exploitation is expropriation of the direct producers. There is some question therefore 
whether non-producers can be exploited, i. e. expropriated, even when their labour is not 
adequately rewarded in terms of the time and effort expended. 
12 c. f. The Emergence of Greek Democracy, W. G. Forest, Wiedenfield and Nicholson, London 
1978, pg 147. 
12 Marx in his analysis of value uses the relation between "the minimum socially necessary la- 
bour time" involved in the production of subsistence as against that involved in the production of 
the worker's output to define exploitation, rather than making it depend upon the propensities of 
particular individuals. 
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Labour of this kind, which has as its object the perpetuation of an exploitative sys- 
tem, is rewarded from the surplus product. These labourers, therefore, share in the fruits 
of exploitation which their labour helps perpetuate directly. They are nevertheless not 
members of the exploiting class, the surplus does not accrue to them even though they are 
remunerated from it. They are therefore neither direct producers nor direct exploiters. 
Their class allegiance is likewise ambivalent. Their objective circumstances in a 
non-revolutionary period tie them to the exploiting class since they are remunerated from 
the fruits of exploitation. But in a revolutionary period a ruling class may not be able to 
continue to reward them. When it becomes obvious that a rival and potentially more suc- 
cessful power has arisen, mercenary interests will no longer be sufficient to hold their 
allegiance. 
The form of payment which they receive is usually the same as that of the exploited 
class, e. g. in feudalism subsistence as household servants, in capitalism wages. Their 
conditions are therefore superficially similar to those of the exploited class with whom 
under certain circumstances they may identify. In a revolutionary period, the justification 
of this kind of labour in terms of the "social good" also becomes problematic. When the 
functions which they are expected to perform at the behest of the ruling class no longer 
tend to aid the development of the productive forces or enhance general well-being, self- 
justification becomes more difficult. 
In particular, the state, whose function is both to preserve the general well-being and 
protect the existing economic order is placed in an ambiguous position when these 
imperatives diverge and usually disintegrates into factions. The allegiance of the "public 
power", as Engels calls it, 13 under these circumstances is by no means certain. The lower 
orders often side with the oppressed classes whose communities they are drawn from and 
whose conditions they all but share. 
13 op. cit. origin of the Family Private Property and the State, pg 528. 
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Marx regards the "Society of December the 10th" for instance, as "Lumpen- 
proletariat" clearly a faction of the proletariat, and indeed like the proletariat they must 
sell their labour to live. 14 Perhaps they are in some sense de-classed workers who are 
potentially members of the exploited class and may under certain circumstances revert to 
this role. 
The importance of class analysis is to aid the comprehension of the dynamics of 
social change. Understanding this process is more important than fitting each group 
neatly into a class. The class position of workers who are not involved in direct produc- 
tion is ambiguous. 
It emerges from this discussion, however, that class membership is not a question of 
similarities in income, power or status. Although the people who one might rub shoulders 
with might command one's sympathy, in terms of changing fortunes and political 
interests it is the functional position within the social structure that crucially determines 
material interests in a situation of social change. Classes undoubtedly differ on average in 
their command of the above mentioned attributes, (income, power and status), but within 
a class their will be a range of different amounts of each corresponding to the rank order 
of its members and between classes there will be overlap. None of these criteria therefore 
provide a reliable guide to class membership and attempting to group those with equal 
amounts together is the result of theoretical confusion and lack of a historical perspec- 
tive. 
The criterion of exploitation needs to be further elaborated. A ruling class is defined 
in terms of its form of property, an exploited class in terms of the manner of its exploita- 
tion. The rule of a certain kind of property is not unequivocally linked to a particular 
method of exploitation. 15 Slavery for instance re-appears in the capitalist era and the 
14 op. cit. 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, pp 136-138. 
15 if one invokes the tautology that a certain kind of appropriation leads to a certain kind of 
property one can only show that feudal exploitation leads to feudal property but not that feudal ex- 
ploitation leads to landed property nor vice versa. 
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production of the slave-plantations was an integral part of the emerging capitalist system. 
Within the category of those exploited by a certain form of property, therefore, there 
are sub-divisions which correspond to different classes. These subdivisions are class divi- 
sions because of the way that they determine class interest. The political objectives, i. e. 
what is counted as emancipation, of an exploited class are crucially determined by the 
form of subjugation of that class, e. g. the slave desires to be a free citizen, the peasant the 
sole owner of his own small piece of land. The proletarian both propertyless and formally 
free cannot emancipate himself without taking control of the means of production as a 
whole. 
The emancipated slave within capitalist society no doubt found that he was still 
exploited as a proletarian, nevertheless, I would contend that slave and proletarian are not 
members of the same class. These different forms of exploitation are not simply acciden- 
tal occurrences they are part of the life-cycle of the mode of production. 
In capitalism's early stages surplus could be extracted by methods similar to earlier 
modes of production, later, as capitalism developed these methods became inappropriate. 
Wage-labour is the necessary form of exploitation of developed capitalism but histori- 
cally it is by no means the only form. 
If a ruling class can correspond to different exploited classes, can one exploited 
class correspond to more than one ruling class over a period of time? I think the answer 
to this is no. Different property forms define different classes even when the form of 
exploitative relations are the same. The journeyman and the mediaeval serf, for instance, 
ire members of different classes even though their form of exploitation is similar. 
We are thus left with a picture of class defined by "vertical" divisions between pro- 
perty forms, within which there are "horizontal" divisions between exploiter and 
exploited and within which there are further sub-divisions corresponding to the forms of 
exploitation. 
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But what then are the consequences for class identity of the transition by a social 
group from being an exploited class under one form of property to being a ruling class 
under another form of property? Because the emergence of a certain kind of property and 
a certain form of exploitation do not historically coincide, the career of a revolutionary 
class will have a period when its class identity is ambivalent. 
The early burghers became capitalists when they began to produce their products for 
the market rather than solely for the lord. The history of this class as such begins then. 
The relations of production in which they laboured, however, do not lose their feudal 
character totally at least until the granting of the town charters. According to whether one 
is interested in the end of feudal exploitation or the emergence of capitalism, the 
members of this class are either the last manufacturing serfs or the first capitalists. In 
fact, in true dialectical fashion they are both. The "tails" of the two movements inter- 
penetrate. 
It follows from this, therefore, that the phrase "the dictatorship of the proletariat" is 
slightly misleading because once this class takes possession of social property it begins a 
new life as something else, "humanity" perhaps. As it struggles to rid itself of the forms 
of subjugation in which it laboured, it has a dual identity. 
1.3.3. Trade, the market and the rule of money 
The analysis of class given so far, however, is incomplete. The classes within capi- 
talism are qualitatively different from any previous classes. In The Communist Manifesto 
Marx says, 
"Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive 
feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and 
more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly 
facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. " 16 
16 The Communist manifesto K. Marx and F. Engels, Penguin Books 1967 pg 80. 
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As productivity increases over time the historical tendency is towards societies of greater 
complexity. The ranks, orders, sub-groupings, increase. Society, as Durkheim. noticed, 
tends towards pluralism. This is due to the increased division of labour and though there 
might be alliances between different sub-groups, social organisation is hardly becoming 
simpler. 
The extension of the market system to encompass all forms of production does, of 
course, tend to subject all property owners to the same market conditions and the same 
periodic crises and likewise the labourers they exploit. Production has become genuine 
"social production" the market links every production process to every other production 
process and regulates them all automatically. 
The main difference between the bourgeoisie and any previous class, however, is 
not that they are a class whose members are all subject to the same market conditions, but 
that they are a class whose membership is not based upon any particular means of pro- 
duction and product. Product differences do not divide them as landed production was 
divided from manufacture. Indeed in the bourgeois era landed production has become 
agrarian capitalism and landownership has been effectively incorporated within the bour- 
geois class. This is because the characteristic property form of the bourgeoisie is not any 
particular type of useful product, it is money. They recognise themselves and other bour- 
geois principally as money-makers. 
The bourgeoisie rose to power by manufacture and trade but the latter practice 
brought with it new economic conditions even though it was dependent upon the growth 
of the former, (manufacture). In a market system all products can be obtained with the 
medium of exchange and all producers are in competition with each other. Under such 
circumstances money becomes the most desirable commodity because it confers social 
power par excellence, it will buy any advantage and this is vital in a competitive system. 
The natural relation between production and need is that production serves the need. 
Where the battle between producers, competition, becomes the dominant motive, 
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however, this relation is reversed. Accumulation of the means of exchange is the prime 
requirement in order to remain ahead of one's rivals. Need satisfaction is only the means 
to this end. Under these circumstances no new type of desirable product can emerge that 
cannot be appropriated by the bourgeoisie. 
Property held in the form of money is property which is independent of any particu- 
lar physical form, it is property in an abstract quantified form, property in general. This 
point has far reaching significance, for in previous modes of production a subject class 
could overthrow a class whose domination was based on one kind of production by sup- 
planting it with a rule based on its own more powerful productive process. 
Capitalism, as the rule of property in general, cannot be overthrown in this way, 
riew products and production processes are grist to the mill, their owners become suc- 
cessful capitalists themselves. 17 The proletariat as an exploited class subject to the rule of 
money can only overthrow that rule by the overthrow, not of one particular kind of pro- 
perty, but of property in general. The proletariat, therefore, is a class with "radical 
chains", 18 it is forced by circumstance to confront the problem which is at the root of all 
the previous systems based on exploitation and oppression, i. e. competition for private 
property. 
The evolution of systems based upon antagonistic social relations was bound to pro- 
gress in this direction since increasing division of labour leads to increased exchange of 
products. Marx explains in Grundrisse19 how increased exchange necessitates the use of 
money. 
17 Neither the type of product nor the form Of Organisation of a particular productive process is 
sufficient to change the nature of the market system, as can be seen from the lack of success of 
worker co-operatives in this direction. Only the transformation of competitive relations in general 
would undermine the rule of money. 
18 "Introducton to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right-, Early Writings of Karl Marx, 
flarmondsworth: Penguin, London; New Left Review 1975, pg 256. 
19 Grundrisse: foundations of the critique of political economy (rough draft) Harmondsworth, 
England; Baltimore, Penguin Books 1973, pp 149,150. 
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A product has two basic properties, it is a useful object and it is a part of the total 
production of the community. The first property depends upon the natural qualities of the 
object, the second is a purely quantitative factor. Exchange brings these factors into con- 
tradiction with each other. 
For instance, if an exchange of goods takes place whereby three suits of clothes are 
worth half an ox, in value terms, i. e. as equivalent quantities of the social product, each 
person in the exchange is receiving what he gives. But as use values, half an ox is as use- 
ful as no ox at all for pulling a plough. "Value" is infinitely divisible, use-values are not. 
To facilitate equal exchange therefore, the owner of the ox must convert it into a form 
which merely represents its value as part of the total product, i. e. a medium of exchange. 
in this way the quantitative and qualitative aspects of products come to exist as separate 
physical entities. The medium of exchange is the object as a quantity of the social pro- 
perty, property in the abstract. 
it is the antagonism between the interests of buyer and seller which establishes this 
result since it is because of this that strict "equality" in exchange is required so that no 
one is cheated . 
20 Exchange on the basis of "from each according to his ability to each 
according to his need", would not encounter the antagonism between these two aspects, 
since it could take place purely on the basis of use-value. 
This is another example of the mechanism of alienation, whereby the universal qual- 
ity of objects as social property has to be represented by something external. This is due 
to the fact that, under conditions of competition to possess them as private property, the 
differences between the particular objects as use-values prevents their social character 
from manifesting itself via exchange. Competition for possession of the product tends to 
undermine the economic process as a collective activity and the result is the alienation of 
this social activity in the "money system" and its rule. 
20 Private property is assumed here also since it is in terms of this that equality is understood. 
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It seems that one of the criteria determining class must be qualified. It is not simply 
differences in the method of production and the product that distinguish pairs of 
ruling/ruled classes from each other, it is these things in so far as they constitute private 
property. it is this dimension of the objects which confer social leverage both in capital- 
ism and before. In general, the correct criterion is different "forms of property" although 
without prior explanation this criterion would have appeared vague. 
The bourgeoisie have the advantage that due to the market they are no longer com- 
mitted to possessing their property in any particular form of useful object, unlike, for 
instance, the feudal aristocracy whose wealth was tied to the production of the land. The 
only effective interest group amongst the exploited, therefore, is the proletariat as a 
whole, simply because the bourgeoisie can shift their property from industry to industry 
and geographical area to geographical area. They must therefore, be confronted across the 
boundaries both of territory and of industry to undermine the rule of their form of pro- 
perty. This requires the unity of all groups of wage-labourers. The need to unite to ensure 
effective action is one of the objective factors which tends to bind these workers together 
as a class. 
A second factor is that their labour is treated as primarily a money-making activity 
irrespective of its form. Labour to the capitalist is equivalent to labour cost, i. e. labour in 
the abstract, labour considered in relation to its potential for producing profit, something 
to be used and discarded in the money making process. Thus they all face the same kinds 
of treatment as commodities. 
Thirdly, there is a high degree of substitutability of labour due to de-skilling and the 
use of machines. This is double-edged in terms of class cohesion. On one hand by 
extending the pool of available labour, it increases competition for jobs between the 
workers and hence is divisive. On the other it means that the success of one group of 
workers in obtaining concessions from employers strengthens the bargaining position of 
other groups of workers because the firms which have conceded now have an advantage 
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over their rivals in the competition between firms and industries for labour. 
Conversely, if one group of workers is forced to accept worse conditions of employ- 
inent, the competitive pressures operate in the opposite direction weakening the rest of 
the workers. This promotes mutual support, especially since wage rates between skill 
groups are linked together by differentials so that gains are not only transmitted between 
similar skills in different industries but between different skills as well. 
Other divisive factors are as we have seen the fact that some wage-labourers are 
involved directly in the process of exploitation, e. g. labour of supervision, and differen- 
tial rewards for skilled and unskilled work. The situation of the latter category of work- 
ers, however, is only secure in the short term as employers continually attempt to de-skill 
their jobs and use cheaper more easily substitutable labour. There is bound to be a rela- 
tion of mistrust between these workers and the employers and grounds for sympathy with 
less privileged workers. The class allegiance of the former is by no means certain in a 
crisis as we have seen. 
Finally, there are people like housewives retired people etc. who are not directly 
involved in the competition between employer and employee, (often via management) in 
the workplace. General crises, however, often affect these groups the worst and they 
share the fate of the other members of their families and communities. These are the prin- 
-ciple reasons I would suggest for Marx's judgement in the quote from 77? e Communist 
Wanifiesto and they throw light upon the concept of class which Marx uses and his view 
of the proletariat. I will leave the discussion of whether new class divisions could appear 
should the proletariat take control to a later section. 
A class is potentially a revolutionary class only when it is both involved at the level 
, of direct production with a form of property destined to become the dominant form and 
-when the form of its exploitation will force it to take control of that property in order to 
-emancipate itself. Neither factor on its own is sufficient, both have to be present. 
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1.4. Forces and relations of Production. 
The account of historical change so far suggests that certain developments in the 
forces of production will alter the balance of power in society, throwing up a new dom- 
inant class. More precisely, new forces of production create a new division of labour 
which under certain circumstances is sufficient to undermine the old class rule. Forces of 
production thus have a determining effect both on the relations of production and on 
social relations in general. To understand this process properly, however, we need to 
understand what sort of changes in the forces of production are responsible for what 
changes in the relations of production. I intend to look at the different types (moments) of 
change in the forces of production and their consequences for the processes discussed so 
far. 
1.4.1. Changes in the Physical form of the forces of production 
First of all there is the question of changes in the physical characteristics of the 
forces and hence the methods of production. This is a major determining factor in the 
conditions of life of the labouring classes. The use of large pieces of capital equipment, 
for instance, and/or a single central power source to drive machinery, requires the con- 
centration of production in the vicinity of this equipment. Although factories pre-date the 
iuse of water or steam-driven machinery, clearly the use of the latter is only possible on 
ithe basis of the factory system. This has far reaching consequences for the living and 
-vorking conditions of the labourers. 
Small scale instruments of labour on the other hand probably mean that production 
-will be dispersed throughout the community and therefore distributed over a relatively 
greater area per number of producers. The growth of towns composed of factories sited 
close to the sources of raw materials and the concentration of the workforce in the same 
areas is a result of the physical requirements of industrial production in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
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This arrangement also determines the forms of supervision of the labourers and the 
forms of organisation to resist exploitation engaged in by the labourers. The social rela- 
tions between the workers, the specific forms of deprivation which they experience, the 
kinds of skills, knowledge and education they acquire and consequently the attitudes and 
political understanding which they have are all conditioned by the physical requirements 
of the labour process. 
Nevertheless, the physical form of the Production process does not directly affect 
the question of the general form of class relations as such. It may, however, have an 
indirect effect by modifying the effects of other factors which are directly related to this 
issue as we shall see later. 
One crucial factor which it does affect, however, is the all-important question of the 
form of property ownership. New modes of production begin with small-scale property 
ownership, but the physical organisation of the productive process determines the 
ininimum social unit which can operate the means of production and this unit will 
become the basic property owning unit of an emerging class. 
There can be no formal acknowledgement of exploitative relations within the revo- 
lutionary forces at the time in which they still confront the ruling classes. Consequently, 
the demands for new property rights cannot be allowed to sub-divide the labourers into 
haves and have-nots within a single production process. The property form which the 
new ruling class demands therefore must he based on the minimum unit of production. 
A piece of land, for instance, requires all the members of a family to work it, thus 
the family unit becomes the basis of agricultural private property. Pastoral peoples, if the 
herds are large, may require an extended family unit to tend them and this becomes the 
basis of ownership. The small craftsman can produce as an individual hence individual 
private property is the basis of the emerging capitalist system. Later developments in the 
mode of production may see the labour of an exploited class replace that of the members 
of the original productive unit, e. g. the slave-based societies of antiquity. Nevertheless, 
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the original form of property entitlement will continue formally to determine possession. 
Family inheritance remains the important property institution in the Ancient world. The 
proletariat produce collectively so workers' collectives will form the minimum basis of 
ownership of this class. 
With respect to the collectivism of the proletariat, this alone is not sufficient to 
necessitate the abolition of private property and the market system. If the workers took 
control of the means of production, the market could continue on the basis of worker co- 
operatives. This, however, would not effectively emancipate the working class. The 
significance of Marx's location of deprivation and oppression in the phenomenon of alie- 
nation can be seen here. 
According to Marx, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, the 
position of the capitalist as owner is the consequence of alienated labour. 21 This is true in 
the sense that it is the consequence of a competitive system which simultaneously deter- 
mines that the worker should alienate his labour and that someone else, therefore, should 
nominally possess it. The possession is merely nominal in the sense that the capitalist is 
constrained in his ability to dispose of the product by the requirements of the market sys- 
tem itself. His actions are in the main dictated by such considerations. He therefore 
merely acts as the representative of capital which has its own alien will, (the laws of the 
market), which he obeys. 
It follows, therefore, that merely to replace the capitalist by a factory committee, 
would simply replace the antagonism between the capitalist and the workers with the 
antagonism between the factory committee and the workers. The factory committee 
would obey the dictates of the market and impose the same alien control over the labour 
process as before. The labourers would lose control of both the labour process and the 
product in the course of the competitive struggle. 
21 op. cit. E. P. M., pp 76,77. 
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1.4.2. Changes in the importance of different sectors of the economy based on the 
development of new productive forces. 
The second type of change in the development of the productive forces we have 
already discussed to some extent. This is the question of the change in the economic 
importance of one kind of productive process relative to another and the consequent 
change in political leverage of the groups associated with each activity. New productive 
forces, as stated before, lead to a new division of labour, but this in turn leads to a new 
balance of power within a competitive system. Prior to capitalism, these changes deter- 
mined which classes would rule. 
The fortunes of the members of the workforce, even in a capitalist society, is still 
tied to some extent to the fortunes of the type of production in which they are engaged 
and individual capitalists will also lose if they let their capital remain too long in an ail- 
ing industry. Such changes do not, of course, as stated previously, threaten the capitalist 
class as a whole but they do provide the vehicle for mobility in and out of the class and 
the emergence of new leaders within the capitalist class. 
1.4.3. Changes in the magnitude of the productive forces 
The third type of change follows on from the latter point. Capitalism is possible as a 
mode of production because of the existence of a near enough to universal market in 
commodities. The development of the institution of the market and the increasing use of 
a medium of exchange is related to the magnitude of the productive process, i. e. the 
changes in the power of the productive forces. 
As stated earlier, increased production leads to increased division of labour which in 
turn leads to increased exchange and in a competitive system, the prevalent use of 
money. Quantitative factors have far reaching importance in determining the nature of 
the relations of production, not only in terms of the evolution of the market system, and 
therefore the capitalist property form, but also the form of exploitation appropriate to a 
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particular mode of production. 
22 According to Engels, the taking of slaves occurs when the productivity of labour 
has risen beyond the level of mere subsistence. Only if the labourer produces a surplus 
product does it make any sense to exploit him as a slave. 
The fonn of exploitation, however, slavery, is also determined by quantitative fac- 
tors. The need to control the slave bodily suggests a situation of scarcity of labour rela- 
23 tive to the available means of production. Competition for labour between exploiters 
and the possibility that the labourer might run away leads to an institution which gives 
the exploiter total right of ownership over the labourers. 
A second situation in which slavery is the most appropriate form of exploitation is 
one where the productive process is undergoing change, expanding or altering in form or 
both. The labourer, under these circumstances, can not be allowed any rights which 
would give him control over his own labouring activity since the exploiter needs to be 
free to direct the labour process as required by the changing circumstances. This latter 
situation is one in which serfage, which gives the worker traditional rights, for instance, 
would be inappropriate and unworkable. The expanding phase of a mode of production is 
for this reason pre-disposed towards the institution of slavery, because it combines both 
of the situations described above. 24 
It might be argued, however, that in Ancient Greece, debt bondage was a means by 
which people were enslaved. Debt bondage merely has the effect of transferring the 
22 op. cit. origin of the Family Private Property and the State pg 486. 
23 This might only be a scarcity of eligible labour, e. g. in Rome where slavery replaced labour 
by citizens. Also, scarcity should be understood as scarcity at the site where the labour is per- 
formed, not scarcity per se. A plentiful supply of labour in some other location, on the contrary, is 
a powerful incentive to enslave. 
24 By expansion of production, what is meant, is the bringing together of new productive forces 
for the purpose of producing. Territorial expansion which simply takes over the existing produc- 
tive forces, albeit introducing new relations of exploitation at the same time, does not necessarily 
engender slavery, as the extension of serfdom to the peoples of Southern Russia and Poland in the 
16th century shows. 
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surplus product from the debtor to the creditor without alteration to the productive forces. 
This raises an important point. What is at issue here is the factors which are responsible 
for the origins of a form of exploitation, not conditions which merely reproduce the 
existing institution. 
Usury leads to slavery, only where slavery is the prevailing form of exploitation. In 
capitalist society, for instance, the debtor will typically pay via wage labour. In general, 
the prevailing form of exploitation will continue in a society until forced to change by 
new conditions. 
Serfage, by contrast, corresponds to the stagnant phase of the development of the 
forces of production. The exploiter in this situation owns the land rather than the 
labourer which suggests that good land25 rather than labour is the thing which is scarce. 
Here, the other means of production are scarce relative to labour rather than vice-versa. 
The labourer is not owned bodily, nevertheless, just as before he is legally prohi- 
bited from running away or working for another master. The difference between this and 
slavery is that this control is exercised indirectly through the obligation of the serf and 
his descendants to work on the same land and to give the surplus to the lord. Since the 
serf has greater freedom to control his own daily activities, the chance of escaping is 
potentially greater. Again, this points to a situation of stagnation; where an escaped serf 
would have no where to find an alternative livelihood, control does not have to be so 
strict. 
The relation which is totally at odds with a situation of expansion, however, is the 
right of the worker and his descendants to live from a particular piece of land. In a situa- 
tion of change any traditional rights of the labourer would be threatened but where 
mobility of labour is required, the right to control the means of production can not be 
tolerated. Serfage also allows the serf to produce in a traditional manner, clearly this is 
25 Land which is highly productive. 
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only possible because the prevailing production process in the society itself remains the 
same. 
Historically, serfage first appears in Europe at the end of the Roman Empire. Unable 
to administer the large estates any longer, the Roman landlords freed the slaves, since 
they could no longer afford to maintain them. They then sold the land on the basis that 
whoever bought it maintained themselves but gave the surplus to the landowner. These 
people were called "coloni". 26 This institution thus corresponded to a time when the 
mode of production was declining and there was an abundance of destitute workers. 
The cost of administration relative to the productivity of labour, therefore, is a cru- 
cial determining factor here. Serfage as a form of exploitation is connected to the ques- 
tion of the optimum possibilities for centralised control. 
The physical aspect of the productive forces is also a relevant factor. Where the 
means of production are geographically dispersed, administration becomes more difficult 
and costly. This is why this institution was adopted by the Germanic tribes who invaded 
Western Europe. They inherited productive forces which yielded a low surplus and were 
geographically dispersed. Armies of slaves were not a possibility under these cir- 
27 cumstances. 
This form of exploitation is thus also determined by quantitative factors, though not 
in a simple way. It can be seen from this that the separation of physical, relational (rela- 
tive importance) and quantitative aspects of change does not exclude interaction between 
these factors. What I have attempted to do, however, is to show the immediate and neces- 
sary connections between certain aspects of change of the forces of production and cer- 
tain types of relation of production as distinct from indirect and accidental relations. 
26 op. cit. origin of the Family Private Property and the State, pg 560. 
27 op. cit. The German Ideology, pg 45. 
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The physical dispersion of the means of production affects the method of exploita- 
tion only indirectly, via administration costs. It is also an accidental determinant of the 
method of exploitation since anything which increases the administration costs of the 
labour force to an unacceptable level would have the same effect. 
There is thus no simple linear correlation between the power of the productive 
forces and the forms of exploitation discussed so far. Rather, they seem to correspond to 
the potential for expansion of the forces of production at any given time. Perhaps the rate 
of exploitation i. e. the amount of surplus per head of population might afford an accept- 
able measure as to which is the more likely, slavery or serfdom. Wage labour, as the 
dominant form of exploitation, on the other hand, corresponds to a certain point in the 
development of the power of the forces of production. 
With respect to legal control over the movements of the labourer by the exploiter, 
the wage-labourers are the most free of all the exploited groups considered so far. As in 
the case of the serf, this points to an abundance of labour relative to the means of produc- 
tion. We have seen that this situation occurs when the development of the forces of pro- 
duction is stagnant or in crisis. Again, like the serf, the wage-labourer is responsible for 
his own maintenance, another factor which points in the same direction. 
Unlike the serf, however, the wage-labourer neither owns nor in any way controls 
the means of production. In this respect, his relationship to the means of production 
more closely resembles that of the slave than the serf. Wage-labour is to slavery as hire is 
to ownership. Hire is temporary ownership. The circumstance in which hire is preferred 
to ownership is usually when the thing hired is only required for a short period. The pre- 
valence of the hire of labour, therefore, suggests conditions of changing demand for 
labour and changing conditions of production. Combined with the over-supply of labour, 
this may indicate a situation of crisis and uncertainty, hence the short-term acquisition of 
labour. 
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On the other hand, where this form of exploitation becomes the normal and persist- 
ing method, it can only do so on the basis of a flourishing economy. These circumstances, 
therefore, can only indicate a constant and rapid alteration and development of the pro- 
ductive forces. This seems to contradict the conclusions drawn from the fact that labour 
is formally free. Capitalism, however, is the mode of production, which in its mature 
form, resolves this contradiction, producing both over-supply of labour and rapidly 
changing conditions of production simultaneously. 
Capitalism expands on the basis of labour-saving technology. This, by definition, 
displaces labour at the same time that it alters the production process. Moreover capital- 
ism progresses spasmodically, oscillating between expansion and contraction. 28 In the 
period of contraction, i. e. when some of the productive forces are being destroyed, not 
only is it impossible that any traditional right of the worker to a livelihood should be 
respected, but neither will negotiated agreements be respected. Over-supply of labour is 
thus created under conditions for which serfdom would be inappropriate. 
If, in this period and afterwards, output all but stagnates, nevertheless, the forces of 
production will not remain constant, capitalist firms will be restructuring their enterprises 
in order to become profitable again. Thus a form of exploitation which confers traditional 
rights of control over the labour process on the labourer will still be inappropriate. 
Such a period creates the conditions whereby economic factors alone are sufficient 
to subordinate the labourers who will offer themselves to be exploited. Physical coercion 
can be reduced to a minimum, hence the labourers are formally free. 
Capitalism can expand on the basis of this exploitation. If this expansion, by absorb- 
ing the surplus labour, undermines the conditions on which the subordination of the 
workforce was originally based, this will tend to express itself in the form of demands for 
28 output rarely contracts, even in periods of so called "commercial crisis". Some of the forces 
of production, on the other hand, cease to produce, and it is in this sense that the forces of produc- 
tion might be regarded as contracting. 
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higher wages by the workers. If granted this will eventually cut off the boom returning 
the economy to a crisis state and the re-subordination of the labour force. 
Under constant conditions of rapid change such as those described above, wage- 
labour becomes the only viable form of exploitation. Serfage is inappropriate for the rea- 
sons already given. Slavery is inappropriate for the compelling reason that fluctuating 
demand for labour leaves the exploiter in the position of either maintaining labourers for 
periods when they are not needed or selling them at a time when no one is willing to buy 
them only to buy more at a time when, because there are more favourable conditions for 
trade, everyone else is doing the same. Selling cheap and buying dear, the capitalist 
would always make a loss. It makes no sense tying up capital in the labour force under 
these conditions. 
As stated in the section entitled "Production and the division of labour" in chapter 
f 29 our, the rapidity of change in the productive forces is conditioned by the amount of 
innovation in the economy already which feeds off itself and the size and interconnected- 
ness of the economic system which magnifies the repercussions of any particular innova- 
tion. These factors increase in magnitude over time as the cycle of innovation speeds up. 
Wage labour, as the dominant method of exploitation, therefore, corresponds to a certain 
stage in the development of the magnitude of the productive forces. 
I. S. "Progressive" classes and the new ruling class. 
As we have seen, changes in the forces of production underlie changes in the rela- 
tions, of production and in particular the rise to power of a new ruling class. The political 
progress of this class to a position of domination is not, however, a pre-requisite for the 
transformation of the mode of production. 
29 cl CH4 section 1.1.1 
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Whether this class is able to act as the principal agent of change depends upon other 
contingent social and historical factors. The form of production carried on by this class 
may be underdeveloped, thus not providing a sufficiently strong political base, or their 
internal organisation or class consciousness might be lacking under certain cir- 
cumstances. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the type of economic activity with which this class 
is associated will ensure the development of these practices iffespective of the ability of 
the new ruling class to promote them itself Other classes will, either voluntarily or by 
virtue of compelling circumstances, promote these relations because of the way that they 
affect their own situations. These other classes, along with the new ruling class itself are 
generally referred to as "progressive classes", since their interests are tied up with the 
progress of the forces of production. 
On the continent of Europe, for instance, capitalism was initially promoted by so- 
called "Enlightened Monarchs" in the majority of countries. Even in the countries where 
early revolutionary struggles took place such as England and the Dutch Republic, in the 
former case, a class of small landowners formed the vanguard of the movement and in 
the latter, the bourgeoisie shared the leadership of the rebellion with the aristocratic 
house of Orange. Monarchs, in particular, once the potential to acquire revenues from 
trade and industry increased, were subject to pressures to cultivate these activities in 
order to have as much wealth and power as their international rivals. 
The class base of monarchy had been the feudal aristocracy which raised armies and 
supported the political claims of the monarch when necessary. This function declined 
rapidly as political power came to depend more upon the revenues which the exchequer 
could obtain from taxation of both the land and trading interests. The monarch, given a 
sufficient income from taxation could train and deploy forces directly. Thus monarchs, on 
pain of losing the competitive battle in the international sphere, were forced to promote 
manufacturing and trading interests even though in doing so they were enhancing the 
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power of a class which at best, would find the monarch's role superfluous and at worst, 
an obstacle to their own ambitions to govern the society directly. 
As far as the small landowners in Britain and the House of Orange in the Nether- 
lands are concerned, a combination of factors threw them into the revolutionary van- 
guard. Each was threated by the loss of their existing power due to attempts at centralisa- 
tion by their feudal masters. 
In the case of the Netherlands, Philip II of Spain attempted to increase central con- 
trol of his lands to guard against the encroachments of Protestantism and the danger of 
secession, the principal provocation here being the introduction of the Spanish Inquisi- 
tion. 
The creation, with the advent of capitalism, of economic power bases throughout 
the large dynastic territories such as the Holy Roman Empire, was already creating 
decentralising pressures. Many princes became Protestant for reasons which were uncon- 
tiected to religion in order to secede from obligations to their feudal overlords. Henry 
VIII of England was one such king, the princes of Brandenburg, later Prussia, afford 
another example. The latter state adopted a policy of religious toleration avowedly to 
attract refugees from the religious wars into its growing manufacturing industries. 
No doubt William of Orange was willing to play the part of the Enlightened 
monarch if the Dutch burghers would accept him. Religious conviction was clearly not an 
issue here since William changed his religion to Protestant in the course of the struggle in 
order to become an acceptable leader to the Huguenots, who were the hard core of the 
resistance to Philip. 
In the case of England, the attempt to increase taxation by the monarch, led to the 
replacing of the gentry in local government by court appointees in order to be better able 
to collect the tax. The loss of power and money in the form of tax, alienated this class 
from the monarch. They were also prepared to organise their production in order to sup- 
ply the expanding towns with food and therefore to turn themselves into agrarian 
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capitalists. Hence they found their natural allies in the urban classes with whom they also 
had ideological links. 
It should be noted here that although the bourgeoisie gained virtual independence 
from Feudalism in the middle ages by their own efforts, they were not in a position to 
assert their supremacy as a social class until the 19th century. Their role in the process of 
transformation of the mode of production, however, was not insignificant. Where the bal- 
ance of forces was such that a swift victory could not be gained by the ruling power, 
whoever had the bourgeoisie as its allies would win in the long run. This class could pro- 
vide the material means of waging war in a manner which could not be matched by other 
classes. The urban classes also supplied the most determined and implacable of the rebel 
forces. It was precisely because of the involvement of this class that rebellions succeeded 
which in an earlier epoch would most certainly have failed. 
2. The relations between "levels" in the "base" and "superstructure" 
In the preceding analysis, the causal primacy of the growth of the forces of produc- 
tion in throwing up new classes and transforming the economic and political system was 
asserted. The causal relations between the economic base and the legal, political and 
ideological superstructure, however, is more complex than this and this complexity 
requires explanation. For instance, the growth of relations of exchange, i. e. the market, in 
the 16th century appears to have been the cause of the subsequent expansion of manufac- 
turing industry. Hence, the relations of production of capitalism seem to be causally prior 
to the growth in the forces of production. 
Again political and legal "superstructures" are supposed to be determined by the 
economic "base" but the political victories and legal reforms of the progressive classes in 
England and the Dutch republic was arguably the cause of the rapid development of 
manufacture and trade in these countries. The "superstructure" appears once again to be 
causally prior to the "base". 
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These battles were also fought out under the banner of Protestantism. This idea sys- 
tem appears to have provided the necessary cohesion which made generalised political 
action possible, once again reversing the causal order which is stressed by Marx. 
Added to these three examples is the situation described in the previous section 
whereby monarchs promoted trade and industry as a response to political rivalry. Again 
political concerns appear to be causally prior to economic ones and this is reflected in the 
doctrine of "Mercantilism" which represents the causal order in precisely this fashion. 30 
To provide a refutation of these seen-ling counter-instances, we need to return to the gen- 
eral theoretical perspective in terms of which Marx and Engels theory is cast. 
With respect to the general economic relations within which the productive forces 
develop, as pointed out previously, technology produces economic dislocations and 
economic dislocations in turn stimulate new technology. 31 Similarly with the growth of 
the productive forces in general. 
Technological determinism is a flawed theory because, like idealism, it suggests that 
one aspect of a process has a linear development by which other aspects of the process 
will be conditioned as mere epiphenomena. in fact, changes in the productive forces 
interact with the economic context via dislocations and contradictions and the condition- 
ing relations are mutual. 
Because of the unplanned nature of the system, the development is spasmodic in 
character. Similarly, the economic sphere interacts with the political and legal spheres, 
economic changes producing political and legal changes and political and legal changes 
in turn affecting the economy. Idea systems are related to social change in a similar 
fashion. 
30 Mercantilism is criticised by Engels in "Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy" in op. 
cit. E. p. M. pp 161,162. 
31 CH4 section 1.1.3 
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With respect to the issue of the growth in trade in the 16th century, in the introduc- 
tion to A Contribution to the Critique Of Political Economy, Marx says, 
"Hence production produces consumption 1) by creating the material for it; 2) 
by determining the manner of consumption; 3) by creating as a want in the 
consumer (the desire for) products which it initially posits as an object. .... 
Similarly, consumption produces the disposition of the producer by soliciting 
him (in the form of) a goal determining need. "32 
The market, i. e. the consumers, appear as such only in so far as saleable goods exist 
which produce in them a need; point three above. The reciprocal relation then takes effect 
as noted in the next point. 
The discovery of new markets is conditioned in the first instance by the existence of 
saleable commodities which gives point to this activity. This in turn depends upon the 
growth of the productive forces. Thus historically, the productivity of feudal agriculture 
makes possible specialisation of a kind in craft techniques and the granting of burgages. 
This gives rise to market relations which in turn give a boost to the crafts. Production of 
wool and later cloth proceeds in the same way until the massive market opportunities of 
the 16th century and afterwards transform the production systern. 33 
Similarly, the transformation in the economy towards trade and manufacture altered 
the balance of power and the legal framework which defined the class relations, but the 
victory of the progressive classes in turn boosted the economies of the countries where it 
took place which then brought forth new developments in technology. 
32 op. cit. Preface and Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pg 
21. 
The words in brackets were added by me for the sake Of clarity. The second phrase replaces the 
word "as". 
33 The incentive to import luxury goods was probably the main motive for the initial expansion 
of trade in the 16th century but this also was possible only because of the already existing prosper- 
ity in Western Europe based upon the growth of the Productive forces. 
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Finally, the justifications for the existing social system were transformed under the 
impact of the critiques of the progressive classes but these new arguments themselves 
acted as a means of both educating and mobilising political forces. Thus Protestantism 
paved the way for the political victories of the progressive classes. 
In more general theoretical terms, the interaction between the various levels of 
social activity has a dialectical form. On one hand the development of each of these prac- 
tices follows its own internal dynamic but on the other hand the interdependence between 
them causes each to affect the circumstances of the other, usually by provoking a crisis. 
As each practice adapts to overcome the crisis this creates conditions which will produce 
a reciprocal reaction in the other. 
The result is spasmodic development, periods of normality followed by rapid, revo- 
lutionary shifts. The development by crisis and adaptation is caused by the fact that the 
changes in the poles of the dialectical relation are semi-independent rather than synchron- 
ised. The relationship between them therefore becomes strained and then violently re- 
asserted. This is the character of "natural" i. e. involuntary growth within such systems. 
These relations are what Marx refers to as the "contradictions" of a mode of production. 
The term "contradiction" describes relations of different types. All divisions of 
labour in a competitive society create contradictions since the different functions of the 
labour thus divided develop their own objectives which are pursued not only without 
reference to other functions but often in opposition to other functions, as in the cases of 
competition and exploitation. 
The activities may be separated because they come to be performed by different sets 
of people but they may also be separated because one type of activity is by its nature a 
response to or the result of another. For example, changes in the patterns of activity at the 
economic level may initiate changes in the patterns of activity at the political level. The 
relations between the forces of production, the economic relations of production, political 
and legal relations and ideological disputes are dialectical in the manner just described 
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and there is mutual causality between them, each provoking changes in the other(s) in a 
cyclical movement (or rather a spiral, since the result of the changes does not restore the 
status quo). 
2.1. Determination "in the last analysis" 
Relations of mutual causality produce on-going cycles but they do not in themselves 
indicate that any particular cause should be regarded as having primacy. Marx, on the 
other hand, whilst indicating that causality within systems is of this reciprocal kind, con- 
stantly asserts that certain causes are to be treated as having primacy when it comes 
determining the rest. Engels in this connection talks about determination by economic 
,, 34 causes "in the last analysis . 
The answer to this problem can be approached I believe along the following lines. 
Although the causes are reciprocal, the type of causality is not necessarily the same in 
both directions and it is upon this qualitative point that I believe that the claim to the 
causal primacy of certain activities over others rests. 
The type of relations described in the previous section are of the means to ends or 
"teleological" type. Changes in the end affects the means in a different and more funda- 
rnental manner than changes in the means affects the end. 35 Alteration of means will 
enhance or retard the achievement of the end, but alteration of the end will render the 
existing means inappropriate and redundant, it transforms the nature of the whole 
activity. 
For instance, the legal constraints upon the direct producers under the feudal system 
were means by which the ruling class could exercise control over the production process. 
They formed a necessary and integral part of this form of exploitation. However, when 
34 Late letters 
35 c. f CH3 section 5.1.1 
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the source of wealth shifted from manorial production to a market system based upon 
manufacture and trade, these forms of control became totally inappropriate, in fact they 
became fetters which prevented the economy developing. The end which they had been 
designed to achieve was no longer the main social priority hence the means had come to 
be at odds with the new goals. New ends require new means. 
On the other hand, where the bourgeoisie or their allies seized power and altered the 
legal framework to a set of more appropriate controls, capitalism developed at an 
increased rate. In this case the means changed but the ends (of the bourgeoisie) remained 
the same, the promotion of capitalism. They were simply realised under this regime with 
greater speed and efficiency, e. g. in the Dutch Republic and in England. This is the so- 
called base/superstructure relation. 
The most fundamental changes take place in the forces of production since all the 
other changes are teleologically linked directly or indirectly to transformations in this 
sphere of activity, i. e. the exploitation of the productive forces. This I believe is Marx's 
basic proposition in his analysis of social structure and change. This proposition 
nevertheless requires further qualification because not all teleological relations have the 
"base" activities as the end and the "superstructural" activities as the means. 
In the doctrine of Mercantilism, for instance, Economic development is seen as a 
Means to strengthen the state. One has to say that it is in fact true that economic develop- 
ment is a means by which the state may be strengthened and therefore a teleological rela- 
tion runs in the reverse direction between the economic and political spheres. The ques- 
tion of primacy, therefore, has a further dimension which relates to the primary determin- 
ing moments in a process. 
Although the interchange between the economic and political spheres is mutual, 
only one of those spheres could logically be the initiator of the relation. The state is an 
institution which maintains the normal functioning of some particular socio-economic 
formation. It therefore pre-supposes the existence of an economy of some kind as its 
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"raison d'8tre". The economy in turn is teleologically linked to the goal of the satisfaction 
of human need as its raison d'8tre. 36 This is a linear teleological chain and it is this chain 
of causes which act as the "raison d'8tre" of others which runs from base to superstruc- 
ture and is prior to any other teleological relation. That which acts as "raison d'8tre is 
logically prior to any other cause. 
The economy may be a means of supporting the state but the state only exists 
because of its teleological relation to the economy. This latter relation is therefore the 
basis of the "mercantilist" relation and the "first cause" even within the relations of 
mutual development. Change this relation and all the other relations are affected. 
Having given an account of the logic of Marx, s argument it is necessary also to 
explain the apparent resilience of the so-called superstructural spheres through history 
despite changes in the economic base. This consideration applies particularly to idea sys- 
tems 
Each sphere of activity is a concrete object and hence, like any concrete object, it 
will have a variety of effects. An idea system may function in a number of different 
ways simultaneously, so that the relation which it has to some political situation may not 
cause it to be abandoned when the situation no longer exists, (it would simply lose its 
relevance as ideology with respect to that issue). An idea system does not necessarily 
have as its function the justification of one particular legal or political position alone, 
even though it may function in this way under certain circumstances, e. g. Christianity. 37 
Such a view would constitute a one-sided representation of the object. 
36 The notion of the "raison d'8tre" can be further specified in the following way: one could im- 
agine certain stable economic formations existing without a state institution, other formations may 
be unstable without a state but one could conceptualise them as existing briefly, one could not, 
however, conceive of a state existing unrelated to an economy because it could not function as a 
state. This is how to test whether the teleological relation in question corresponds to this concept. 37 c. f. CH7 section 1.3 
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On the other hand, an idea system which specifically has an economic or political 
system as its object ceases to have any relevance when that object ceases to exist. Hence 
Marx points out that bourgeois political economy will have only antiquarian interest 
when capitalism ceases to exist. 
As a materialist, Marx is committed to the view that idea systems articulate sensu- 
ous experience in some way but not in a narrow and one-sided way. A change in the way 
men produce their material existence will transform the nature of the debate and contro- 
versy surrounding economic and political practice and will render irrelevant some idea 
systems whilst altering the significance of others. 38 
On the other hand, the demise of idea systems may not rest simply upon their loss of 
relevance for every issue but upon the acceptance or suppression of such views by dom- 
inant political factions. 39 
Ideas can survive historical change in another way. Even when a system of ideas or 
a single proposition refers specifically to some object and that object ceases to exist, the 
idea can still be retained as relevant as an example, parable, metaphor etc. of a more gen- 
eral principle which remains valid. For example, the oppression of widows and orphans 
warned against in the Bible might be taken as an expression of the general principle of 
pot oppressing the more vulnerable social groups when widows and orphans themselves 
are not in the same jeopardy as in biblical times. 
The survival of idea systems is quite striking, not only do they have different, even 
opposed implications for action in different contexts so that they are not dependent for 
their significance upon any particular context, but they can even survive the 
38 A political struggle may similarly have a different significance for different participants and 
the struggle may not end because the objectives of some of the participants has been gained. A 
war, for instance, may be started by one group but continued by other groups who were initially 
Jrawn in as allies for entirely different reasons. 
39 Similarly, political struggles may end when the participants who are the strongest decide that 
the struggle should end. 
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disappearance of the questions which they specifically address to some extent by operat- 
ing at a more universal or general level. This is one possible explanation for the durabil- 
ity of religious ideas. 
The view that religious ideas address "the human condition", however, is not neces- 
sarily true. For instance, the promise of life after death may seem to offer comfort for a 
fear of something inevitable, but even this would take on a new significance if life could 
be extended indefinitely. Under these circumstances the promise would become 
irrelevant for those who do not wish to die and undesirable for those who do. Questions 
posed at higher levels of generality do, however, address themselves to the more per- 
vasive and therefore to the more fundamental problems of existence. 40 
As for the case of the categories of bourgeois political economy, only the proposi- 
tions concerning the features common to all modes of production would remain relevant 
if capitalism ceased to exist and these are not particularly informative. 41 
These qualifications do not invalidate the claim that the base-superstructure relation 
is a teleological relation and that the alteration of the end transforms the means (after an 
initial period of crisis as always). Whilst the idea systems may survive, their role in ideo- 
logical disputes does not. The character of the arguments change and the ideas are put to 
a different use. 
The discussion of ideology brings us to the question of the historical development 
of consciousness. As stated before, since the transition to socialism involves understand- 
ing and taking control of ones own social institutions, the evolution of consciousness 
must be a crucial causal factor in this process. 
4() Political struggles may also be perpetuated by the generalisation of the objective. A cam- 
paign against a particular abuse may be extended to other abuses of the same type when the initial 
abuse has ceased. 
12 
41 op. cit. Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique Of Political Economy, pg 
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Chapter Six 
History and Consciousness 
(The historical development of consciousness) 
1. The meaning of "consciousness" in Marx's work 
For the purpose of clarity it will be useful to give a preliminary definition of what 
Marx usually means when he refers to "consciousness" and "forms of consciousness". He 
is not referring, as would an 18th century empiricist, to what is likely to be happening in 
the mind of an individual when he or she perceives the world. Rather, he is referring to 
the stock of meanings, theories and interpretations through which whole classes of people 
represent to themselves their experiences and thus come to terms with the circumstances 
of their lives-' 
These interpretations are social products and include moral, philosophical, religious, 
social and political theories. Thus in a modern way, Marx regards the perceptions of both 
groups and individuals as "theory-mediated" but also, in a manner which goes beyond 
present-day empiricists, he regards these theories as social products and hence conscious- 
ness as mediated by social processes (mediated both by social causes and the social 
consequences of holding certain viewpoints). 
Also, as a political theorist his primary focus of interest is not so much how the 
consciousness of any particular individual is conditioned, but the factors which condition 
the consciousness of whole classes of individuals, because it is this collective conscious- 
ness which has the most significant repercussions in terms of political action. It is these 
I c. f. op. cit. The German Ideology, pg 47. 
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collective interpretations which are being referred to therefore in the discussion of cons- 
ciousness in the rest of this chapter. 
2. Class relativism and truth 
The fundamental point which Marx stresses when he discusses his method is that 
"consciousness cannot be anything other than consciousness of existence"2 it therefore 
must be explained as a response to the material life-circumstances of those whose cons- 
ciousness it is and not vice versa. The material circumstances of different classes differ, 
however, so that one would expect their consciousness to differ also. On the other hand, 
if consciousness is simply taken to be a reflection of the specific conditions of a particular 
class, then the consciousness of each class would simply be a one-sided, partial, and 
therefore "ideological" viewpoint in the pejorative sense of this term. 
Such a view of what Marx is saying would be too simplistic however. 3 It contrasts 
sharply with his view that the proletariat must understand the dynamics of social organi- 
sation in order to overcome the alienated condition of capitalist society and thus solve the 
problems which have beset all societies since primitive communism. In order to do this 
their perception of social reality must in all essential features be the truth. 4 
The apparent "problem" outlined above could only be set up by interpreting Marx's 
statements selectively. Almost everywhere the class-relativist statements appear, they are 
immediately qualified, locating them within a wider realist framework. To interpret 
Marx's views on consciousness more correctly, we need to examine the issue in greater 
detail. 
2 Idem. 
3 Although the statement "the truth is proved in practice" from the theses on Feuerbach which 
seems to beg the question "whose practice? " has led some theorists to this conclusion. 
4 "Truth" for Marx would be an explanation which can adequately account for all relevant 
viewpoints, since he is a dialectician. 
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As indicated in the opening paragraph, there are two principal factors which condi- 
tion consciousness: the evidence drawn from the life-experience of an individual or 
group which both prompts and confirms ideas, and the consequences of holding and act- 
ing upon certain ideas, i. e. the existential considerations which condition5 commitment. 
The position of the individual, however, differs from that of the group with respect to 
these factors. 
2.1. The consciousness of individuals 
The consciousness of individuals, even within the same class will admit of a 
significant amount of variation. This is hardly surprising. In terms of life-experience, i. e. 
the evidential element which conditions consciousness, although certain conditions 
within a class may be common to most of its members, the factors determining life- 
circumstances apart from these common factors vary considerably. These personal and 
individual6 differences will condition the consciousness of an individual as much as the 
common ones, in some cases assuming greater significance to the persons concerned, 
thus creating variation in both the motivation for holding certain views as well as the evi- 
dence immediately available to support them. 
Also, as far as the consequences for the individual of holding certain viewpoints is 
concerned, an individual can, under most circumstances, hold and express views which 
run counter to the interests of the class with little or no political consequences to the class 
and neither, therefore, to him or herself. Indeed, because of the possibilities of social 
mobility, an individual may feel able consciously to act against the interests of his or her 
class without suffering the undesirable repercussions which would affect the other 
5 The word "condition" here does not mean that the individual or group has no choice, it means 
that they take account of these conditions when they make their choices. 
6 Intersecting membership of other social groupings, e. g. ethnic minorities, may introduce 
influences common to these groups which will further condition a person's consciousness as well 
as purely individual factors. 
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members. Because of this, some people will adopt the viewpoint of classes of which they 
are not members but to which they aspire or expect to be members, even if these views 
are expressly hostile to their own class. 
It must be stressed, however, that for the majority in any class, social mobility is not 
a real possibility and that whatever affects the class as a whole will affect them also. 
Variation in viewpoint due to this cause therefore should not be overstated. 
For adult members of any group, radical changes in their habitual way of life will be 
problematic since it will face them with the possibility that they may not be able to adjust 
to the new situation. There are, therefore, countervailing pressures which pre-dispose 
individuals to adopt views which are favourable to the interests of their class. 
The views held by Marx with respect to the possibility of individual variations in 
consciousness can be seen from the following quotations: 
"it is quite 'possible' that particular individuals are not 'always' influenced in 
their attitude by the class to which they belong, but this has as little effect upon 
the class struggle as the secession of a few nobles to the tiers itat had upon the 
French Revolution ...... 
7 
(this was a response to the charge of "narrow mindedness" by Herr Heinzen), and 
"Just as little must one imagine that the democratic representatives are indeed 
all shopkeepers or enthusiastic champions of shopkeepers. According to their 
education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven and 
earth. "8 
and also, 
7 "Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritisierende Moral. Beitrag zur Deutschen Kultur- 
geschischte. Gegen Carl Heinzen", in Deutscher Brusseler Zeitung, 28th October to the 25th of November 1847. 
8 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, op. cit. Selected Works p 120. 
206 
"Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process 
of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range 
of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of 
the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that 
holds the future in its hands. " 
and from the same section, 
"If by chance they (the petit bourgeoisie) are revolutionary, they are so only in 
view of their impending transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their 
present but their future interests. "9 
These quotes, and concepts such as "false class consciousness" and "Lumpenproletariat", 
all point to the conclusion that Marx holds a view similar to the analysis outlined above. 
His own class origins were petit-bourgeois and his skills would have fitted him for 
membership of this class also but he chose to adopt views hostile to their interests. The 
fact that he was a member of an oppressed minority, the Jews, and that his family had 
chosen to abandon Judaism in order to avoid the civil disabilities to which Jews were 
subjected, one suspects influenced his radicalism and the atheistic humanistic form which 
it took. 10 His own case, therefore, is an example of individual deviation. The way that the 
consciousness of a group, and in particular a class, is conditioned, however, differs from 
this analysis in crucial respects. 
2.2. The consciousness of groups 
By attributing consciousness to groups I do not mean to suggest that a group is a 
person in its own right, an alien being with a mind. A group which is organised, in 
Marx's terms, "for itself', i. e. consciously pursues collective interests, will have a set of 
9 op. cit. The Communist Manifesto pg 9 1. 
10 c. f. Karl Marx: his life and environment, 1. Berlin, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1978, pp 19,20. 
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values, viewpoints, theories, etc. in terms of which these interests are articulated. The 
consciousness of the group, therefore, is the set of values which are expressed by its 
spokesmen (or women) and propagated by its institutions and the prevalent opinions car- 
ried along its communication networks with some degree of formal or informal control of 
dissent. These views will ultimately rest upon an approximate consensus of opinion 
within the group. 
A common viewpoint has to be arrived at by the members of the group if collective 
action in pursuit of common goals is to become a possibility. There will be a reciprocal 
causal relationship between the actions of the representatives of the institutions of the 
group and the consensus of opinion of the group as a whole. The executive, however, can 
only exercise political power if the members of the group are prepared to support its 
actions. This means that it must act in accordance with the consensus of opinion. II 
On the other hand, the executive may act to control dissent in order to manipulate 
the consensus. Consensus can only be "managed", however, within limits, i. e. when the 
dissent is that of a minority. It is the central role played by consensus which licences the 
application of the term "consciousness" to the collectively held opinions of a group 
which are expressed through its institutional structures. 
In terms of the life-circumstances which condition the consciousness of the group, 
since these views must express a consensus, only common features can act as condition- 
ing factors. It is the material circumstances common to the class, therefore, which condi- 
tion class-consciousness. Individual variations in consciousness due to special conditions 
will fail to gain the sympathy of the class if they do not accord with common experience 
and sentiment. The concept of "common experience, however, should be elaborated 
further. 
11 Sometimes collective apathy may allow the institutional leaders to act independently but this 
assumes that their actions are broadly in line with the expectations of the group, otherwise opposi- 
tion would arise. 
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In "common experience" we are dealing with a universal denoting a class of events 
experienced by many individuals. This universal should be understood as a concrete 
Hegelian universal rather than in terms of the Socratic notion of universality which is 
denoted by a single feature possessed by all the members of the class. 
Women, children, old people, male workers etc., may all experience the conditions 
of their class differently, but because of the interdependent relations between these 
groups the conditions which directly affect one section will indirectly affect the rest. 
Deprivation, for instance, will tend to affect the whole internal structure of a class wher- 
ever it is concentrated. Dangerous conditions of work for a male worker means the threat 
of widowhood for his wife with all the attendant difficulties this brings. Hardship for the 
wife disrupts the family life of the male worker (usually increasing his militancy at 
work). This creates bonds of sympathy and understanding12 between the sub-divisions of 
the class (which is strengthened by daily face to face contact), and a common conscious- 
tiess of the situation. The consciousness of the conditions affecting all is expressed in the 
consciousness of each. 
Sections of the community who for one reason or another identify themselves as 
outsiders, on the other hand, will not find easy acceptance of their views within the class. 
The perspectives of those who are successful relative to their fellows, for instance, and 
who for that reason do not identify with the aspirations of the group as a whole, or of 
those who are despised by the other members and perhaps are motivated in their views by 
a sense of revenge, will remain minority opinions. 13 Once again, therefore, the 
12 The relations of interdependence may create common cause even without real understanding 
or sympathy. A man who feels responsible for the standard of living of his family is shamed by 
hardship inflicted upon them. He may actually be uncomprehending and indifferent to the suffer- 
ing of his wife but will react in her defence for the reasons stated above. In reality consensus is 
formed via some element of both motivations. 
13 A further reason for a common understanding occurs when different groups face common 
treatment by an oppressor, especially when the situation is such that whatever treatment can be 
meted out to one group can and would be meted out to the rest. Each will then tend to sympathise 
with the others as oppressed groups, irrespective of the differences between them and make com- 
mon cause against the oppression, which, if allowed to affect one, would be used against all. 
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consciousness of the class will invariably have as its major conditioning factor the cir- 
cumstances "common" to the members of the class. 
With respect to the way the consequences of holding certain views conditions class 
consciousness, unlike the situation for the individual, changes in class consciousness 
have immediate implications for the goals and objectives of the whole class and hence 
affect its social and political future. The opinions and perspectives which inform the con- 
sensus, therefore, are of direct political interest to the members of the class. 
Members of the class will attempt to make sure that the consensus views are favour- 
able to their own interests and since class consciousness is a question of consensus, the 
majority interests will be the predominant conditioning factor which influences it. Should 
any group succeed in manipulating the consensus for their own ends, they will do so only 
in so far as their views are made to appear to coincide with the interests of the majority. 
Class consciousness is also, therefore, more susceptible to the determining pressure 
of class interest than individual consciousness. 14 This latter point allows us to understand 
why Marx regards the consciousness of ruling classes as inevitably ideological in charac- 
ter. 
2.3. The consciousness of a ruling class 
Every ruling class claims to rule on behalf of the whole community, despite the fact 
that its existence as a class presupposes relations of exploitation between itself and other 
classes. 
14 The degree to which the consciousness of a class could diverge from views which support its 
material interests, can be estimated by the influence which reformers within an oppressing class 
can exercise over its policies or the impact of passive resistance aimed at changing the conscious- 
ness of the class from without. Marx always tends to suggest that change in policy only comes 
when the reforming interests coincide with the material interests of powerful groups within the rul- ing class, e. g. the " 10 hours" legislation. Other case studies might include the Vietnamese war or 
the black civil rights movement in the U. S. A. 
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The political circumstances surrounding both its rise to power and its consolidation 
of power, therefore, will dictate that these antagonisms should be concealed or minimised 
in significance in order to justify its rule both to other classes and to its own 
members. The political consequences of exposing the exploitative nature of the system, 
therefore, militate against a ruling class developing or propagating a veridical view of it. 
As Marx says in The Gennan Ideology, 
"For each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling before it, is 
compelled, simply in order to achieve its aims, to represent its interest as the 
common interest of all members of society. " 15 
It is initially successful, Marx explains, 
11.... because in the beginning its interest really is more closely connected to the 
common interest of all other non-ruling classes and has been unable under the 
constraint of the previously existing conditions to develop as the particular 
interest of a particular class. " 16 
in its period of decline, however, as class conflict grows, 
"The earlier conceptions of these relations of intercourse, in which the real 
individual interests were asserted as general interests, decline into mere 
idealising phrases, conscious illusions and deliberate deceits. But the more 
they are condemned as falsehoods, and the less they satisfy the understanding, 
the more dogmatically they are asserted and the more deceitful, moralising and 
spiritual becomes the language of established society. " 17 
Victorian hypocrisy is a case in point. It is not necessary for the system to be in a 
state of decline for the situation described above to obtain. It is merely necessary that 
15 op. cit. The Gernzan Ideology, pp 65,66. 
16 Ibid. pg. 66. 
17 Ibid. cited in Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Philosophy, T. B. Bottornore 
and M. Rubel, 2nd edition, Harmondsworth, Penguin 1961, pg 96. 
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exploitation and therefore the potential for class conflict should take an extreme form in 
that society. This can occur during periods of rapid growth. 
The maxim of an exploitative relation is "do unto others what you would not have 
them do unto you", i. e. it is by its very nature one-sided. The imperatives of class rule, on 
the other hand, dictate that the actions of the ruling class should be seen to be justified by 
some universal standard. 
The ruling class will be compelled, therefore, in its desire to prohibit reciprocal 
actions of others whilst reserving them for itself, to promote universal standards which its 
rnembers cannot keep because of the exploitative nature of its rule. Both the standards 
and the violations are a product of the same exploitative relations, the ruling class is thus 
caught in an unavoidable contradiction. 
The Victorian ruling class consciously promoted Christian values amongst the 
working class as a "civilising" influence. They needed to be seen to be adhering to those 
same values themselves, of course, for the reasons stated. But when they said "thou shalt 
riot steal", they principally meant "thou shalt not steal from the ruling class" and likewise 
"thou shalt not kill". 
If anyone took the trouble to walk around the cotton mills or visit the working class 
areas, however, they could not fail to see that those who produced the wealth which the 
ruling class lived from were themselves desperately poor and that the conditions under 
which they lived and worked, maimed and killed large numbers of them. This situation 
existed to satisfy the desire for gain of the ruling class. 
Anyone who took these values seriously, therefore, must draw the conclusion that 
the ruling class stood condemned by their own values. The conditions of labour of the 
working class constituted a kind of robbery with violence. The attempt to apply the 
universal concepts in a particularistic manner necessarily resulted in a hypocritical cons- 
ciousness ridden with contradictions. 
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The case is similar with the Victorian attitude to sex. Chastity was strongly 
emphasised by the ruling class principally to control the behaviour of the women of their 
own class who were regarded by their husbands as property. 18 Chastity was also 
preached to the working class but mainly as a way of accustoming its members to the dis- 
cipline of an external authority. But if the women of the ruling class were to be kept sex- 
ually immature then the sexual needs of the male members of the class had to be serviced 
elsewhere. Prostitution, therefore reached its highest levels in the Victorian era as work- 
ing class girls were driven by poverty to perform this role. 
The male members of the ruling class once again were forced to break in private the 
rules which they proclaimed in public. The coincidence of the highest levels of 
"inunorality" and the greatest emphasis on morals is not an accident, it is a consequence 
of the contradiction between the ideological and the practical requirements of exploita- 
five relations. 
The contradiction between the ideological and practical imperatives to which the 
individual bourgeois was subjected was understood in a one-sided manner as an inevit- 
able conflict within the psyche of the individual. The exclusion of the social dimension of 
the problem from consideration functioned ideologically to prevent social criticism but in 
doing so it also prevented the cause of the contradiction from entering the social cons- 
ciousness. 
The situation was therefore understood as uncaused, a metaphysical absolute com- 
mon to all men, an insoluble problem within the mind of the individual. This view was 
expressed in literature in the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. 19 Victorian society was all 
too aware of the fact that the public face of the moral, respectable individual masked the 
potential for private evil but this was understood a-historically as part of the human 
18 cf. F. Engels' discussion of monogamy in The Origin of the Family Private Property and the State. pp 494-498 
19 The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Robert Louis Stevenson, 1886. 
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condition rather than following from the imperatives of Victorian upper class rule. 
A divided consciousness of this kind, however, is common to all societies founded 
upon antagonistic relations of production. It is generally interpreted in a one-sided meta- 
physical fashion, for the reasons described, 20 as a struggle between the flesh and the 
spirit, nature and consciousness, mind and matter. 
The contradiction was sharper in Victorian society, however, not only because of 
the severity of the exploitative relations but also because it subscribed to the ideals of 
individualism. Standards applied to all individuals, there was no possibility therefore of 
publically applying different standards to the behaviour of different groups. This situa- 
tion necessitated a hypocritical consciousness with respect to the treatment of subordinate 
social groups. 
In general, moral codes express the consensus of opinion on what actions will bring 
desired results for some group or other. 21 There may be conflicting moral views within a 
society corresponding to the conflicting aspirations of different groups. The consensus is 
experienced as an "alien" external constraint, however, only when the social organisation 
of a group combines cooperation and conflict within the same relations. "The general 
interest" then has to be imposed from without, 22 often in the abstract mystified form of 
an absolute "ought". 
The conflict between moral and sensual interests is the conflict between social 
imperatives and individual goals. 23 To represent this conflict as a metaphysical absolute 
20 This situation is not necessarily a product of the contradictions affecting the consciousness 
of a ruling class with respect to exploitation, the more general phenomenon whereby in a competi- 
tive society the desires of individuals bring them into conflict with each other thus threatening so- 
cial cooperation is sufficient to explain the ascription of good and evil in this fashion. 
21 Morality is usually a public matter although Nietzsche envisaged "self-overcoming", i. e. the 
formation of private moralities, as crucially important for the future of western culture. 
22 c. f. op. cit. The Gernwn Ideology pg 53. 
23 There may be a conflict between immediate gratification and long term satisfaction, as in Plato's Protagoras, 
1. 
the latter there being identified with both the rational and the moral. In this 
case however, the moral" is still "sensual", their absolute opposition is represented by Kant's 
1noral theory. 
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is, therefore, to suggest that the antagonism between individual and social requirements 
is similarly unavoidable. This is true only for societies founded upon an antagonistic 
form of the division of labour. A society organised in such a way that individual and 
communal imperatives coincide, would simultaneously unite the demands of the "flesh" 
with those of the "spirit" also. 24 
2.4. Proletarian consciousness and class relativism 
Having looked at the way in which the consciousness of a ruling class is condi- 
tioned, we can return to the question of relativism. In The German Ideology, Marx says, 
"On the other hand, each class in turn achieves an independent existence over 
and against the individuals ...... we have already indicated several times how 
this subsuming of individuals under the class brings with it their subjection to 
all kinds of ideas, etc. "25 
and later, 
The subsuming of individuals under definite classes cannot be abolished until a 
class has taken shape, which has no longer any particular class interest to 
assert against a ruling class. 
26 
and also, 
"The whole semblance that the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain 
ideas (morality, ideology, etcj, ends of its own accord as soon as class domi- 
nation ceases to be the form of social Organisation: that is to say as soon as it is 
no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or the 'general 
interest' as ruling.,, 27 
24 It is the Hegelian perspective which allows us to search for such a synthesis despite the argu- 
ments which represent the demands of the individual and the society as inevitably antithetical. 
25 op. cit. The German Ideology, pg 82. 
26 Ibid. pg. 83 (my italics) 
27 Ibid. pg 66 (the words in brackets were added by me) 
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Marx regards the proletariat as a "universal" class, a class whose interests do not lie in 
setting itself up as the exploiter of other classes but in abolishing exploitation and class 
rule altogether. As such its consciousness will not suffer from the constraints and con- 
tradictions described above. 
I will return to the question of the factors which condition the consciousness of the 
proletariat later but the discussion above gives some indication of why the consciousness 
of this class need not necessarily be one-sided and therefore class relative in the manner 
of previous ruling classes. 
3. Four questions 
In attempting to understand Marx's account of the historical development of cons- 
ciousness to the point where the causes of alienation, class conflict, artificial scarcity, 
repression of the individual by the group etc. can be understood and the problems solved, 
three main questions have to be answered. First, how do the material conditions of 
society evolve in such a manner as to permit the nature of the problem to be correctly 
perceived by any individual who considers the issues seriously? Secondly, why is it pos- 
sible for the proletariat and only the proletariat as a class to adopt this view as its class 
perspective? Thirdly, Given that the proletariat can achieve such a view what factors 
predispose it to do so? Why should the proletariat attempt to solve "the riddle of his- 
tory"? The remaining and all-important question which follows from this analysis is: 
what kind of social organisation will produce a solution to these problems? I will argue 
that the key to the answer to this latter question, as Marx realised, lies in the forms of 
social relations which existed, already developed, in his own time within the working 
class. 
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3.1. The mechanisms which detern-dne consciousness in general. 
In answer to the first of these questions, adequate knowledge of the world is gained 
for Marx, as it is for Hegel, when apparently accidental and unrelated phenomena are 
found to be necessarily interconnected and are understood as the manifestations of a sin- 
gle, universal phenomenon. Discovery of the system governed by its own laws which 
unites the apparently individual phenomena and hence the identification of the universal 
which manifests itself in each particular, alone gives the practical understanding which 
allows mankind to address and attempt to deal with the root causes of things. Science is 
characterised by the discovery of universality and necessity. This involves the unmasking 
of what Marx calls "fetishism". 
Fetishism is the identification of a god with its physical representation. Marx uses 
the term more generally to mean the identification of a universal entity with a particular 
manifestation of it. 28 Knowledge is gained when the universal is seen to be more than the 
particular and therefore not merely identical to it, and the behaviour of the particular is 
understood as simply one particular manifestation of the universal. 29 The unmasking of 
fetishism allows the knower to grasp the full range Of manifestations of the universal and 
thus to grasp the fundamental pattern of its behaviour. This is crucial where one is 
attempting to "cure the disease" rather than to "treat the symptom,,. 
28 Engels refers to Adam Smith as the "economic Luther", c. f. op. cit. Outlines of a Critique of 
Political Economy, pg 166 and op. cit. E. P. M. (Marx's explanation) becausejust as Luther accused 
ýcatholicisrn of worshiping physical representations of God instead of God who appears directly in 
the human conscience, Smith accuses previous economists of confusing the physical embodiments 
of wealth with its essence, labour. 
The representations of wealth are not always a arbitrary as in the case of coins and precious 
metals, which were identified with wealth by the Mercantilists, but can also be natural objects as in 
the case of corn, which was identified with wealth by the Physiocrats. 
29 The elimination of fetishism, as can be seen, is the elimination of "one-sided" viewpoints in 
the Hegelian sense. Newton's system was "fetishist" in this sense from the point of view of the 
theory of relativity, although the parallel with the more familiar usage of the term is not so obvi- 
Ms. The transcending of one-sided viewpoints is a general principle in the acquisition of 
knowledge. 
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Fetishism also involves the failure to distinguish between the operative features of 
the phenomenon which explain its behaviour and the features which are merely present 
but passive. 
Extending the religious parallel further to illustrate the point, for instance, the 
Israelites under the leadership of Saul won battles using guerrilla tactics in the moun- 
tains, the Philistines then said said that their god was a god of the mountains who could 
not give them victory on the plains. Saul was tempted into a battle on the plain at Gilboa 
and duly lost. David, however, who succeeded Saul, fought the Philistines on the plain of 
Esdraelon and won. 30 This demonstrated to the Philistines that not only was the efficacy 
of Yaweh more universal in its scope than in the particular terrain of mountainous areas, 
but also that Yaweh's association with mountains was not the operative factor in affect- 
ing the outcome of battles. As far as battle-winning was concerned the connection with 
mountains was accidental. The point to note here is the way that new experience condi- 
tions consciousness both of the relationship between universal and particular and of 
which are the operative factors responsible for certain effects. 
If God speaks to someone from a burning bush then the witness could not be blamed 
for thinking that God looks like a burning bush. But if God then speaks to that person 
from a peal of thunder, he or she will know that this particular physical form is not the 
only form which he can assume. In the same way the historical development of the 
material conditions of existence tends to enlighten the historical actor as to the real 
causes of things. 
An example of this has already been given. Prior to capitalism, those who possessed 
most of the wealth in society owned it in the form of a certain kind of physical object, 
e. g. land and the produce of the land. Under these conditions it was natural that wealth 
30 The Bible as History: Archeology confirms the book of books (New edition) Werner Keller, 
Hodder and Stoughton 1980, Ch 16. 
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should be identified with the natural objects in which it principally was stored. With the 
advent of the market system, however, it could be seen that wealth can be held in physi- 
cal forms which are in principle of unlimited variety and can each be exchanged for 
another. Value can change its form and therefore appears independent of any particular 
form. 31 
With respect to the way that historical circumstances condition consciousness, it is 
not simply that experience allows the conscious subject to perceive a difference between 
the universal and the particular which could not have been perceived under other cir- 
cumstances, prompting the conceptual distinction, nor is it just that the separation 
between the universal and particular is forced under certain empirical conditions on pain 
of the unintelligibility of the phenomenon, as in the case cited above. It is also the fact 
that even if someone arrived at the idea through speculation without being prompted by 
experience, which is a possibility, no evidence would be available to support the claim. 
If for instance God only appears as a burning bush but someone suggested that he 
need not appear in this particular form, how could the proposition be demonstrated? The 
idea would remain speculative and be unlikely to be accepted as knowledge by the group. 
Historical development, however, provides the evidence to support the correct solution as 
well as the problematic for which only such a solution will suffice. The mechanisms 
which condition consciousness in this way are as follows: increasing diversity, rapidity of 
change, the increasing division of labour and social conflict. 
31 Indeed in the form of money, as distinct from money tokens, it appears to be independent of 
all physical forms. Transactions can be carried out in the modern era by simply crediting or debit- 
ing accounts held in a bank. These accounts consist merely of numbers on paper or numbers stored 
in an electronic device. It is not the numbers which one owns; the numbers merely record ones 
wealth, which apparently does not take a physical form at all in this situation. 
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3.1.1. Increasing diversity 
This topic has been dealt with largely in the previous section. The historical 
development of the forces of production culminates in a society where wealth takes 
diverse natural forms each of which can be exchanged for the others as "quantities of 
wealth". The forms of labour which produce the wealth are similarly diverse and it is pre- 
cisely under these conditions that they are conceived of as wealth-production in general, 
i. e. labour in general, the category of modem political economy. 
In the introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy Marx 
says 
"Indifference with regard to a specific kind of labour presupposes a highly 
developed totality of real kinds of labour, no single one of which is predom- 
inant any longer. The most general abstractions arise as a rule only together 
with the richest concrete development, in which one thing appears common to 
many, common to all. At this point it ceases to be conceivable in a particular 
form alone.,, 32 
Not only is it the case that the society engages in diverse kinds of wealth-creating 
activity, each individual does also. The worker's consciousness of the nature of his own 
labour changes also therefore. 
One's own labour comes to represent something more than a particular kind of 
labour to each individual as the volatility of the system of production demands ever- 
changing practices and the redistribution Of man-power from one branch of industry to 
another. Marx continues: 
"Indifference towards specific labour corresponds to a form of society in which 
individuals pass easily from one kind of labour to another, and in which the 
32 op. cit. Preface and introduction to the Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, pg 
36. 
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specific kind of labour is accidental, and therefore indifferent to them. Labour, 
not only as a category but in reality, has become a means to create wealth in 
general and has ceased to be organically tied to particular individuals in a 
specific forM.,, 33 
This latter point is double-edged in its implications. On the one hand, it points to the 
possibility of the many-sided development of the worker, but on the other, the separation 
of the specific form of labour from the worker's sense of identity reveals the possibility 
of his total alienation from his own labouring activity. 
Rather than all of the possibilities of his productive potential becoming part of his 
identity, none of them do, since he is tied to no particular one and his labour is outside of 
his control. His labour is a commodity to be used by others. In this form it is experienced 
as an abstract universal, simply effort expended, the particular form of which is irrelevant 
since it is experienced as a loss. 
it is in this form that it is understood by the political economist, who, reflecting the 
consciousness of the bourgeois, also regards it merely as effort which can be acquired 
and directed into the most lucrative channels. Once it is no longer conceived of as part of 
the worker's life-activity, its loss is no longer conceived of as a hardship. 
3.1.2. The rapidity of change 
Diversity can take two forms, synchronic (contemporaneous) as in the situation 
described above, and diachronic (succession in time). 34 In a slowly changing environ- 
ment, the fact that a thing will take diverse forms as it undergoes change is not easily 
appreciated. In a situation of rapid change, however, the diversity of form becomes 
33 Idem. 
34 These terms originate in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and are used by Piaget in the dis- 
cussion of dialectics in his book entitled StructuralisnL J. Piaget, Routledge, Keegan and Paul, 
London 1971. 
221 
obvious and the kinds of comparison and logical conclusions described above can conse- 
quently be made. 
A concrete example of how consciousness is conditioned by the perception of 
change might be the comparison between consciousness in slowly developing societies 
where division of labour and social reward depend upon hereditary qualification and 
consciousness in a more rapidly developing market system. 
In a system where division of labour is hereditary, the same social status is always 
combined with the same form of labour to which in turn always accrues the same degree 
of social reward. In such a system it appears that the structure of authority, the distribu- 
tion of wealth and the division of labour will always have the same form. Also, it is not 
possible under these conditions to ascertain which of these three attributes is the opera- 
tive factor in determining the others, i. e. to comprehend the causal relations existing 
between them. 
A ruling class will claim that social reward and the performance of certain functions 
is their hereditary prerogative, i. e. that social status is the principal causal factor. In law 
and custom this may indeed be the case. This contrasts with Marx's analysis, where 
social status is merely the recognition of consolidated social power which in practical 
terms rests upon the division of labour. 
When the speed of development of the productive forces increases, however, the 
division of labour undergoes perceptible changes, some branches of industry contract, 
others expand, some disappear while others come into being in a relatively short space of 
time. Under these conditions it becomes obvious that those involved in increasingly suc- 
cessful branches of industry acquire wealth and power and eventually status while those 
whose form of activity is no longer socially important eventually lose these things. The 
same activity will attract different degrees of status and reward as its relative importance 
changes. Status and reward, therefore, show themselves to be particular social attributes 
which an activity may have in varying degrees in the course of the development of the 
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economic system. 
A synchronic universal will manifest itself as a set of interrelated things, a system; a 
diachronic universal as a set of interrelated stages of development, a process. It is the 
process of the development of the productive forces manifesting itself in changing pat- 
terns of the division of labour which is seen to be the principal causal factor here. Status 
and social reward are seen not to be the principal causes, i. e. the operative factors in 
determining change, since the relationships between different levels of reward and status 
can only be understood in terms of the changing division of labour. 
In addition, it can be seen that in the struggle to obtain status and reward, it is the 
position of the individual in the division of labour which is the decisive factor, conferring 
social leverage, and it is this, therefore, which is the principal cause. Heredity most cer- 
tainly cannot be anything more than a purely accidental factor since as individuals move 
from one social activity to another, a necessary feature of a rapidly changing economy, 
they no longer retain their previous status or level of reward. Heredity makes no differ- 
ence. 
It could be argued, however, that division of labour is the principal cause in a 
market system but hereditary status is the principal cause in, say, a feudal system. But the 
point which is being made is that the only difference between the two systems in terms of 
the question is the speed of development and that feudalism would exhibit the same 
features if observed over a long enough time scale. 35 
Capitalism simply makes them observable within a single lifetime, thus demonstrat- 
ing which factors are part of the central dynamic and which are either accidental or peri- 
pheral consequences. This point is illustrated in Marx's famous passage referring to bour- 
geois society from The Communist Manifesto: 
35 In fact, all revolutionary transitions exhibit this same set of relationships 
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"All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable preju- 
dices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated 
before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is 
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real con- 
ditions of life, and his relations with his kind. "36 
and also in the discussion in the introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Politi- 
cal Economy where he says: 
"Bourgeois society is the most developed and complex historical organisation 
of production. Therefore, the categories which express its relations, the 
comprehension of its structure, also allow an insight into all extinct social for- 
mations from the ruins of which it built itself up, .... Human anatomy provides 
a key to the anatomy of the ape. "37 
In comparing these societies, we are merely looking at different phases of a single 
process. The later phase is an augmented version of the earlier phases. The same princi- 
ples are at work but the degree of differentiation and the rate of change is greater, permit- 
fing a better understanding of its causal relations. 38 This brings us to the next mechanism 
which gives insight into social processes, - increasing division of labour. 
36 op. cit. The Communist Manifesto pg 83. 
37 
37 op. cit. Preface and Introduction to A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pg 
38 In particular, if diversity of the form of property leads to the notion of the rule of property in 
general, the movement of property gives rise to the notion of the property system. 
Rapid change demonstrates how capitalists decisions follow changes in market conditions. 
These changes follow a predictable pattern and thus constitute a process, a diachronic universal 
which can be seen to be the underlying determining factor in Capitalist social relations. 
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3.1.3. Increasing division of labour 
Increasing division of labour creates situations in which it can be discerned which of 
the functional elements (moments) of a process is responsible for which effects. As Marx 
says, once different aspects of a process are divided i. e. they are performed by different 
groups of people, then as separate processes they develop in an uneven, non- 
synchronised manner producing a potential for conflict between the groups. 39 
Under these circumstances it is possible to make comparisons between them and to 
apportion responsibility for certain effects in a manner which is not possible when the 
functions are combined in the activity of a single group. 
Under the feudal system, for instance, the lord of the manor would combine the 
principal legal, political and economic functions which determine the life of his area in 
his own activities. It is not clear under these circumstances which of these concerns act as 
the motive force in determining the actions of him or his class. 
The rationale for such actions given by the actors themselves can be either deli- 
berately deceptive or genuinely mistaken-40 Explanations which stress legal and political 
motives, for instance, Marx might well have regarded as ideological. 
When these functions devolve upon separate people however, then the activities of 
the separate groups may be compared. Internal disputes between the judiciary, politi- 
cians, and those who are responsible for production and whose viewpoints eventually 
prevail, are instructive as to which motivations govern the actions of which group and 
how this is related to their functions within the whole. 
39 Citations in Chapter I section 1, where he suggests that division of labour leads to conflict. 
40 One is justified in drawing such a conclusion under the circumstances where the explanation 
given by the actor would lead one to expect a certain pattern of behaviour from him or her but at 
some point the person behaves in a manner which is inconsistent with this explanation and possi- 
bly more consistent with an alternative explanation. 
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A good example of how the historical development of the division of labour within 
a social group leads to a change in the consciousness of the participants with respect to 
the causes of social behaviour would be a study of the development of the capitalist class 
from small artisans to factory owners. 
Among the small artisans of the 16th century, the functions of ownership of the 
means of production and personal labour went hand in hand. The small artisan was both 
an owner and a labourer. The consciousness of this class vis-a-vis the aristocracy and the 
catholic church at that time was critical and expressed by the work ethic. This was inter- 
preted in religious terms in the idea that love for one's neighbour involved living by 
one's own labour rather than imposing the burden of tithes or taxes upon others. This cri- 
ticism was clearly levelled by the petit bourgeoisie from the point of view of their iden- 
fity as workers. At this stage they advanced the demand for an egalitarian society. All 
should be equal as "citizens" or "in the sight of God" or whatever, irrespective of social 
position. 
Later, as the functions of ownership and labour separated, wage labour became the 
dominant economic relationship. Ownership and labour and the interests that flowed 
therefrom came to be embodied in different groups of people. Still, while these groups 
had a common enemy in the aristocracy, they remained allies and neither was conscious 
of the differences between them. 
When the bourgeoisie took control, however, then the limits of bourgeois political 
and social ambitions could be seen. The interests Of Property owners was to see a polari- 
sation of wealth in society and the concentration of it in their own hands. The interests of 
the workers lay in the development of a classless society. Not until these functions had 
separated was it possible to see that they were implicitly opposed to each other. 
When the small artisan was both owner and worker it was not possible to see that 
though, as workers, the petit bourgeoisie might advance the idea of a classless society, as 
owners, they could not bring it about. Indeed, competition for the possession of private 
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property leads of itself to inequality and the re-emergence of classes. The obstacle to the 
formation of a classless society can thus be seen to be property ownership itself but this 
only becomes clear after the bourgeoisie, as owners, fail to establish such a society. 
3.1.4. Social conflict 
In the previous section we saw how the separation of functions leads to their 
separate, uneven development and the potential for conflict between them. Actual conflict 
between the groups performing these functions focuses attention upon these differences. 
Thus it was the "June uprising" of the Paris workers in 1848 and its violent suppression 
by common consent of all the bourgeois parties which made the workers aware of their 
separate class interests vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. The willingness of the bourgeoisie to act 
against the working class served to demonstrate its opposed interests. At the same time 
certain figures who had expressed radical views and had received unequivocal support 
from the workers, e. g. Ledru-Rollin, were discredited for backing this action. 
This shows a second role played by conflict in the development of consciousness, 
namely, that it forces hard choices to be made thus exposing the limits of professed radi- 
calism and other opinions. Contradictions, Particularly between what people say or allow 
to be believed and their true motives can remain hidden if they are not challenged. By 
forcing people to act upon their views, to choose between alternative sides in a conflict 
one can see their actual motives. This is not only true of individuals but also, more 
importantly, of classes. 
A ruling class is vulnerable in this respect in the area of the contradiction between 
its one-sided, practical interests and its universal, legitimating ideology. The supposed 
Christian good-will of the Victorian ruling class towards the working class was exposed 
as a sham the more it was forced to mobilise to defend its own interests against those it 
Professed to feel sorry for. Furthermore, in any protracted struggle, the attempts to 
explain actions taken against the exploited classes in terms of a universal morality 
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become more convoluted and difficult to believe. 41 The simpler explanation that they are 
pursuing a one-sided, class interest becomes more and more obvious. 
Conflict will thus teach in a way that is impossible if the pretensions of a ruling 
class remain unchallenged i. e. if they are not forced to act in defence of their particular 
interests. It allows one to determine the real bases of the actions of social groups and thus 
to ascribe causality more correctly. It selects the correct explanation from a set of plausi- 
ble ones in a manner similar to a crucial teSt. 42 
All four of these characteristics, diversity, rapidity of change, division of labour and 
conflict, increase as the forces of production increase. With the advent of the capitalist 
system they increase dramatically, making possible a perception of society in which the 
sources of its problems can be perceived clearly for the first time. 
In Hegel's philosophy, consciousness moves from one-sided abstractions to cons- 
Ciousness of the concrete universal. The means by which this transition is achieved is, 
however, purely logical. It moves solely within the realm of thought. For Marx on the 
other hand this transition is mediated by changes in the material circumstances of life 
which condition thought. The material changes just described play the role which logic 
plays for Hegel, i. e. permitting this theoretical development to take place, (or rather, 
more correctly, the logical process is necessitated by the attempt to come to terms with 
these changes). 
One would expect the forms of consciousness corresponding to capitalist society, 
therefore, to exhibit greater universality and to have as their dominant concerns the 
41 The problem for the ruling class is that it cannot predict the twists and turns of the struggle. 
An explanation given today, therefore, might well conflict with an action which it finds it neces- 
sary undertake tomorrow. The rationalisations thus become more and more transparent and 
strained as the conflict progresses. 
42 explanations of events which only serve to obscure the truth and cause people to fall back 
upon prejudice, e. g. Northern Ireland or the Middle East. 
This might justify the post-modem perspective that reality is always ambiguous, against 
this, however, it might be argued that certain events nevertheless have a decisive effect on the 
consciousness of the majority e. g. "Bloody Sunday" in Northern Ireland. 
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problems outlined in chapter one. In chapter seven I shall show that this is in fact the case 
by analysing the principal "isms" of the 19th and 20th centuries. At this point, however, I 
shall turn to the second question broached earlier, namely, why it is possible for the 
proletariat and only the proletariat to have a totally accurate view of the system as its 
form of consciousness. 
3.2. The "universal" class 
A partial answer to the question cited above has already been given in the section 
entitled "The consciousness of a ruling class". The contradictions within the situation of 
an exploiting class militate against it ever forming an accurate view of its own form of 
rule. The less defensible its position the more its official pronouncements become an 
exercise in apologetics. For instance, when capitalism was a progressive movement its 
spokesmen did not feel the need to obscure its perceived shortcomings. This is why Marx 
has a higher opinion of Smith and Ricardo than the so-called "vulgar" economists who 
followed them. 
But there is a second argument in Marx's work which suggests that a class whose 
rule is based upon exploitation cannot form an adequate understanding of the social sys- 
tem and this is because of the narrowness of its outlook. The questions faced and the 
solutions given by this class are simply related to its own one-sided concerns, they lack 
the necessary scope and universality needed to understand many of the social phenomena 
manifested by the system. 
This view is implied in the quote in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte about 
whether a spokesman is to be regarded as "petit bourgeois", 
"What makes them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in 
their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get 
beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same 
problems and solutions which to which material interest and social position 
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drive the latter practically. 43 
In contrast to this view, Marx suggests that the problematic faced by the exploited class 
, of the modem era, the proletariat, is unique in that the problems which it faces are univer- 
sal in scope. The problems of the class are the problems of "mankind", Le the the funda- 
mental social and historical problems of human society. The proletariat, as a class, he 
suggests, is not intellectually limited in the same way as the bourgeoisie by the narrow- 
ness of its own material concerns, rather is it driven by circumstances to address wider 
issues, but this latter point is the subject of the next section. 
if this is true of the proletariat the question still remains as to why it should be so. 
What makes the proletariat special with respect to the two forms of limitation mentioned 
above? Above all, how can Marx regard it as a class within which there is is no latent 
potential for class division and rule? 
In The Gennan Ideology, Marx gives the following explanation of why under each 
new ruling class social relations become progressively more liberal and humanistic, i. e. 
less restrictive and one-sided: 
"When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the rule of the aristocracy, it thereby 
made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above the 
proletariat, but only in so far as they became bourgeois. Every new class, 
therefore, achieves its domination only on a broader basis than that of the pre- 
vious ruling class. On the other hand, the opposition of all non-ruling classes to 
the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly. These 
two characteristics entail that the struggle to be waged against this new ruling 
class has as its object a more decisive and radical negation of the previous con- 
ditions of society than could have been accomplished by all previous classes 
which aspired to rule.,, 
44 
43 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, op. cit. pg 120. 
44 op. cit. The German ideology pg 66. 
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Each new class establishes its own "freedoms" as general freedoms, freedom for all. The 
succession of classes therefore presents us with a cumulative process whereby the aboli- 
tion of the narrow restrictions which are necessary to the rule of each previous class are 
progressively done away with. The system therefore, tends towards the cumulative elimi- 
ination of relations which serve particular interests and appears to be moving towards a 
]hurnanistic society which serves universal interests. 
The explanation given above is not sufficient by itself, however, to make the case. 
As we have seen, the development of the forces of production leads to an increase in the 
division of labour. The division of labour is potentially a source of new class divisions. 
As fast as the old forms of exploitation are eliminated, it is possible that new ones could 
arise. A humanistic system would never be reached. 
According to Marx's own analysis, the demands advanced by an emerging ruling 
class will be conditioned by their material interests. An analysis of the dynamics of the 
evolution of the material interests of successive ruling classes, therefore, is necessary to 
supplement the explanation given above. 
Such an analysis has already been given in chapter 5. Beyond a certain point, the 
increase in the division of labour, rather than increasing the class divisions in society, 
creates a situation, via increased exchange and the emergence of the market, whereby all 
forms of property are interchangeable. Under these circumstances class rule is no longer 
based upon the ownership of a particular form of property or the control of a particular 
form of labour. Society tends to polarise into "two great classes"; property in general is 
opposed by labour in general. Hence, division of labour within the working class will not, 
tinder these conditions, be a source of new class divisions. 
The consciousness of the proletariat, therefore, is conditioned in a manner different 
from all previous classes, i. e. its interests are not narrowly those of a particular kind of 
labour and it does not have to hide from itself and others its exploitative relations to 
another class. This is one of the reasons why this class is able to understand itself and its 
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own social circumstances without self-deception. 
However, whilst this is true within a capitalist system, it need not remain true when 
the market has been abolished. Division of labour within the new system would remain a 
potential source of leverage from which one group could establish its supremacy over 
others. If this is not to happen, everything depends upon the political content of the 
proletarian movement which builds the new system and determines the form of the solu- 
tion to this problem to be adopted within the new social structure. 45 
3.3. The proletarian problematic 
The problem of emancipation which faces the proletariat differs in character from 
that which has faced all exploited classes previously. This is a point developed in the pre- 
vious chapter but restated here with respect to consciousness. Marx differentiates the 
experience of the proletarian from that of other exploited classes as follows: - 
"The division between the personal and class individual, the accidental nature 
of the conditions of life for the individual, appears only with the emergence of 
a class which is itself a product of the bourgeoisie. This accidental character is 
only engendered and developed by competition and the struggle of individuals 
among themselves. , 
46 
That is to say, since an individual's life circumstances are subject to changes in market 
conditions, the life-circumstances which might be expected by a person occupying a cer- 
tain position in the division of labour appropriate to his or her class are not guaranteed. 
For the proletariat this is something negative, a problem. 
This situation did not hold for exploited classes previously. Marx illustrates this by 
pointing out that the emerging bourgeoisie regarded their condition of existence, movable 
45 We have seen examples of the problem in the history of putative socialist states in the 20th 
century, e. g. the problem of bureaucracy in the Soviet Union and technocracy in China. 
46 op. cit. The German Ideology pg 84 (my italics). 
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property and craft labour 
....... as something positive, which was asserted against feudal landed pro- 
perty ....... 
47 
and that consequently, these emancipated serfs, which the burgesses originally were, 
...... did not rise above the system of estates, but only formed a new estate, 
retaining their previous mode of labour even in the new situation, and develop- 
ing it further by freeing it from its fetters, which no longer corresponded to the 
development already attained. "48 
The proletariat on the other hand cannot emancipate itself simply by gaining control 
of, and generalising, its own labour process; it must abolish it. As stated before, if work- 
ers owned their own production units collectively, Le. the factories, but continued to pro- 
duce for the market as before, the conditions which rendered their situation precarious 
before would still exist. 
The capitalists, although their pursuit of gain can be prosecuted more or less ruth- 
lessly depending upon the individuals involved, are ultimately only the servants of the 
11 god" capital whose will is exercised through market forces. Even the most liberal of 
them will cut wages, increase hours and lay off workers when demand falls. 
To remove the servant but leave the master does not solve the problem. Hence Marx 
continues: 
"Thus while refugee serfs only wished to be free to assert the conditions of 
existence which were already there, and hence, in the end, only arrived at free 
labour, the proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals will 
have to abolish the very condition of their existence hitherto (which has more- 
over been that of all society up to the present), namely labour. "49 
47 Idem. 
48 Idem. 
49 Ibid. pg 85. 
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The subjection which the labourer experiences to alien forces compelling him to work in 
conditions of deprivation and uncertainty is the result of the market which is in turn 
based upon economic relations of self-interest on one hand and the need to cooperate in 
social production on the other (operating in the context of an advanced division of labour 
and high productive potential). 
It is precisely this coincidence of cooperation and conflict under conditions of 
increased productivity which was identified in Chapter I as the source of all the destruc- 
tive and repressive social phenomena enumerated there which have been a feature of all 
societies other than primitive communism. Capitalism is simply their most generalised 
and developed form. 
The proletariat, therefore, has the cause of these fundamental problems as part of its 
own problematic. Moreover, as Marx states elsewhere, they suffer from all of these 
phenomena directly. The proletariat will only address the problem of its own emancipa- 
tion, however, when its conditions are experienced as intolerable and when it can 
envisage what appears to be an achievable solution. 
Before turning to the issue of what kind of social structure might constitute a solu- 
tion to these problems, I will examine the dominant forms of consciousness of the capi- 
talist era in order to show how they reflect the universal characteristics of the process of 
social and historical development. In particular, I will attempt to show how the cons- 




Forms of Consciousness of the Capitalist Era 
1. Individualism 
Individualism is the principal ethic of the capitalist system. It is the value system 
that has as its ideal the individual acting by him/herself and for him/herself In so far as 
society is assumed to be composed of such individuals, the elaboration of this form of 
consciousness in ethical, legal and philosophical systems will address this putative indi- 
vidual. 
Since all individuals are considered to have the same humanity, this viewpoint is 
universal with respect to the range of people to whom it applies. Consequently, it 
ascribes all rights, duties, entitlements etc. to individuals irrespective of a person's 
membership of other social groups. Man in general has become the principal object of 
concern; in this sense, it also appears to be a form of humanism. 
This tends to confirm the view expressed in chapter six, that as modes of production 
develop in productive power and sophistication, consciousness moves towards a tran- 
scendence of particularistic views and addresses itself to universal issues, a stage 
achieved with the emergence of capitalism. 
It is not obvious at first sight, however, that this form of consciousness is in any way 
modern or peculiar to the capitalist system. Those who forced King John to sign the 
Magna Carta, ostensibly did so as champions of the rights of the people in general and as 
Marx himself says, every class that aspires to rule claims to represent "the people" rather 
than its own particular interests. Even earlier, the Ancient Greeks of the classical period, 
600 to 400 b. c., referred to the members of the polis equally as "citizens" and in the latter 
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part of this period the Athenians evolved a democratic system based on the principle of 
one-man one-vote. Finally, some religions, and in particular Christianity, appear to have 
preached equality among their followers irrespective of race or class although most of 
them differentiate according to gender. 
To understand why individualism is indeed a modern phenomenon peculiar to capi- 
talism and thus to fully comprehend its nature, it is necessary and instructive to distin- 
guish it from the cases listed above. 
1.1. Rights of "the people" 
The major difference between the rights conferred by the Magna Carta and those 
prescribed by individualism, is that the rights granted by the Magna Carta did not exclude 
nor were they opposed to the feudal obligations which prevailed in the society at that 
time. Whatever freedoms "the people" in general might have these do not conflict with 
the rights and obligations which were deemed to hold between hereditary groups. 
Individualism, on the other hand, only regards as legitimate, obligations freely con- 
tracted between consenting individuals. Rights attach to the individual alone and larger 
groups have no prior claim upon him or her. Even the claim of society over its members 
has to be justified in the "Social Contract" theory as a relation which is deemed to have 
been implicitly agreed to by the individual. It has to be represented this way in order to 
remain consistent with the individualist ethic. I 
Individualism is, therefore, profoundly hostile to all obligations which are imposed2 
upon the individual by virtue of his or her membership of a social group (i. e. obligations 
reflecting inter-group relations). Modem individualism is a more radical doctrine, there- 
fore, than any particular defence of the rights of "the people". It would have been 
I second Treatise on Government, John Locke, section 119. 
2 An individual might be deemed to have accepted the obligations contracted by a group if he 
or she chose to join it in full knowledge of these obligations. 
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incompatible with the social structure of any society prior to capitalism. 
1.2. Greek "citizens" 
The difference between the ideas informing Athenian democracy and modem indi- 
vidualism consists in the fact that the majority of the people in the city state were not 
classed as "citizens". Most of the inhabitants of the Athenian state were slaves, 3 hence 
the rights of the citizen were not intended to apply to them. This relationship to a large 
body of slaves was the typical situation of the city states of antiquity. It is not the case, 
therefore, that these states had a dominant ideology that was man-centered in character. 
Their views merely expressed the relationships which were thought appropriate among 
the members of the ruling class. Individualism, on the other hand, in principle extends 
rights to all persons, though in practice, states who ostensibly subscribe to this view have 
practiced discrimination on the basis of race, creed, nationality, gender etc. It is a tes- 
timony to the universality of the doctrine, however, that it has, at the same time, provided 
the theoretical basis of a criticism of these practices within such cultures. 
1.3. Christian "brotherhood" 
Finally, perhaps the most revealing comparison is with Christian theology. It is part 
of Christian doctrine that "all men are equal in the sight of God" irrespective of race or 
Class etc. 4 Even non-Christians are to be treated as "brothers" and "neighbours" with the 
injunction to "love them as oneself' and thus to regard them as having rights equal to 
one's own. This doctrine was preached 1500 years before the emergence of capitalism. 
The examination of its historical origins and subsequent development, however, allows 
us to make a further distinction between it and the modem individualist ethic. 
3 op. cit. origin of the Family Private Property and the State, pg 536. 
4 There is some contradiction between this and the exclusion of women from positions of au- 
thority in the church and with some of the statements of saint Paul about female obedience to the 
rnale members of the family. 
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The ostensive originator of these views, Jesus of Nazareth, is portrayed in the gos- 
pels as the son of a carpenter and a Jew, a member, therefore, of the lower classes of an 
oppressed nation. His teaching, that the possession of wealth, status and power is at best 
irrelevant and at worst an obstacle to salvation, coincides with the perspectives one might 
expect in any underclass. It is a fairly typical attitude amongst the dispossessed to place 
value upon personal qualities among individuals rather than differences in wealth, status 
and power, of which they have very little, and to regard the latter as false criteria by 
which people should be judged. This is a viewpoint eloquently expressed in Burns' 
poem: 
"The rank is but the guinea stamp, 
the man's the guid for a' that. " 5 
This view of wealth and power runs through most of Jesus's pronouncements and is 
antipathetic to the consciousness of more privileged classes who regard respect for their 
social position as all-important. He also attacked alienated social relations and practices, 
e. g. the observances of the religious hierarchy and the privileged position accorded to the 
Jews. These things are, of course, symbolic reflections of the power and status differen- 
tials within society and are correspondingly experienced as empty forms from the 
humanistic value perspective of an underclass. 
To this "class consciousness" of Jesus was added the cosmopolitan consciousness of 
Paul. Jesus's emphasis upon the content of action irrespective of who performs it and his 
lack of observance of social mores was the principal source of the enmity directed against 
him. His main attacks, however, were aimed explicitly at the leaders of his own people 
who were already compromised by their relationship to Roman imperialism. His views 
remained unforgivable, therefore, only in the backwater of Judea. 
"A man's a man for a' that" - Robert Burns 
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In order to spread Christianity beyond Judea, where it was proscribed, Paul was 
forced to attack the parochialism of its Jewish leadership and to further eliminate cultural 
and national distinctions from its practices. It was these historical pressures, therefore, 
which conditioned the universality of its outlook. 
The above discussion does not offer an answer to the question of what makes 
modern individualism unique, rather it further specifies the problem. It appears that an 
oppressed class can evolve a form of consciousness centered upon the individual at any 
point in history. 
It does, however, reveal a surprising and significant feature of modem individual- 
ism, namely, that what appears to be the perspective of an underclass has become the 
dominant ideology. This situation is indeed unique. It is this which distinguishes it from 
its historical predecessors. This proposition, however, requires further qualification 
because Christianity also became the official religion of the Roman Empire and of the 
Germanic states which succeeded it in the West, i. e. it also became a dominant ideology. 
There is not enough space here to go into the details of how Christianity became the 
official religion of the Roman Empire. As the official state religion, however, it became 
hierarchical, authoritarian and ritualistic. Its beliefs were standardised at the council of 
Nicea and a single orthodoxy was taught everywhere. There was thus a tension between 
elements of its teaching and its new form. For example, Jesus had said "call no man 
father, you are all brothers" but the head of the church was called "Pope". 
Under these new conditions, the egalitarian elements of the doctrine were 
suppressed, at least in so far as they had radical implications for the organisation of 
church or state. Christianity became the official ideology, therefore, only in so far as it 
did not emphasise the egalitarian side of its doctrine. This was also the position adopted 
by the Christian church when Christianity regained its influence after the collapse of the 
Roman Empire in Western Europe. 6 
6 That this was the case is evidenced by the treatment of those who challenged the church on 
the basis of egalitarian views. For example, John Huss was declared a heretic for saying that the 
Priesthood were not privileged in their knowledge of God but all believers were equally fallible, a 
239 
The egalitarian aspects of the doctrine did not find a significant political expression 
until the reformation and at this time it found support principally among the urban classes 
whose wealth had been accumulated independently of the feudal order and who were 
resentful of feudal taxation. 
Thus it was in the modem era when Luther spelled out the radical implications of 
the parable of "The Good Samaritan". This story was used to illustrate one of the two 
basic rules of Christian life and is, therefore, central to the faith. Anyone who would 
enter the kingdom of heaven is exhorted to ignore personal danger and social difference, 
just as the Samaritan did and help anyone who needs such help. This is a similar principle 
to "from each according to his abilities to each according to his needs". 
The implication of this injunction, however, is that anyone who fails to act in a 
neighbourly way in this sense is acting immorally. Living by the imposition of a levy 
upon the labour of others cannot be considered a neighbourly act and Luther drew the 
logical conclusion of the immorality of this, thus launching what was potentially a funda- 
mental critique of the whole feudal order. 
Although he aimed his main criticisms at the Roman Catholic church, others, e. g. 
the levellers and the diggers, drew the more general conclusion. 7 In the period of chaos 
that attended the disintegration of the feudal order under the impact of trade and the shift 
of the economic and political centre of gravity towards the towns and towards trade and 
industry, many types of people found Protestantism attractive for a variety of reasons. It 
was the consciousness of the urban bourgeoisie, however, which was eventually to 
position later adopted by Luther. This view, of course, undermined the basis of the Church's au- 
thority and hence its power. The original position taken by the Franciscans: that Jesus had urged 
his followers to dissociate themselves from wealth and power so the church should renounce its 
wealth and power also, was likewise treated as a heresy. 
7 Jesus may have said, in response to a question about taxes, "Render unto Caesar that which is 
Caesar's", implying that Christians should not worry about worldly gains or losses. The militant 
Puritans, however, were attempting to establish "the kingdom of heaven on earth" and "money 
changers in the temple" were not to be tolerated. 
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determine the ideology of the new order. 
1.4. Individualism respecified 
Thus it was only in the modern capitalist era that the individualist aspects of Chris- 
tianity became part of the dominant ideology. Modern individualism, therefore, is radical, 
in the sense of attributing rights and obligations to individuals whilst denying the claims 
of any group over an individual unless the individual has agreed to be so bound; it is 
universal in scope; and in modem society and only in modem society, it has become the 
established point of view. 
This latter point still poses a problem. One would suppose that only a classless 
society could accept the equality of all individuals and the individual as the focus of 
social identity, as its dominant viewpoint. 
1.4.1. The consciousness of the bourgeoisie 
In previous periods the political possibilities of egalitarianism could lead to no more 
than the setting up of small, ideal communities outside the mainstream of society. The 
bourgeoisie, on the other hand, could envisage a society made in its own image and the 
self-image of the bourgeoisie was conditioned by its relation to the market. 
The bourgeoisie were originally freed serfs. The freedom of their new urban 
existence was primarily the freedom to select an occupation i. e. the possibility of becom- 
ing socially mobile. Mobility of labour is a prerequisite of a constantly changing system 
such as capitalism and although this mobility was limited in the first instance, the urban 
environment stood in marked contrast to the fixed labour system of Feudalism. 
Under these changed circumstances, occupation did not inevitably determine one's 
identity. In theory, anyone can engage in any occupation and the same options are open 
to all. The bourgeoisie, therefore, were able to conceive of themselves as free individuals 
with equal opportunities-8 
8 In capitalism, any controls which an occupational group may seek to exert over its members 
cannot be allowed to override the individual's right to opt out on pain of restricting the develop- 
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Secondly, the bourgeoisie lived by trade. Social remuneration and therefore, access 
to wealth and power, depended upon the fluctuations of the market. In the long run, the 
rate of profit between different types of production tends to equalise. Any advantage 
enjoyed by a particular type of production is, therefore, transitory. To accumulate wealth 
consistently, one would need to constantly change the type of product in which one's 
money was invested in line with changing patterns of demand. It follows, that as owners 
of products, no individual enjoys any advantage over any other and that the type of pro- 
duction itself, confers no special privilege. 
Again, the universality of forms in which wealth can be acquired and the inter- 
changeability of one form for another leaves each individual owner in potentially the 
same position as any other. It is the ingenuity of the individual which determines whether 
he becomes wealthy or not, not the particular form of his property. 
Mobility of capital, like mobility of labour, is a prerequisite of the capitalist system. 
Equality of opportunity between owners, therefore, is also conditioned by the basic form 
of the mode of production. The bourgeois thus understands equality between individuals 
in terms of equality of opportunity. Since each faces the totality of options each is in the 
same position as any other. This applies for both sides of the bourgeois self-image, i. e. as 
worker and as owner. Individualism, therefore, is the complementary aspect of the 
universalising tendency of capitalism. 9 
To the early theorists of capitalist society, social structure appears unnecessary. 10 
Impersonal market forces rather than human interventions control social relations. This 
ment of the system. By changing occupation, an individual can negate all other claims which the 
group might have upon him. All rights, must ultimately rest with the individual in order to guaran- 
tee mobility of labour between competing groups. The universality of the possibilities of occupa- 
tion, therefore, conditions both the sense of equality and the understanding of the need for equality 
of opportunity between individuals. 
9 The total system of possibilities, i. e. the whole division of labour, is expressed in the oppor- 
tunities available to each individual (in principle) - vis. Hegel. 
10 e. g. Principles of Sociology, Herbert Spencer, Williams and Northgate 1883-5, pg 808. 
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alien form of control appears at first as a liberation from humanly imposed (and arbitrary 
and unjust) social differences. To bourgeois consciousness, it seems to be yet another 
dimension of equality and freedom. External control can be reduced to a minimum. Each 
individual may do anything that he or she chooses providing that it doesn't interfere with 
the right of any other individual to do the same. II This is the libertarian side of the doc- 
trine. 
Social relations of this kind mark a watershed in human history. The problem of the 
relationship of the individual to society is consciously addressed in an overt form, 
unmediated by a particularistic, fetishist, ontology. The contradictions in the bourgeois 
solution, however, are equally clear. 
1.4.1.1. Liberty, equality and fraternity 
In capitalism's revolutionary period, this individualistic viewpoint was understood 
in a humanistic way by some. Liberty and equality would lead to fraternity - positive and 
mutually supportive relations between individuals. Unlike Christianity, however, which 
enjoins positive obligations towards others upon its adherents, the individualist ethic only 
prescribes the negative obligation of non-interference. This is because relations between 
individuals in a market system are adversarial, being based upon competition. 
Competition, however, tends towards the polarisation of wealth and power in 
society, those with an advantage use it to gain greater advantage and those with little 
advantage lose even what they have, thus equality and fraternity disappear and exploita- 
tion becomes the normal practice. Competition, polarisation and exploitation destroy fra- 
ternity, equality and liberty respectively. If modem individualism is similar to humanism 
in that it focuses upon the individual as a human being, the relations which it envisages 
II This formulation is somewhat unclear. In practice it means where there is a conflict of in- 
terest the status quo wins. 
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between these human beings is negative rather than positive. It is a kind of negative 
humanism prescribing universal rivalry. 
Equality of opportunity which is based in the fluidity of the system is negated by 
competition and the polarisation of relative advantage. Both fluidity and competition are 
the result of the acquisitive dynamic which is the system's driving force. Polarisation 
reduces the majority of people to propertyless labourers who have little chance of social 
mobility. Universality of options, therefore, exist only for the more successful members 
of the society and consequently, equality of opportunity remains convincing only to them 
as a description of the way that the system functions. 
With respect to liberty, the right to pursue one's own aspirations as long as this 
doesn't impinge upon the right of others to do the same is an impossible demand in a 
society based upon acquisitiveness and competition. Each, by acquiring as much of the 
social wealth as he or she can is diminishing the ability of others to do the same, reducing 
their life-chances. 
As for the ideal of non-intervention by authority, as Durkheim pointed out, market 
agreements are based upon a pre-contractual understanding not to break the contract. 12 
As soon as there are perpetual winners and perpetual losers, the temptation to reverse the 
losses by non-market means is so powerful that the bourgeois authorities have to inter- 
vene everywhere to prevent this occurring. Activities that are thus criminalised are many 
and various. 
Since competition penetrates to the most minute levels and activities take the most 
diverse forms, the state is obliged to exercise corrective control on almost everything. 
The labouring classes in particular are subject to discipline at every turn, particularly at 
work. In the struggle between different capitals, sacrifices are made principally by this 
12 The Division of Labour in Society, Emile Durkheim, Free Press, Collier MacMillan Publish- 
ers Ltd. 1964, pp 215,216. 
244 
class, whereas their rewards are slight. The tendency for the worker not to cooperate with 
such a system, therefore, has to be countered by authoritarian forms of labour organisa- 
tion. In such a system, capital alone is free. Even the capitalist is constrained by the 
imperatives of the market. Individual freedom in a competitive system leads to its oppo- 
site, collective authority, 13 being imposed. 
At the level of the world market there is uncoordinated movement and sporadic 
violence as states settle economic differences by the use of force, while within the institu- 
tional structures involved in this competition there is tight authoritarian control precisely 
to prevent such anarchy breaking out and preventing them from competing effectively. 
Two undesirable options condition each other. It is the worst of both worlds. 
1.4.1.2. Liberalism and Conservatism 
The reflection of this contradiction14 in the consciousness of the bourgeoisie takes 
the form of, on one hand, an affirmation Of the commitment to individual freedom whilst 
on the other, lamenting, but nevertheless affirming, the need for a strong central author- 
ity. The commitment to the latter ought to be seen as an admission of the failure of the 
aspiration towards the former. To affirm both is surely to attempt to have one's cake and 
eat it. The political representatives of the bourgeoisie nevertheless tend to affirm both 
positions, oscillating between them according to the context of the argument. The politi- 
cal parties of the ruling class, although each in their own way guilty of this "double- 
think", differ from each other by the relative emphasis placed by each upon freedom and 
13 Where opposed but equally essential activities are a feature of some real situation, if institu- 
tionalised practices are founded upon just one of them, then the other will be encountered as an 
external disruptive factor. Furthermore, if the principle governing one activity entails the principle 
which governs the other, then in practice one activity will engender the other activity. This is why, 
at the material level, one-sided practices "veer round" into their opposites. A stable institutional 
framework therefore, must include in the form of a synthesis the opposed pair, e. g. liberty and au- 
thority (individual and collective interest), equality and difference, fraternity and rivalry. This ar- 
guably is what capitalist institutions do not do. See also section 2.3.3 
14 Since anarchic competition and authoritarianism stem from the same source, the acquisitive 
motive which governs economic activity. 
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authority: conservatives placing more upon the latter, liberals placing more upon the 
former. 
The contradiction within the position of conservative parties is evidenced by the fact 
that on one hand they represent themselves as the party that recognises the need to 
strengthen the power and scope of authority, the party of "law and order", but also on the 
other, as the party which abhors state intervention in the affairs of individuals. Liberal 
parties on the other hand, represent themselves as the party which defends individual 
freedom but which, in order to do so is forced to enact protective legislation. The posi- 
tions taken by these parties can only be interpreted consistently as the one-sided defence 
of the interests of the classes they represent. 
The liberals, as representatives of the petit-bourgeoisie, 15 use authority to restrict 
the polarising tendencies of the system which negate their constituents freedom. The con- 
servatives, as representatives of those who possess the most wealth and power, 16 use 
authority to defend the natural tendency of the system to polarise in order to preserve the 
freedom of their constituents to accumulate wealth. Both, however, are committed to the 
defence of the same contradictory system in the last analysis. 
The theoretical defenders of capitalism argue that the interests of the individual and 
the society are inevitably opposed and therefore, that there has to be a compromise 
between liberty and authority. 17 They argue that the compromise represented by capital- 
ism is the best of all possible alternatives. 
The Hegelian response to a situation where two necessary aspects of something 
oppose and limit each other, however, would be to search for the synthesis which can 
give free play to each. For Hegel this means a new idea in which opposed principles can 
15 This is the original social base of liberalism but a broader definition of it as a political move- 
ment is given in a later section. 
16 In developed capitalism this is the large capitalists, 
17 On Liberty, J. S. Mill, John W. Parker and Son, London 1859, pg 134. 
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be seen to coincide and upon which a new form of social organisation can be based. For 
Marx it means a new system of social relations which allows the opposed principles 
based upon opposed interests to be able to coincide in practice. A solution along these 
lines to the opposition between liberty and authority, the collective and the individual 
interest, would address the fundamental problem stated at the beginning and thus consti- 
tute a solution to the so called "Riddle of History". As stated before, however, the key to 
the solution to this problem is to be found in the social relations already developed 
among the proletarians. 
2. The consciousness of the working class 
Although the preceding section is labelled "The consciousness of the bourgeoisie", 
it is, in fact, more specifically an account of the ideas which inform its consciousness in 
the period of its supremacy, i. e. the ideas which fully and adequately articulate its 
interests as a class. During its rise to power, by contrast, the views expressed by its 
spokesmen and accepted by its institutions contained an admixture of free-market ideals 
and those originating in the period of feudal domination. These latter ideas still retained 
some relevance in a society not totally transformed to one dominated by capitalism. An 
ideological battle was carried on within the class itself between the more radical "free- 
market" thinkers and conservatives who were influenced by the rationale of a system 
based upon patronage and landownership. 
Similarly, in the period prior to the supremacy of the proletariat, both the ideals of 
capitalism and those of socialism will have some influence within the class as the ideo- 
logical struggle is fought out. In this section, however, I shall only give an account of 
those views which, originating from the experiences of the class, appear to provide a 
credible solution to its problems and an alternative to capitalist society in which it is 
exploited and its interests subordinated. The justification for this approach is that only 
views which both address and provide solutions to the problems arising from the 
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subordination of the class can be deemed to express its class interest. 
Secondly, in so far as these views do appear to provide solutions to both the prob- 
lems of the class and those of all modes of production subsequent to primitive commun- 
ism, they alone can be regarded as anticipations of a future mode of production, since 
they alone can offer an acceptable alternative. 
2.1. Consciousness of the problematic 
The consciousness of the working class is conditioned by both negative and positive 
features of its collective experience. The negative features of its experience are the 
shortcomings of capitalism from which it, as an underclass, suffers most and of which, 
therefore, it has greater consciousness than other classes. These negative features plus the 
awareness of the mechanisms governing the social order define the problematic of its pol- 
itics. The positive features, on the other hand, are the strategies adopted to cope with 
these problems and which forshadow new kinds of social organisation and new and more 
satisfactory kinds of social relationship. In the remainder of this section I will briefly 
recapitulate the problematic. 
First of all, the mobility of capital and the substituteablity of labour demonstrate, 
respectively, that capitalists and labourers, each form a single interest group. Furthermore, 
general changes in economic conditions affect the vast majority of workers in a similar 
way and the vast majority of capitalists in a similar way, though with differences in 
degree, reinforcing the point made above. 
The rapidly changing economic conditions reveal to the workers that the behaviour 
of the capitalists towards the workforce is itself dictated, within a limited variation, by 
impersonal market forces and therefore, the question of competition for the possession of 
property and the profit motive has to be addressed and not just that of class rule. 
When capitalism is in crisis they are its first victims. They suffer the most from 
poverty, intra-communal violence, casualties in warfare, etc. When capitalism is 
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prospering, they are overworked and others take the "lions share" of the benefits. 
It is obvious to them that equality of opportunity is not available to them because of 
the polarisation of advantages in society. Personal liberty is more of a phrase than a real- 
ity as far as they are concerned because it is restricted both by poverty and by authori- 
tarian structures within and outside of work organised primarily to control their possible 
reactions to being exploited. Finally, they are aware that competition undermines frater- 
nal relations and leads to a level of malicious and petty behaviour which, for those whose 
individual isolation is not compensated for by wealth, endangers their already weak posi- 
tion and ruins their quality of life. 
One important negative feature of their environment which has not been dealt with 
so far, however, is the way that the capitalist system, which is ostensibly founded upon 
individualism, represents a radical negation of individuality for the proletarian. It is the 
attempt to reclaim this individuality which is one of the mainsprings of the socialist 
movement and the reason why Marx regards it as "humanistic". 
2.1.1. The negation of individuality and the humanist response 
For individualism to be possible, each person must be in a position to develop his or 
her particular potentialities (ideally to the full), so that each can make their contribution 
to society in their own individual way. The conditions inflicted upon the proletarians, 
however, force them to renounce control over their own actions, which amounts to a 
renunciation of their individuality in principle both at work and in order to find work. 
Furthermore, the work they are forced to perform is stultifying in its nature and 
squanders their human potential, thus making it impossible to fulfill the condition for 
individualism stated above. This renunciation is thus both a denial of individuality in 
their current circumstances and of the possibility of developing their individual potential 
in the future. it amounts to a suppression of their human nature. 
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Despite the increase in material wealth and the freedom of the labourer to withdraw 
his or her labour from a particular employer, in the respects just cited, the condition of 
the worker is very much inferior even to that of workers in previous modes of production. 
In the condition of slavery, for instance, the worker is forced to sacrifice his or her 
time and effort to obey the will of another. The proletarian on the other hand has to com- 
pete with others in order to attain this condition. 18 The slave who is sold on the slave- 
market as property is oppressed by external circumstances. The proletarian is required to 
perform this act his or herself, to "sell himself' to an employer, and is thus responsible 
for his or her own condition of exploitation. 
The demand of servility and submission to the will of another is, therefore, more 
radical and more subtle than in any previous mode of production. It exacts a psychologi- 
cal requirement from the worker not just his or her physical compliance. Those who 
appear half-hearted and unwilling to alienate themselves in this way will fail in the com- 
petition for work. Unable to find work, they will be marginalised and punished in a sys- 
tem based upon wage-labour. Thus psychological pressure is placed upon the worker to 
become submissive in his very identity. Only thus does a worker become acceptable. 
A basic requirement of capitalist employers is that the worker should show him or 
herself ready to "conform", i. e. to relinquish his or her will to another. In the modem era, 
certain privileged workers who do this become "Organisation men", their identities malle- 
able to the needs of the firm. The rewards of these workers are luxuries such as better 
than average housing, foreign holidays, modem conveniences of one kind or another. 
These rewards are nevertheless on the scale of human satisfaction no more than "animal" 
comforts, i. e. they induce pleasant feelings. They do not allow the worker to discover his 
18 The degree of control exercised by the owner of labour over the labourer varies both under 
the institution of slavery and of wage-labour. For instance, the Grand Vizir was the second richest 
and most powerful man in the Ottoman Empire although legally he was the slave of the Sultan. In 
contrast the early factory owners claimed the right to regulate the behaviour of workers in all 
respects, both in work and out, and could exercise this right because of the threat of dismissal. 
250 
individuality, nor do they develop the potentialities of the worker as a significant social 
actor. Since most of the worker's time is given to the firm, his work activities constitute 
his identity. He has neither the time nor energy to discover within himself anything else. 
The result of this is necessarily "Philistinism". 19 
"Conformism" for the majority of workers, however, means to accept without pro- 
test or even without acknowledging the justification of protest, the use of their time and 
effort in mind-crushingly meaningless tasks, Le a basic waste of life. Marx refers to cer- 
tain forms of human activity as productive of "idiocy". He talks about the "idiocy of rural 
life, 120 and of "craft idiocy" when discussing the one-sided development of the craftsman 
of the guild system. But the capitalist practice of splitting work into minute repetitive 
tasks to be performed for extended periods of time, often at the speed of a machine is 
surely more conducive to idiocy than any of them. 
Furthermore, the control of the worker's activities is more intensive. Competition 
between capitalists ensures that the firm lays claim to every second of the workers time. 
It was the use of supervision and the threat of dismissal rather than technology which ini- 
tially raised the productivity of labour in the factory system. Capitalism is, therefore, by 
its very nature tyrannical as well as destructive of individuality. The repression of indivi- 
duality here is extreme, a person whose capacities are formed by these trivial, servile and 
all-pervasive activities alone would arguably be sub-human. A subterranean defence of 
their humanity is thus forced upon the workers. 21 
18 Such activities as can be engaged in are recreational and relegated to leisure time, i. e. they 
give the actor pleasant feelings. 
19 Capitalism produces Philistinism as a general phenomenon. The capitalists themselves, 
although they have relative freedom of choice, develop (and often value) only the aggressive and 
acquisitive side of their potentialities, since they are not directly involved in creative activity. 
20 op. cit. Communist Manifesto, pg 84. 
21 Against this, one has to add that the rapidly changing conditions of capitalism and the per- 
petual insecurity of the worker in a complex system, sharpens the workers wits. In addition to 
which, the capitalists provide the workers with the basic education necessary to perform their roles 
within the society. Nevertheless, this doesn't invalidate the assertion that most of their adult life is 
spent in the stultifying manner described. 
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Another factor which suppresses individuality and thus dehumanises the worker, is 
the evaluation of all forms of productive activity in terms of the commercial motive, 
reducing the significance of the workers contribution simply to that of a money-making 
activity. The specific nature and particular qualities which the worker brings to his work, 
i. e. the manner in which the individuality of the labour is expressed, are regarded as 
irrelevant and unworthy of respect. As a consequence, the worker himself is merely 
regarded as exploitable labour irrespective of what he does. 
Individual responsibility is also rendered problematic by this situation. A worker 
who acknowledges responsibility for the result of his own labour, is opposing the right of 
the capitalist to dispose of it as he wishes. 22 By seeking to retain some proprietary con- 
trol he will marginalise himself in a market system. If such attitudes were prevalent they 
would be at odds with a system operating on a purely commercial basis. 
Finally, This stultification of human development is represented as something which 
the worker is morally obliged to accept by virtue of "the work ethic". A parallel rationale 
would suggest that the slave is morally obliged to accept his slavery because if he ran 
away he would have to beg or steal to survive. It is surely a questionable assertion that 
one can be morally obliged to accept a situation which is itself immoral. One could 
equally argue that the worker is morally obliged to refuse to accept such conditions in 
order to defend basic human freedom both for himself and for the sake of others. 
The work ethic, applied to exploitative relations, as can be seen engenders a con- 
tradiction of which the capitalists emphasise only one side. The solution to this problem 
would be to transform the social context in which the ethic is applied to one in which 
human freedom and self-development are given primacy in social activity. 
22 e. g. scientists who wish to restrict the use of their inventions on moral grounds or the Lucas 
Aerospace Combine who proposed an alternative range of socially useful products to the weapon 
systems produced by their company. 
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These circumstances condition the aspirations of the workers and inform their poli- 
tics. The squandering of potential and the waste of life in subjection to a system whose 
narrow goal is the accumulation of wealth in the abstract, i. e. money, is something which 
they are forced to struggle against. Their own ideals, therefore, are humanistic, in the 
sense that they value the development of human capacities and abilities as a means to 
their own personal fulfillment. 23 The complete realisation of these goals, however, would 
require that each individual should have freedom of choice over his or her own activi- 
tieS24 and unrestricted access to the resources of the society. This is the positive human- 
ism which capitalism appeared to promise but could not fulfill. These aspirations are 
taken up by the proletariat who have no stake in protecting the existing system and whose 
own intra-communal relations prefigure an alternative which would make this situation a 
real possibility. 
That these ideals should form the content of proletarian demands is important 
because the formal means, collectivism, which makes possible their achievement, 
nevertheless, does not by itself guarantee the pursuit of humanist ends. It is also the case, 
however, that cooperative activity, reinforces these humanist susceptibilities and attitudes 
as will be seen below. 
The significance of this latter point is that such attitudes are not, therefore, merely 
grounded in the reaction to the alienating conditions of capitalism, (and thus liable to 
disappear when those conditions disappear), but also in the relations and practices which 
form the basis of the new system itself. 
23 This has been expressed in such events as "The Great Kinder Trespass" whose object was to 
open up the countryside for the benefitof city dwellers where it had been closed by landowners 
and the political demand for the provision of education as a good in itself rather than as an instru- 
ment for the development of the economy or some other narrow goal. 
24 Only the individual can judge whether his or her life is satisfactory, guidance may be given, 
but the final decision must be their own. 
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2.2. Defensive strategies and alternative social relations 
Marx claims that . 
"Capitalism developed within the interstices of the Feudal Sys- 
tem", that is to say it grew in the "spaces" where feudal relations did not, and indeed 
could not operate. These spaces were created by virtue of the fact that unlike peasant 
agriculture, craft production always exceeded the amount that could be consumed by the 
lord and the craftsman himself. 
25 The craftsman, therefore, had a semi-independent 
income from the market which could be taxed but not easily controlled. It was this 
anomalous relationship which made possible the growth of the market towns and eventu- 
ally their power. 
By contrast, capitalism does not have any "spaces". There is no forseeable form of 
production which could not, in principle, be adapted to the end of the marketing of sale- 
able commodities. 26 The proletarians, therefore, in order to emancipate themselves, have 
to create spaces within capitalism where capitalist relations cannot operate. In doing so 
they create an alternative social system in the microcosm. 
This is not to suggest that these new relations of production arise in a manner which 
is unconnected to the growth in the forces of production. The proletariat and its condi- 
tions are themselves a product of the forces of production which have created the market 
system. Also, It is Marx's contention that, whereas with Feudalism the new forces were 
incompatible with the relations of production only in the particular area of the economy 
where they developed, in the organically connected, universal system of production of 
capitalism they become generally incompatible. Proletarian independence is won, 
25 An early example within the Manorial System itself was the miller, who ground corn for the 
whole village not only for the lord. Millers were traditionally self-assertive which was a result of 
their monopoly position and their independent income. 
26 There are isolated products such as road repair and maintenance, whereby collection of reve- 
nue is most easily done in the form of taxation. Other utilities such as railways cannot be run on 
the basis of competition because the profit margin is too low. Public monopolies in the main, how- 
ever, can also be run as private monopolies, so increasing scale does not necessarily favour public 
ownership. 
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therefore, in and through these general crises. 27 28 
2.2.1. Collective bargaining 
One strategy for partially negating capitalist relations of production is the creation 
of trade unions and the practice of collective bargaining. This removes the competition 
between individual workers (i. e. the market relation) which would weaken their bargain- 
ing position with an employer and create mistrust between them. 
The power relation between an individual worker and an employer in a bargaining 
situation always favours the employer because if the contract is terminated, the employer 
only loses the services of a single worker, whereas the worker loses his livelihood. 29 Col_ 
lective bargaining, on the other hand, threatens the employer with a temporary loss of his 
source of income and thus goes some way towards correcting the balance of power. 
The logic of the situation, as far as the workers are concerned, is that if each only 
looks after his own interests, then collectively they will be weak. Each individual will 
lose. This is an example of the paradox of competitive individualism. Whereas, if each 
defends the interests of the others, this seemingly altruistic behaviour will make them 
collectively strong. Each individual will benefit. This is the counter-paradox of collectiv- 
ism. By this method, they can resist the de-humanising effects of capitalist social rela- 
tions. 30 
27 Their claim to authority as a class stems from the fact that they produce the material wealth 
of society and that the crises which cause unemployment, racism, wars, etc. are a result of their be- 
ing too good at what they do in the context of capitalist relations of production. The perceived in- 
justice of the fact that they have to pay for this situation provides the incentive for them to take 
control and to transform society closer to their own ideals. It was just such a sense of injustice 
which spurred the bourgeoisie to challenge feudal relations. 
28 The proletarians may be driven back in a crisis, just as in the early days, the bourgeoisie 
would lose to feudal classes in confrontations that had been provoked by the restructuring of the 
economic system. This restructuring, however, in both cases favours the emerging class, until a 
point is reached where they cannot be driven back. 
29 The only exception to this situation is that of the skilled worker at times when his labour is 
Scarce. 
30 Bargaining takes place on a range of issues, not simply the question of the workers share of 
the product of his labour. There is the question of how precisely the nature of the work is to be 
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Collective bargaining represents only a partial negation of market forces, however. 
Collective bargaining also makes use of market forces. The competition between workers 
is negated but competition between the workers and the capitalist continues as usual. The 
limits of this strategy can be seen in the fact that its strength depends upon general 
market conditions. 
The significance of trade union activity for the workers' consciousness, however, 
consists in the fact that it extends cooperative activity beyond production in the work- 
place. What is more it does so with a significant modification. Cooperation in the work- 
place is imposed by the firm and organised by management, it takes an alien form. 
specified. The employer will want to be as flexible as possible on this in order to be able to alter 
working practices in response to economic changes. The worker, on the other hand, will not want 
to see the intensity of work arbitrarily altered, or the requirement to work extra or unsocial hours 
imposed, without a renegotiation of terms. The attempt by workers to make the work situation 
predictable and subject to negotiation is regarded by employers as a "restrictive practice" since it 
interferes with their right to dispose of the labour power they have bought in any way they wish, 
i. e. their rights over labour as a commodity. Another issue is what kind of activities are the con- 
cern of the employer and relevant to the wage contract. Should the worker's beliefs or his activi- 
ties outside of the workplace or his moral behaviour or even his appearance be subject to the 
employer's control? Employers have and still do attempt to intervene in these areas of a workers 
life, the workers, on the other hand, will try to create a sphere of individual freedom for them- 
selves and limit the employers power. There is the question of safe working conditions, which in- 
variably costs the employer money. The question of whether management have the right to subject 
workers to verbal abuse and degrading treatment to which the worker cannot respond in kind 
without the possibility of dismissal. Employers associate this "macho" attitude of management 
with the enforcement of discipline and their own power. The question of the amount of informality 
and "fraternisation" which is allowed to take place in working hours. Work without sociability is 
abnormal and imposes psychological strain upon the workers but employers believe that it also ab- 
sorbs time and reduces output. The question of the length of the working day and whether workers 
should be obliged to perform work which is physically and mentally debilitating, (this also in- 
cludes the issue of breaks in the working day). In short, the workers attempt to create a humane 
and civilised environment in which to work and over which they have some control. All these is- 
sues, however, are points of conflict with the employers since they reduce "efficiency" and/or 
weaken the employers' control, i. e. they blunt the edge of exploitation. 
Capitalists will sometimes argue that the interests of the employer and the worker coincide 
since they both depend upon the prosperity of the economic enterprise. The preceding list is an 
illustration of the areas where this is not the case. 
30 In a recession, because of economic stringency, employers will attempt to break the power of 
trade unions with increased ferocity and the use of draconian measures. At the same time unem- 
ployment will make workers afraid of losing their jobs and provide a supply of non-union labour 
which can be substituted. There is also the possibility that employers may simply close increasing- 
ly unprofitable firms, all of which weakens the ability of the union to create the conditions 
described in footnote 24. 
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Cooperation in trade union activity, and in particular in industrial action, on the other 
hand, is voluntary; unpopular industrial actions can never be maintained. This self- 
organisation of the workforce is held together by a sense of the need for solidarity, i. e. a 
sense of moral obligation, based upon the rational appraisal of circumstances and entered 
into voluntarily. Collectivism, therefore, is more than just a formal means to an end, its 
content forshadows new forms of association. 
The description above is highly significant because, as Marx could hardly have 
failed to notice, it corresponds to the situation which it was the aim of the whole "Ger- 
man idealist" tradition to bring about: moral obligation, based upon reason and entered 
into freely. 31 Kant suggested this as a "rational ideal", Hegel believed that "Reason" 
would bring it about by acting mysteriously through history. Here it occurs as the rational 
response of workers to their own circumstances. There is a general sense of obligation to 
act collectively for the reasons mentioned above, within which particular strategies will 
be argued for in a fraternal manner. The worker's pursuit of "individual" interest is here 
simultaneously "social" in character, since it takes into account the fortunes of the group 
as a whole. 
A general definition of a socialist consciousness would be one in which there is an 
understanding of how individual actions, in their aggregate effect, create collective con- 
ditions and imperatives which then reciprocally affect the possibilities of life for each 
individual (e. g. the paradoxes noted earlier). Such an understanding acts as a mediating 
influence upon the actions of each individual via the comprehension of where their self- 
interest really lies. 
31 Although not the abstract rational ideal of Kant, it nevertheless has a social, i. e. potentially 
universal, dimension as will be seen below. 
31 If the majority regard them as misguided they will not be Persisted in, since that would prob- 
ably strain the sense of solidarity beyond breaking point. 
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Trade union solidarity is one example of this. The following sections will attempt to 
complete the picture. Socialist consciousness permits development away from social 
institutions based upon the "accidental" consequences of individual actions, i. e. capital- 
ism, to one whose institutions are based upon a consensus which comprehends such 
32 causal relations. 
2.2.2. Self-help organisation 
Even more important to workers' consciousness is the organisation of mutual aid 
within working class communities. The principle "from each according to his abilities to 
each according to his needs" was coined by St. Simon and reiterated by Marx. Its real 
basis in working class consciousness, however, is not the ideas of a particular theorist but 
the practices which the workers successfully adopt to deal with the problems inflicted by 
the capitalist system. 
if for instance, in a mining village, a worker was killed or injured in the pit, the rest 
of the miners families would support the family of that worker according to what was 
possible in their own situation. 33 No family would know who might be affected in this 
way but each would underwrite the position of the others. In this way the worst effects of 
the system would not fall on any particular individual but would be borne by the com- 
munity as a whole. These practices were the forerunners of the welfare state. The princi- 
ple which governs this collective practice is "from each according to ability, to each 
according to need". 
32 Note the similarity of this rationale to the form of the Hegelian argument in The Philosophy 
of Right which suggests that it is rational to support laws against theft, since one would lose more 
from the general practice of theft (in terms of freedom) than one would gain by being free to steal 
from others. 
33 At a later period the trade union partly took over this ftinction although extra support would 
still be given. 
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This strategy is not "charity" as the bourgeoisie understand it, i. e. the "privileged" 
giving to the "underprivileged", it is a strategy for survival for the group, by maintaining 
the viability of each of its members, the group preserves its own strength. It is the basis 
of fraternal relationships and also of mutual understanding, since each is entitled to and 
receives the genuine sympathy and support of the others, both because it could happen to 
any of them and because they need each other. 34 
This is only one example of this kind of relationship. People living close to the 
"bread-line" can be overtaken by many kinds of misfortune: accident, illness, redun- 
dancy, family breakup, etc. all of which would jeopardise their economic viability. 
Amongst the working class communities, help will be extended to others in the case of 
problems in general, in order to ensure the survival of all. This situation produces rela- 
tionships and a behaviour pattern which permeate to the most mundane levels. It appears 
as a willingness to help, a generalised goodwill. 
The mutual support given is moral and psychological as well as physical and unlike 
village communities of a previous era, it includes people who are strangers to each other. 
This is necessarily so since it is an urban phenomenon and embraces large aggregates of 
people. 35 It is part of the communal "shield". It also has a positive value, in that it per- 
mits the satisfactions of friendship and mutual help as a way of life. 
What the members of these urban communities can be seen to have in common, in 
this instance, is not a sense of obligation to a specific group of people but a common 
belief in certain strategies and universal principles embodied in their way of life. This 
makes possible the formation of an immediate rapport between total strangers and indeed 
between groups of strangers which in turn facilitates collective organisation and 
34 i. e. it is a genuinely "universal" problem with a "universal" solution in the Hegelian sense. 
35 it is this "openness to strangers, who are immediately made to feel that they have the support 
and friendship of others, which explains the reputation for friendliness of the industrial areas of 
Northern England. 
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collective action. 36 
Mutual support is not simply a defensive measure, as the worker's attitude to educa- 
tion illustrates. Anyone who could escape from the conditions of the working class 
through education would be approved of rather than resented and thus could find support 
within the community. 
37 This attitude is recorded in novels such as Howard Spring's 
Fame is the Spur This is because firstly, education is valued by the members of the com- 
munity as a worthy aspiration and secondly, it is hoped, without guarantee, that members 
of the working class who become educated will in turn help further the ends of the class. 
Added to the humanistic attitude mentioned earlier, therefore, is one which regards 
the self-development of each individual as of benefit to the whole group. This is to be 
contrasted with the competitive relations of capitalism where the success of another, is 
the success of a competitor and potential rival, and hence is resented. The supportive 
relationship, therefore, extends not only to those who are less able to survive but also to 
those that have greater ability. This is again the same principle of "from each according 
to ability to each according to need" although in this case "need" is understood in the 
sense that Marx tended to use it, namely, to cover human requirements in general. 
Where the political representatives of the working class have achieved power, they 
have introduced structures which institutionalise these relationships. Municipal socialism 
consists in providing services for the whole community partly on the basis of a local pro- 
perty tax which is considered to be roughly related to individual ability to pay. Thus such 
things as transport may be supplied cheaply or even free at the point of use since it is 
paid for from progressive taxation. At the national level, a health service available to all 
36 The implications of this were well appreciated by the bourgeoisie in the Ist World War, 
when at Christmas, the opposing armies arranged a cease-fire, exchanged presents and played foot- 
ball. The military then began to regularly move companies to different locations and to deploy 
snipers to foment mistrust between the combatants. 
37 This is not to suggest that one could not also find envy and rivalries within these communi- 
ties. Competitive relations and the structured insecurities of capitalist society ensure that these atti- 
tudes are present also. 
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who need it, income support to those who are unemployed or sick etc. is paid for by 
national taxation, also related to the ability to pay, and education is provided from the 
same public funds on the basis of ability to benefit. The principle which operates here is 
"from each according to (roughly speaking) ability to pay, to each according to his 
needs". "Ability" here pertains to the ability to help, i. e. the distribution of relative advan- 
tage in society, (in a capitalist system this is a question of wealth and income rather than 
natural ability). 
Because the communal institutions are redistributive, they counteract the polarising 
tendencies of capitalist society. The "mixed economy" is a compromise between systems 
acting in opposite directions. At a certain level, this works in favour of capitalism 
because it prevents the worst social and political problems caused by poverty from aris- 
ing. 
This is true especially where there is a culture of mutual support which is not funded 
by the state. In this situation problems are ameliorated at no cost to the capitalists and 
thus paradoxically it stabilises the capitalist society. One should not lose sight of the fact, 
however, that the principles of distribution involved in each system are diametrically 
opposed. 
Both have a view of equity which is based upon a notion of equal exchange. In a 
market system, equality in exchange is reckoned on the basis of the "value" of the goods 
irrespective of how they have been acquired. Questions of the contribution of social 
advantage and disadvantage to this process, therefore, lie outside the scope of this princi- 
ple, which is precisely why the acquisition of these advantages confers unequal leverage 
in the distribution of wealth in society. 
Distribution on the basis of the principle of "from each according to ability to each 
according to need", on the other hand, also operates on the basis of judgement of equal- 
ity. 38 What is equalised here, however, is the degree of sacrifice (taking into account 
38 Marx argues in Critique of the Gotha Programme I section 3, that any rule applied equally in 
unequal circumstances, i. e. to different needs and abilities, will be unequal in its effects but that 
distribution on the basis of "From each according to ability etc. " rectifies this inequality by taking 
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differences in ability) made by each individual and the degree of benefit or satisfaction 
(taking into account differences in need) accruing to each. Exchange is "equal" in this 
case, therefore, at the level of human experience, it is experienced as equal. 
it is "fair" in terms of human cost and benefit which is ultimately what "fairness" is 
about. Thus, I would argue, it is precisely because this principle takes such differences 
into account (that all men are not equal in ability or need) that it prescribes true equity. 39 
This kind of communal provision is often represented as "state control" and a limi- 
tation of choice, since the form of provision is decided by the administrative body and 
hence a limitation of the "freedom" of the individual. 40 In a free market, however, choice 
is limited by the ability to pay, you cannot choose what you cannot afford. 
It is true that the choice of those who are relatively better off is limited to some 
extent by this system due to the reduction of their disposable income but this is simply to 
say that the basis of payment, taxation, is redistributive. The choice of those who would 
not be able to afford such provision is enhanced, as is their freedom to make a decent life 
for themselves. 41 
over and above the question of redistribution, however, there is a net gain in indivi- 
dual freedom from this system for all users. In a society where each individual competes 
for resources with others, the environment of each individual is potentially hostile since 
others will place obstacles in his or her path. Each individual is isolated and weak, their 
freedom to act limited by the rivalry with the rest. 
the differences into account. I take this to mean that it equalises the sacrifices and the satisfactions 
in terms of the way they are experienced. - op. cit. Selected Works pg 320. 
39 Socialist egalitarianism is sometimes crudely attacked on the grounds that it fails to recog- 
nise that all men are not equal. It is the capitalist principle of equality, however, which disregards 
both natural and social inequality which is why its system of distribution is inequitable. 
40 The involvement of the consumers in decisions about provision, however, can be done on the 
basis of consultation, a procedure which makes sense for large scale projects. Also, the administra- 
tive body is subject to democratic control. 
41 There is a utilitarian argument based on the notion of the diminution of marginal utility with 
increasing wealth, which suggests that redistribution from rich to poor increases the total satisfac- 
tion in society. 
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in a society with collective provision, however, the environment is supportive and 
obstacles are removed from the path of individuals. They are freer, therefore, with more 
power to pursue their personal goals without hindrance, making use of the support of oth- 
ers and of the collective resources of the society as a whole. 
Since the principle of "from each according to ability to each according to need" 
takes individual differences into account, those whose actions are governed by it must 
learn how to appreciate each other's individuality simply in order to judge when it is 
being fulfilled. Hence, once again this behaviour pattern can be seen to promote a 
humanistic perspective. 42 
People who help others, for instance, will have a good idea when need is genuine 
and when they are being taken advantage of. Nevertheless, they will tend to err on the 
side of generosity. This occurs for two reasons. Firstly, it is imperative that the commun- 
ity as a whole should extend help to those who genuinely need it. In order to maintain 
this system, those who receive help have to be given the benefit of the doubt. Each 
member of the community knows this. 
Secondly, such are the sensibilities of each individual that although being cheated is 
regarded as a source of irritation and annoyance, to allow others to suffer without helping 
is worse because it makes the individual feel responsible for that suffering. Alleviation of 
need is understood to be the main priority. Taking a risk in order to to help others is 
regarded as a sign of strength and goodwill and is socially approved of, although it will 
not be remarked upon since it is the norm. Refusal to help when one could easily do so, 
on the other hand, is regarded as a sign of personal weakness and one can lose the respect 
42 This situation stands in contrast o that described by Marx in the Economic and Philosophi- 
cal Manuscripts of 1844, op. cit. pp 74-75, where he explains the alienation of social relations as 
the result of the dehumanising of the individual who can then only regard others in a similar 
fashion to him/herself and treat them equally inhumanly. Here, however, the reverse obtains, the 
consciousness of the humanity of others provides the working class with the basis of a moral cri- 
tique of inhuman treatment and dehumanising conditions. 
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of others for being "mean" or "selfish" if one behaves in this way. Contrary to the belief 
of bourgeois commentators, these relations are quite stable and will not be undermined 
by selfish individuals taking advantage of them. 
Not only is this illustrated by their duration in those areas where they have occurred 
historically, but it is also underpinned by the following rational consideration. Any indi- 
vidual who attempts to accumulate material benefits for his or herself but gives nothing 
to anyone else loses the respect and possibly the support of others, forfeiting the availa- 
bility of the greater resources of the whole community for a smaller amount of personal 
possessions. Such a person would be poorer thereby. It would be suspected that someone 
who isolates themselves in this way is perhaps compensating for social inadequacy. 
2.2.3. Cooperation in the labour process 
Although distribution in a capitalist economy is based upon competitive social rela- 
tions, production, narrowly understood as the labour process itself, is purely cooperative 
in character. Also, despite the fact that the division of labour at work is imposed upon the 
workforce by management, within that division, which the workers do not control, there 
are patterns of cooperation which are spontaneously arrived at by the workers them- 
selves. These social relations are the model not only for workers' solidarity, but also are 
the natural organisational form for all their collective activity. 
In the Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1857-8), 
Marx points out that the distribution of the product in an economy is determined by the 
distribution of the means of production within the production process, i. e. it Is deter- 
mined by the organisation of production 
itself (capital-profit, land-rent, labour-wages 
etc. ). 43 ff a new fonn of distribution, "from each according to his abilities to each 
43 op. cit. Preface and Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political EcOnOMY, PP 
23,24. 
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according to his needs", is to be achieved, therefore, one would anticipate that this would 
presuppose a new distribution of the means of production, which would in turn entail a 
new form of the division of labour. 
44 I will argue in the following paragraphs that the 
organisational form which the workers spontaneously adopt could form the basis of this 
new division of labour. 
When a task has to be performed by a number of workers, the form in which they 
organise themselves tends to have certain distinct, if somewhat obvious, characteristics. 
Firstly, if there is a job which one person can do but which others cannot, then that per- 
son will take charge and do it. If a job requires strength, then the strongest person will 
take the heaviest part If it is a question of knowledge of how to do something, then the 
person who can see a solution will attempt to explain it and to organise the others. This 
flexibility of organisation is based upon the primacy of the common purpose and is 
45 guided by the principle "from each according to ability". 
it is a naturally occurring organisational form when a job has to be done and when 
everyone benefits from its accomplishment and no one benefits from failure to accom- 
plish it. Other organisational practices which are common are the "spelling" of others 
when an unpleasant or difficult task has to be performed by one person, i. e. the sharing of 
the task so that the burden does not fall too heavily upon a particular worker, and con- 
versely if relations within the group are good, allowing each worker to have a chance of 
performing a particular task if they want to do so. No one will be allowed to "struggle" at 
a job if others can help them out. In this way, the task is accomplished with minimum 
strain on the individuals concerned. 
46 
44 Redistribution, via a central administration, although following the same principle, presup- 
poses an original distribution of a different type and is, therefore, only a stage on the path to the 
achievement of a society based upon the principle of "from each according to ability to each ac- 
cording to need. " 
45 The ability to organise in this way depends upon a facility for rapidly achieving a consensus 
based upon a rational appreciation of circumstances. 
46 This is also a case of to each according to need, 
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The differences in ability are acknowledged and appreciated by all the members of 
the group since everyone benefits from the capacities of each member. These distinctions, 
although acknowledged, are not divisive, as they would be if the social relations within 
the group were competitive, because in these circumstances they do not confer leverage 
towards the acquisition of differential rewards. Their significance here is totally different. 
The relations between the workers are fraternal and this fraternity is itself valued to 
the point where if differences were to result in rivalry the more gifted would feel them- 
selves to be worse off, having lost the support and friendship of others. The organisation 
is one one hand meritocratic and on the other egalitarian since each is equally valued as a 
contributor to the collective effort. 
47 
The same relations can be seen in collective activity outside of work. If, for 
instance, a group of workers are going somewhere, say to play football, but some do not 
have transport, the others will take them. Those without resources will not be made to 
feel bad about accepting help from others. Rather, the object of the exercise in which they 
are all taking part will be emphasised, their value as participants will be regarded as 
outweighing the issue of the difference in means. On the other hand, where cost inflicts 
undue hardship on some rather than others, then cost will be shared in such a way that no 
one has to contribute very much (the proverbial "whip round"). 
This is also the most effective form of organisation as the following example illus- 
trates. In "The Ten Peaks Race" held by the army in the early eighties, 48 by the end of the 
race, just two teams were in contention, a team of Gurkhas and a team of Territorials. The 
time of the third member of the four-man team counted as the score. The Gurkhas, as 
individuals, are proud men, none of whom would wish to be thought not to be "pulling 
his weight". The Territorials were made up of men of diverse occupations and abilities. 
47 There is an excellent study of this phenomenon in One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch 
by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. 
48 Televised by Granada Television. 
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Gradually, due to natural differences in strength, some of the Gurkhas fell back. But 
when a member of the Territorial team, an accountant, began to struggle another member 
who was a scaffolder and used to carrying weights carried his pack, i. e. carried two 
packs, until the accountant got his second wind. The Territorials won the race. The col- 
lective result justified the means. 
No one thought less of the accountant. The informal organisation of workers which 
is mutually supportive and makes the best use of ability is the most effective form of 
Organisation. Crucially, however, it is only possible because of the fraternal relations in 
which differences are not divisive. 
This form of organisation is also non-hierarchical, there is no monopoly of decision 
making and no fixed chain of command. Bureaucratic organisation has, however, under 
certain circumstances, a technical advantage over other forms and the workers will adopt 
it in these situations. This is the case when information about the collective activity is not 
available to everyone. Central control under these circumstances ensures the coordina- 
tion necessary for concerted collective action. Lenin was impressed by the workers capa- 
city to operate in a disciplined and effective manner within this kind of organisational 
structure. 
Marx, on the other hand, more often praises the capacity of workers for self- 
Organisation based upon fraternal and egalitarian relations such as those within the politi- 
cal organisations of which he had first hand knowledge and of the Paris Commune. What- 
ever the advantages of bureaucratic Organisation, it is this latter form which has the most 
potential for the reorganisation of society along socialist principles and the provision of a 
solution to "The Riddle of History". 
For the bourgeoisie, however, bureaucracy is indispensable for another reason. In 
forms of organisation in which there are potential antagonisms between leaders and fol- 
lowers and between the followers themselves, the activities of individuals must be forci- 
bly subordinated to the leadership by an authoritarian chain of command. Each person in 
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authority must be controlled by someone higher and decisions monopolised by the lead- 
ing elite. This is because under the competitive form of Organisation of bourgeois society, 
individuals cannot be relied upon to act in accordance with organisational goals. The 
corresponding forms of consciousness are the ethic of automatic submission to authority 
and the cult of the worship of leaders. 
49 
In the form of Organisation which has been attributed to the workers above, in con- 
trast, decisions are taken by whoever can supply the initiative and the others will 
cooperate by taking up appropriate roles. This requires that knowledge of what the col- 
lective activity itself requires should be diffused throughout the group so that each can 
play a socially responsible role. Discipline relies upon a sense of collective purpose and 
is also "managed" by the relationships between members. 50 
The game of football (soccer) is a good illustration of this form of organisation 
(which may partially account for its popularity amongst the working class). Because the 
game is fluid with situations changing rapidly at distances too remote for any individual 
to take charge all the time, control by a central decision maker, the captain, is not effec- 
tive and is indeed unnecessary-51 Players "read" the game and play the appropriate role 
according to the circumstances. Everyone is a strategist and each plays in response to the 
initiatives of the others. Discipline is maintained by the common purpose and intra-tearn 
relations. Effectiveness depends upon the knowledge and ingenuity of all the members 
of the team. 
In some places, where the Labour Party is in control of the local authority, one can 
see an attempt to reflect these kinds of relationship at an institutional level. There is an 
attempt to make local government into a cooperative enterprise with the officials merely 
49 This was discussed in Chapter 4 in the section entitled "Unity and kingship". 
50 Criticism is usually open but often tinged with humour to deflect any sense of confrontation. 
51 captains in football are merely a vestige of bourgeois prejudice as far as control of the game 
is concerned. Workers play without them. 
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taking the role of co-workers doing a Particular job in cooperation with the rest of the 
public whose interests they serve. To this end they increase the flow of information on 
what decisions are being planned, make the government offices more accessible to the 
public, information on services which are available being displayed inside them, and con- 
sult well in advance those people who government decisions affect, acting only with their 
approval . 
52 Input from the public is encouraged since it is regarded as crucial to the col- 
lective enterprise and relations with the public are intimate and fraternal rather than 
remote and authoritarian. This engenders trust on both sides. 
possibly some worker cooperatives also attempt to institutionalise these relation- 
ships. If the economy were to be organised on this basis, however, one might perhaps 
envisage certain workers maintaining particular necessary social organisations on a 
serni-permanent basis with others contributing how and where they can. This would 
require that knowledge of what the economy requires at any given time should be avail- 
able to all. 
Organisations would attempt to make the best use of the labour force which they 
happen to have at any particular time. The variability of the personnel would not present 
a peculiar difficulty. Turnover of labour is equally a feature of capitalist organisation, the 
difference between them lies in the motivation for workers to join or to leave. 
A discussion of forms of consciousness is not the appropriate place in the thesis to 
discuss alternative social structures so I will not pursue this issue in greater detail at this 
point except to make the following observation: In any society that claims to have solved 
the problem of "alienation", labour must be voluntary. If it is not, then by definition 
11society" or some part of it has become an alien entity constraining the individual 
worker. 
52 Sometimes the local authority will be placed in the position of arbiter between interest 
groups and if no compromise can be found will generally act on the principle of defending the 
most vulnerable party, i. e. on the basis of other socialist principles. 
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Labour, however, is not in principle very different from consumer activity, both 
involve the expenditure of effort to attain some desirable end. The difference between 
them is that in societies based upon exploitation one is performed voluntarily and the 
other is not. A socialist society, therefore, would attempt to develop a social system in 
which labour is performed voluntarily by the individual for rational purposes and which 
is intrinsically satisfying. I shall return to this topic later in chapter eight. 
Mutual tolerance between workers is inevitably a part of cooperative practice. This 
is true of cooperation both in work and out, i. e. in all spheres of life. One can rarely pick 
and choose who one works with even if the work is voluntary (since in this case those 
willing to work select themselves). In any form of cooperative activity it is necessary to 
make allowances for each other's shortcomings because squabbles are invariably 
counter-productive. Living with others in a community requires the same attitude. 
In the labour process then, a form of understanding of others is gained which 
accepts the possibility of 
both human frailty and human achievement without the strict 
apportioning of blame. 
In a community, an understanding and sympathetic attitude to the 
variations in human behaviour is what binds the members together as a community and is 
also crucial to the 
functioning of self-help organisation and any form of communal 
action. 
53 This form of consciousness is universal in two respects. First, it recognises the 
full range of human responses, secondly, the potentialities which it recognises apply to 
everyone. It is, therefore, sophisticated and humanistic in character. 
In circumstances where cooperation is all-important, personal weakness in most 
cases will not put an 
individual beyond the entitlement to the sympathy and the support 
of others. This 
is an important complement to the positive evaluation of individual 
53 This understanding is deepened in conditions of hardship when collective survival is 
paramount. Each 
individual can identify with the problems and potential inadequacies of others 
because each knows that the same problems could affect them also and they too might be found 
wanting. Equally, they are also aware of 
the potential for strength in the face of adversity within 
the community which is a source of pride 
both in themselves and the others. 
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differences in providing a solution to the opposition between the individual and the 
society as will be seen below. 
The extent of this tolerance can be estimated by examining its limits, i. e. those cases 
which are not tolerated. The most obvious case of this is strike-breaking. Here an indivi- 
dual deliberately acts in a manner which is ostensibly to the detriment of the rest by 
undermining their bargaining position. The punishment for this is to be "Sent to Coven- 
try", but when one considers what this entails, however, it can be seen that this is merely 
the withdrawal of the support of the rest of the community. Often this is simply an accep- 
tance of the logic of the individuals own attitude, i. e. where he or she holds to the indivi- 
dualist beliefs of the bourgeoisie. It is an object lesson on the fallacious nature of these 
views since it demonstrates the extent to which the individual relies upon the community. 
if this is the typical form which discipline takes one can see that the limits of tolerance 
are quite broad. 
2.3. The theoretical and historical imPlications of this form of consciousness 
The theoretical significance of these practices is that they are concrete examples of 
social behaviour which resolve what from the point of view of exploitative modes of 
production would be unresolvable conflicts and in which simultaneously, irreconcilable 
oppositions are reconciled, i. e. they present us with examples in practice of Hegelian 
syntheses. 
2.3-1. "Means to an end" and "ends in themselves" 
One example of such an opposition is the Kantian distinction between treating oth- 
ers as "means to an end" (i. e. exploitatively) and treating them as "ends in themselves". 
The latter is not only considered to be a desirable pattern of behaviour on the grounds 
53 op. cit. The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, section 63, pg 52. 
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that it respects individual freedom and the welfare of others but also because for Kant it 
is the only "rational" course of action. 54 
In reality, however, in societies based upon competition and exploitation, treating 
others as a means to an end is necessarily the dominant form of social relationship. Kant 
does not supply an explanation of how his rational ideal is to be realised in practice, 
except that others should be convinced by his argument. Here, however, we see the 
reconciliation of this opposition 
in practice. 55 
In a culture based upon mutual aid, the lesson has already been learned that the gen- 
eralisation of egoistic, competitive behaviour creates a society where each individual is 
surrounded by ill-will, is less free and is generally weak and that by contrast, the general- 
isation of mutual support and goodwill creates an environment where each individual has 
greater security and has greater freedom to develop a personally fulfilling life. 
By treating others as "ends in themselves", each person guarantees that he or she 
will be treated likewise. Such behaviour is therefore simultaneously a means to one's 
own ends. This is not merely a theoretical ideal but a cultural practice developed as a 
rational response to the oppressive conditions of a competitive society. 
2.3.2. The individual and the social 
According to liberal bourgeois social theory, the interests of the individual and 
those of the society are always potentially opposed due to the fact that individual desires 
are many and various and their pursuit cannot be guaranteed to be in the public interest. 
According to this viewpoint, if individual decisions are completely subordinated to the 
collective interest, this is regarded as tyranny but if individual decisions have complete 
54 Because (according to Kant) it alone can be held as a general principle of action without con- 
tradiction. 
55 Individuals naturally attempt to manipulate their environment in such a way as to realise 
their personal goals. This includes other people with whom they come into contact. This tendency 
cannot be eliminated but it can be rationally directed. 
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priority over the collective interest, the result will be the disintegration of social order. 
Both these alternatives are undesirable. Therefore, according to this view, the best one 
can hope for is to trade off some individual freedom against some social control, i. e. the 
best solution is a little of each. 
However, we see in the solidarity shown by the workers in their trade union activity 
a commitment to the collective interest in so far as it serves the interests of the individual 
members. This reflects a form of consciousness in which the individual interest is under- 
stood as being fiurthered by the pursuit of the collective interest (the collective interest 
appearing as an expression of the individual interests). The same commitment is evident 
in the institutionalisation of mutual aid and also in the spontaneous form of cooperation 
within the division of labour. 
Also, reciprocally, the collective interest is understood as being furthered by the 
pursuit of individual interests. As we have seen, the self-development of the individual is 
a collective goal of the working class not only because it represents freedom from the 
stultifying effects of capitalism, but also because it is the only rational goal of an 
economic system. 
56 In addition to which, free, individual self-development is regarded as 
a resource for the society as a whole, both in the wider sense of demonstrating the possi- 
bilities of life for each as well as in the narrower sense of enhancing communal produc- 
tion. 
These attitudes are supported by the fact that it is part of the practice of cooperation 
to tolerate individual differences in behaviour as the price of maintaining unity in collec- 
tive activity. For all these reasons, the pursuit of individual interests furthers the collec- 
tive interest. In the circumstances described, therefore, the interests of the individual and 
those of the community are not opposed. The consciousness of the individual is 
56 A situation which is negated in the capitalist economy because of the "alien" driving force of 
competition and profit to which individual needs are necessarily sacrificed. 
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simultaneously both individual and social in character. 
2.3.3. Liberty, equality and fraternity 
As we have seen, in a society based upon competition, individual liberty "veers 
round" into its opposite, to use the Hegelian phrase. Not only does collective unity have 
to be imposed from without, but each competitor limits the freedom of action of other 
competitors and the polarisation of society into winners and losers, exploiters and 
exploited, leaves the losers and the exploited constrained disproportionately by poverty 
and by authoritarian control. 
The relations just described, however, avoid these consequences. Here, the collec- 
tive interest is understood to be a prerequisite of individual freedom, the relations 
between people are based upon mutual support rather than rivalry and distribution 
according to need avoids the problem of the polarisation of wealth. Individual liberty is a 
stable feature of these relations because its opposite, the collective interest or the interests 
of others are taken into account. In capitalism, by contrast they are encountered as an 
external limit to freedom. 
Similarly with equality, if individual differences in the capacity to acquire wealth or 
differences in need are ignored, then a system of equal opportunity will become increas- 
ingly unequal as these external differences create a cumulative advantage for some over 
others. Distribution on the basis of from each according to ability to each according to 
need, however, takes into account hese differences and thus ensures equality at the level 
of individual experience. 
Fraternity, in capitalist society, despite a notional equality of opportunity, is des- 
troyed by rivalry between competitors and by polarisation of advantages. However, in a 
situation where an individuals ability is an asset o others rather than a source of competi- 
tion there is a basis for real fraternity. 
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This kind of fraternity can accommodate comparisons of ability and even friendly 
rivalry because the security of the individuals concerned is not threatened by the out- 
come. These relations, therefore contain the potential to realise the goals which capital- 
isrn promised but could not fulfill. 
2.3.4. Historical problems of social organisation 
These relationships also provide the key to the problems outlined in Chapter one 
(taken from The German Ideology) namely, artificial scarcity, class and class conflict, the 
repressive state, alienation and the privatisation of property itself. 
Clearly distribution according to need will do away with artificial scarcity, which is 
a product of competitive distribution and polarisation of advantage. Abolition of a fixed 
division of labour prevents class formation on the basis of the monopoly of the means of 
production (since it presupposes free access to the means of production) and also the 
corresponding class conflict which is rooted in exploitation. 
The state, in so far as it represents the collective interest which has to be imposed 
upon civil society, becomes superfluous in this role when there is genuine communality 
of interest (as do authoritarian relations in the workplace). 
Alienation, which is the result of collective activity becoming a power in itself over 
and above individual interests, will disappear once the individuals both understand the 
social cause of the phenomenon and also become capable of acting collectively to change 
things rather than as an aggregate of separate individuals. 
Individual power, wealth and self-determination which have been lost to the system 
can then be regained through collective institutions which enable the individual to freely 
contribute according to ability and consume according to need thus realising his or her 
individuality within and through the collective life of the community. 
Private property is abolished under these circumstances in the sense that goods can- 
not be possessed in such a way as to confer social leverage by virtue of others being 
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(de)prived. 
2.3.5. Abstract oppositions 
The quotation "Communism is the riddle of history solved ...... is the concluding 
summation of a passage that claims that communism represents the resolution of a series 
of abstract oppositions. These oppositions are as follows: man/nature, man/man, 
existence/essence, objectification/self-confirmation, freedom/necessity and 
individual/species. Each opposition reflects an antagonistic relationship within all modes 
of production based upon class divisions. 
The opposition or conflict between man and nature can be understood in two ways, 
as the exploitative relationship of man to the non-human world and as the struggle of 
man within himself against his own nature, i. e. the flesh/spirit dichotomy. The latter 
opposition, as shown in chapter six, rests upon the conflict between individual desires 
and collective, moral imperatives which have been internalised. 
Where pursuit of the collective interest is the means to the realisation of individual 
interests (and v. v. ), no such conflict will occur, the moral imperative will not be experi- 
enced as something external to the will and irrational but as a rational means of achieving 
individual goals. Morality thus becomes based transparently upon rational considerations 
and individual interests. 
With respect to non-human ature, men are as much objects of nature for each other 
as non-human nature is and in an exploitative society, both are treated as objects of use. 
Amongst the working class, however, the relations between people are not in the main 
exploitative and each treats the other as someone whose individuality, i. e. their nature, is 
an asset. There is a tendency within the working class to generalise this perspective to the 
rest of nature as we shall see. 
In the early part of human history, man was subject to nature, it dominated him, but 
in the recent period he increasingly controls and dominates it. The present danger is that 
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the dynamic towards exploitation will destroy the natural foundation on which human 
well-being rests. In capitalism the satisfaction of need is only a means to the end of the 
accumulation of property, nature is used to satisfy certain basic needs without taking into 
account either the totality of man's potential relations to it or the limits to which exploita- 
tion can be driven. 
Within the urban working class, however, who are deprived of nature in their sur- 
roundings, there is a need and an appreciation for nature which shows itself in the attitude 
to the countryside, gardens and to animals as pets. Nature is valued as psychologically 
and emotionally important to them. 
57 It is true of nature in general that in so far as one 
destroys or suppresses and distorts it, it becomes incapable of standing in a complemen- 
tary and mutually enhancing relationship to one. 
Upon the basis of the type of consciousness which sees nature as complementary to 
man, however, can be built a relationship to nature which neither destroys nor suppresses 
and distorts it. 
58 
The opposition between man and man is founded upon exploitative human relations, 
i. e. individual egoism within the framework of social cooperation. The kind of social 
relations described above, however, transcend the limitations of such a society and thus 
solve this problem. 
By the opposition between existence and essence, Marx is referring to the fact that 
in a society where the worker is subservient to the imperatives of competition he or she is 
not able to fulfill their human potential (essence) as it exists at that level of the 
57 Animals in particular are regarded as companions and their suffering is regarded as unac- 
ceptable. This relationship shows a dimension of human sensibility which is denied by the purely 
exploitative relation. 
58 Those who hold that human concerns are more important than the well-being of non-human 
nature forget the dialectical relationship between them. This view, by devaluing the non-human 
world, impoverishes their relationship to it. If as Marx says, human progress in history is charac- 
terised by the development of higher forms of need and sensibility, by this criterion, such a view 
must appear limited and barbaric. 
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development of the productive forces. This situation is remedied in the circumstances 
where the individual is free to choose their own activities and has access to the resources 
of the whole community. 
By the opposition between objectification and self-realisation, Marx is referring to 
the alienation of labouring activity which again is remedied when the worker is in control 
of his or her own activities. 
Similarly, the opposition between freedom and necessity, in this context, refers to 
the fact that labour is not performed freely but constrained by the competitive system 
itself and minimally, the need to survive. Where the productive forces are developed to 
the extent that the latter consideration absorbs a negligible amount of labour, any extra 
effort can be made subject to choice once the problem of alienation has been overcome. 
Necessity then is "inner necessity" which is the same as free choice. 
By the opposition between the individual and the species, Marx is referring to the 
fact that human skills and ingenuity serve the purpose of expanding the system itself but 
are not available for individual use. The individual is thus deprived of his or her species- 
powers. Where alienation has been overcome however, the resources of the whole society 
are available for individual use so that individual "species being" is reclaimed. 
The relations which have been described contain a complete caring, humanistic 
altemative to the hostile environment of capitalism. The moral force of this in the twen- 
tieth century has been responsible for reactions which have manifested themselves in the 
most atrocious attacks upon such communities around the world. Militaristic regimes 
typically attack those responsible for the care of others and the women and children of 
those they classify as left-wing in an attempt to intimidate by torture and fear those 
whose very existence is a living critique of the sterility of their own regimes. This brings 
us to another important form of consciousness in the modem period, fascism. 
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3. Fascism 
Fascism is alienated consciousness in the political sphere in its most universal form. 
It takes its name from the "Fasces", the symbols of punishment and state power in ancient 
Rome. Fascism may be defined as the belief in the right of absolute power of those in 
authority over their subjects, it is worship of authority as an ideal in itself. 
59 I have not 
defined it here in terms of its social and historical basis but in terms of its central concept 
as a form of consciousness. It differs, however, from mere authoritarianism in a way 
which both points to the social and historical circumstances which gave rise to it and 
which also shows it to be a modem phenomenon. 
All forms of authority are examples of alienated social relations. They reflect conso- 
lidated power relations between social groups. One is required to behave in a certain 
manner towards someone in authority by virtue of the status of the group of which he or 
she is a member, not by virtue of any personal relationship which may have been entered 
into as individuals. The relations are "alien" therefore since they are imposed by social 
pressures external to the individual and dictated by the social structure. 
Authority represents the rights of the "social" over the "individual" and the rights of 
authority are thus a product of the conflict within the system. 
Fascism makes its appearance (historically) at a time of economic crisis when the 
contradictions in the social structure of capitalist society break out into open conflict and 
threaten to destroy the basis of the economy. Unable to resolve the contradictions, all the 
classes who have a stake in the existing order put their faith in authoritarianism and 
repression to restore that order. This is the response which one would expect from a rul- 
ing class. 
59 This implies the obligation of the subject to be submissive, the right of authority to punish at 
will and the frequent exercise of this right as a reminder and reaffirmation of it. 
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Capitalism, however, is legitimated by the ideal of equality of opportunity and suc- 
cess is ostensibly based upon merit, i. e. universal ideals. Under these circumstances, the 
legitimacy of bourgeois rule derives from their success in making the system work for 
themselves and everyone else. When the system fails, therefore, there is a crisis of legi- 
timacy. 
There is no other particularistic ideology, e. g. "divine right" or traditional leader- 
ship" on which they can fall back. Also, the apparatus of direct social control is 
insufficient to impose authority due to the fact that under normal circumstances the 
market automatically regulates many social relations. With capitalism, the system itself is 
in control. 
The bourgeoisie, therefore, lack the legitimacy needed to gain assent to the restruc- 
turing of society in a more authoritarian direction. It may be attempted in the name of 
,, the nation" or "the people" but the problem is that no group has the prestige to act 
unchallenged as the representatives of these ideals. The interests and ideals of the various 
factions of the ruling class themselves conflict. The only ideal which they have in com- 
n1on is the need for order and authority to stabilise the system. It is this ideal, therefore, 
to which they turn. The lower middle classes, who lose the most, are its most vociferous 
advocates. 
The value of authority can admit no antecedent justification, neither "the nation", 
"the race", "the people" nor tradition. To allow an appeal to these values would be to 
invite rival interpretations of these interests and to provide grounds to challenge the rule 
of the authorities. If argument was permitted the absence of a solution to the problem of 
the conflicting interests within the capitalist economy would be exposed. This is why the 
crushing of dissent is a necessary precurser to a fascist take-over. 
The rule of authority must be absolute including the power to innovate. The authori- 
ties are the custodians of social values and to question their judgement is heresy. The 
worship of authority here is necessarily irrational in the sense that to ask for reasons for it 
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is to challenge its primacy. This is the submission of the individual to the social in its 
most pure, i. e. most universal, form. 
Nevertheless, fascists do cast themselves in the role of the champions of the nation, 
the people, the race and tradition. This, however, is part of the attempt to unite potential 
support behind themselves, they are not constrained by these values. Fascism, however, 
also engenders nationalism and racism. 
3.1. Nationalism, racism and fascism 
Fascism demands the subordination of the individual to authority. It denies people 
the right to follow their personal values and inclinations, i. e. the right to assert and 
respect themselves as individuals. This loss of self-esteem it replaces with vicarious 
identification with the prestige of the group to which the individual is subordinated. It 
thus compensates feelings of personal inferiority with feelings of group superiority and 
displaces the antagonism between the individual and the group towards outgroup 
members. This is necessary to ensure group cohesion and individual satisfaction. 60 Both 
racism and nationalism serve this purpose. The groups attracted to this ideology are 
those who cannot assert their own interests in society anyway, i. e. peasants, petit bour- 
geoisie etc. and those who regard themselves as losers in society and have little to lose, 
therefore, in the way of self-esteem. 
To them it offers association with power which they could not obtain for them- 
selves. Fascism thus has no answer for the conflicts within society, it merely displaces 
them in certain directions. Its basic principle is conflict. 
60 The stripping of the individual of self-respect and allegiance to personal values by humilia- 
tion and replacing this with esprit de corps is a well tried technique for training those who routine- 
ly exercise violence from soldiers to torturers. 
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Liberalism and socialism 
The main policy of liberalism, like socialism, is to oppose the tendency of capital- 
ism to polarise wealth and power. To this end, it will champion minority rights and indi- 
vidual freedom and thus liberal and socialist policies frequently coincide. Both envisage 
a society which is genuinely based upon liberty, equality and fraternity. Traditionally 
they differ, however, on what kind of social structure could realise these ideals. 
Liberalism's traditional constituency was the small capitalist. Its political pro- 
gramme aimed merely at freezing the capitalist economic structure in its early pluralist 
stage. More generally it draws support from the middle orders of society who, whilst 
privileged enough not to want major changes are nevertheless relatively powerless and 
vulnerable. Many liberals, therefore, also fear the collective strength of the working class, 
either because it threatens capitalism or because it appears to them as a new form of dom- 
ination. 
The broadening of liberal theory to encompass all disadvantaged groups'61 however, 
leads to more emphasis on the ideals Of liberty, equality and fraternity and less to the 
class objectives. Under these new conditions some liberals who believe that the realisa- 
tion of these ideals is more important than defending capitalism will become the natural 
allies of the socialists and in some cases indistinguishable from them. 
The intelligensia of the ruling class are particularly prone to this kind of liberalism 
because each division of labour develops a dynamic of its own and the producers of ideas 
often take their own pronouncements seriously. Their own type of activity removes them 
from direct involvement in exploitation and therefore, they find it easier to take a more 
idealistic viewpoint. 
61 Liberalism's constituency, and hence its interests, have become broader because of electoral- 
ism, since its has had to rely upon the most disadvantaged groups for its electoral support. 
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From a socialist point of view, however, liberalism which is tied to capitalism is 
self-contradictory because the tendency of capitalism to polarise cannot be arrested 
without stultifying its development. Competition will always destroy such attempts. 
Liberalism has successes only where its objectives coincide temporarily with those of 
large capital, e. g. the welfare state, because it provided stability and a guaranteed market 
whilst capital could afford it. 
Christianity and working class consciousness 
The ideals of Christianity are much closer to the values and attitudes of working- 
class consciousness than they are to the values of the bourgeoisie. Competitive individu- 
alism, although universal in scope, imposes no positive obligations upon people, indeed 
it prescribes universal rivalry. According to this doctrine one is not responsible for one's 
neighbour, each is responsible only for his or herself Also the rights of property dom- 
inate everything no matter how the property is acquired (except by theft). 
By comparison, as Donald Soper has often said, the principle of distribution "from 
each according to ability to each according to need" is the moral of the story of the "Good 
Samaritan". It is the principle of mutual support given on a comradely basis rather than as 
charity. 
The evaluation of sacrifice in terms of the experience of the individual (i. e. personal 
loss) rather than the amount given is shown in the parable of "the widow's mite" and 
accords well with the notion of human equality expressed in this principle. 
The understanding attitude towards the strengths and weaknesses of others which is 
part of mutual support and collective activity is expressed in the statement "let he who is 
without sin cast the first stone". 
Also, There is no doubt whatsoever, despite what Weber says about the protestants 
accumulating material things by accident, worry about material things pervades capitalist 
society and gives great poignancy to the verse "Consider the lilies of the field 
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All of this is hardly surprising if one accepts that Christianity originally expressed 
the consciousness of an oppressed class of an oppressed people. Christianity is also inter- 
nationalist whereas competition for property divides humanity on the basis of nation, race 
and class etc. For the Christian however, this relationship is double-edged because for 
him or her the behaviour described above is a prescription from God whereas for the 
working class it stems from the rationale of their way of life. 
The working class have been resistant to the ideas of Christianity for two reasons. 
First, because the other-worldly attitude to action condemns them to suffering in this 
world. The more capable they feel of asserting their rights the less this view appeals, 
indeed it is seen as hypocritical lecturing on behaviour by those who do not face the same 
problems. The religious groups that have had credibility with the working class have 
been the ones whose members shared their conditions of life. 
Secondly, because the same behaviour is shown spontaneously within their own 
communities. The working class see "good" people outside the church. The ideals, there- 
fore, are for them a secular reality and the church has little to offer. On one hand social- 
ism appears to be a way of realising Christian values but on the other hand it has the 
potential to usurp the belief. 
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6. Consciousness and revolution 
one can see, therefore, that within the consciousness of the working class is the 
understanding of how to re-organise social relationships in principle in order to solve the 
problems which constitute the so called "Riddle of History". These problems can only be 
solved in reality, however, under conditions where the working class emerge as the dom- 
inant class within society. This depends upon the progress of capitalism and the 
62 The involvement of the non-conformist churches in the early development of the labour 
movement in this country and Christian Marxists in South and Central America have stressed the 
former point, whereas church hierarchies tend to Pay more attention to the latter. 
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development of the productive forces within it. 
In the next chapter I shall discuss the contradictions within capitalism which Marx 
believed would provide the same kind of opportunity for the working class to take power 
as the rapid expansion of trade and manufacture provided for the bourgeoisie in the six- 




Structural Changes in the Capitalist Era 
Conditions for a proletarian revolution 
The rise to preeminence of the bourgeoisie took place in two stages, their self- 
emancipation from subjugation within the feudal system - Le to become an estate in their 
own right - and their rise to become the class whose interests dominate society, i. e. a rul- 
ing class. If the rise to power of the proletariat is supposed to follow the same pattern one 
would be forced to make the judgement that so far it has largely been engaged in a strug- 
gle for emancipation from subjugation within capitalism rather than the restructuring of 
the world economy along non-capitalist lines. 
Communist revolutions have not, perhaps for historical reasons, been able to solve 
many of the problems engendered by the capitalist mode of production. Relations of pro- 
duction within them bear a striking resemblance to those of capitalism itself. Also, work- 
ers' activities within capitalist societies, - collective bargaining by trade unions to control 
the work situation, the struggle for the franchise and minimum conditions of welfare - are 
aimed at freeing the the working class from disabilities which are not suffered by the 
more privileged bourgeois classes, i. e. for emancipation rather than domination. 
The economic transformation of the system which would provide the opportunity 
for proletarian interests to predominate does not appear to have occurred so far. In The 
preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx suggests two con- 
ditions which must be fulfilled before such a transformation can take place. He says: 
"No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there 
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is room in it have developed; and new higher relations of production never 
appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the 
womb of the old society itself. " I 
In this chapter I intend to deal with each of these conditions in turn. 
1.1. The contradictions of capitalism 
The first condition, namely, that the limit placed on the development of productive 
forces by the social relations of production will have to have been encountered, implies 
that any antagonistic mode of production, if not destroyed by external forces, only passes 
into a new mode because of the development of its own internal contradictions. These 
contradictions, however, are of two different kinds. Firstly, contradictions within the old 
mode of production which are driven to the point of breakdown by the new mode of pro- 
duction which is emerging from within it. Secondly, tendencies within the old mode of 
production which would destroy it irrespective of whether an alternative mode is 
developing within it or not. An example of the the latter, would he the collapse of the 
Roman Empire - if my analysis in chapter four2 is correct. An example of the former 
would be the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 3 
Reading Marx's theory of proletarian revolution one gets the impression, not of a 
class involved in new forms of economic organisation, 4 but of one which has defensive 
organisations which can assume power when capitalism undergoes a prolonged crisis 
I op cit. Preface and Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pg 
4. 
2 CH4 section 2.3.2 
3 The immense wealth realised by merchant capital and the concomitant growth of urban 
manufacturing created a drift from the land which tended to impoverish the landowning classes. 
Also, their income could not keep pace with new levels of consumption nor in some cases rising 
prices. This pressure attenuated feudal relations. The aristocracy increased the exploitation of the 
peasantry who revolted. Knights revolts occurred as vassals rebelled against the demands of their 
lords. Feudal dues exacted on the towns were repudiated and monarchs attempted to build in- 
dependent power bases for themselves from the new money; abandoning, and indeed undermining, 
their old class base, the aristocracy. 
4 Unless the forms of cooperation engaged in by the working class are themselves regarded as 
having economic potential, e. g. syndicalism. 
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produced by its own immanent tendencies. This crisis does not appear to be provoked 
either by new economic forms or by the independent action of the proletariat. The 
proletarians merely respond to it and the severity of their own oppression. The explana- 
tion thus seems mainly to invoke the second type of contradiction, i. e. one which does 
not involve the emergence of a new economic formation-5 This impression may not be 
entirely accurate but Marx does spell out in greater detail the contradictions deemed "nor- 
mal" to capitalism rather than the way its mature development brings forth proletarian 
social forms which challenge and inhibit the old system. This he does in his examination 
of the causes of capitalist economic crises. 
1. Theories of crisis 
Marx's detailed exan-fination of the machinery of capitalist crises may, in part, stem 
from the implications which they have for a solution to "the riddle of history". Capitalism 
is a system based upon the generalised rule of property (most obviously recognisable in 
the rule, or power, of the universal medium of exchange - money). The contradictions 
which come to the fore in capitalist crises, therefore, are the contradictions which beset 
property in general and solutions to these crises involve the overcoming of contradictions 
inherent in all forms of property, and therefore, in all previous modes of production based 
upon particular forms Of Property- 
Marx's analysis of crises is often subsumed under three headings, "crises of over- 
production", "crises of disproportion" and "crises caused by the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall". 
6 In fact, these are not separate causes. 7 For this reason I shall distinguish 
only between the short-term and long-term causes of crises. I shall deal with the former 
5 This situation is similar to the collapse of the Roman empire and does not augur well for the 
transcendence of capitalism by the working class. 
6 cf. E. Mandel's introduction to Capital Vol III, Penguin 1981 pp. 38-42. 
7 Crises of overproduction are also crises of disproportion and result in a short-term, or cycli- 
cal, fall in the rate of profit as we shall see below. Similarly, the long-term tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall will bring in its train the other phenomena. The proper distinction here, therefore, is 
probably between the short and long-term tendencies of capitalism. 
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under the heading of "crises Of Overproduction" and the latter under the heading of "crises 
caused by the tendency of the rate of profit to fall,,. 
1.1.1.1. Crises of overproduction 
Crises of overproduction are essentially caused by an imbalance in the distribution 
of value within the system between capitalists and workers. The profit motive leads the 
capitalists to increase labour productivity and to appropriate the increased surplus for 
themselves. This is then available for reinvestment. If this is successful, however, the 
means of consumption possessed by the workers will not keep pace with the increases in 
investment. Hence in the consumer goods industries, whose revenues come mostly from 
the spending of the workers, the rate of return on investment (the rate of profit) will fall. 
This will trigger a recession as the least efficient firms collapse. Because demand for cap- 
ital goods depends on investment by the consumer goods industries, the recession will be 
general-8 
Recovery will occur only when the amount of money available for investment is 
matched by sufficient consumer demand. This state of affairs under free market condi- 
tions will occur when some of the value of the amassed capital is destroyed. The capital 
tied tied up in buildings and machinery etc. (production capital) will lose value in a 
recession because there will be few buyers for it, whereas many will want to to sell and 
cease production. Much of the liquid capital will go into banks or the stock market. This 
money is potentially available for production should a upturn in the economy occur. 
Crises of confidence in the prospects of the large firms still trading, however, can cause 
panic on the stock markets, destroying the value of shares. Similarly, the banks can be 
brought down by bad debts. 9 By this mechanism of destroying some of the funds 
8 This can also be regarded, therefore, as a crisis of disproportion or the overproduction of capi- 
tal goods. 
9 in this situation, market pressures cause them to lend at any cost. They have a large number of 
depositors but few will borrow in a recession, in addition to which, those who do borrow are more 
likely to be firms with liquidity problems (potential defaulters) rather than those wishing to ex- 
pand. 
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available for investment and the cheapening of capital costs, the imbalance in the system 
between consumer demand and investment levels is forcibly corrected. 
The general principles involved 
Marx regards this as an example of conflict between the forces and relations of pro- 
duction-10 As such, it brings into question the adequacy of the relations of production, 
revealing the flaw within the capitalist system and signaling the potential of the system to 
fail permanently. 
Secondly, in so far as it is a crisis of disproportion, it is an example of how coopera- 
tion, represented by a coordinated division of labour between consumer and capital goods 
production, is in conflict with competition, which produces polarisation and a maldistri- 
bution of resources towards the capital goods sector, disrupting the system. II The latter 
opposition, between cooperation and competition, is the basic contradiction of all anta- 
gonistic modes of production. 
Thirdly, the principle of equality of exchange is in contradiction to the requirement 
to realise a surplus over and above cost, which is the motive force of the system. This 
problem is solved from the point of view of production by the circumstance that the 
labourer produces more than his or her cost of subsistence. The problem reappears, how- 
ever, from the point of view of consumption because, since the workers' labour power is 
of less value than the value it creates, when the surplus is increased, the workers cannot 
buy their own products via equal exchange in sufficient quantities to permit profit on the 
10 Capitalists perform the function of assembling the forces of production in ever increasing 
quantities only in so far as it allows them to extract a surplus from the productivity of labour. 
Where the accumulation of the productive forces actually prevents sufficient surplus being taken, 
the system will cease to function. The exploitative relation between capital and labour is then act- 
ing as a fetter upon the further development of the productive forces. 
This brings the value of exploitative relations into question. Such relations are an inherent 
part of all systems based upon competition for the accumulation of private property. 
II The interdependence between the sectors reasserts itself forcibly by the destruction of the 
value of the resources amassed by the capitalists, bringing the system back into balance. This is an 
example of a forced realignment discussed in chapter four section 2. 
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reinvested capital to be realised at the previous rate. Exploitation, once more, appears to 
be the problem. 12 
If, however, as indicated above, spending on capital ultimately responds to consu- 
mer spending, the reverse is also true. Capital spending, through increasing employment 
and wages, increases consumer spending. This raises the question of whether increased 
capital spending generates sufficient demand to avoid the problem of overproduction. 13 
1.1.1.2. Crises caused by the tendency of the rate of profit to fall 
The long-term tendency of the system to become chronically susceptible to crises is 
explained by my Marx's theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. He explains it 
in terms of the labour theory of value whereby the value of a good or service is measured 
by the average socially necessary labour time 14 required to produce it. 
Profit is explained as the product of surplus labour, i. e. labour perfortned over and 
above what is strictly necessary to produce the equivalent value of the labourer's means 
of subsistence. Thus the working day is partitioned between the time the labourer works 
to produce his or her own subsistence and the time when he or she is producing solely for 
the employer. In this latter period, the worker is considered to be producing "surplus 
value" which is the source of the capitalist's profit and is subsequently realised when the 
goods are exchanged in the market. 
The ratio of the time necessary for the worker to produce his or her subsistence to 
the surplus labour time is referred to as the "rate of surplus value" 15 and also, for obvious 
12 This is not the argument of Proudhon ridiculed by Marx in op. cit. Capital Vol. 1, pg 971 ff. 
The problem is not the absolute lack of demand in the system - Proudhon simply forgot that the 
capitalists also buy products - but the inadequacy of consumer demand relative to the funds avail- 
able for investment in that sector. The demand for capital goods is related to the demand for con- 
sumer goods and it is this relation which allows underconsumption to cause a crisis in the whole 
system. 
13 Clearly, even if the whole amount were spent as wages to the workers, the amount received 
back in spending on consumer goods could only equal at most the amount invested. This does not 
allow for profit. The new investment has to generate profit at the same rate as previous investment 
if the average rate of profit is not to fall. 
14 For a definition see op. cit. Capital, Vol 1, pg 303. 
15 op. cit. Capital Vol 3, pg 134. 
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reasons, the "rate of exploitation". It is denoted by the symbols "s/v" in Marx's work. "s" 
stands for the value of the surplus product (in man-hours); N" stands for the cost value Of 
"variable capital" which is how the worker is seen from the point of view of the capital- 
ist. Labour is termed "variable" in the sense that the value of its output may vary while its 
cost value remains fixed. This variation in output may be caused by the increase in the 
length of the working day or by shortening the time required to produce subsistence (by 
njeans of new technology). The raw materials and machinery used in production, in con- 
trast, are refeffed to as "constant capital" because their cost value is transferred unaltered 
to the value of the product - passed on in the price. Together, the value of constant capi- 
tal, variable capital and the surplus product "c+v+s" make up the total value of the pro- 
duct. 
The "rate of profit" is defined as the relationship of the surplus to the total invest- 
ment, i. e. , S/C+v',. 16 Marx's point about the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is as fol- 
lows. Historically and for technological reasons, the ratio of "c/v" increases. This is 
because capital of increasingly greater value is being used, on average, per worker. For 
tile surplus per worker to increase, however, either the proportion of the working day 
required to produce subsistence must decrease or the length of working day itself must 
increase. Clearly, there is a limit to each of these strategies. The working day cannot be 
longer than 24hrs (in reality the physical maximum is probably 18hrs) and the amount of 
time taken by the production of subsistence cannot decrease below zero. The surplus 
value produced per worker is therefore limited but the value of the capital employed per 
worker is constantly increasing and in principle unlimited. 
The ratio "sk+v" for each worker and therefore, for the total workforce, has a ten- 
dency to fall because the constant increase in "c" in the denominator cannot be compen- 
sated for either by constant increases of a similar proportion in "s" or by decreases on a 
similar scale in "v". 
17 
16 op. cit. capital, Vol 3, pg 133. 
17 c. f. op. cit. Capital, Vol 3, pg 319. 
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This situation is further complicated, however, by the consideration that the amount 
of constant Capital per worker used in the production of a particular type of good or ser- 
vice may vary from firm to firm. This means that for each good, assuming the workers 
productivity to be the same, the same amount of variable capital and the same surplus 
would be combined with different amounts of constant capital and hence, the total value 
(C+v+s) for the same good would vary between producers. If the total value is equivalent 
to price, therefore, the price would vary between producers also. This, of course, does not 
happen because competition establishes a single market price. This means that the prices 
at which goods are sold are not necessarily equivalent to their values for any particular 
firrn. 
However, for the system as a whole, Marx believes that the relative proportions 
between the aggregate values of constant and variable capital and surplus value is 
reflected in their money equivalents. This is true on the condition that the establishment 
of a market price for a good merely redistributes the total value between firms in a way 
which reflects the average value per item. The total or aggregate value would thus remain 
unchanged and be equivalent in money terms to the product of the average value (market 
price) and the number of items, i. e. aggregate price or total revenue. The total cost of 
constant capital would thereby reflect its total value and similarly with wages and the 
surplus. In the light of this, the assertion that the rate of profit has a tendency to fall 
remains valid since it involves total magnitudes. 
If the rate of profit falls to a level where the slightest problem with the economy 
causes losses to be made, this would deter investment and leave the economy in a per- 
manently depressed state. A situation of permanent recession or chronic crisis would 
create the conditions for revolution. Marx regards this situation as a further example of 
conflict between the forces and relations of production, in this case a potentially terminal 
one. 18 
18 For amplification of this point cf. the accompanying footnote to the same point in section 
1.1,1.1 "The general principles involved". 
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1.1.2. Is communism the solution to the riddle of history? 
The problems of overproduction and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, are 
caused by the fact that there is a plurality of owners of private property each competing 
to acquire the produce of the whole economy. This acquisitive behaviour, causes both the 
polarisation of wealth responsible for overproduction and also triggers the recessions 
attendant on the fall in the rate of profit. 
The solution would seem to be, for the first problem, the centralised. coordination of 
production, so that imbalances do not occur and for the second problem, the negation of 
the individualistic competition which destabilises the economy at low rates of profit 
and/or no longer provides an adequate motive for social production. In short the abolition 
of the market as the regulator of the economy. This would suggest that communism is the 
only logical solution to capitalism's crisis. The proletariat would be forced by the logic 
of the situation to adopt some form of communism. The question remains, however, as 
to whether this would solve "the riddle of history". 
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in the section entitled 
,, private Property and Communism", just prior to the paragraph containing the statement 
about the "riddle of history", Marx describes three stages of communism. Of the first 
stage, which simply involves the community taking over the means of production, he 
says; 
"The category of worker is not done away with but extended to all men. " 19 
and 
"The community is only a community of labour and equality of wages paid 
out by communal capital - by the community as the universal capitalist.,, 20 
and 
19 op. cit. E. P. M. pg 94. 
20 Ibid. pg 95. 
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"The first positive annulment of private property - crude communism - is thus 
merely a manifestation of the vileness of private property which wants to set 
itself up as the positive community system.,, 21 
Clearly this situation is not a solution to the riddle of history. It isn't even the abolition of 
private property. The reason why this is so is because the relations between individuals is 
still based on acquisitiveness. He says, 
"General envy constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which greed 
reestablishes itself and satisfies itself only in another way. -22 
As shown in chapter one, it is acquisitiveness and the pursuit of self-interest in the con- 
text of cooperative social relations which produces all the problems which constitute "the 
riddle of history". In this context, the mutual suspicion and hostility which governs social 
relations produces censorious laws which are imposed by an alien and repressive state. 
Marx says, 
"Crude communism is merely the culmination of this envy and of this 
levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum. "23 
Levelling-down is clearly a way of restricting access, i. e. of depriving people of the use 
of, the property of the community. Not only do private property, alienation and the state 
not disappear, but even class and artificial scarcity may make a limited comeback. Where 
society is an alien being, a god, there will be a priesthood, a set of administrators that 
represent the god and do its will. This crucial role confers social leverage and hence the 
possibility of the reemergence of social divisions. 
The point to be noted here, is that a solution to the contradictions of the capitalist 
economy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of a solution to the riddle of history, 
for Marx. Capitalism institutionalises acquisitiveness in its most generalised form of 
21 Ibid. pg 90. 
22 Ibid. pg 95. 
23 Ibid. pg 95. 
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cornpetitive individualism. Removal of the institutional structure does not, by itself, 
change the dynamics of the situation. 24 New forms of cooperation and different social 
relations are required. These he envisages as contained within the workers movement. 
His three stages, however, do not appear to contain a dialectical movement. All he 
says about the dynamic which takes the society towards fully developed communism is 
that it represents the attempt to overcome self-estrangement. Whilst self-estrangement is 
a contradiction it is not peculiar to the early stages of communism. The whole weight of 
the responsibility resolving this problem, therefore, lies with the political and social con- 
tent of the workers movement. This brings us to the second condition for revolution, 
narnelY, that the material conditions for the new social relations of production should 
already have matured within the womb of the old society. I shall now look at the extent to 
which this might be thought to have been achieved or be achievable. 
Tendencies which lead to socialist social relations 
There are four basic long-run tendencies within capitalism which combine to pro- 
duce institutional structures and a political constituency for socialist style solutions to the 
problems of capitalist society. These comprise the increasing centralisation of control 
over both the economy and economic enterprises, the growing need to intervene to stabil- 
ise the system, deepening contradictions which are seen to flow from both the market and 
competition and the growing sensitivity of the system to disruptive activity by the work- 
force, leading to the need to incorporate them and their demands. 
1.2.1. Centralisation 
As the capitalist mode of production develops over time there is a tendency towards 
greater concentration of both economic and political power. In business there is 
24 Democratic control of the means of production does not, Of itself, constitute a solution, nor is 
it to be identified with socialism. The community could be guided by a spirit of meanness and in a 
majoritarian system, minorities could be consistently outvoted (J. S. Mill's tyranny of the majori- 
ty). 
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competitive centralisation as larger firms take over smaller competitors which are partic- 
ularly vulnerable in times of economic crisis. The size of the largest enterprises con- 
stantly grows and, despite the continued existence of many small firms, it is the success 
or failure of the largest enterprises which determines the success or failure of national 
economies. 
The interests of the state are, therefore, increasingly tied to the interests of these 
large firms. Since they often have interests which cross national boundaries, Le they are 
multi-nationals, their interests also affect foreign policy. 
Despite the spreading of ownership via the joint-stock coMpany25 share capital 
itself becomes concentrated in fewer hands in the sense that the bulk of shares are owned 
by an increasingly smaller percentage of of share owners. Effective control is concen- 
trated within a small group of large shareholders (from which managing directors are 
usually drawn). Decisions which govern the performance of the whole economy, there- 
fore, are concentrated within this group. Given the connections with government and the 
way that the decisions that the largest capitalists make affect people's lives, there is an 
increasing tendency to believe that the administrative decisions they take, rather than 
market forces, are the appropriate means of solving the problems of social life. This is 
particularly convincing to the large number of administrators running the corporations 
and government. These people have a tendency to believe in a form of "managed capital- 
ism 
Competitive centralisation also occurs at the level of national economies. Competi- 
tion from South East Asia was the underlying cause of the European Single Market. The 
result of removing barriers to competition is that the largest firms get larger, swallowing 
up the markets of their smaller competitors. This has the the advantage of making them 
more competitive internationally and hence strengthening the economies of the Single 
25 A phenomenon which is by no means new. It was well-known to Marx from his own era. 
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Market countries. However, because a market needs some regulation, i. e. intervention, 26 
in crucial areas, decisions have to be taken centrally. This political centralisation, how- 
ever, involves some loss of sovereignty and provokes the same kind of conflicts 
described in the section entitled "Unity and Kingship" in chapter four. Individual, internal 
power has to be relinquished for the sake of enhanced, collective, external power. 
The international response to the European Single Market was the attempt by the 
U. S. A. and Canada to form a North American Single Market and the announcement by 
the Comecon of their intention to do the same. ASEAN was also considering the idea. 
The tendency amongst the advanced industrial societies, therefore, is towards larger 
economic and political units. 
At the global level, there has been the attempt by the major economies to pursue a 
coordinated financial strategy ever since the meeting at Bretton Woods at the end of 
World War 11. Governments now meet regularly and with increasing frequency to plan 
economic strategy. 27 
The increasing tendency to try to "manage" capitalism is in part the result of the fact 
that the growth in the size of economic and political units as well as the growth in the 
scale of capitalism itself deepens the contradictions of the system rendering more urgent 
the need for intervention to stabilise the system. 
1.2.2. Intervention 
It was realised in the nineteenth century that lack of coordination between manufac- 
turing and finance deepened recessions. Governments began to intervene to smooth out 
the cycle. 
26 In the realm of fiscal and monetary policy and also over policing, border regulation and other 
functions of the state. 
27 it would be wrong, however, to suppose that the increased planning to control capitalism 
makes the world a safer place (as Lenin argued against Kautsky in Imperialism the Highest Stage 
of Capitalism). When the world economy does go into crisis, the larger and more powerful the 
economic units, the more destructive the conflict between them. - Imperialism the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1975 pp 142-146. 
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After two major wars in the twentieth century which arguably had economic causes 
and the growing destructive capacity of the major industrialised countries in the post-war 
period, it became even more urgent that large scale economic collapse should be avoided 
at all costs. 
Keynesian economics appeared to offer a strategy, demand management, for con- 
trolling the cycle and replacing the anarchy of the market with centralised regulation. 
This raised expectations amongst the public that the government should be able to con- 
trol the performance of economy. Although by the early seventies this strategy had failed, 
governments still use demand management as a tool for regulating the economy and the 
public expectation is still that the economy should be managed. 
A second area of intervention is that of research and development. Leading edge 
technology is developed through projects which require expensive equipment. The larg- 
est of these are of necessity government sponsored. The U. S. A. develops much of its new 
technology through the space programme and military research. The Japanese govern- 
rnent sponsors research and development which its leading companies feed off. The 
E. E. C. has joint programmes which are aimed at keeping ahead in the technological race. 
Advantage in this area will go to the country which can make available the largest pool of 
centralised funds. 28 Where all firms are obliged to do their own research and develop- 
ment, duplication of research will take place and the scale of investment in key areas will 
be too small to maintain the leading edge position of the country. The trend in this 
respect, therefore, is towards state capitalism. 
it is ironic that at a time when state capitalism in Eastern Europe is supposed to 
have failed that the rest of the world in some ways is moving closer to it. The underlying 
cause of the failure of the Soviet and Eastern European economies is related to this ques- 
28 In any mode of production, the country which has the largest surplus to use for military or 
strategic economic purposes will have the greatest international leverage, as I suggested in chapter 
four in the section on centralisation. 
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tion of the centralisation of surplus funds for research and development. 
At the height of its performance the whole of the communist world together only 
accounted for 15% of world production. Its surplus was, therefore, at best only one fifth 
that of the capitalist world (assuming comparable efficiency). Most of the capitalist 
surplus product was reinvested in the U. S. A. and to a lesser extent in Europe and Japan. 
The West's capacity for research and development was, therefore, that much greater and 
a technology gap was bound to develop irrespective of the relative efficiency of the two 
29 systems. 
The lesson to be drawn from this is perhaps that socialism isn't possible in one 
country if it has larger capitalist neighbours with which it has to maintain technological 
parity. It is interesting to note that in the end both systems had a form of mixed economy 
with the state setting the parameters in which the market operates and funding its key 
research. 
A third form of intervention is where industry requires long-term capital investment 
but the market is volatile and unpredictable and/or the rate of profit is low. The paradigm 
case of this is agriculture. Agriculture in Britain was underdeveloped in the pre-war era. 
The uncertainty of harvests and hence market prices meant that long-term planning was 
not possible hence investment in new technology was not forthcoming. The government 
intervened to guarantee the farmers a constant income by subsidising any shortfall. This 
29 The Soviet Union prioritised military development in order to keep pace with the west in this 
sector and consequently, the domestic sector fell behind technologically and became relatively 
stagnant. 
Eastern Europe, on the other hand, in attempting to industrialise was forced to import its 
new technology from the West and hence was drawn into the world market system. The collapse 
of world market prices in the 1980's then forced the Eastern European countries to devote more of 
their production to export in order to pay debts, and hence, their domestic markets became drasti- 
cally undersupplied. The resulting shortages, spiraling black market prices and pollution as old 
technology was pushed to its limit irrespective of environmental considerations produced political 
instability. 
Meanwhile the Soviet Union which usually subsidised Eastern Europe was involved in a ra- 
pidly escalating arms race. Notice that this was a competition between two state funded sectors. 
The Soviets could not keep pace, particularly with respect to the S. D. I. programme and had to turn 
its attention to the problems of its domestic economy. 
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rnade possible the high technology farming we have today which now produces sur- 
pluses. Similar procedures were followed in the U. S. A. and the E. E. C. where the govern- 
ments, buy the excess crop to maintain prices. Although the result has been food moun- 
tains, surplus is preferable to deficit. 
Other heavily capitalised industries may also have problems of underinvestment. 
This was certainly the case with coal and steel in the pre-war period before the govern- 
ment nationalised, them. It remains to be seen whether some of the newly privatised 
industries will stagnate due to low rates of profit and market uncertainties. The tendency 
towards instability and downward pressure on profit mentioned earlier should produce 
increasing necessity for this kind of intervention. 
Transport is another area which typically has high overheads, low rates of profit and 
a highly variable market. It is also desirable that it should provide a reliable and 
comprehensive service to the rest of the economy. The market does this very poorly, 
lacking coordination and providing a patchy and changeable service. Nor will industry 
invest in general education. Its training programmes are likely to be narrowly vocational. 
The government, therefore, is increasingly required to provide infrastructural support of 
this kind. 
A fourth area of intervention is welfare services. Capitalism tends to produce a 
polarisation of wealth. Great wealth can coexist with extreme poverty. Driven to the 
extreme, this can create both political instability and be a threat to the efficiency of the 
system. In wartime, for instance, societies either become more egalitarian so that 
sacrifices are shared more equally or risk, like Russia in the First World War, a revolu- 
tion where the soldiers shot their officers and returned home to fight the Czar. War also 
exposes the lack of efficiency caused by poverty. Rowntree's studies showed that in Bri- 
tain at the same time a third of the soldiers were physically unfit to fight. 
Robert Owen, in his New Larnark Mills, had shown that one could make more 
money with a well cared for workforce than with a sick and undernourished one and the 
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threat of social unrest caused by poverty has been a perpetual since the industrial revolu- 
tion. Unrest is particularly damaging to employers in a boom when there are profits to be 
made. In post-World War Two Britain, soldiers returning to join the workforce were not 
prepared to put up with the deprivation suffered by their parents. At the same time the 
economy was heading for a boom. These factors among others30 conditioned the intro- 
duction of the welfare state. 
Countries which are newly formed by unifying smaller states are particularly 
vulnerable to the destabilising effects of wealth polarisation. The danger is that regional 
disparities will cause the state to disintegrate into its constituent parts. It is perhaps 
worthy of note that the first welfare state was introduced by Bismark (a man not noted for 
his liberalism) in the newly unified Germany. The Social Charter is intended to perform a 
similar function for the Single Market. 
31 
All these interventions simultaneously create a constituency of people who regard 
capitalism as flawed in some way since their job is to compensate for its shortcomings. 
These people have jobs which are paid from central funds and are not wedded nor indeed 
sympathetic to the drive for profit. Their criterion of success is service and they are quite 
happy to see centrally funded, administrative solutions to social problems. Those who are 
involved in welfare services also see the effect of poverty which disposes them critically 
towards the system. 32 
30 The beginning of the welfare state can be dated from Lloyd-George's "People's Budget" of 
1909. it was designed to fend off growing support for the Labour Party. To that extent, the fran- 
chise, which was granted to working-class males at the end of the 19th century in order to incor- 
porate this class (which was of central importance to an imperial economy and increasingly organ- 
ised), was also a crucial factor. It was mobilised again in 1945 to return a Labour government. 
"The People's Budget" was also used to break the control of the Tory dominated House of Lords 
over legislation, c. f. Post-Victorian Britain: 1902-1951, L. C. B. Seaman, London, Methuen 1966, 
pp 26-35. 
31 The extent of the regional polarisation in the E. E. C. is potentially greater than in the United 
Kingdom because it is larger and richer. 
32 Teachers are also to be included within this group in so far as they regard their role as help- 
ing individuals to develop their full potential rather than merely supplying the needs of industry. 
This is also the central concern of Marx's work and in so far as the system fails to permit this 
teachers will also be critical. 
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Capitalism thus of necessity promotes alternative forms of economic activities 
within itself, just as Feudalism promoted the development of capitalism. Those con- 
cemed with these activities have different, and in the case of these involved in welfare, 
importantly, humanistic priorities. The activist within the "New Left" movements are 
primarily drawn from these "new professionals". 33 They have been described as a "New 
Middle Class" but all they have in common with the old middle class is that they are 
well-educated and they work in the non-manual sector. They are wage-workers and, 
therefore, not liable to defend capitalism if it begins to fail as a capitalist would. They 
more often than not tend to identify with the interests of those they serve and their views 
are influential amongst the working class in general. 
The amount of intervention depends upon the problems engendered by capitalism's 
contradictions. As these problems grow, so the non-capitalist sector with its own priori- 
ties also grows. 
1.2.3. Capitalist contradictions 
As capitalism, has continued to expand a set of serious contradictions has been exa- 
cerbated by the scale and speed of this development. Conflicts have become more 
dangerous and less acceptable to the public. The demand for raw materials is outstripping 
their discovery. Pollution is threatening to destroy the basis of the system of production 
itself (as well as ruining the quality of life) and the international polarisation of wealth is 
threatening the third world with starvation conditions and creating political problems for 
the future. All these problems are global, that is to say systemic, and as such call for solu- 
tions at the global level. The market cannot by itself provide these solutions, hence 
another level of intervention involving international cooperation will be necessary. 
In each of these cases their are contradictions which fall into two categories. These 
33 These include not only environmentalists, nuclear disarmers and animal rights activists but 
also the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades and Action Direct. 
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are: processes produced by the system which undermine its viability and the growing 
disparity between the possibilities of life engendered by the means of production and the 
realisation of this potential under the existing relations of production. Paradoxically, this 
disparity is most obvious when capitalism is most successful, i. e. in a boom, because then 
it can be seen which problems it cannot solve in principle. 
1.2.3.1. Conflict 
As capitalism grows, so the destructive power of capitalist states increases, i. e. their 
rrlilitary capability increases. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the consequence of a 
global conflict could be the destruction of the system itself. However, because of the rela- 
tionships of economic and political rivalry which characterise capitalism and the periodic 
economic crises which heighten tensions within the system, such a conflict becomes 
increasingly likely. 
The ending of the Cold War has not diminished this possibility in principle, in fact 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons is making a nuclear exchange at some stage more 
probable. Nor does historical evidence justify faith in deterrence. The combination of two 
factors tend to undermine deterrence: severe internal economic and political crises coin- 
ciding with the existence of new technologies and strategies which might persuade a 
desperate government to gamble on taking minimal losses in a war. 
In the First World War, Germany sought to avoid the consequences of disturbing 
"The Balance of Power" with the "Schlieffen Plan" in the Second World War, Schlieffen 
Mk. 11 was augmented with "Blitzkrieg". Already in the U. S. A., there are those who talk 
34 
about "winnable nuclear wars". 
Conflict is also increasingly unacceptable to an affluent society. When material 
problems of the world are solved in principle, it isn't obvious why it is necessary to go on 
34 Edward Teller and those at the Livermore institute who developed S. D. I. for just such a pur- 
pose. 
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fighting. This contradiction was felt most acutely by the generation of Americans who, 
instead of enjoying the affluence of the sixties boom, were forced to fight and die in the 
jungles of South East Asia. 35 
The view offered by pro-capitalist commentators is that conflict is inevitable. How- 
ever, the acceptance of the inevitability of conflict within capitalism stems from the view 
that if one is engaged in competition to take the most one can from the world economy 
one has to be in a position to defend it from others who may try to take it back. These are 
precisely the kinds of attitudes and practices, however, which come to be regarded as an 
unacceptable intrusion on the peaceful enjoyment of the wealth thus produced. 
Capitalism also engenders conflict at the individual level. It promotes hostile and 
negative human behaviour, narrowing human relationships to those of competition and 
exploitation. In so far as it does this, it belies its potential for enhancing the quality of 
life. 36 
Because of this, the Hippies of the late sixties preferred to forgo the material 
benefits of the system in order to rediscover positive human relationships characterised 
by friendship and love. They also regarded working for material benefits in the future as a 
form of confidence trick to keep people on the treadmill. 
The New Left also regarded the benefits offered by capitalism as without intrinsic 
worth. They regarded them as forms of "alienated consumption". Passive forms of leisure 
are sold en mass by advertising to a population that is in no position to discover their 
own likes and dislikes because they are not in control of their own lives. This kind of 
consumption was regarded by the New left as a de-humanising opiate. 37 
35 The answer to the question for many was U. S. Imperialism. The Red Army Faction, for in- 
stance, originated in the German anti-Vietnam War movement. 
36 Indeed, as individualistic competition increases, so does crime, suicide, forms of addiction 
etc - 
37 c. f One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse, Abacus 1964. 
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Much of capitalism's production is geared to selling the illusion of success and 
glamour as a compensation to the majority of people to which it denies the reality. Since 
pretence is unsatisfying, this is an insatiable market of people whose desires can be con- 
trolled by advertising and whose attitude towards their own personal identity is easily 
molded since their actual life-experience is, by contrast, banal and shabby. Furthermore, 
in pursuit of the illusion of personal worth, precisely because they know that it is an illu- 
sion, they become evermore dissatisfied and aggressive towards the world in general. 
Thus a contradiction between material affluence and personal satisfaction is intensified 
the richer the society becomes. 
1.2.3.2. Environmental problems 
As capitalism expands, the increasing levels of production also cause increasing lev- 
els of pollution. This is both hazardous to life, and in the case of climatic change poses a 
serious problem for the survival of the system itself. One aspect of this threat is that 
poisonous substances can enter the food chain, making the population sick. This is a seri- 
ous social problem, discrediting the system as well as undermining its efficiency. 
Even more serious, however, is the threat of global warming. The increased produc- 
tion of carbon dioxide by the burning of fossil fuels and the depletion of the forests 
creates the so called "greenhouse effect" where radiant heat can enter the atmosphere but 
cannot leave. This would melt the ice caps and cause the sea to rise. Populated areas of 
the world would flood causing a refugee problem on a massive scale. This in turn would 
seriously disrupt the economic system. Not only would some raw materials be lost in the 
areas affected, but there would also be political and economic instability in others close 
by. 38 
38 The effect of industrial production can also alter the weather system in other ways, creating 
hot spots over cities, for instance. Any alteration of the weather is likely to affect agricultural pro- 
duction which also would have economic and political consequences. 
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These perceived threats to the environment tend to discredit the market system 
because the methods of disposal that cause pollution are usually the most cost-effective 
ones from the individual capitalist's point of view. It seems, therefore, that there is a 
positive incentive to pollute built into the system, since cutting costs is always a high 
priority, if not a necessity, for capitalists. Furthermore, competition ensures that one pro- 
ducer cannot afford to use cleaner but more expensive technology if his/her competitors 
do not. 
If this situation is to be avoided, therefore, some form of collective agreement 
which disadvantages no-one would seem to be the way forward. At the very least, this 
would entail a moratorium on certain kinds of activity which damage the environment. 
Such a moratorium, however, although it applies equally to all, might, nevertheless, still 
be perceived as unfair. The reason for this, of course, is that the circumstances of all 
countries are not the same. Some will bear the brunt of a moratorium because the banned 
activity is crucial to their economy whilst to others it is peripheral. 39 Countries which are 
already disadvantaged are not likely to agree to this further disadvantage-40 The only 
kind of solution that is likely to be perceived as fair is one which takes into account 
differences in need and differences in ability to pay. An agreement which which can 
hold, therefore, would have to be redistributive. A comprehensive solution along these 
lines would perhaps entail a central fund into which countries paid in proportion to their 
G. N. P. and withdrew according to environmental need as specified by environmental 
experts -a kind of "ecological health service". 
Unless there is such an alteration in global social relations, however, capitalism will 
experience a serious, if not terminal crisis driven by its own dynamics. 
39 This is the same problem as that discussed in chapter seven regarding the bourgeois and so- 
cialist concepts of equality. "A rule applied equally to those who are not equal will not be equal in 
its effects". 
40 China and India will principally be penalised by a ban on C. F. C's while Brazil will be a loser 
by a moratorium on the depletion of rainforests Oust as Norway is presently by the whaling ban). 
it is doubtful that in the long run these countries can beforced to disadvantage themselves in this 
way. 
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1.2.3.3. Depletion of resources 
Again, as capitalism expands, its demand for raw materials and other resources 
increases at accelerating rate. This rate of consumption is presently so rapid that many 
resources will be exhausted within the next twenty to fifty years. This is occurring, not 
because most of our resources have already been consumed, but because the rapid 
increase in demand will consume what is left of them in a very short time. The problem, 
therefore, is the rate of increase in demand. 
Nor is the problem merely that the known resources are finite, (this, at least in prin- 
ciple, might be solved by finding new reserves or switching to different technology). The 
more serious problem is that the speed of acceleration of demand will eventually outstrip 
our capacity to adapt even if we use these strategies, given that both are difficult and time 
consuming. Capitalism, without intervention, cannot control its rate of increase in 
demand for resources and also it must, by its very nature, continually expand. 41 
All the problems stated so far have features in common. They stem from the fact 
that capitalism is reaching the "Malthusian" stage of its development analysed in chapter 
five. The mode of production has reached a scale where it is encountering the environ- 
Inental limits to its further development along the same lines. This throws into question 
the social relations which constitute the dynamics of the system and which are driving it 
through these limits. The problems posed are twofold: capitalism's inability to coordinate 
the rate of expansion with the capacity to manage the environmental factors on which the 
system depends, and the fact that it adjusts to contradictions only in the wake of crisis, 
though crises such as nuclear war or global warming will not provide a second opportun- 
ity. 42 
Should China and India manage to industrialise, the problem will become very 
41 Recycling of resources merely alleviates this problem somewhat. It doesn't check the 
demand for increasing quantities. 
42 Destructive weaponry is equally a problem of scale and limits. 
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much worse, as the former contains one quarter of the world's population and the latter 
only a little less. Furthermore, industrialisation is usually accompanied by an initial 
increase in population which would create even greater pressure on resources. According 
to the United Nations Population Fund, the population of the world will almost double by 
2050 to ten billion people. 43 This brings us to the fourth problem - the North-South 
divide. 
1.2.3.4. The North-South Divide 
As stated before, any competitive system will produce a polarisation of wealth. 
This is not denied by capitalism's advocates. They claim, however, that as the system as 
a whole becomes richer, so its poorest members also benefit. The empirical evidence of 
recent years, however, would not substantiate this at the global level. 44 Substantial 
numbers of people today face starvation and death and the poorest countries have become 
poorer. 
One problem is that mainly agrarian societies, which in the past suffered only from 
fluctuations in the weather, now also suffer from fluctuations in the world market to 
which they are linked by their association with capitalism. 
Furthermore, the decisions which they are encouraged or coerced into taking by the 
major capitalist countries are often not in their own best interests but rather in the 
interests of the aforementioned capitalists. 
In the case many of the poorest countries, this can be enough to destroy the fragile 
basis of the economy. The worst problems occur where recession forces the over-use of 
resources, destroying the capital base of the country, (for instance, where the over-use of 
43 Quoted on Ceefax 13-5.91 
44 Nor at the individual level in the major capitalist countries where the accentuation of market 
forces in recent years has led to the formation Of an impoverished underclass. 
one wonders if, without intervention, collective bargaining or the fact that western workers 
hold a key position at the centre of a global imperialist system, the absolute immiseration of the 
western working class would not have Occurred as some of Marx, s writing seems to suggest. 
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land causes deserts to grow as in the case of some African countries). 
In the post-war boom, countries that were part of the capitalist empires were a 
highly productive source of cheap raw materials. The relative national prosperity which 
this brought encouraged indigenous middle classes to agitate for independence. 45 Faced 
with costly and difficult insurgencies in more than one country, the imperialist countries 
cut their losses and adopted a policy of incorporation. Where possible the insurgencies 
were temporarily defeated so that delegation of power could take place on terms which 
were satisfactory to the imperialist countries. The newly independent countries were then 
adrnitted as full members to international institutions such as the United Nations, the 
World Bank and the I. M. F. The real power in these institutions, however, lies with the 
niain donor countries, i. e. the major capitalist countries, and economic control over the 
newly independent countries was, if anything, intensified despite their formal freedom. 
The imperialist countries were prepared to lend money for development only in so 
far as that development provided a market for the their manufactured goods or was done 
by their multi-national corporations. When the recession came, the major capitalist coun- 
tries were even more anxious to lend money in order to extend their markets at a time 
when markets were contracting. They were also anxious to lend because the banks were 
the recipients of large amounts of liquid capital due to the manufacturing downturn. 46 
Western governments hoped the prosperity of the financial sector would cushion the 
effects of the recession in manufacturing. 
To this end, the conventional wisdom propagated by western economists was for 
developing countries to abandon import substitution, since this would diminish foreign 
45 The process whereby prosperity causes classes below the ruling elite to assert political rights 
was discussed in chapter four, section 3.4 headed "Decentralisation" and also in chapter five, sec- 
tion 1.5 headed "'Progressive' classes and the new ruling class", concerning the emergence of na- 
tion states from feudal control. 
46 The oil crises intensified this effect by increasing the energy costs to industry while the oil 
, venues were 
deposited in western banks. Money is the banks' capital. If they have it, re they need 
to make it work for them. In times of inflation, this is even more urgent for the banks, since money 
which is held devalues over time. 
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Inarkets, and develop their export industries in Order to pay for the imports instead. To do 
this, of course, they would have to borrow. From the point of the developing countries, 
however, the downswing of the cycle is precisely the wrong time to borrow and the 
greater their dependence upon the world market in a recession, the worse the internal 
effects will be. By the time their exports were increased, the world market was unable to 
absorb them. Prices fell and the developing countries were left with crippling debts. 
The effects of this has been to create situations where more and more production is 
devoted to exporting to repay debt and less and less to the home market. Also, western 
technology requires continuous imports to keep it running (spare parts and raw materials 
- fuel, fertiliser etc. ) which also absorbs money. 
47 The first casualties are the population 
whose needs go unsatisfied, in particular the poorest section, usually in the countryside. 
In economies under more severe pressure, the western technology will breakdown and 
b, ecome useless and the advantage of industrialisation will be lost. In the most severe 
conditions resources themselves will be destroyed and environmental damage done by 
the attempt to keep pace. 48 Populations which may have grown due to urbanisation and 
relative prosperity in the boom are then left stranded in starvation conditions in the crisis. 
This situation undermines the credibility of the capitalist system in the eyes of 
western public opinion as a system capable of bringing prosperity to the world. For some, 
the existence of suffering on this scale is unacceptable and undermines the legitimacy of 
a system which is based upon the individual pursuit of wealth. Liberal (in the non-free 
market sense) and Christian opinion would favour some measure of intervention and 
redistribution. Added to this, Third World countries themselves are demanding economic 
reform, e. g. the proposals for a "New International Economic Order". 49 
47 Some countries where people are starving nevertheless have to export food to pay for the 
means of production of that food. 
48 This is a vicious spiral. Smaller the Productive base the more pressure is put upon it which 
diminishes its productivity even further. 
49 Should the world economy enter a boom phase this may well succeed since countries which 
have preserved their capital will be stronger and may form cartels. Combined with liberal opinion 
this may force a change. 
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The fact that a substantial body of opinion is prepared to prioritise welfare above the 
market augurs well for a transition to a more humane system should capitalism fail to 
deliver. This may not be sufficient to force a transition, however, without the support of 
organised labour. 
1.2.4. The growth of organised labour 
The fortunes of the labour movement and in particular the trade unions, rises and 
falls with the trade cycle. When labour is in demand, wage bargaining is effective, 
rnembership grows and laws regulating the unions are liberalised through political 
influence and pressure. In a recession, the reverse occurs. The need for draconian meas- 
ures leads to attacks on the unions (since they pose an obstacle by defending workers 
interests) unemployment weakens their bargaining position, membership falls and laws 
are passed removing their privileges and controlling their behaviour as public opinion is 
inobilised against them. 
50 
Over and above these cyclical patterns, however, one can discern a long run ten- 
dency towards increasing strength of the labour movement. This occurs for structural rea- 
sons. Over time, capitalism becomes more and more integrated, its parts increasingly 
interdependent. This means that action by smaller groups of workers can have an increas- 
ingly greater dislocating effect. Added to this, the centralisation of capital is accom- 
panied by a corresponding growth in the size of unions as they also amalgamate and 
rationalise in order to cope. The emergence of large unions in key industries has been, 
and still is, regarded as a major threat by capitalist governments and their supporters. 
N40re recently, the need for flexibility in a rapidly changing market has led to an attempt 
to fine tune production by a method known as "Just-In-Time" management. It operates in 
such away that there is no need to carry stocks of unused materials, whatever is needed 
50 The same issues have cropped up over and over since the turn of the century: the Labour Par- 
ty levy, immunity from damages from the effects of a strike, the legality of strikes in sensitive in- dustries etc. The law on these issues oscillates backwards and forwards according to the political 
climate, itself determined by the state of the economy. 
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arrives just in time for use. Needless to say, anything which disrupts this timing will 
immediately immobilise a whole chain of interdependent producers. This leaves 
employers dependent upon good labour relations since they cannot easily plan for a pro- 
tracted struggle. 
All this points to the increasing need to incorporate organised labour within the 
decision-making processes of the firm and the national economy. All the major industri- 
alised countries, with perhaps the notable exception of the U. S. A., have attempted to 
incorporate organised labour to some extent. 51 The influence and power of the trade 
unions, however, brings with it the concerns for welfare and security of their member- 
ship, i. e. left-liberal politics. Incorporating the labour movement in this way also reduces 
the capitalists' room for manoeuvre in a crisis and provides a focus for confrontation. 
The above analysis, however, principally refers to workers in the first world coun- 
tries who are in the strongest position, being located at the centre of an imperialist sys- 
tern. 52 The "Achilles-heel" of the labour movement internationally, is that the workers in 
the industrialised countries may not support the interests of the workers in the third 
world. 53 
2. Outstanding problems 
From the discussion above one can see that capitalism is facing crises of essentially 
two kinds. Firstly, from its own internal dynamics and secondly, from its relation to 
environmental factors and problems of scale. Nevertheless, at this point in time, it is not 
51 In a boom this is the only way to restrain wages. Only in a recession can the trade unions be 
ignored. Already, in the mini-boom of the late nineteen eighties, the bargaining power of skilled 
workers had returned and employers were not able to restrain wages in that sector. 
52 The stability of the birth-rate also helps strengthen wage bargaining. In the post-war boom 
the employers were forced to supplement indigenous male labour with immigrant and female la- 
bour. 
53 This depends, at the moment, on whether they will extend their own ideas of justice to all 
workers or whether they espouse the capitalist ideology of self-interest. Ultimately, solidarity 
should be based upon the perception that cooperation will allow them to find solutions to prob- 
lems, e. g. conflict, which are in the interests of all of them. While capitalism can shield western 
workers from its more unpleasant effects, however, it can undermine this rationale. 
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generally accepted that socialism provides a complete answer to these problems. This is 
because there are a number of outstanding issues for which socialism does not appear to 
provide a solution. Principally this involves the questions of labour motivation and 
jabour discipline. Also, in the minds of many, there is an association of socialism with 
the centralisation of power and hence alienation, Le to a problem, itself associated with 
"the riddle of history". 
Centralisation and decentralisation 
As we have seen in chapter four, all modes of production based upon competitive 
social relations begin with a decentralised power structure and end up with an effectively 
centralised one. However, since socialism would do away with the competitive relations 
which lead to centralisation, the question arises as to whether it would itself be central- 
ised or decentralised. 
We have also seen in chapter seven that bureaucratic control is, in the main, a func- 
tion of the internal conflict within a social system. Central control is, in essence, a con- 
servative response to the question of social order produced by lack of trust of those at the 
periphery. Whether a society is centralised, therefore, depends upon the quality of social 
relations within it. Ideally, socialism is based upon comradeship. 
Comradeship implies people working together for a common set of goals, in this 
case to create and sustain a society where everyone can realise their full human potential 
in conditions of personal security based on mutual support. It also implies mutual trust. 
Trust is born out of mutual tolerance and sensitivity to each other's individual needs as 
well as the guarantee of support. Relationships of this kind imply a sense of responsibil- 
ity both to others and to the society itself. This would allow a high level of autonomy and 
decentralised decision-making (rather like the game of football in chapter seven). In prin- 
ciple, therefore, there is no reason why a socialist system should not be decentralised 
with a high level of individual autonomy, over and above the practical requirement of 
coordinating collective activity. 54 
54 in a socialist society coordination requires open access to infonnation and a sophisticated 
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2.2. Labour motivation and the problem of alienation 
Given that it is quite difficult to characterise the western socialist parties as "totali- 
tarian", capitalism's single claim to superiority in the West has been on the grounds of 
it 9s supposed efficiency. This is because firstly, competition in a market ensures that what 
people want55 is supplied at the lowest cost, i. e. with the most economical use of 
resources. Secondly, competition between individuals for wealth ensures that either the 
desire for personal gain or the fear of poverty forces people to use the maximum effort 
for the purposes of production, i. e. it ensures labour discipline. Since socialism abolishes 
this kind of competition, it is argued that it is, therefore, inefficient. 
Looked at from a different point of view, the question of labour motivation is the 
last and most crucial of questions for a complete solution to "the riddle of history". This 
is because if "society" or "the market" employs sanctions to force people to work then 
alienation has not been abolished. The question of efficiency, therefore, goes right to the 
heart of the problem. 
2.2.1. Work 
Work in the broadest sense is any effort used to change the world in some way 
(including oneself). Although any form of human activity is work in this sense, this is not 
a trivial point. Imprisonment, for instance, uses inactivity as a form of punishment, which 
demonstrates that work is actually a human need. It is only work which does not serve 
the interests of the worker, work which is forced upon the worker which is a chore. It is 
not labour but alienated labour which is a source of human oppression. 
There are positive reasons why people engage in work independently of being 
driven by the demands of the market system. People will expend effort where they enjoy 
network of communications. 
55 in practice capitalism generates needs which are merely compensations for problems it itself 
creates. It sells the solace of illusions of success and power to those it deprives of these things and 
all kinds of diversions to distract people from the unsatisfactory nature of their existence. 
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the activity itself, e. g. sports or hobbies. They may also take pride in the finished object 
as a demonstration of their ability or creativity, (self-realisation in Marx's terminol- 
Ogy). 56 More instrumentally perhaps, they will produce objects which they can consume 
themselves, for instance, D. I. Y. work around the home. 
However, these are all individual activities. Society is organised around collective 
activity. Nevertheless, people will also voluntarily engage in collective activities where 
the enterprise appears rational and in their own interest. There are many individual exam- 
ples of this, e. g. wells dug in third world villages, schools built or the communal effort 
exerted in Britain during the Second World War. 
For this to succeed, however, there needs to be common goals which are generally 
approved of and which give meaning to the activity. There must also be communication 
of information by which people can assess the effect of their activities and what still 
needs to be done, thus involving them on a day to day basis. Also, in a system which is 
not dominated by an elite, there must be dialogue between the groups and individuals 
who are cooperating and who give each other mutual support and encouragement. This 
form of meaningful dialogue draws the individual into the life of the community and 
overcomes political alienation (with a small Ilp"). 
The examples given above, however, describe individual events and exceptional cir- 
cumstances. Much day-to-day labour is routine in character. Minute division of labour is 
also thought to contribute to work appearing to be meaningless. 57 Meaninglessness, how- 
ever, really stems from two situations: where the link between effort and its result is 
unclear and where the purpose of of the activity is either unclear or disapproved of. Even 
routine activity can be done with cheerfulness if it is regarded as valuable and important. 
Exploitative conditions for labour are largely responsible for the meaninglessness of 
56 This form of satisfaction is blighted for the worker where the labour is coerced or performed 
under exploitative conditions. 
57 See Robert Blauner Alienation and Freedom University of Chicago Press 1964 pg 22. 
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labour under capitalism, since they make the labourer cynical about the purpose of the 
activity and resentful of the way that it is imposed (they are excluded from all decision 
rnaking). 58 
So far the motivations described are those of rational self-interest. One should not 
underestimate human capacity for altruistic motivation, however. On an individual basis 
people often perform tasks for the sake of children, family or friends simply for the 
pleasure of giving them pleasure. A substantial number of people in capitalist society 
prefer to work in "caring" professions for very similar reasons and people will often work 
unstintingly for a personally held ideal. A socialist society would make use of such 
rnotivations which are more likely to flourish where the system is perceived to be fair in 
terms of distribution and is orientated towards mutual support. 
Indeed, it is the fact that capitalism functions on the basis of narrow, quasi- 
Hobbesian assumptions about human motivation, i. e. people are only motivated by avar- 
ice and fear, which is responsible for the stultifying atmosphere of capitalist society. A 
humane society needs a broader view of mankind to make use of the more generous and 
indeed rational human aspirations which exist. Socialism provides this opportunity. 59 
2.3. The Price Mechanism 
In relation to the points made above, it is often said that socialism cannot estimate 
the size and nature of demand because it would lack a "price-mechanism". In response to 
this, firstly, it should be noted that the price mechanism performs a quite different func- 
tion to the one described above. The rapidity with which retailers need to re-order is all 
that is required to estimate the changes in demand. The fact that prices rise when shor- 
58 A similar situation obtains under bureaucratic forms of communism. 
59 A more liberal perspective is being pioneered within capitalist society. Tom Peters, for in- 
stance, argues that unless large firms mobilise the interest and ingenuity of the workforce, under 
modern conditions, their markets will be cannibalised by small groups of highly motivated people 
who will target niche markets better than they can. This is still very much a minority opinion, 
however. See Tom Peters, Thriving on Chaos, Alfred A. Knopf 1987 Ch. IV. 
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tages occur functions to raise the profits of suppliers and hence provide an incentive to 
increase supply, i. e. it coordinates supply to demand. 60 
in a socialist society, this function would have to be performed by an information 
network and a positive response to need by producers motivated in the manner described 
above, rather than by individual pursuit of profit. This, if anything, is the crucial differ- 
ence between the two systems. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to work out in detail an institutional framework 
which could perform these functions, 61 rather it is to analyse the logic of Marx's position 
and to reconstruct his problematic. 
3. Conclusion 
Communism, therefore, is a system where private property is abolished in the 
specific sense that in it, no-one is deprived of the use of property in such a manner that 
this deprivation can be used as a means of exercising power over them. 62 Labour is 
organised on a voluntary basis and care is taken that an individual can pursue the 
development of their own capacities and contribute in their own way. The society 
underwrites the aspirations of the individual by providing the necessary support in a 
much wider ranging fashion than at present. Organisation is fraternal in character and dis- 
tribution is on the basis of "from each according to ability to each according to need". 
This follows from the way production is organised and also the abolition of private pro- 
perty. 
60 As well as rationing consumption of scarce resources to the "better-off'. 
61 Nor, unfortunately, do I have the space here to attempt this, worthwhile and necessary 
though it may be. 
62 This objective can be accomplished by various means. Demand can be saturated for any par- 
ticular product such that it could be obtained free to all at the point of distribution. In this way no- 
one can be deprived of the item who wants one. Health care in Britain operates on this basis and 
some Israeli kibbutzim operate this principle for most goods. 
Another method, where appropriate, is the provision of communal goods such as transport, 
roads, parks, museums etc. 
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This prescription is not simply a utopian construct, produced in the belief that peo- 
ple should be nice to each other. Each of the points addresses a central problem besetting 
all modes of production from the era of primitive communism onwards (a more detailed 
discussion of which is found in chapter seven section 2.3). The crux of the issue is that 
competition and conflict in the context of social cooperation produces social institutions 
that are as destructive and oppressive as nature itself before man came to control it. This 
problem is analysed by Marx in a dynamic historical context as it evolves through suc- 
cessive modes of production. Capitalism, in which this dynamic finds its most universal 
form, provides the chance to understand this movement and control it. Communism as 
outlined roughly above points the way to a solution and hence to the solution of "the rid- 
dle of history". 
In so far as we do not appreciate the nature of our own institutions, however, they 
appear as alien forces imposing not only their own demands but also their own time scale 
for the solution to these problems. The world at present is on the verge of a number of 
crises in which this understanding will be crucial. In the light of this, the salience of 
Marx's analysis cannot be stressed too strongly. 
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Conclusion 
The Riddle of History Solved? 
I began by asking the question of why Marx thought it was possible to make the 
claim that " Communism is the riddle of history solved and knows itself to be this solu- 
tion". 
The term "communism" in this statement is ambiguous; it could refer to a set of 
ideas, a mode of production or a social movement. Only the latter could be thought to 
,, know itself to be this solution" whereas only one of the former could be a solution to the 
"riddle of history" - one in theory the other in practice. 
What I have tried to show in the thesis is that certain practices of the working class 
implicitly embody the principles which Marx associates with communism and that these 
practices reconcile the oppositions associated with "the riddle of history" in the manner 
of an Hegelian synthesis. As such they do, in principle, constitute a solution to the prob- 
lem. 
To be a genuine solution, a solution in practice, however, they need to be embodied 
in the consciousness of a social movement which at some point will be in a position to 
make them the basis of a new mode of production. 
Marx's theory of history suggests that not only does capitalism, because of its 
fluidity, reveal the essential nature Of oppression in all modes of production hitherto and 
also place its subject class, the proletariat, in a position where it must deal with these 
problems to reclaim its own humanity, but because of its own contradictions, it also 
strengthens that class vis a vis the capitalist class itself. This view is the source of Marx's 
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optimism. 
Capitalist economic crises, however, pose the problem for the proletariat in a dif- 
ferent way. The same fundamental contradictions lie at the root of both the cyclical and 
the long-term crises of capitalism. In order to avoid in the long-term the catastrophic col- 
lapse of this mode of production, these fundamental problems must be overcome. 
The proletariat, because it has already developed means of dealing with these prob- 
lems, is favourably placed to do this. There is a difference, however, between conscious- 
ness of how to create a better way of life and consciousness of what Hegel would have 
called "the world historical significance" of this behaviour. This conceptual gap is what 
marx's theory is intended to bridge. 
Marx did not provide a blueprint for communism. In the light of this, it may seem 
somewhat premature, therefore, to announce that "Communism is the riddle of history 
solved", having no idea what communism would be like. What Marx's theory does pro- 
vide, however, is a detailed analysis of capitalism in the context of a theory of history 
from which can be extrapolated the broad outlines of a solution to historical problems. 
This is of crucial importance in two respects, first, and most obviously it shows how 
it is possible to transcend the social relations of capitalism. Secondly, it places this solu- 
tion in the context of a historical problem, so that its significance can be seen. Without 
this perspective it would be possible for the proletariat to recreate the same problems as 
in other modes of production, as I suggested in chapter eight. This is why it is important 
that communism should be self-conscious, i. e. should "know itself to be this solution". 
This is a minimal but necessary requirement for not committing the same mistakes as 
before. 
Communism aims to fulfill the expectations which capitalism raised but failed to 
deliver for liberty, equality and fraternity. Hegel saw the desire for liberty as the driving 
force of history, in this Marx concurs. It is fratemity, however, which is the crucial dis- 
tinguishing feature of socialism. Fraternity is important because it represents the negation 
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of the antagonistic social relations which are the source of the problems discussed above. 
Thus it is the forms of cooperation which perrnit fraternal relations to exist between peo- 
pie which are the key to the solution Of "the riddle of history". 
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